

SPARTA AND LAKONIA

A REGIONAL HISTORY 1300 TO 362 BC



PAUL CARTLEDGE

SECOND EDITION

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Paul Cartledge



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To Judith Portrait (again)

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Preface

The basis of this book was laid in an unpublished doctoral thesis 'Early Sparta c. 950–650 BC: an Archaeological and Historical Study' (Oxford 1975). To my former supervisor, Professor J. Boardman, and my examiners, Professors C.M. Robertson and W.G. Forrest, I am principally indebted for its conception and fruition. It could not, however, have been completed without the unstinting assistance of many archaeologists, historians and geographers, the staffs of museums and libraries in Greece, Ireland and England, and grants from research funds in the Universities of Dublin and Oxford. The following scholars and friends are owed especial thanks: R. Beckinsale, D. Bell, J.N. Coldstream, K. Demakopoulou-Papantoniou, the late V. Desborough, L. Marangou, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, G. Steinhauer (Acting Ephor of Lakonia), E. Touloupa, P.M. Warren, J.G. Younger.

The present book represents a considerable expansion, conceptual as well as geographical and chronological, of the thesis. It is not primarily a political history, but an attempt, inevitably provisional, to map out a new kind of history of ancient Sparta – one which does justice as well to the area unified and exploited by the Spartans as to the inhabitants of the central place. The inspiration to write it was provided by the invitation of Professor R.F. Willetts to contribute to the series of which he is general editor. I wish to thank him and Mr N. Franklin for their constant encouragement and helpful criticism. Drafts of various chapters have also been read and greatly improved by O.T.P.K. Dickinson, W.W. Phelps, J.B. Salmon and G.E.M. de Ste. Croix. None of these of course should be regarded as incriminated by the results, for which I alone bear full responsibility.

I am also most grateful to the following for permission to reproduce, sometimes in modified form, published maps and illustrations: the Managing Committee of the British School at Athens; the Swedish Institute in Athens; J. Bintliff, J.N. Coldstream, R. Hope Simpson and

W.A. McDonald (Director of the Minnesota Messenia Expedition).

Trinity College, Dublin

June 1978, P.A.C.

Preface to the second edition

The original edition of this book was commissioned by Norman Franklin, when Routledge was 'Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd' and operated out of London, Henley, and Boston. This new edition was commissioned by Dr Richard Stoneman, by which time Routledge had become part of Taylor & Francis and was based in London and New York. I am most grateful to Richard for suggesting this republication and for his patience in awaiting what I hope are the improvements I have been able to effect. Errors of one sort and another in the original edition have been silently corrected. An appendix (below, pp. 315–22) deals briefly with the book's reception and lists certain bibliographical addenda covering the period 1979–2000, paying special regard to the book's particular conception as a regional history. I am most grateful to all those colleagues, scholars and friends who have written to me pointing out errors or other deficiencies; they include: Michel Austin, Ephraim David, David Harvey, Stephen Hodgkinson, Pavel Oliva, Richard Talbert, and Helen Waterhouse.

February 2001, P.A.C.

Notes on the spelling of Greek words and on dates

Consistency in the transliteration of Greek words is impossible of attainment. In general I have preferred to reproduce Greek letters by their nearest English equivalents rather than Latinize them: thus Krokeai not Croceae, Lykourgos not Lycurgus. On the other hand, Lysandros for Lysander, and similarly for other 'household' names, must have seemed merely pedantic.

Unless otherwise specified, all dates are BC.

I

Introduction




Figure 1 The frontiers of Sparta c. 545

Chapter one

Boundaries

‘Without a geographical basis the people, the makers of history, seem to be walking on air.’ So wrote Jules Michelet in the 1869 Preface to his celebrated *Histoire de France* – but in vain, it seems, so far as most historians of Sparta have been concerned. For it remains as true of them today as it was of historians in general in the nineteenth century that, once the *de rigueur* introductory sketch of geographical conditions is out of the way, the substantive analysis or narrative proceeds ‘as if these complex influences ... had never varied in power or method during the course of a people’s history’ (Febvre 1925, 12).

There is, however, perhaps even less excuse for this outmoded and harmful attitude in studying classical Sparta than in studying some other ancient Greek states. For, as is well known, the Spartans throughout the period of their greatest territorial expansion and political supremacy (c. 550–370) rested their power and prosperity on the necessarily broad backs of the Helots, the unfree agricultural labourers who lived concentrated in the relatively fertile riverine valleys of the Eurotas in Lakonia and the Pamisos in Messenia. And besides the Helots there literally ‘dwelt round about’ the Perioikoi, who were free men living in partially autonomous communities and providing certain essential services for the Spartans but farming more marginal land. Any serious account of Spartan history therefore is obliged to make more than a token gesture at understanding the mutual relationships of these three groups of population. Thus it is with the ‘infrastructure of land allotments, helots and perioeci, with everything that includes with respect to labour, production and circulation’ (Finley 1975, 162) that this study will be primarily concerned, in a determined effort to bring the Spartans firmly down to earth.

In this connection it is encouraging to note the recent upturn of

interest in a more broadly geographical and materialist approach to Graeco-Roman antiquity – not to mention prehistoric Mediterranean studies, where, as we shall see in more detail in [Chapters 4 and 6](#), the lack of written texts necessitates an overriding concern with the total recoverable human and natural environment. A leading exponent of Roman agrarian history has recently defined a major desideratum as ‘close study, region by region, of the changing patterns of land use and agricultural production, supported by analysis of demographic and other socio-economic data provided by our sources’ (White 1967, 78). This applies equally to Greece. Moreover, not only does he state the objective clearly, but he conveys too the limitation imposed by the available evidence.

However, before the nature, extent and quality of the evidence can be explored, a prior question obtrudes itself. What is a ‘region’? The answer is not as straightforward as might at first blush be supposed, for it implies a solution to the notorious problem of frontiers or boundaries. ‘Natural’ frontiers may have been consigned for good to the conceptual rubbish-heap, but should they be replaced by a strictly geographical, a vaguely cultural or a broadly political notion of regional demarcation? I have little doubt that for the geographically minded historian like myself, as opposed to the historical geographer, the third course is the one to be adopted. To quote Lucien Febvre (1925, 311) once more, ‘all States consist of an amalgam of fragments, a collection of morsels detached from different natural regions, which complement one another and become cemented together, and make of their associated diversities a genuine unity.’ Our task therefore will be to explain how the frontiers of Lakonia came to be fixed where they were and why from time to time they fluctuated.

There have been many Lakonias. That is to say, ‘Lakonia’ has experienced many incarnations and metamorphoses between the earliest use of the name (in late Roman or early mediaeval times) and its present application to one of the provinces of contemporary Greece. The Lakonia of my title, however, is none of these. Indeed, the name is convenient and useful precisely because it has no exact political denotation for the period chiefly under consideration in this book, c. 1300 to 362. It should serve therefore as a constant reminder that the size of Lakonia in antiquity varied directly in proportion to the strength and inclinations of the inhabitants of its central place, which from about 1500 has been located in the vicinity of modern Sparta.

Frontiers should not of course be viewed as it were from the outside; but if ‘Lakonia’ is to be used for purposes of description and analysis, it requires spatial definition. It has seemed most convenient, and on balance historically least misleading, to fix upon the status quo

of c. 545, a high-water mark from which the Spartan tide was not compelled to recede for almost two centuries. Hence my Lakonia, like the ancient terms 'Lakedaimon' and 'Lakonike' (sc. *ge*), will also encompass south-west Peloponnese, which will be referred to hereafter for convenience as Messenia. I shall not, however, use 'Lakonia' to obliterate the separate identity of Messenia in the way that 'Lakedaimon' and 'Lakonike' designedly did. For I shall be principally concerned with Lakonia in a narrower and more familiar sense, roughly the territory east of the Taygetos mountain range (but including the whole of the Mani). This is primarily because this smaller Lakonia was the heartland and laboratory in which the Spartans first experimented with the system whose essentials they later transferred to Messenia, but also because the evidence for Messenia has recently been collected, sifted and published (admittedly with a primary emphasis on the Late Bronze Age) in exemplary fashion by the University of Minnesota Messenia Expedition (*MME*; cf. now Meyer 1978).

Our sources for the frontier consist of scattered notices in ancient authors, especially Strabo and Pausanias, and those physiographical features that have undergone no – or no significant – alteration since our period. (Epigraphical evidence, apart from some dubious cuttings in the living rock at Arkadian Kryavrysi, is confined to the western frontier of the reduced Lakonia after the liberation of Messenia from the Spartan yoke in c. 370: [Chapter 15](#).) Needless to say, no ancient literary source made a consistent effort to define the extent of territory under Spartan control at any given point in history, so all due credit should go to Friedrich Bölte, the first scholar to appreciate and exploit the potential of clear and detailed geological maps (Bölte 1929, 1303–15).

On the east, south and west Lakonia is bounded by the Mediterranean. Only in the north are the geographical limits blurred, and even here the lack of clarity is merely in detail, for the main outline can be simply described. Once the Thyreatis (ancient Kynouria) had fallen permanently to Sparta as the prize for winning the 'Battle of the Champions' in c. 545, the frontier ran from a point on the east coast some two kilometres north of modern Astros (near ancient Thyrea) along a range of hills above the River Tanos east of Mount Parthenion (1,093 m.). Westwards the border was formed by the watershed of the Eurotas and the tributaries of the east Arkadian plain. To the west of the Taygetos range the northern frontier of Messenia skirts the southern edge of the plain of Megalopolis. West of the latter it loops round the ancient Mount Hira (864 m.) to run out into the sea along the Nedha valley, the southern boundary of the transitional region of Triphylia.

The details are more complex, but the Thyreatis at least poses few problems. It is bounded on the north by Mount Zavitsa, on the west by the Parnon mountain range and in the south by the river of Ay. Andreas. In the mid-second century AD the frontiers of the Spartans, Argives and Tegeans met on the ridges of Parnon (Paus. 2.38.7). Thus if the Hermai have been correctly identified at modern Phonemenoi (Rhomaïos 1905, 137f.; 1951, 235f.), the frontier will have made the expected abrupt turn south of Mount Parthenion and followed Parnon in a southerly direction for about ten kilometres.

Our next evidence consists in the identification of Perioikic Karyai, which lay on the ancient frontier. It almost certainly occupied the vicinity of modern Arachova (now renamed Karyai) a short way south-east of Analipsis, which remains a border-village to this day (Loring 1895, 54–8, 61; Rhomaïos 1960, 376–8, 394). The statement of Pausanias (8.54.1) that the River Alpheios marked the border between Spartan and Tegeate territory has caused difficulties, perhaps to be resolved by identifying Pausanias' Alpheios with the river of Analipsis, the uppermost course of the Sarandapotamos, which either did, or was believed to, form part of the great Alpheios (Wade-Gery 1966, 297f., 302).

Our next clue is the frequent mention in the sources of the sub-region of Skiritis, whose control was vital to Sparta since it lay athwart routes from Arkadia to Lakonia and Messenia. Bölte identified Skiritis with the crystalline schist zone between the River Kelephina (ancient Oinous) and the Eurotas to west of the 'saddle' of Lakonia. This is in harmony with the fact that the only ancient settlement in Skiritis accorded independent mention in the sources is Oion, a frontier-village and guardpost which was probably situated in a small ruined tract north of modern Arvanito-Kerasia (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 33). In other words, at Analipsis the ancient frontier deviated sharply from its modern counterpart and moved north-west to make considerable inroads into the present-day province of Arkadia.

West of the headwaters of the Eurotas Mount Chelmos rises to 776 m. above sea-level. The region at its foot has been securely identified with ancient Belmina or Belminatis (other variant spellings are found). This was a frontier-zone hotly disputed between Sparta and Megalopolis after the foundation of the latter in 368 ([Chapter 13](#)) as much for its abundant water-supply as for its strategic position (Howell 1970, 101, no. 53). In the extreme north-west angle of Lakonia lay Aigyti, a large trough drained to the northwest by the River Xerillos (ancient Karnion). Entering Messenia Mount Hira, like Andania further south (*MME* 94, no. 607?), is perhaps best known for its role in the final stage of the Spartan conquest in the seventh century. Further expansion to the north was barred at this point by

Phigaleia, but neither Phigaleia nor Elis was able to prevent Sparta from exercising a fitful de facto control over Triphylia, perhaps from as early as the late eighth century. Messenia proper, however, was bounded on the north by the Nedha valley, a 'natural no-man's land' (Chadwick 1976a, 39).

Such was the area available to the Spartans from c.545, some 'two-fifths of the Peloponnese' according to an ancient estimate (Thuc. 1.10.2) or about 8,500 km². No other polis (city-state) could compete; Athens, for example, Sparta's nearest rival, commanded only about 2,500. Mere size, however, does not by itself account for the power and influence wielded by Sparta for so long a period. The question which the present work will attempt to answer is how, and in particular how efficiently, did Sparta utilize the possibilities afforded by this (in Greek terms) enormous land-mass.

We must conclude this first introductory chapter by looking at a second, and in some ways the most important, boundary, the one fixed by the available source-material. Greek geography, broadly interpreted, developed alongside history as a branch of Ionian 'historie' (enquiry) in the sixth and fifth centuries. But whereas history (in something like the modern sense) was an invention of the fifth century ([Chapter 5](#)), 'scientific' geography was a Hellenistic creation. At the threshold of the latter epoch stood Theophrastos, the most distinguished pupil and successor of Aristotle at the Lyceum, to whom we owe the first fumbblings towards a systematic botany and geology. Theophrastos by himself, however, despite his frequent references to Lakonia, is totally inadequate for our purposes and must be supplemented by ancient literary evidence of the most disparate origins and of correspondingly disparate value. We have already met Thucydides, Strabo and Pausanias: in what follows I shall have occasion to draw on – among many others – Alkman, Herodotus, Aristophanes, Plato, Vitruvius and Athenaios. By no means all of these inform us directly of conditions in Lakonia, or even of conditions in our special period; many have no interest in the information for its own sake; all too often they convey only the extremes experienced, precisely because they were extreme.

There are, though, two main types of evidence by which the unsatisfactory literary sources can be complemented or corrected, archaeology and modern scientific data relating to all aspects of the environment. Controlled excavation in Lakonia has for a variety of reasons been lamentably slight, a deficiency that for many historical purposes is irremediable. There are, however, other methods of building up the archaeological record besides excavation, and in the following chapters I shall be discussing, and utilizing the results of, all available archaeological techniques. Here, however, I propose to

examine briefly what I take to be the inherent limitations of archaeological material as historical evidence, regardless of the quantity or quality of the available data (ideally of course data susceptible of statistical analysis). For even though the spade may be congenitally truthful, 'it owes this merit at least in part to the fact that it cannot speak' (Grierson 1959, 129). Material remains, in other words, may be authentic testimony to the times they represent, but they are not self-explanatory, and a long-standing dispute concerns itself with the problem of precisely what kinds of inference it is possible or legitimate to draw from them. This dispute has of late received a fresh injection of vitality from the so-called 'new' archaeologists, who (in the words of a leading spokesman) advocate a 'shift to a rigorous hypothetico-deductive method with the goal of explanation' and believe 'there is every reason to expect that the empirical properties of artifacts and their arrangement in the archaeological record will exhibit attributes which can inform on different phases of the artifact's life-history' (Binford 1972, 96, 94).

Now while I agree wholeheartedly with the stated aim of the 'new' archaeologists of explaining whole societies in systematic terms, I have to confess my profound disagreement on two counts. First, I do not believe that our categories of social analysis are yet sufficiently fine to be capable of expression in the form of laws from which deductions may automatically be made. Symptomatically, the 'new' archaeologists have been surprisingly happy to operate with models which resemble 'parables' and betoken 'creeping crypto-totalitarianism' (Andreski 1972, ch. 13). Second, I remain firmly within the camp of such 'old' archaeologists as Piggott (1959, ch. 1) on the question of what kinds of inference one may legitimately draw from the accidentally surviving durable remains of complex social arrangements. I believe, in short, that there is a hierarchy or pyramid of levels at which material data may be explained in economic, political and social terms. From archaeological evidence alone we may infer (relatively) much about material techniques, a considerable amount about patterns of subsistence and utilization of the environment, far less about social and political events and institutions, and least of all about mental structures, religious and other 'spiritual' ideas and beliefs. To take a simple example, the fact that the art of Sparta's colony Taras was largely in the Spartan tradition does not by itself show that political relations with the mother-city were cordial: the art of Kerkyra was wholly in the Corinthian tradition, and yet we know from literary sources of political friction, even outright warfare, between Kerkyra and Corinth from an early date (Boardman 1973, 219). This is not of course to deny that technique and subsistence-patterns may themselves imply non-material features of social

existence. It is to deny that there are assured criteria whereby one may automatically infer the latter from the former. For 'there is sufficient evidence that identical artifacts and arrangements of artifacts can result from different socio-economic arrangements of procurement, manufacture or distribution' (Finley 1975, 90).

On the other hand, the 'new' archaeologists – apart from those who adopt a non-historical or anti-historical approach – have performed a signal service in asking questions which 'old' archaeologists, especially perhaps those whose business is with the classical Graeco-Roman world, had considered either outside their province or not worth asking. To this extent 'social archaeology' (Renfrew 1973) represents a major step in the right direction, and it is to be hoped that the questions, techniques and methods it employs (minus the inappropriate 'systems' models) will consistently be directed to the material remains of Graeco-Roman antiquity both in their excavation and in their interpretation.

The rest of this chapter will consider how far the historian of ancient Lakonia can use modern scientific data to eke out, modify or explain the notoriously unstatistical ancient sources. Here we are brought hard up against the recalcitrant problem of climatic change. For, since climate influences human social behaviour primarily through the medium of the plant, and since we are relatively well informed on the agricultural potentialities of contemporary Lakonia, it is essential to assess first how far the climate in our period resembled that known to have prevailed in the last century or so and then whether it had remained more or less constant in the interim.

Climate itself, however, is a complex concept. Its basic conditions have been elucidated as follows (Lamb 1974, 197): the radiation balance; the heat and moisture brought and carried away by the winds and ocean currents; the local conditions of aspect towards the midday sun and prevailing winds; the thermal characteristics of the soil and vegetation cover; and the reflectivity of the surface. Human influence on climate, though by no means negligible, is problematic (Mason 1977). Thus the reconstruction of past climate involves a variety of techniques, mainly scientific. Progress in their application has brought the realization that a rigorous distinction must be drawn between climatic fluctuations or oscillations, which are regular and occur in cycles ranging from decades to centuries (intervals of 200 and 400 years appear to be quite prominent), and climatic changes, which are relatively infrequent.

However, it is also clear from the extent of disagreement among experts that there is, in the first place, room for more than reasonable doubt as to which of the basic conditions of climate are decisive for climatic change; and, second, that for many periods of antiquity there

is insufficient evidence to decide for or against the inference of a climatic change as opposed to a fluctuation or oscillation. These two points are well illustrated by a controversy affecting the interpretation of the late prehistoric and early historical period in Greece. In 1966 Rhys Carpenter put forward the hypothesis that the downfall of Mycenaean civilization and the impoverishment of the ensuing Dark Age were due in part to a shift in the prevailing trade winds which brought on extended drought lasting perhaps as late as 750. This hypothesis has received qualified approval on the climatological side from Lamb and others, but another expert, H.E. Wright, whose views pack the extra punch of first-hand experience in the relevant area and period, has not only impugned the atmospheric mechanism invoked by Carpenter but adduced pollen evidence which certainly does not confirm and may even refute the hypothesis of extended drought (Wright 1968). But in case anyone should be overawed by this seemingly 'hard' evidence, note should also be taken of the opinion of a colleague of Wright, W.G. Loy (1970, 43), that, although drought may never be 'proven as the cause of the Mycenaean downfall, it is even less likely that it will be disproven as a major or at least contributing cause for the apparent depopulation of the south-west Peloponnese during the sub-Mycenaean period'.

The lay onlooker has every right to feel baffled in face of such confusion and apparent contradictions. However, even if Carpenter's hypothesis should be proved correct, much of our period remains unaffected. More important still, an authoritative historical geographer has recently expressed what appears to be the more representative view that during this epoch 'in the Mediterranean region the climate was probably not perceptibly different from that of today' (Pounds 1973, 14). We may therefore cautiously adopt the working hypothesis that the climate of Lakonia in our period more or less closely resembled that of the present day ([Chapter 3](#)).

It still remains, however, to ask whether the climate in this region has remained substantially constant since the fourth century BC, and the answer is that it has not. That we may answer thus unequivocally is due to the intensive application to Greece by Bintliff (1977) of the findings of Vita-Finzi (1969) in the Mediterranean valleys generally. To summarize, the geomorphology of contemporary Greece differs radically from that of Greece in our period in that today's prime arable land, the 'Younger Fill', is ultimately the product of a climatic fluctuation occurring in the late Roman and mediaeval periods. The prime arable land of antiquity, on the other hand, was the 'Older Fill' laid down by at the latest 20,000. Both the 'Older' and 'Younger' Fills were generated, according to Bintliff, by cold and wet ('pluvial') climatic phases, between which there was sandwiched a warmer,

drier phase more akin to that obtaining today. It was this warmer, drier climate which Lakonia enjoyed during our period. The most striking implications of Bintliff's research for our subject will be disclosed in [Chapter 10](#), but it has of course a wider importance. For it bears on all matters relating to the utilization of the physical environment.

Not, to return to Febvre, that the physical environment is a narrowly determining factor in human history. Perhaps the chief merit of Febvre 1925 was to develop the insights of Vidal de la Blache, who rigorously distinguished between the possibilities and necessities offered or imposed by a given environment. On the other hand, Febvre perhaps did not go far enough. As I hope to show, it is the conditions of production, the economic basis of human society, which in the long run explain the nature and direction of social and political change.

Notes on further reading

The conception of 'human geography' developed by Gourou (1973) owes much to Febvre, to whose memory the book is dedicated. The ideas of Vidal are conveniently brought together in the posthumous Vidal de la Blache 1926.

For a distinguished survey of the role of the environment in the Mediterranean, focused on the sixteenth century AD but with an enormously wider application, see Braudel 1972, 1. A start has been made in the study of Greece from a regional and ecological standpoint by Doxiadis and his 'ekistics' school, but this seems on the whole to be a false one: see Wagstaff 1975. Bakhuizen 1975 is on the right lines.

A map of the contemporary provinces ('nomoi') of Greece is given in *ESAG* no. 107.

For the history of ancient geography see Aujac 1975; Pédech 1976.

For all my strictures on the 'new' archaeology, there is much of value in Renfrew 1972 (esp. the first four chapters) and 1973.

Rhys Carpenter's hypothesis of a prolonged drought from c.1200 is considered in context in [Chapter 6](#).

The physical setting

The separation of the Peloponnese from the mainland and its upheaval to its present altitudes can be shown to be geologically recent from the strong resemblances in structure and relief between the mountains of the Peloponnese and those of central Greece both east and west of the Isthmus (of Corinth). At the end of the Pliocene (about two million years ago) much of the peninsula was still covered by a shallow sea or lakes, while the remainder consisted of subdued mountains or hills. When the crust eventually began to break irregularly, the bottoms of new gulfs sank as bordering land was thrust up. This new land around the margins ('Neogen') was composed of clays, marls, sands and conglomerates, the old inland region being made up mainly of limestone.

Tectonically Lakonia, as we have defined it, falls into six sections. (The geomorphology of Messenia is discussed more briefly in [Chapter 8](#).) From east to west they are: the east Parnon foreland; Parnon; the west Parnon foreland, including the Malea peninsula; the Eurotas furrow; Taygetos, including ancient Aigyitis and Dentheliatis; and the west Taygetos foreland. The principal features of their relief and geology may now be described in this same order.

The east Parnon foreland extends south from Mount Zavitsa to Cape Ieraka, where the Parnon range sheers off obliquely and runs out into the sea. It takes the form of an inverted triangle whose base is formed by the Parthenion mountains and their continuation eastwards as far as the pass of Anigraia. The region subdivides naturally into a northern section, the ancient Thyreatis or Kynouria (the ancient names were interchangeable: Meyer 1969), and a southern section south of the river of Ay. Andreas. These differ from each other especially in geological composition. The Thyreatis is a high upland plateau, made up principally of Olonos limestone but overlain

sporadically by schist, whose imperviousness provides spring water and so encourages settlement (Bintliff 1977, 100). The cultural centre in antiquity was the deltaic alluvial plain of modern Astros formed by the action of the River Tanos and that of Ay. Andreas which flow into the sea just six kilometres apart. The southern section of the foreland by contrast is mainly Tripolis limestone and, so far as is known, schist occurs only on the margins of Parnon. The coastline is the steep edge of a typical karstic plateau broken by a fault. The area around Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai) gives a good idea of the character of the area as a whole. Inland the broad, high plateaux for the most part reach 800 m. close to Parnon, fall away to 600 m. further east, only to rise once more towards the coast, this time to 1,200 m. The disappearance of the eastern portion of the foreland through foundering has caused the underground water of the remainder to flow steeply to the sea and made the surface more waterless than ever.




Figure 2 The geology of Lakonia

Not unexpectedly, therefore, settlements are today few and relatively large. Communications both within the foreland and between it and the rest of Lakonia are poor. True, the main route in antiquity from Sparta to Argos via Tegea crossed the Thyreatis (Chapter 10). But north-south travel by land was and is hindered by the deep, narrow and steep gulleys created by rivers flowing from Parnon, and there are no low passes over Parnon to link the foreland to the Eurotas valley. Hence communication continues to be chiefly by sea from coastal settlement to coastal settlement, although the exposure of the coast to north-easterly winds must have made seafaring under ancient conditions perilous. These physiographical

features militated against the political unification of the area, but this was nevertheless achieved by the Spartans, in the teeth of Argive competition, after the middle of the sixth century ([Chapter 9](#)).

The mountain range of Parnon (only once so called in an ancient source, Paus. 2.38.7) is a residual ridge rising quite gently from the plateau. Beginning in the hills north of Dholiana it runs for ninety kilometres in a south-easterly direction, the outermost spurs reaching the sea north of Monemvasia (near ancient Epidauros Limera). Its northern section, about thirty kilometres long, is on average between 1,600 and 1,800 m. above sea-level. Here the summit of Mount Malevos (1,935 m.) is clad on both flanks with fir and black pine. Despite the claim of Bölte (1929, 1296) that the northernmost ridges are nowhere difficult to cross, although they are between 1,100 and 1,300 m., communication must always have been desultory. Central Parnon occupies the twenty-two kilometres between Platanaki Pass and Kounoupia ('mosquito-place' – ill-omened name); like south Parnon, it is lower than the northern section. Geographically and geologically Parnon is but the continuation of the inner Arkadian chain, to which it is joined by the broad threshold known in antiquity as Skiritis. The blue-grey, coarse-grained marble, crystalline limestone and schist of the north give way to Tripolis limestone south of Kosmas (ancient Glympeis/Glyppia?). Above the fir woods, which grow in places at 1,750 m., 'alpine' grasses provide pasturage for the numerous sheep, which apart from sporadic charcoal- or lime-burning today as in antiquity constitute the chief means of livelihood in this inhospitable area.

The west foreland of Parnon may be subdivided into two. The northern section to Goritsa expands southwards from about six to fifteen kilometres in breadth. It is joined to Skiritis, and thereby to the Eurotas furrow, on the west and borders on the Spartan plain further south. Although it is predominantly a limestone plateau thinly veiled by Kermes oak and phrygana (maquis-like scrub), impervious mica-schists crop out to provide sites for fairly large settlements. Skiritis geologically is a continuation of the central Arkadian highlands, but like Parnon is distinguished from them by its substrate of schist. The latter subdivides naturally at Kaltezai into a northern and southern section, the whole forming an inverted triangle thirteen kilometres wide at the base and only four at the apex where it disappears into the basin of Sparta. South of the latitude of Sparta outcrops of mica-schist become rarer, necessitating settlement on the limestone outliers of Parnon itself. Here the inhabitants are forced to rely on cistern water, but this is not plentiful since west Parnon falls in the rainshadow of Taygetos.

The southern section of the west Parnon foreland is for the most

part a mere three kilometres wide, but it broadens out to nine kilometres where it abuts on the north-eastern perimeter of the Lakonian Gulf at Mount Kourkoula (916 m.). Generally it does not rise above 500 m. and is often hard to distinguish from Parnon itself. Worthy of note is a series of basin plains ('Karstpolje') extending south from Geraki (ancient Geronthrai) to the northern end of the Molaoi plain and thence towards the bay of Monemvasia. Their surface is composed of relatively fertile alluvial soil and contrasts with the surrounding area where life-facilitating springs occur only on the impervious schist. The foreland with few exceptions has never played any very important historical role and in recent times has suffered severe depopulation.

The Malea peninsula continues the west foreland and not Parnon. It is bounded on the north by a line running N 55° W from Epidauros Limera to the northern end of the plain of Molaoi and thence around Mount Kourkoula to the Lakonian Gulf. From Molaoi to Cape Malea (of 'round Malea and forget your home' notoriety) is a distance of fifty kilometres; below Neapolis (ancient Boiai) the peninsula is only five kilometres wide. Apart from a few depressions filled with Pliocene deposit and alluvium, the upland is composed of strongly folded schists overlain by massive black or grey Tripolis limestone. On the east the highland descends abruptly to the sea, while on the west groups of fiat-topped hills fall steeply to the Lakonian Gulf. Settlements today are located on the edges of plains or at the junction of schist and limestone, as for example the chain of villages near Neapolis. The area is noted for its production of onions, part of which is exported. But in antiquity by far the most important natural resource it contained was iron ([Chapter 7](#)). Attempts to re-open the workings in the nineteenth century failed for lack of water, adequate transport and, it was said, enthusiasm on the part of the workers.

Three offshore adjuncts of the Malea peninsula deserve separate mention – Elaphonisos, Kythera and Antikythera. In Pausanias' day, the second century AD, what is now the island of Elaphonisos (ancient Onougnathos or 'Ass-jaw') was still joined to the mainland (3.22.10). It had become separated by at the latest AD 1677, and in the process of separation at least one ancient settlement, the Bronze Age site at Pavlopetri ([Chapter 6](#)), found its way underwater. The cause of the separation is perhaps to be sought in a eustatic rise in sea-level rather than in crustal movements due to earthquakes or in the compaction of sediments (Bintliff 1977, 10–26, esp. 15, 25f.); but these are troubled interpretative waters into which I need only dip my toes. At any rate, the area has certainly been strongly affected by seismic activity during the period since records have been kept (Galanopoulos 1964). Further up the Lakonian Gulf at Plytra (ancient Asopos) submarine remains

suggest a land-shift of at least two metres. Elaphonisos is now a roughly triangular slab of soft dark limestone rising to 277 m. Its light and sandy topsoil is liable to erosion and unsuitable for cultivation. For its water-supply the population (a mere 673 in 1961) relies on a few deep wells.

Kythera belongs today to the province of Attiki. Previously it had been incorporated in the province of Argolis, and it has often been somewhat distinct, historically, from the rest of Lakonia – not least, as we shall see ([Chapter 4](#)), in the Bronze Age. The separation of the island from the mainland is geologically recent: its structure is similar to that of the Malea peninsula, consisting largely of Tripolis limestone. South of the limestone hills around Cape Spathi a belt of schist stretches from coast to coast as far south as Potamos, in whose vicinity a fine-grained white marble is found. Despite the general lack of fertile and cultivable land, the economy remains primarily agricultural, supplemented by a plentiful supply of seafood. The present-day pattern of settlement is dictated by considerations of security rather than accessibility to natural resources, a reversal of the ancient priorities.

Antikythera (variously named in antiquity) lies equidistant from Kythera and western Crete. It resembles an oval with extended points, having a longitudinal axis of ten kilometres and a maximum width of almost four. Its plains and terraces rise to 364 m. and are composed of marl up to 60 m. Although the island is poor in water and mainly provides only fodder for goats (hence perhaps one of its ancient names, Aigilia), it also yields barley in the valleys and is self-supporting. However, population density in 1961 was a paltry eight per km².

In the sharpest possible contrast the Eurotas furrow is, and must always have been, the heartland of Lakonia: population density in 1961 was sixty-eight per km². It occupies an area of about 800 km² between the basin of Megalopolis and the Lakonian Gulf. From a width of only six kilometres in the north it broadens out to twenty-five around the Gulf. Its relationship with the Megalopolis basin is not clearly defined, for the upper reaches of the latter spill over into the furrow at 500 m. without a break, and the tributaries of the Alpheios and Eurotas are linked by a valley watershed at 483 m. The furrow takes its name from the Eurotas, the second largest river in the Peloponnese, which flows mostly along its eastern margin but is diverted below Goritsa to the western. Almost exactly in the centre of the furrow, on the Eurotas itself, lies Sparta, the ancient and modern capital of Lakonia. For convenience of exposition the furrow may be split into four: a northern section stretching as far south as the Langadha gorge on the west and the confluence of the Kelephina

(ancient Oinous) and Eurotas on the east; the Spartan basin; a section comprising the hill-country of Vardhounia on the west and the Pliocene table of Vrontama on the east; and finally the present Helos plain.

The northernmost section lies between north Taygetos and Skiritis, whence flow the upper course and most important tributaries of the Eurotas. Geologically the upper part of this section is Olonos limestone and flysch, the lower schists. Population here has remained more or less static since the end of the nineteenth century, but Georgitsi (near ancient Pellana) has suffered appreciable depopulation, from 1,646 in 1928 to 984 in 1961.

The basin of Sparta lies between the sharply defined central portion of Taygetos and Parnon. It is twenty-two kilometres long, between eight and twelve kilometres wide, and trends in a south-south-east direction. It was originally filled with Pliocene deposits of an inland sea, the 'Neogen' soil which formed the backbone of agriculture in our period. But these have been partly removed by erosion and partly overlain by the recent alluvium generated during the late Roman/mediaeval climatic oscillation mentioned at the end of [Chapter 1](#). There are today three main cultivated areas: the well-watered piedmont of Taygetos, thickly forested with citrus (a post-classical import), olive and mulberry (now fostered by artificial irrigation), and fertile in vegetables; the centre of the Spartan plain, which bears olives, wheat, barley and maize (an import of the sixteenth or seventeenth century AD), the peculiarity of its soil being that it can produce two cereal harvests in a single year; third, the hills along the Eurotas, which yield wheat or barley. Population in the basin has unsurprisingly fluctuated little overall in recent times. Sparta itself has grown by well over a half since 1928, despite the relatively primitive level of industrialization.

In the south the basin of Sparta is blocked by the Vardhounia hill-country, eighteen kilometres wide. Its western portion merges with Taygetos and is composed largely of schists; its eastern limit is marked by the stream west of modern Krokeai, the Kourtaki. The area rises to 516 m. at Mount Lykovouni and is geologically very similar to south Taygetos. East of Vardhounia lies the Vrontama plateau, composed of Pliocene conglomerates and marls and named for its most important modern village. The plateau is separated from the Spartan basin by a limestone ridge south-west of Goritsa. It declines gradually from 300 m. in the north to 150 m. at Myrtia along a bed of conglomerate overlying the marl. West of Grammousa the Eurotas buries itself in the Tripolis limestone causing routes of communication to deviate from the river and pass either over the Vrontama plateau south-eastwards to the Malea peninsula or through Vardhounia to Gytheion.

The Helos plain and adjoining land are bounded on the west by the Vardhounia hills and on the east by Mount Kourkoulia, whose spurs in the form of a Pliocene table-land reach down to the marshy coast. Apart from this narrow strip of marl on the east the soil is alluvium brought down by the Eurotas and its tributary the Mariorhevmia (which preserves the name of ancient Marios). A fact of inestimable significance, however, is that the present form of the Helos plain differs markedly from that of its ancient forerunner, which indeed was not strictly a plain. For the 'Younger Fill' around the head of the Lakonian Gulf is due to the climatic oscillation already noted, in which cool and moist phases promoted alluviation and coastal aggradation (Figure 3). The ancient shoreline, that is to say, lay appreciably further inland and, as has recently been proved by a deep core, the ancient landscape lies buried beneath in places five to fifteen metres of recent alluvium. Thus the agricultural character of the region today cannot simply be read back into antiquity. For example, the abundant irrigated crops of citrus, cotton and rice grown on the 'Younger Fill' are post-classical and indeed, in the case of the two last, twentieth-century imports.

The Taygetos range, known locally as Pendedaktylo ('five-fingered') or Makrynas ('far-off one'), runs for some 110 km. from the Megalopolis basin to Cape Matapan (ancient Cape Tainaron), the second most southerly point in continental Europe. In structure it is an upfold of several Peloponnesian rock-types. Crystalline schists and marble are overlain by various slates and limestones. With the last major upheaval great faults appeared along both sides of the range, the western marking the shore of the Messenian Gulf and the high eastern edge of the plains of Messenia. Transverse faulting split the range into three main sections, the central being elevated above the rest.




Figure 3 The Helos plain: geological change

Northern Taygetos extends south as far as the Langadha gorge and the north-east angle of the Messenian Gulf. Its breadth (from twenty-one to twenty-four kilometres) falls into three longitudinal subdivisions. The eastern ridge is narrow and straight, rising gently southwards to 1,610 m. above the Langadha, and is made up of dark limestones, schists and shales. The western ridge is fairly broad but never exceeds 1,300 m.; it is uniformly composed of massive limestones. Between these two ridges lies much lower country worn out of the sandstones and fissured limestones by the southward flowing Nedhon (ancient Nedon) and the northward draining Xerillos (ancient Karnion). The inhabitants of this intermediate zone, which embraces the ancient Aigyti and Dentheliatis, were the most backward of any encountered by Philippon.

Central Taygetos extends for thirty-six kilometres from the Langadha to the valleys of Xirokambi and Kardamyli (ancient Kardamyle) on the east and west respectively. This is the highest part of the range, the limestone peaks culminating in Proph. Elias at 2,407 m. The magnificence of the aspect on the east stems from the sharp contrast between the craggy walls of Taygetos and the flatness of the Spartan plain. To the west the lower crests are of marble and mica-schist; the eastern terrace is composed by bold limestone bluffs interrupted by deeply etched ravines. Central Taygetos seems to have been largely uninhabited in antiquity, when it was used by the Spartans as a hunting-ground (Chapter 10). Today the schist has been

extensively planted to wheat, barley, rye and maize (the latter up to 1,300 m.).

Southern Taygetos comprises the block between the Xirokambi-Kardamyli pass and the gap between Karyoupolis and Areopolis, which carried the main ancient route to the southern Mani from Gytheion. This section is considerably larger than the preceding and less sharply defined from its surroundings. The eastern limestone chain sinks abruptly from the summit to 1,500 m., but rises again to 1,700 m. at Mount Anina. On the west the marble is less rigid and is dissected by valleys. The region as a whole is more favourable to vegetation and habitation than those to north and south. The whole eastern side is today rich in small settlements, which often perch picturesquely on ridges and slopes amid dense tree-growth; this may, however, have been largely virgin forest in our period.

South Mani is a continuation of Taygetos. Its main summits, which are of marble, decline southwards from 1,100 to 310 m. three kilometres north of Cape Matapan. In only a few places is the marble overlain by mica-schist, where the mere four springs known to Philippon take their rise. Unusually scanty amounts of soil result from the weathering of the hard marble, and this is quickly swept away in winter by rain-storms. Where it does stay put, it is mixed with coarse blocks and small stones ('the Mani is all stones' is a proverbial saying) – the farmer's bug-bear. In such a context the annual migration of the quail is of more than sporting interest; hence Porto Kayio (on the site of ancient Psamathous) from the Venetians' Porto Quaglio and the Frankish Port des Cailles. Depopulation in the twentieth century has been drastic.

The final tectonic division of Lakonia, the western foreland of Taygetos, runs from Kalamata (ancient Pharai) to Cape Grosso not far north-west of Matapan. It is a coastal terrace and a remarkable erosion-feature, originally cut level by the waves but unequally elevated thereafter by earth-movements. Later still, rivers incised deep ravines, at whose mouths inlets have been produced by sinking. The latter process has probably been furthered by the solution of the marble through weathering. At Cape Kitries in the north the terrace is eight kilometres wide; it narrows to its smallest breadth at Trachilas Bay. From 400 m. at Kitries (ancient Gerenia?) it declines to 98 m. at Cape Grosso. From Kardamyli to the estuary of the river of Milia (Little Pamisos, an ancient frontier between Lakonia and Messenia: [Chapter 15](#)) the foreland is chiefly composed of Tripolis limestone patchily overlain by marl; in the Milia valley a zone of mica-schist gives rise to the exceedingly rare spring water. Further south marble is ever-present covered only by a shapeless mass of loam produced by weathering. However, despite the forbidding nature of the terrain,

Periodic communities succeeded in maintaining themselves here – a suitable reminder with which to close this chapter that man is never wholly the slave of the physical environment.

Notes on further reading

The outstanding though somewhat outdated contribution to our understanding of Greek geography has been made by Philippon: Kirsten 1956 includes a bibliography of his numerous works (by no means confined to Greece); for his discussion of Lakonia and Messenia see Philippon 1959, 371–523. Also useful for many points is the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division Geographical Handbook of Greece (3 vols, March 1944, October 1944, August 1945). See now, however, Bintliff 1977, I, ch. 2; II, chs. 3–4. The technical terminology can most easily be grasped through Whitten and Brooks 1972 and Moore 1976. For the relief of Lakonia and Messenia, and for the location of modern place-names, the regional maps issued by the Greek Statistical Service should be consulted. My [Figure 2](#) is modified from the map produced by the Institute of Geology and Subsurface Research at Athens (1954). I have also used the air photographs taken by the RAF in the last world war, prints of which are housed in the British School at Athens.

In general I have avoided citing modern population figures, partly because there are inherent dangers in interpreting census-returns (Cox 1970, 33–43), in part because the most reliable modern census, that of 1961 (Kayser 1965), was taken well after Greece had been sucked into the orbit of international finance capital. It is, however, perhaps worth noting that one third of the total population was then living on less than 5 per cent of the total surface area, almost one half on less than 15 per cent.

The survival in the north Parnon region of a language which retains certifiable traces of its ultimate Doric ancestor, Tsakonian, bears eloquent witness to the isolation of the region.

Rogan 1973 is the work of an interested amateur; but her maps clearly mark the extent and subdivisions of the extraordinary Mani, and she traces settlement here from prehistory to the present day site by site (with some bibliography).

Chapter three

Climate

The ancient Greeks' equivalent of our word climate was not 'klima' but something like *krasis aëros* or simply *horai* (seasons). By these terms they understood primarily changes in temperature, relative humidity and prevailing winds, but even for these they devised no instruments to record their fluctuations. Our concept of climate is immensely more complex, and modern instrumentation permits it to be considerably more sophisticated ([Chapter 1](#)).

Climate rivals relief in its importance as a geographical factor. Since it determines which crops cannot be grown in a particular region, it sets limits to the range of ecological adaptations available to man. How far the influence of climate extends into the spheres of personal character or political organization were matters for debate even in antiquity, but its effects on health, patterns of settlement and lifestyles are less obscure. In this chapter only the climate recorded for Sparta will be considered in detail, since it is not greatly different from that recorded for Gytheion, Kythera and Leonidhion. By contrast Messenia (represented by readings taken at Kalamata) lies on the other side of the Taygetos weather-shed, on the wetter, western side of the Greek mainland.

If the arguments of [Chapter 1](#) are cogent, the Spartan climate for most if not all of our special period will not have been very different from that of today, although within this period there will undoubtedly have been fluctuations. Our scanty literary sources tend to support this assumption, apart from their suggestion of heavier forestation, which can be more satisfactorily explained on historical than on climatological grounds (Bintliff 1977, I, chs 3–4). The overall picture of classical Greece they present is of a generally rocky, infertile and poor country (esp. Hdt. 7.102.1), blessed with a few fertile plains, notably those of Lakonia and Messenia (Eur. fr. 1083N). Nothing has

changed here. The relative prosperity enjoyed by mainland Greece between c. 700 and 300 was due to a combination of historical variables, not to the fact that its climate was in important respects better than it is now.

Lakonia belongs to the climatic sub-group which embraces Attiki, Corinthia, Argolis and the Kyklades. This does not of course mean that there are no divergences within the sub-group: in temperature, for example, Sparta is more continental, Athens more maritime. Indeed, there are divergencies, though insignificant ones, within Lakonia itself. However, the sub-group as a whole is characterized by slight rainfall and marked, prolonged summer drought, thereby possessing to the fullest degree the differentiating qualities of the 'Mediterranean' climate and landscape.

The most important climatic factor is warmth. The formula adopted in Greece for calculating mean daily temperature is to divide by four the sum of the temperatures recorded at 0800 and 1400 hours plus twice the temperature recorded at 2100. The mean temperature at Sparta in July is 27°C, which when adjusted to allow for the height of the meteorological station above sea-level (c.200 m.) is the hottest in Greece. The (unadjusted) mean for January is 8.8°C, the range of 18.2°C between January and July being higher than that of Athens (17.8°C). The absolute minimum temperature recorded at Sparta is -6.3°C, the absolute maximum a stifling 43.5°C: again, there is an enormous range here comparable to that recorded for Athens. As far as the effect of temperature on crops is concerned, however, mean monthly values are of little analytical significance (Papadakis 1966, 16f.). What ought to be recorded are the daily maxima and minima, from which the mean monthly maxima and minima may be computed. (The 0800 and 1400 hours recordings are perhaps not far off the daily minimum and maximum, but they are far enough astray to ensure systematic distortion.) Thus a freak reading like the -6.3°C (or the -11°C at Athens) will lose much of its merely apparent significance when it is thrown into the scales with all the other daily minima for that month. In general temperatures do not begin to drop appreciably until December, when the Spartan winter properly speaking starts, and even then there are considerable day-to-day fluctuations. In March the transition to spring is completed, the opening of the ancient campaigning and sailing seasons and a time of hunger (Alkman fr. 20.3-5 Page). By June summer has come round again. The hottest days ('of the Dog') occur towards the end of July and beginning of August, in other words during the close season between the cereal-harvest and planting.

Next after warmth in order of importance is rainfall, the 'key challenge' (Angel 1972, 88). Merely to state the average annual

rainfall at Sparta (81.66 cm.) is to disguise the essential characteristic of all Mediterranean rainfall, its seasonal distribution. What we need to know is for how long and how much rain falls on the days it does fall, on how many days it falls, and in which months. On Kythera, for example, one fifth of the total annual rainfall recorded for one year fell within the space of a few hours. Such rainfall causes severe flooding and extensive soil-removal: with good reason Theophrastos described Lakonia as 'liable to flooding, rainy and marshy'.

The average annual number of rain-days at Sparta is eighty-seven, about half that of southern England, which receives a comparable quantity of rain per annum. The annual drought at Sparta lasts two months: that is to say, fewer than three centimetres of rain fall on average in July and August together, compared to 1.25 at Gytheion, 1.5 at Leonidhion. As in most other places in Greece, the mean monthly rainfall values show their sharpest rise between September and October, and one third of the total annual rainfall is deposited in November and December. The seasonal distribution does, however, have its compensations. For it makes a harvest of essential cereals possible everywhere in Greece – indeed, two harvests in central Lakonia. But Sparta does not of course receive the same amount of rainfall each year: the lowest annual figure is less than half the annual mean, as it is for Gytheion and Kythera too. What makes the average as high as it is, bearing in mind how far south Sparta lies, is its proximity to Taygetos, which increases the uplift effect on moist airmasses in late autumn and winter.

The key to understanding the Greek climate lies in the study of atmospheric circulation and airflow. We lack direct evidence for Sparta, but the picture obtained by Lehmann (1937) for the plain of Argolis is said to hold good for the east Greek mainland as a whole. From April to June southerly winds prevail, but in all other months winds are mainly northerly, reaching maximum frequency in July and August. Sparta, exceptionally, receives northerly winds throughout the year – an important fact, because it confirms the view that it is not the prevailing northerlies which cause the summer drought; besides, the drought is shorter in Sparta than in many other places. The cool north-easterly summer trade wind, the Meltemi, which often reaches Force 7 or 8 on the Beaufort scale, blows hard until 1700 hours and slows down the rise of air-temperature. On summer evenings katabatic winds gravitate down the slopes of Taygetos to Sparta and accelerate the cooling of the air, which begins in earnest when the sun disappears behind the mountain and suddenly swathes the town in shadow. In winter stormy rain-bearing southerlies alternate with gusty northerlies which bring rain to the eastern side of the Peloponnese and cause snowfalls on the lowlands in December.

As far as thunderstorms are concerned, Parnon acts as a weathershed for the Eurotas valley. One May Philippson observed repeated heavy storms on the west side of Parnon, while on the east there was either no rain or an insignificant amount. His observations are confirmed by the meteorological data. In May and June Sparta has on average twelve thunderstorm days per 1,000, few but over twice as many as Leonidhion. The picture repeats itself in the mean annual figures: 3.5 per 100 at Sparta, only 1.3 at Leonidhion. In July the frequency of thunderstorms declines to 2.3 per 1,000 at Sparta; they are virtually unknown in this month on Kythera.

Hail is not particularly common in Greece, and it was fortunate for the Spartans that the beginning of the growth period for cereals coincides with the lowest average number of hail-days (November). The highest figure is recorded for May, before and during the harvest, but even this is insignificant. In July it declines once more into non-existence. The annual average compares favourably with that of Athens whose higher figure is accounted for by the amount it receives on average in October to December.

Snow is a climatic variable of considerable importance to the organization of daily life. Brought by north-east winds, it falls especially in February on the north and east flanks of mountains. Sparta itself receives snow very rarely: of the more important states of ancient Greece Athens and Sparta occupy opposite ends of the scale in this regard. But the Spartans directly or indirectly experienced the effects of snowfalls. For it remains on Taygetos, in appreciable quantity in some places, until the end of June, and so constituted a most effective obstacle to communication via mountain passes ([Chapter 10](#)). On the other hand, as was shown in midwinter 370–69 ([Chapter 13](#)), snow could act as a useful protection for Sparta by causing the Eurotas to run high; and in the summer the melting snow refills the mountain streams, which have a particularly beneficial influence on the piedmont at the western edge of the Spartan plain.

The harmful effect of frost on growing crops hardly needs special emphasis. But in view of the undoubted hardiness of a Spartan upbringing it is perhaps significant that between November and April Sparta has on average twice as many frost-days per 100 as Athens. Although white frost is not uncommon in Greece, we have no information for Sparta.

Fog and cloud are negligible climatic factors in Greece and neither appears with sufficient frequency to detract from the famed blueness of the Greek sky, which is due to the dryness of the air. Attempts to classify visibility in terms of distance are of course ludicrous, and there is no better foundation for claims that there is a significant correlation between blueness of sky or clarity of air and traits of

character. Sunshine, however, the inverse of cloud and fog, does have therapeutic qualities, and insolation at Sparta is among the highest recorded in Greece. On average Sparta receives 329 sunshine-hours in June, 387 in July and 364 in August. As for relative humidity, another favoured candidate for the role of character-moulder, it reaches its peak at Sparta in December, then declines to its minimum in July, remaining throughout the year higher than that of Athens.

Finally, dew deserves a special mention, for a form of condensation which lies directly on vegetation is very important in a relatively rainless country. (Fog-drip from trees is negligible.) Figures for dew-nights are not available for Sparta, but the ancient evidence for the importance of dew in cult (mainly from Athens) suggests that they will not have been frequent.

To conclude, the climate of Sparta represents, what we might have expected from its location, a compromise between eastern and western Greece. In comparison to its nearest recorded neighbours, Sparta has a somewhat rougher winter climate, akin in some respects to that of Athens. In summer the differences are much slighter, Sparta being rather hotter, owing to its inland situation. In our brief survey the climates of Athens and Sparta have occasionally been compared. If such a comparison has any historical value, that of Sparta is harsher and more demanding.

Notes on further reading

The standard work of synthesis on the Greek climate is Philippon 1948; but see Lauffer 1950 for many supplements and some corrections. Useful companions are Livathinos and Mariolopoulos 1935 and *ESAG*. The figures I have cited are based on recordings made between 1900 and 1929. The relevant tables are reproduced in the Admiralty Handbook I, App. 9.

There is much of relevance in Papadakis 1966. He discusses in detail (39ff.) how he would set about making a climatic classification and attacks attempts to base a classification on figures like those used by Philippon. The latter are, however, adequate for our purposes.

Chapter four

The Stone and Bronze Ages to c. 1300

‘Revolution’, like ‘democracy’, is a grossly overworked term, one of the list of slogan-words which seems to justify the emotive theory of morals. But if ever a human process merited the title, it is the one compendiously dubbed the ‘Neolithic Revolution’. For this was perhaps ‘the greatest revolution ... in the history of Mankind’ (Theocharis 1973, 19). After maybe the better part of three million years of hunting and gathering by various species of homo, homo sapiens began instead to produce its means of subsistence. Through the domestication of wild grasses and animals there was unleashed the only kind of progress of which it is any longer possible to speak without equivocation, progress in man’s control over nature. Not that the Neolithic Revolution was an inevitable process, nor did its onset mark a sudden complete break with the past. Its advance, moreover, should not be likened to that of a steamroller, especially if for any reason we should be unwilling to accept that Neolithic techniques of farming were diffused from the Fertile Crescent. It was for its consequences, in other words, rather than the manner of its introduction, that its title is most fully justified.

As recently as a generation back it would have been impossible to write a general survey of the Neolithic period in Greece such as Theocharis 1973. Now, however, thanks to the remarkable finds at the Franchthi cave in the Argolis, all the stages of the Revolution can be traced in Greece from its immediate Mesolithic origins to the Final or Epi-Neolithic threshold of our more immediate concern, the Bronze Age. To specify, this cave has yielded a continuous stratigraphic sequence from the Late Palaeolithic to the advanced Neolithic. Greece, however, may prove to have yet greater surprises in store. For although Neanderthal skulls and Mousterian tools had signalled the presence of man here, including the Peloponnese, from as early as the

Middle Palaeolithic period, it was reported in 1976 that human bones found embedded in a stalagmite in Chalkidiki had been dated some 700,000 years before the present. If corroborated (which is, however, unlikely), this find would upset prevailing theories about the geography of the evolution of man.




Figure 4 Neolithic and Early Helladic Lakonia

Fortunately we need not concern ourselves here with such lofty

heights of speculation about the progress of man from ape to artist nor even with the ultimate origins of plant-cultivation, which have recently been placed in Palestine some 12,000 years ago. There is for a start no Lakonian equivalent of the Franchthi cave. Its nearest rival, however, is in Lakonia, the Alepotrypa ('Fox-hole') cave in south Mani on the east coast of the Messenian Gulf; but this does not seem to have come into its own until towards the end of the Neolithic (Figure 4). Recent excavations have, it is true, revealed doubtful traces of Late Palaeolithic occupation in the form of tools and bones. But the certainly datable evidence of pottery does not make its appearance until the middle of the sixth millennium or late on in the Early Neolithic period. To date, this pottery is the only sure evidence that Lakonia was inhabited at this time, unless three remarkable marble figurines (two certainly female) belong to the Early Neolithic (Theocharis 1973, figs 17, 200, 226).

These tiny sculptures were reportedly found in the vicinity of modern Sparta, but a more likely provenance is Kouphovouno, a low mound site about two kilometres south-south-west. This was, as it were, the Sparta of Neolithic Lakonia, but settlement here cannot be firmly documented before the last third of the sixth millennium, that is in the Middle Neolithic period. By this time, however, attested settlement in Lakonia was attaining a wider distribution. Apart from Kouphovouno and (probably) the Alepotrypa cave, there is evidence of occupation near modern Apidia in the west Parnon foreland south-east of Geraki. At Apidia, however, the pottery in question was not unearthed in controlled excavation but picked up during surface survey, and so this is perhaps an opportune moment to stress how flimsy is the basis of evidence on which any reconstruction of the prehistoric ('text-free') period in Lakonia rests.

This may best be done by taking as our frame of reference the arguments of a leading prehistorian with experience of the problems of the Aegean (Renfrew 1972, 225–64). Attempting to trace the pattern of settlement in Greece from the Neolithic through the Bronze Age, Renfrew began correctly by pointing out the inadequacy of the available evidence, overwhelmingly assembled through surface exploration rather than scientific digging. Such evidence is subject to a series of limitations as raw material for 'history' that can only be surmounted by – or at least not without – excavation. For example, soil erosion, later settlement, deep ploughing, alluviation and maquis-type vegetation can singly or in combination obliterate or temporarily obscure traces of habitation. Different settlement patterns and cultural assemblages paint surface pictures of unequal perceptibility. Accidentally uncovered worked stones can swiftly take on a new lease of life in modern structures far perhaps from the site of their original

discovery. Finally, and by no means least, the preconceived notions of archaeologists can blinker their field of vision.

Expressly recognizing these limitations, all of which apply to the Lakonian evidence, Renfrew concluded that, although inter-regional comparisons might be seriously misleading, figures for developing intra-regional settlement patterns and population density could be statistically significant. In fact, not even this more modest claim will withstand scrutiny, at least not in the case of Lakonia; survey has been notably more thorough in, for example, Messenia. For a 50 per cent or less surface coverage of the region leaves far too great a margin of error, given the dearth of excavation; and the preconception that prehistoric settlements of all periods were typically centred on 'akropolis' sites has been contradicted by more recent surveys of other regions, which have restored the low hillock and indeed the valley-floor to their rightful place.

Renfrew's misapprehension of the number of sites occupied in the various prehistoric phases is compounded by unwarranted assumptions about the character and size of settlements, as we shall see in [Chapter 6](#). However, to return to the Neolithic, we have so far registered the occupation by 5000 of three sites, located in three of Lakonia's six main geological subdivisions. These three continued to be inhabited into the Late Neolithic (c.4500–3500, according to Phelps 1975), when they were perhaps joined by a fourth at Geraki. Although the quantity of skeletons recovered from the Alepotrypa cave represents the most impressive concentration in Greece, the situation in Lakonia as a whole can hardly be described as one of overpopulation. Something of a transformation, however, seems to have been effected in the Final Neolithic period (3500–3000/2500). Now the southern part of the Eurotas furrow was settled at Asteri (Karaousi) and Ay. Efstratios, while occupation continued to the north at Kouphovouno and perhaps Palaiokastro (between Chrysapha and the Menelaion site) and to the south at Alepotrypa. The presence of silver jewellery in the latter suggests a measure of prosperity, but all good things must end and the collapse of the roof crushed or trapped a veritable charnel-house of corpses (Lambert 1972, 845–71). Traces of habitation probably to be assigned to this same phase have been detected in a double cave at Goritsa in the west foreland of Parnon west of Geraki (itself still occupied), at Goules near Plytra in the Malea peninsula, and at Kardamyli, Kambos and Kokkinochomata in north-west Mani.

Can we create a pattern out of these scanty and disparate materials? Given the apparent break in Lakonia between the Upper Palaeolithic and Early Neolithic (no Mesolithic), Neolithic techniques of farming must have been imported rather than spontaneously developed here.

At any rate, the wild ancestors of the relevant domesticated grasses and animals have only been found at Franchthi (oats, barley). Whether the importation was through diffusion or immigration cannot be firmly decided without a good deal more exploration and excavation, but 'the distribution of the known sites suggests that the neolithic people first entered Lakonia by sea, via the Helos and Molaoi plains' (Hope Simpson and Waterhouse 1961, 168). On present evidence they did not venture far from the coast but occupied roughly south central Lakonia. Kouphovouno, however, is fairly far to the north and, to judge by its houses, graves and stone artefacts, was perhaps the single most important site. It would of course be rash to speak of a hierarchy of settlements at this stage, but Kouphovouno's central position in the Spartan basin is noteworthy. For in view of the strong correlation between the distribution of cornlands in Greece today and that of the Neolithic tells, the chief crops must have been cereals, probably emmer wheat and barley (J. Renfrew in Theocharis 1973, 149).

Direct palaeobotanical evidence is lacking for Lakonia, but three disc-shaped clay bread-ovens have been found in the Alepotrypa cave. Here too were discovered the bones of ovines or caprines and bovines, together with marine shells. However, the chief evidence for the Lakonian Neolithic is its pottery, although this was a concomitant, rather than a basic ingredient, of Neolithic culture. It was hand-made (like all pottery in Greece before the Middle Bronze Age) and sometimes beautifully decorated, as was for example the late polychrome ware at the Alepotrypa cave and Apidia. By the Late Neolithic it is possible to speak, with special reference to the pottery, of a cultural 'koine' stretching from Thessaly to the Mani.

More obvious evidence of cultural contact and communication is provided by the obsidian artefacts from Kouphovouno and Alepotrypa. The source of this volcanic rock has been proved beyond doubt to be the island of Melos, whence it was being obtained by the occupants of the Franchthi cave as astonishingly early as 7000 or even earlier (C. Renfrew in Theocharis 1973, 180, 339-41). But perhaps most exciting of all is the discovery of copper tools in the Alepotrypa cave. The source of the ore and the place where the metal was smelted are not yet established, but these implements provide a convenient transition to the Early Bronze Age, known in mainland Greece as the Early Helladic (EH) era.

For 'man's discovery of copper ore and the means whereby it could be turned into metal was one of the major discoveries in history' (Branigan 1970, 1). Since there was apparently no transitional ('Chalkolithic') phase in the Peloponnese, the sharp break from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age argues diffusion of the secrets of

metallurgy, possibly by immigrants, from the Near East via the Kyklades and perhaps the Troad (Branigan 1974, 97–102). At first copper, beaten and hammered, was employed on its own, then tin from Etruria, Sardinia or Spain was alloyed with it to produce implements and weapons of bronze. However, EH and its tripartite subdivision are, like the entire subdivision of the Aegean Bronze Age (Stubbings 1970, 241), based on the classification of pottery not the typology of metal artefacts. So there is inevitably some elasticity about the date at which a particular region or site can be said to have entered the Bronze Age properly speaking. For Lakonia, 2700 or thereabouts is a reasonable approximation.

The general features of EH Greece are fairly clear: a dispersed ‘farmstead’ pattern of settlement on low hill-sites preferentially near the sea; ‘Urfinis’ pottery and the ‘sauceboat’ shape diagnostic of EH II; active trade and communications, especially by sea; increasing use of copper and silver. In short, this was a progressive and on the whole prosperous era, although, as we shall see, hardly one in which the ‘way of life was urban and commercial rather than rural and agricultural’ (Hooker 1977, 17). As far as Lakonia is concerned, however, the dearth of excavated evidence and especially of metal artefacts enforces a probably distorting reliance on the testimony of pottery. On the other hand, the evidence from Kythera, to which I shall return at the end of my discussion of EH Lakonia, is unique in the Aegean world as a whole and potentially of great significance.

Surface surveys have revealed some thirty to forty Lakonian sites, mostly dispersed farms or hamlets, occupied in EH times ([Figure 4](#)). The majority of these was attested by sherds alone, a handful by stone celts alone, but it is at least clear that in this period all the main geological sub-regions were settled, chiefly on or near coasts. The main concentration was in the most fertile area, the Eurotas valley, but the district around Vatika bay in the Malea peninsula was also extensively settled. No pottery of either the EH I or EH III sub-phases has been picked up, but the quantity of the ware from the intervening sub-phase suggests that in Lakonia as elsewhere EH II was a long and mainly peaceful epoch. Apart from the pottery and celts, two fragmentary animal figurines have been found, at Palaiopyrgi near Vapheio in the Spartan basin and at Laina near Goritsa. A special position is occupied by the long since known but only recently published hoard of gold and silver jewellery allegedly from the Thyreatis (Greifenhagen 1970, 17f.). This belongs to the end of the EH period (c.2000) and includes filigree work and other features betraying links with the Troad. I suspect, though, that its original home was Lerna (below).

Fortunately the surface surveys have been followed up by

excavation – but unfortunately at only one site, Ay. Stephanos on the western edge of the present Helos plain. EH pottery was unearthed in appreciable amounts associated with burials (often in stone cists, perhaps an anticipation of Middle Helladic practice) as well as in settlement areas (Taylour 1972, 261). There was no EH III and apparently no EH I either, a satisfying confirmation of the picture derived from survey. So far as I can see, the only published metal object from an EH context was a pair of bronze tweezers (Branigan 1974, Cat. 1320). Indeed, apart from the Thyreatis hoard, this is the only EH metal object known so far from Lakonia. Finally, we must note the now underwater necropolis of some sixty tombs, probably mostly EH, on the mainland side of the strait between Pavlopetri islet and the Malea peninsula. Within the adjoining settlement (also submerged) many of the finds were apparently of the end of the Bronze Age, and I shall return to them in various connections.

In this present state of our knowledge of EH Lakonia we cannot even begin to ask how the region may have compared to the better known ones of the Peloponnese, Argolis and Messenia. This is, to say the least, disappointing, because certainly two and possibly three major developments occurred on the Greek mainland in the EH period. First, social differentiation and societal complexity became such that at Lerna in Argolis and at Akovitika on the north-east shore of the Messenian Gulf (four kilometres west of Kalamata) successive stages of building culminated in the erection during EH II of structures suggesting the emergence of an individual or family-group as political over-lord. The function of such structures as centres for the redistribution of goods and services has been admirably explicated by Renfrew (1972, 52f.), although I cannot accept the ‘systems’ model of ‘culture process’ that he employs to explain them. Rather, the appearance of such centres presupposes exploitation, that is the extraction by a few rich people from the many primary producers of a surplus of products thereby made available for redistribution.

This surplus resulted from the second of our three major EH developments, the establishment of the ‘Mediterranean triad’ of dietary staples (corn, olives and wine) as the basis of subsistence. Again, the demonstration of the occurrence and significance of this development is due to Renfrew (1972, 265–307), and it is this development which explains my earlier rejection of Hooker’s characterization of the Early Bronze Age. I shall consider the special qualities of the triad at the appropriate points in later chapters.

The third major EH development is far more controversial. Either towards the end of the period or, more rarely, actually terminating it, several destructions occurred in mainland Greece. For reasons which it is outside the scope of this book to explore, these destructions have

been attributed to Indo-European invaders from the north, who spoke an early form of Greek, rode horses and used the potter's wheel. Suffice it to say here that this neat connection cannot be demonstrated on linguistic or archaeological grounds (Hooker 1976; 1977, 12–32). However, what is more or less beyond dispute is that between c.2000 and 1900 the EH culture gave way to the Middle Helladic (MH), that the foremost types of MH pottery were thrown on the wheel and that some time before the inscription of the earliest known Linear B tablets (Chapter 5) a form of Greek was being spoken in mainland Greece.

None of these three major developments, as I have said, can be positively identified in Lakonia as yet. However, some consolation for this lack of evidence may be gleaned from Kythera. This island's destiny has often been a little distinct historically from that of mainland Lakonia, but at no time was this distinctness more marked than in the Bronze Age. Surface exploration had been conducted since the nineteenth century, but it was only in 1963–5 that excavations were carried out in the most fertile area, the Palaioiopolis valley on the east coast. About 100 m. inland from the Kastri promontory a trial trench on the Kastraki spur yielded sherds not only of EH II (and nothing later) but also of EH I, the only sample of this so far attested in Lakonia (it has Boiotian analogies).

Still more remarkable, however, were the finds from the main dig on the Kastri promontory itself. For these represented the earliest known 'colony' of Cretan settlers, who had emigrated to Kythera during the currency of Early Minoan II pottery. The most economical explanation of this succession of culturally distinct settlements is that around 2500 'the Cretan newcomers ousted the mainlanders' (Coldstream 1973, 35). Coldstream, indeed, goes further and speculates that the Cretan occupation of the best land on Kythera may have set up a kind of frontier between the Minoan sphere of influence on the one hand and the Helladic/Cycladic on the other. I feel doubtful whether the evidence (mainly pottery) will bear such a weighty super-structure of hypothesis. Equally dubious is the suggestion that a small marble vase inscribed in hieroglyphs (with the name of an Egyptian Fifth Dynasty solar temple erected by Userkaf) is evidence of wide foreign relations. For it was a sporadic find and could have made its way to Kythera at a much later date.

Returning to rather firmer ground, we find that evidence from survey has revealed widespread settlement in MH Lakonia, but a slightly altered settlement pattern (Figure 5). An appreciable number of EH sites is given up and some new ones are selected, often on and around an 'akropolis'. The result is that, although fewer actual sites are known in MH (between twenty and thirty) than in EH, these can sometimes be described as of 'village' type rather than isolated

farmsteads and hamlets. The concentration of sites in the Helos plain has provoked the suggestion that MH invaders entered Lakonia by sea (Hope Simpson and Waterhouse 1961, 170); but in the present state of our evidence it is perhaps prudent not to fall back too readily on the invasion hypothesis. What is certain is that local versions of the leading types of MH pottery – grey and yellow ‘Minyan’ and matt-painted – are present in Lakonia.

Three excavated sites call for special mention, two in the Eurotas valley, the third in the west Parnon foreland. The latter, Geraki, utilizing one of the basin plains mentioned in [Chapter 2](#), had perhaps been occupied more or less continuously from Neolithic times. But the trial excavation of 1905 suggested that it only grew to importance in the MH period. Characteristically MH cist-graves (one containing a fine bronze bird-pin) and matt-painted pottery were unearthed, the latter belonging especially to the latest, MH III, phase. Potentially of most significance, perhaps, were the large blocks of walling on the akropolis, but these are not certainly MH in date nor necessarily defensive in purpose. In the Spartan plain Amyklai, later to form part of classical Sparta, had been first settled in the EH period. Apart from an apparent break at the end of MH (there is no LH I, at least), the excavated site seems to have been occupied continuously thereafter at any rate to the eleventh century (cf. [Chapter 7](#)). MH wares represented include grey and black (‘Argive’) Minyan, matt-painted and light-on-dark. The latter may reflect contact with Minoan Crete, but it is from our third and best known excavated site, Ay. Stephanos, that the Cretan connection is most clearly apparent.

from the Middle to the Late Bronze Age in Lakonia. There is a strong Minoan influence, and a very high percentage (over 50%) of the painted pottery finds persuasive parallels for shape, range and decoration with the MM IIIB and LMIA pottery of Kythera' (Taylour 1975, 17). In other words, the cultural frontier postulated by Coldstream for the second half of the third millennium had been trampled underfoot by the end of the seventeenth century. Ay. Stephanos thus provides a perfect illustration of Hooker's 'First Phase of Minoan Influence (Middle Helladic and Late Helladic I pottery)', in which 'an imperfect fusion between Helladic and Minoan leads to the beginning of a distinctive Mycenaean culture' (Hooker 1977, 6; but he is wrong in thinking that it was largely confined to the Peloponnese).

A further note on terminology is appropriate here. The Late Bronze Age in the Greek mainland is known conventionally as either the Late Helladic (LH) or the Mycenaean period: Mycenae 'rich in gold' and the seat of Homer's Agamemnon, sceptred 'lord of many islands and all Argos', has yielded its treasures to the spade on a scale that only an unbridled optimist like Schliemann could have envisaged. For many scholars the epithet 'Mycenaean' remains no more than a convention convenient to describe the period of c.1550 to 1100/1050. By others, however, it is given a precise political connotation, at least for the thirteenth century. I am personally out of sympathy with the latter, for reasons given in [Chapter 6](#) and [Appendix 2](#). But Mycenae none the less cannot be ousted from its central position in the transition from the MH to the LH period, despite the recent accessions of material from excavation which fill out and balance the picture.

Part of this balancing material comes from Lakonia, and a relatively recent attempt to define LH I pottery (Dickinson 1974; 1977, 25f.) has drawn extensively on the finds from Ay. Stephanos and, especially, Kythera. Of far greater moment, however, are the finds from the two grave-circles at Mycenae and their paler reflections at, for example, Peristeria in Messenia. The art of the Mycenae shaft-graves and the raw materials of the artefacts entombed within them display an enormously widened range of foreign relations, extending from Egypt perhaps to the Black Sea, from Syria perhaps even to Britain. Hooker (1977, 36–58) has convinced me that we should not regard the occupants of the shaft-graves as barbarian intruders incarcerated with the loot of their raids. Instead the evidence from Mycenae, where both grave-circles were inaugurated in the late MH period, may be seen as a greatly enlarged and enlivened version of the humbler process of transition under heavy Minoan influence apparent at Ay. Stephanos. Indeed, Dickinson has suggested that the originators of the LH I style of pottery could have been potters who emigrated to Central Greece from Kythera, since mature Kytheran LM IA seems to be the single

most important influence on the style.

However that may be, relatively little is known of LH I in Lakonia, apart from Ay. Stephanos and perhaps Epidauros Limera. Taking together therefore LH I and LH II, which span roughly the sixteenth and fifteenth centuries, we find occupation on only some fifteen to twenty sites, an apparent decrease on the MH figure. The discrepancy, however, may simply be due to failure to find or distinguish the relevant pottery, for by LH II at any rate there is unambiguous evidence that a qualitative change has been effected in Lakonian social, economic and political organization. In none of the preceding periods, as we have seen, was it possible to establish with certainty the existence of a settlement hierarchy. But by the fifteenth century three of the six main subdivisions of Lakonia can boast a kind of monument which seems to presuppose economic prosperity, a high degree of social differentiation and centralization of political control – the tholos (beehive) tomb. From east to west early Mycenaean tholoi have been excavated at Analipsis in the west Paron foreland, Vapheio in the Eurotas furrow and, if it may be dated so early (cf. Dickinson 1977, 92), Kambos in the west Taygetos foreland.

Each has produced exotic and expensive grave-goods, but far and away the most striking is the one at Vapheio, which deserves closer attention for four main reasons: first, the central place of Lakonia, whatever its precise location, will henceforth always be found in the Spartan basin; second, Lakonia is now seen to be marching in step with the hitherto seemingly more progressive regions of the Peloponnese; third, the quality of the artefacts from the Vapheio tholos is strikingly high; finally, and perhaps most instructively, the promise of the fifteenth century is not apparently fulfilled in the thirteenth in Lakonia, as it is in the Argolis and Messenia.

The tholos itself is quite large (10.35 m. in diameter) with a built approach (dromos) measuring 29.80 m. The stones, however, are not well worked or laid, and the tomb is somewhat unusual for being sited in the top of a hill rather than cut out of the base of a slope. It was robbed in antiquity for its contents (and more recently for its worked stones), but the tomb-robbers overlooked an underground pit in the floor of the chamber. Herein lay the 'Vapheio Prince', his splendidly intact grave-goods offering a sharp contrast to his utterly disintegrated skeleton. Rings, gems, beads, a mirror, an earpick, perfume vases, cups, a sword, nine knives and daggers, a pair of hunting-spears and axes – the range of artefacts is impressive enough. Overwhelmingly impressive are their materials and quality: 'Palace Style' pottery, two vases of alabaster, an axe of Syrian type, a finger-ring of iron, beads of amethyst and Baltic amber, scale-pans of bronze, lamps of stone, two daggers inlaid with metal cut-outs and niello, cups of silver. Finally,

there are the most famous items of all, the two gold cups now prominently displayed in the National Museum at Athens; their bovine scenes have a strongly Cretan flavour even if they were not necessarily both executed by Cretan craftsmen. In short, the Vapheio tholos and its contents seem to me neatly to encapsulate the distinguishing features of Hooker's 'Second Phase of Minoan Influence', namely 'the almost complete fusion between Helladic and Minoan and the adoption on the mainland of Minoan art-forms and the external features of Minoan cult' (Hooker 1977, 6).

Thus we may suppose that much of LH II Lakonia was divided into local 'princedoms'. But LH II was not only the great age of the tholos tomb in the region. It also witnessed the inception or growth of the burial practice which some prehistorians consider to be diagnostic of the LH period as a whole, the entombment of generations of families in chamber-tombs excavated from the softer rocks rather than built in to them as most tholoi were. Chamber-tombs of LH II date are known from Krokeai in Vardhounia and Epidauros Limera in the Malea peninsula; the contemporary stone-built oval tombs at Palaiochori in the east Paron foreland may have been derived from the latter (Dickinson 1977, 63f.)

As far as the scanty excavated evidence from settlements is concerned there is just one site to be added to Ay. Stephanos, that occupied in historical times by the sanctuary of Menelaos and Helen on a bluff overlooking the Eurotas east of Sparta ([Figure 6](#)). British excavations were resumed here in 1973 after an interval of over sixty years, and preliminary reports speak of a MH phase of occupation followed by one datable to LH IIA (including LM IB imports). Neither of these deposits unfortunately was associated with any structure, but an impressive though relatively short-lived LH IIB-III A1 building complex of two storeys has been identified, from which came a seal, two female terracotta figurines and a contemporary house-model, perhaps representing a shrine. The potential significance of these discoveries is that they mark the earliest phases of occupation of the site which many believe to have become in the thirteenth century the Lakonian equivalent of Mycenae, Pylos, Thebes and other palatial centres. But as yet, as we shall see in more detail in [Chapter 6](#), this supposition cannot be corroborated.

However, the Menelaion site undoubtedly reflects the general expansion of Mycenaean civilization in Lakonia in LH III A or roughly the fourteenth century. The building complex referred to above was itself quickly replaced at the end of the fifteenth century by an even more elaborate 'Mansion'. The suggested explanation for the replacement is the occurrence of an earthquake or tremor of the kind to which the region as a whole is still prone. But the 'Mansion' too

was abandoned before the end of LH IIIA1, and the 'Mansion' area was not reoccupied for another century and a half, and then only on a reduced scale. Settlement is, however, attested elsewhere on the site in the interim.




Figure 6 The Menelaion hill near Sparta

The twenty-five or so other LH III A sites in Lakonia (identified chiefly by surface survey) pale somewhat by comparison. However,

excellent quality kylix (stemmed goblet) fragments of this phase are reported in association with substantial building remains at Ay. Stephanos, which has also produced a LH IIIA sealstone. There are LH IIIA sherds from Palaiopyrgi, the large hill occupied since the EH period with which the Vapheio tholos some 300 m. away is most easily associated. A chamber-tomb at Melathria near Skoura in the Spartan basin has yielded one of the earliest known Mycenaean pictorial vases, dated to the end of the fifteenth century by Demacopoulou (1971). A terracotta from Lekas in the Helos plain has been classed among the earliest ('naturalistic') Mycenaean figurines (French 1971, 110). Finally, an amber seal with indecipherable design, one of the more ambitious Mycenaean attempts at carving the material, was found with LH IIIA pottery and other impressive grave-goods in a chamber-tomb at Pellana in the northern Eurotas furrow (Strong 1966, 17f.)

I have left to the end of this final introductory chapter the early Late Bronze Age evidence from Kythera, which yet again offers us a window on the wider Aegean world. As we have seen, a Cretan 'colony' at Kastri probably ousted a settlement of mainland stamp around 2500. The Cretan character and connections of the 'colony' were maintained unbroken until the LM IB phase; an eighteenth-century inscription of Naram-Sin, King of Eshnunna, testifies to continuing widespread foreign relations (unless it too is a later immigrant like the Userkaf inscription). Cretan influence on the mainland increased noticeably at the transition between MH and LH, and the credit for the change to LH I pottery was perhaps partly due to potters from Kastri. About 1500, however, a cataclysmic volcanic eruption on the island of Thera destroyed a flourishing 'Minoanize' settlement there and perhaps much else: some pumice was carried as far as Nichoria in Messenia during the currency of LH IIA (Rapp and Cook 1973). Thereafter, perhaps in direct or indirect consequence of the Thera eruption, Cretan influence in the Aegean waned. Indeed, it is widely believed that c.1450 the palace of Knossos was taken over by mainlanders. However, some seventy-five years later Knossos too was reduced to political if not physical insignificance.

This change in relations between Crete and the mainland is nicely reflected in the way LM IB pottery (exported, incidentally, to Palaiochori and Epidauros Limera as well as to the Menelaion site) is increasingly jostled by LH IIA at Kastri, until the settlement was actually abandoned at the end of the currency of the style (c.1450). Hardly any LH IIB was found, but there was LH IIIA pottery in a chamber-tomb further south at Lioni, and Kythera appears to have attracted Egyptian attention in the first half of the fourteenth century (Sergent 1977, 138). In the succeeding LH IIIB phase ([Chapter 6](#)) the

destiny of Kythera was reunited with that of the mainland: both were firmly Helladic. Thus in the light of the Kytheran evidence above all, but taking account also of the rest of the finds from Lakonia, it seems to me misleading to describe even the LH IIIA2 period, let alone LH IIIB, as the 'Third Phase of Minoan Influence' (Hooker 1977, 6).

Notes on further reading

For bibliography on the individual sites mentioned in this and later chapters see [Appendix 1](#).

With my remarks on the impossibility of giving figures for population density in Lakonia compare and contrast McDonald and Hope Simpson in *MME* 132: 'Of course, a solid basis for even the most carefully hedged estimates of prehistoric population in Messenia does not yet exist. Some of our colleagues have therefore pressed us to avoid absolute numbers entirely, since it is so easy for the most cautious estimates to become accepted facts. Perhaps we should have heeded their advice ...'

The 'Neolithic Revolution' is succinctly discussed by Cole 1970. Hauptmann 1971 is an excellent review of research on the Stone Age, especially the Neolithic, in the Aegean.

For the Early and Middle Bronze Ages in general see Caskey 1971, 1973; Schachermeyr 1976. A good, though dated, discussion of the transition between the two, as indeed of all aspects of the Greek Bronze Age, is Vermeule 1964. The most recent discussion of the Mycenae shaft graves is Dickinson 1977, 39–58. A pottery deposit from Ay. Stephanos spanning the MH/LH transition (c.1700–1450) has been fully published by Rutter and Rutter 1976. Disagreeing with Dickinson 1974, J.B. Rutter suggests that LH I was developed in the southern Peloponnese (perhaps actually in Lakonia) earlier than in the northern Peloponnese and that the stimulus to the change was the immigration of potters from Kythera to Crete in MH III. Dickinson's most recent views may be studied in Dickinson 1977, especially 24 and 108 (with its n. 2).

For the 'Cretan connection' from c.1525 to 1375 see Hooker 1977, ch. 4. But his conclusions on the 'Mycenaeanizing' of Knossos in the fifteenth century are vitiated by his omission of the Warrior Graves and his unclear account of Linear B.

II

Preclassical Lakonia c. 1300–500
BC

Chapter five

Greek oral tradition as history

Almost half a century ago the Mycenaean period was fully prehistoric in the sense that it was 'text-free'. (The Homeric poems, some aspects of whose historicity are considered in [Appendix 2](#), are not of course contemporary texts.) But thanks to a combination of cryptographic detective work and linguistic scholarship it is now possible to read some of its documents. These are the accidentally baked clay tablets of varying shapes and sizes inscribed in 'Linear B', a syllabary devised to transcribe an early form of the Greek language. We cannot say certainly where or when the syllabary was invented, but the few findspots of the tablets are significant: Knossos, Pylos, Mycenae, Thebes and Tiryns. To these we may add the sites which have produced vases inscribed with Linear B symbols: Eleusis, Kreusis, Orchomenos, Chania and now the Menelaion site (Catling 1977, 34). The syllabary's total attested number of symbols (signs and ideograms) is about 200. To judge from the evidence of handwriting, the only available criterion, there were about 100 scribes working at any one time at Knossos, about fifty at Pylos. The contexts in which the tablets were found may be spread over a period of up to two centuries (c.1375 at Knossos to c.1200 at Pylos), but little or no stylistic development is discernible. The tablets reveal the existence of a basically agrarian economy with a developed division of labour and a multiplicity of social statuses and factors of production.

Such are the bare facts. The decipherment of the script – still contested by a few diehards – has undoubtedly made available an important new source of information and provoked a staggering volume of research. Yet in view of the tendency of some Mycenologists to rush to premature judgments it is necessary to state at the outset that the scope of the advance is restricted in terms both of geographical applicability and of the type of information the tablets

convey. Thus Lakonia is only one of the (archaeologically) important regions which have yet to produce Linear B tablets, unless one of the two signs incised on a schist tab found sporadically at Ay. Stephanos really is Linear B (*BCH* 1974, 613). It is uncertain how far this negative evidence should be pressed, although it is perhaps fair to comment that, if there had been a Lakonian Pylos, it ought to have been discovered. Second, the tablets are in fact merely the everyday administrative mnemonics of centralized and bureaucratic monarchies, used for the collection of raw facts primarily of a narrowly economic nature (accounts, lists, prices, assignments, requisitions and the like) and not for final digests or permanent records. They contain not a scrap of poetry, law, history or oratory. In short, although there is perhaps a case for redefining the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries in the Mycenaean world as 'protohistoric', the Linear B tablets do not mark the beginning of Greek history in the strict, narrower sense in which that word is employed in this chapter.

Moreover, although it can never be demonstrated, it has proved a highly fruitful working hypothesis that in c.1200 the Linear B script shared the fate of the palace-economies it had exclusively served ([Chapter 6](#)) and that subsequently there was felt neither the need nor the inclination to transmit the technique of writing to the rising generation. In other words, in the 400 or so years before the Greeks created an alphabet out of the Phoenician nonvocalic sign-system they again communicated among themselves, as they had done before c.1500, solely through oral discourse, whether in poetry or prose, and normally in face-to-face contact. The fact of renewed illiteracy is not perhaps in itself remarkable, since the Linear B script was almost certainly a scribal preserve. But for the historian of the period from 1300 to the eighth century or even later it raises the crucial problems of method involved in handling Greek oral tradition.

Before discussing these, however, I should point out that, although 'historian', 'historiography' and kindred expressions have a classical Greek etymology, their respective spheres of reference in ancient and modern (i.e. 'western') cultures do not wholly overlap either in the activities they describe or in the aims to which the activities in question are directed. It is therefore at first sight somewhat anomalous that Herodotus is now fêted in the phrase of Cicero as the 'Father of History' and that Thucydides is considered – admittedly with qualifications and serious reservations – to be Klio's favourite son. But it was long ago recognized that Herodotus was a very different kind of historian from Thucydides and that both differed again from the ideal type of the modern historian. Where then do the differences lie? Not surely in the matter of objectives narrowly conceived – 'We have to discover not merely how it actually happened but why it happened

that way and had to happen that way' (Beloch 1913, 7) – but rather in general outlook and technical methods, above all in the treatment of sources.

From the second half of the seventeenth century onwards the idea had become accepted that a modern scholar had as much justification in writing the history of antiquity as the ancients themselves, even if the methods adopted were strictly speaking as often those of the antiquarian as of the historian proper. The modern historiography of the ancient world began with Edward Gibbon, in the sense that it was he who fused the outlook and methods of the (antiquarian) 'érudits' with those of the enlightened but airy 'philosophies' (below). But the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable development, sometimes dismissed unfairly as 'Hyperkritik', whose effect can be seen in a work like Bernheim 1894. The essence of the new approach, if it may be shortly summarized, was its canonical insistence that usable evidence must be securely dated, contemporary, documentary and of known provenance. When applied to the ancient world, this approach could lead to excesses, and Beloch himself was rightly castigated for confusing the methods of the historian with those of the various kinds of natural scientist. However, in what follows I hope to show that the reaction against the scepticism of Beloch has in some respects and in some quarters been too sharp.

A leading Homerist has written that 'the question how far tradition may be legitimately called in evidence is a living problem and a chief cause of irreconcilable disagreement among historians and critics' (D.H.F. Gray in Myres 1958, 228). The peculiar qualities of the Homeric epics may require, and they have been given ([Appendix 2](#)), somewhat specialized treatment. But this remark applies none the less to all the preserved literary evidence relating to the period from c.1300 to 480 or roughly the late Mycenaean, Dark and Archaic Ages. The discussion cannot be entirely confined to Sparta, but here the problems are seen in particularly sharp relief. For the state never produced a historian of its own, and the course of its eccentric development occasioned with time the phenomenon (by no means confined to the ancient world) aptly named 'the Spartan mirage', the distorted image of what both Spartans and non-Spartans for various and often mutually inconsistent reasons wanted Sparta to be, to stand for and to have accomplished. The reasons why Sparta never produced a historian have repeatedly been canvassed, and the conventional solutions are given in terms appropriate to differing views of Spartan abnormality. What is really remarkable, however, is not that Sparta produced none but that any Greek state ever produced one. If that seems paradoxical, in view both of known historical traditions of long standing in other civilizations and the fifth-century achievement in

Greece, then a glance first at the ways in which Greek writers from Homer to Herodotus represented the past and then at the available means of reconstructing it should render the paradox less impressive.

There is some dispute whether Greek historiography experienced a lengthy gestation or sprang fully formed from the head of Herodotus. But there should be no doubt that the earliest Greek literature, the Homeric poems, are not history books. This fact can be established from several different viewpoints – aetiology, chronology, geography, delineation of character and motivation, overall intention and so on – but it remains a fact, despite attempts at interpretation which seem ‘to make no distinction in principle between the tales of prehistoric wars and heroic deeds retailed by the epic poets and, say, the account of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides’ (Hampl 1962, 39).

Again, some (including even A.D. Momigliano) have seen in Hesiod (c.700) the first stirrings of a historical consciousness. But the most immediately relevant passages, the invocation of the Muses and their ambiguous response in the preface to the *Theogony* and the myth of the Five Races in the *Works and Days*, seem to me to indicate the contrary. A concept of truth which includes more (but not much) than simply not-forgetting is outlined, but there is no hint of methods of verification; truth is guaranteed by memory, but memory is sacralized as the goddess Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses, and thereby removed from the human, empirical sphere; the time factor is taken into account, but mutually incompatible ways of representing it are hopelessly confused; the aetiological perspective of history is implicit in the attempt to account for present ills by a description of the past, but the mortal races of Bronze and Iron receive no connected narrative and are separated by a notoriously inorganic interpolation (taken over from Homer), the Race of semi-divine Heroes. In short, the historical achievement of Hesiod was no more – but from a religious standpoint no less – than to provide the Greeks with a mythical past from the Creation of the Gods to the unexplained end of the Race of Heroes.

Lesser poets than Hesiod, both inside and outside the ‘Epic Cycle’, who were partly at least utilizing an inherited stock of traditional oral poetical language, merely ‘completed’ the stories of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by providing their events and characters with antecedents and issue. A large portion of their work, however, consisted in doing for contemporary humans, especially the blue-blooded variety, what Hesiod had done for the immortal gods: elaborating respectable but no less fictional family-trees. The only Spartan poet in this genre – of whom the name, a few lines and a handful of doubtfully attributed works are known – is Kinaithon (probably seventh century). The suggestion that his subjects included the deeds of Herakles and

Orestes makes sense in the light of the attempt of the Spartan royal families to connect themselves with these 'Achaean' ([Appendix 3](#)) but it hardly inspires confidence in Kinaithon's impartial striving after veracity. Indeed, he may owe his rather dim remembrance to precisely this sort of religiose para-political activity rather than to his skill as a poet.

By about the mid-seventh century 'original' epic poetry was beginning to lose its fascination for singers and audiences alike and was being challenged by the more personal genres of elegy and lyric, in which Sparta was excellently represented by Tyrtaios (c.650) and Alkman (c.600) respectively. Apart from citing a few acceptable mythological precedents, including the first surviving version of the conflated myths of the 'Dorian invasion' and the 'Return of the Herakleidae', Tyrtaios devoted himself to the present in a pragmatic fashion. Through a skilful fusion of old and new, both in language and in ideas, he advocated a moral and political ideal to which future generations of military-minded Spartans paid more than lip-service. Alkman was proud of his pedagogic inventiveness, but he too was largely content to draw on an inherited mythological stock for his themes and may have had the same kind of anti-historical outlook and effect as Tyrtaios and Kinaithon. His death meant also the death of the local poetic tradition. Half a century later, around 550, the Sicilian Stesichoros visited Sparta. It is significant of the prevailing Spartan intellectual climate that he lent his voice to an interpretation of a myth-historical tradition (Orestes again) designed to validate the Spartan claim to sovereignty over Arkadia and perhaps even the Greek world as a whole.

By 550, however, the intellectual epicentre had shifted for good from the Peloponnese to east Greece, especially Miletos. The prime movers in this inchoate Enlightenment were natural philosophers (it is wrong to describe their explanations of natural phenomena as 'scientific' or 'materialist'), and their advance was premised on 'two great mental transformations: a positive way of thinking, excluding every form of the supernatural and rejecting the implicit assimilation established by myth between physical phenomena and divine agents; an abstract way of thinking, depriving reality of that power of change with which myth endowed it' (Vernant 1971, II, 106). These 'mental transformations' were accompanied by or presupposed corresponding changes in language, which perhaps is not merely 'a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas, but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity' (Whorf 1956, 212). Together they made possible history as we understand it.

Yet initially the spirit of critical secular enquiry they expressed, including the new notion that men acquire their knowledge through

their own unaided efforts, led to no search for new sources of information about the past and no development of a historical consciousness beyond the tendency, exemplified c.500 by Hekataios (not coincidentally from Miletos), to use personal experience as a yardstick to measure the intrinsic plausibility of the 'many and ridiculous tales' about the past he picked up on his travels. (The words in inverted commas are taken from the Preface to Hekataios' *Genealogies*, which is quoted in full in Jeffery 1976, 34.) These tales, whose content was often ultimately religious, were thereby pruned of their fantastic accretions, but the historicity of the residue was not questioned. Thus still in the fifth century 'the atmosphere in which the Fathers of History set to work was saturated with myth' (Finley 1975, 13).

Not all myths of course are narrowly speaking historical. But in one application of their general function – myth 'anchors the present in the past' (Cohen 1969, 349) – they can present themselves to the historian as evidence about the past, and we must decide by what criteria they are to be assessed. Clearly the strict application of nineteenth-century 'hyper'-critical methods is inappropriate. But how far and in what direction can or should we today improve on the rationalizing of a Hekataios or the limited but devastating scepticism of an Eratosthenes, the Voltaire of antiquity? There is no straightforward answer to this question, but the best account of the problems involved of that I know is a now undeservedly little-read essay by George Grote (1873), to which I shall return.

Any answer, however, must depend on the evaluation of at least the following factors: the nature of oral tradition (defined as 'verbal testimony transmitted from one generation to the next one or a later one' in Vansina 1973, xiii) in an illiterate or semi-literate society, or in a society which did not keep records of a detailed, documentary kind; the distinction between accurate or exaggerated matter of fact on the one hand and variously plausible fiction on the other, and the psychological and sociological circumstances affecting the relationship between them; the ultimately religious content of much Greek legend; and the effects of political and social change on traditional material. It is only when the implications of all these factors taken together are squarely faced that the vastness of Herodotus' achievement – 'there was no Herodotus before Herodotus' (Momigliano 1966, 129) – can be viewed in correct perspective.

It will always be easier to say what Herodotus' achievement amounts to than how it was effected, because he was 'one of the great innovating geniuses of the fifth century' (Collingwood 1946, 28). The three aspects of his achievement which perhaps most commend him to modern scholars are these: his hierarchical ordering of types of

evidence and the methods of obtaining it according to their intrinsic reliability; his unobtrusive creation of an acceptable though inevitably lacunose chronological framework; and his generally temperate exercise of that 'judgement' whose indispensability is primarily responsible for keeping the methods of the historian and those of the natural scientist conceptually distinct. We should not, however, exaggerate the discontinuity that Herodotus' work represents. Among his conscious influences must be counted Homer as well as Hekataios: the ancients hit the mark when they characterized Herodotus as 'most Homeric' ('Longinus' 13.3), for style is an essential ingredient of any historian's makeup. It is 'the image of character', as Gibbon put it in the first page of his autobiography. Besides, the critical principles of Herodotus fall short of the rigorousness of Thucydides, for whom 'getting the facts right was all-important' (Ste. Croix 1972, 6).

Thucydides, however, in striving for higher standards of veracity, set up a contradiction never resolved by his successors, even when altered conditions would have made its resolution possible. He believed that only contemporary, and above all political, history could be written adequately, but that the basis of historical documentation should remain oral testimony. That this was not unreasonable in his own day (and a *fortiori* at all earlier periods) may be judged from the fact that not before the end of the fifth century did his own democratic Athens, for all its energy in publishing documents involving the common weal, establish a central archive. This fact needs emphasis, since the historical methods described and practised by Bernheim and his fellow-thinkers paradigmatically presuppose the existence of 'objective' documentary records, securely dated and incapable of distortion with the passage of time. So powerful, however, was the example of Thucydides that the habit of personal inspection of documents was but rarely acquired in antiquity, the supreme irony being that from his day onwards the quantity and quality of documentary material were steadily increased by antiquarians like Hippias of Elis and Hellanikos of Lesbos, both of whom, incidentally, visited Sparta and wrote about Spartan institutions. The result was that, to the detriment of the respective practitioners, 'political history and learned research on the past tended to be kept in two separate compartments' (Momigliano 1966, 4), a restrictive practice finally overcome by Edward Gibbon.

The intellectual development begun by the East Greek philosophers in the mid-sixth century and embraced by all leading Greek thinkers before Plato has been described as 'the emancipation of thought from myth' (Frankfort et al. 1946, ch. 8). However, even the most fervent admirers of the 'rationalist' *par excellence*, Thucydides, are obliged to admit that his acceptance as fact of certain beliefs about the very

distant (even pre-Trojan War) past sits uneasily with his rigorous inspection of contemporary testimony and that in this respect he went further even than the ‘credulous’ Herodotus. The fourth-century ‘universal’ historian Ephorus, it is true, declined to treat of the period before the ‘Return of the Herakleidai’; but it is not clear whether this reflects a sceptical outlook or the view that the earlier period was irrelevant or had been adequately treated already (e.g. by Homer). In any case, neither he nor any other surviving author before Eratosthenes, head of the Library at Alexandria in the late third century (and ‘Beta’, as he was known, was the exception to prove many rules), impugned the historicity not merely of the variously fantastic accretions but also of the supposedly true kernel of the traditional tales.

The proper question to ask then is not why it took so long, but how far it would be possible – for historians in antiquity from the fifth century on and for us alike – to distinguish historical fact among the mass of traditional material, which consisted partly of knowledge about the past embedded in poetical or prose narratives handed down through the generations, in part of sheer fiction handed down in the same way, and partly of the learned speculations of over-heated imaginations. For it seems probable, as I have pointed out, that between c.1200 and c.800 Greece was illiterate and that between c.800 and c.450 there was no recitation or writing of history (as we understand that word) and precious little retrieval and storage of the stuff from which history can be created. Indeed, in the case of Sparta an apocryphal *rhetra* (ordinance) expressly forbade the inscribing of laws, and the only other records kept here were lists of names (victors at the great religious festivals, eponymous magistrates and kings) and oracles. The authenticity of the earliest sections of these lists and their properly historical value have both been questioned, with some justice.

Faced with this situation, Grote correctly asked (1873, 87): ‘With what consistency can you require that a community which either does not command the means, or has not learned the necessity, of registering the phenomena of its present, should possess any knowledge of the phenomena of its past?’ He himself, however, was too good a historian to deny outright that traditional material contained any factual element. He insisted only that belief should be withheld until the tradition itself could be independently verified.

The advantage we hold over Grote today is not so much a greater sophistication in methods as a vastly increased knowledge of the contemporary material remains, which are authentic, though not self-explanatory, records of the times they represent. These are the only sure basis on which to reconstruct the history of the period down to

the eighth century, if not later; but they do not constitute a sufficient basis. In particular, archaeology rarely if ever warrants narrowly political inferences (see further [Chapter 1](#)). Certainly an explanation which takes account of both the traditional literary evidence and the material remains may be preferable to an explanation which ignores one or the other. But this by itself does not increase its likelihood of being correct. In short, I agree with Gibbon that ‘ancient history’ (properly so called) begins in the sixth century ‘with the Persian Empire and the Republics of Rome and Athens’. I remain extremely doubtful that it will ever be possible to write a wholly convincing narrative or systematic account of Greek history before c.550, the starting-point of Herodotus, the ‘Father of History’. In the remaining chapters of this Part, therefore, I can claim no more than to have based my account on all the available ancient evidence.

Notes on further reading

The fundamental publication of the Linear B syllabary is Ventris and Chadwick 1973. Most of the tablets are now fully published and transcribed. For the inscriptions on vases see Sacconi 1974. The controversy over the dating of the Knossos tablets is briefly resumed by Hood (1971, 112–15); but Hood is one of the few who still reject the decipherment. Perhaps the best general discussion of the bearing of the tablets on the various aspects of Mycenaean civilization is Hiller and Panagl 1976; a good short summary is Dow 1968.

An introductory work on the historical value of oral tradition is Vansina 1973, but this is controversial even among Africanists. Henige 1974 is in some ways superior, but he too relies heavily on African evidence. This qualification is crucial, since the evaluation of oral tradition as historical evidence depends largely upon detailed ethnographic knowledge of the features of oral history as a system within the culture under study rather than as isolated scraps of ideas.

I have briefly discussed the origins of the alphabet, with special reference to Lakonia, in Cartledge 1978. The basic account is still Jeffery 1961, 1–42; add now Coldstream 1977, ch. 11.

For the distinct activities of the historian and the antiquarian, and a historical perspective on this restrictive practice, see Momigliano 1966, ch. 1. An excellent discussion of Gibbon’s contribution to historical method is Momigliano 1966, ch. 2. But antiquarianism retains a strong foothold in ancient history to this day.

For the essential distinctions between the methods of the historian and those of the natural scientists see Berlin 1960; Hexter 1971, ch. 1. But the gap may not be quite as wide as they suppose.

The standard work on the ‘Spartan mirage’ in antiquity is Ollier 1933, 1943. Tigerstedt 1965 and 1974 is more complete, but belies its

title; it is particularly useful for its massive bibliographical footnotes. Far more enlightening is Rawson 1969, which brings the story down to the Second World War. Starr 1965 is usefully succinct.

On post-Homeric epic poetry see Huxley 1969, esp. 86–9 (Kinaithon); but the assertion that ‘a flourishing body of local legends in Lakedaïmon ... came down from the Mycenaean age, preserved and elaborated by the ... Achaean survivors from the ruin of the bronze age civilisations of Peloponnese’ (85) should be treated with caution.

Bibliography on Tyrtaios and Alkman may be found in the notes to [Chapters 8](#) and [9](#). For Stesichoros and Sparta see West 1969, 148.

On Hekataios generally see Pearson 1939, ch. 2. His possible contribution to the transmission of the Spartan king-lists is considered in [Appendix 3](#). For Herodotus’ place in the history of historiography see Momigliano 1966, ch. 8. On Thucydides see the notes to [Chapter 12](#).

Eratosthenes’ multifaceted intellectual achievement is assessed by Fraser (1970; 1972 *passim*).

An excellent restatement of what seems to me essentially Grote’s position on mythical and legendary tradition is Finley 1975, ch. 1.

Chapter six

The last Mycenaeans c. 1300–1050

The Linear B tablets, as we saw in the previous chapter, do not enable us to write a history properly so called of the late Mycenaean period. However, the use of tablets made of clay does suggest at least a *prima facie* comparability with the contemporary civilizations of Egypt, Anatolia and the Levant and so provides a convenient transition to what I believe to be a proper context for studying late Mycenaean Greece. The documentary evidence for contact or conflict between the Mycenaean Greeks and their eastern neighbours in the political, diplomatic or military spheres may in many cases merely be the spurious outcome of ‘a sort of philological game of hopscotch’ (Carpenter 1966, 45). But the intercourse in articles of trade (actual finds and inferences from the Linear B tablets), linguistic borrowings, artistic interconnections and, I should say, the very use of the unsuitable medium of clay for Linear B script – these are not so easily dismissed. I am of course far from believing that Mycenaean Greece was just ‘a peripheral culture of the Ancient East, its westernmost extension’ (Astour 1967, 357f.). But I find it implausible that the contemporaneity of the Mycenaean ‘time of troubles’ with the series of destructive upheavals engulfing the whole eastern Mediterranean basin was just a coincidence, even if the nature of the connection between them cannot be precisely demonstrated.

Underlying tensions in the Middle East were given ominously concrete expression in c.1300, when Egypt and Hatti (the Hittites) fought a major but inconclusive battle at Qadesh in Syria. Sixteen years later Rameses II and Hattusilis III concluded peace on terms which included guarantees of mutual aid in case either power was attacked by a third party. The treaty was then sealed in the accepted manner by a marriage-alliance. The practical effect of this elaborate diplomacy, however, was relatively short-lived. In c.1232 Merenptah

was obliged to repulse an invasion of Egypt mounted by Libyans from Cyrenaica and 'northerners from all lands'; and in c.1191 and again in c.1188 Rameses III defeated insurgents who came by land and sea from the north-east to settle in the Nile delta. In the interval between these onerous but successful exploits of the two Pharaohs the capital of the Hittites at Hattusas in Anatolia was destroyed and their empire disintegrated. The kingdoms of Ugarit, Alalakh and Alasia (Cyprus?) met a similar fate, and there were further disasters elsewhere in the Levant. In the space of about a century the balance of power in the Middle East had been forcibly and irretrievably altered.

In round numbers 1300 can therefore legitimately be regarded as a pivotal date in the history of the Bronze Age civilizations abutting the east Mediterranean basin. In Greece it was approximately then that the Mycenaean civilization received its diagnostic expression in the construction of massive fortifications and palatial complexes at Mycenae and elsewhere. To be more exact, 1300 was the date now most widely accepted for the transition from the LH IIIA style of pottery to LH IIIB. This may seem an improbable way of making a historical assertion, but history is nothing without chronology, and the chronology of the Aegean Bronze Age, as already remarked, is a matter of the typology of its pottery. The three main ceramic phases of the Mycenaean period (LH I—III) are not incompatible with the few available excavated stratigraphies (most recently that from Nichoria in Messenia). But the sub-divisions of these phases – seven for the third alone and ten in all, according to the still generally useful scheme of A. Furumark first proposed in 1941 – are based on somewhat subjective judgments of the direction and pace of stylistic change and on arbitrary decisions as to where one sub-phase ends and the next begins. Absolute dates, moreover, may be derived only from the association of Mycenaean pottery in datable Egyptian contexts or with objects that can be cross-referenced with the Egyptian series. Thus it is hardly surprising that both the initial and the terminal dates of LH IIIB pottery are disputed (1300 and 1200 are strictly approximations and perhaps considerably too low) and that the nature and pace of stylistic change are detectable with assurance only at Mycenae. These are not trivial matters, since the 'historiography' of the late Mycenaean period depends upon them.

It is not disputed though that pottery can and must be used as evidence for chronology. However, deeper problems confront those who wish to draw other kinds of inference from the various facets of pottery manufacture and distribution. These problems are particularly acute when pottery, thanks to its fitness to survive, constitutes the bulk of the artefactual or – as so often in prehistoric contexts – the total evidence, and when the amount of controlled excavation has

been comparatively slight. Such is the situation in Mycenaean Lakonia. Take, for instance, the question of population density. Of the inherent limitations of evidence from survey listed in [Chapter 4](#) the one particularly relevant here is that not all types of pot have the same or even comparable potential for survival or for survival in an obvious or diagnostic way. For the overwhelming proportion of Lakonian LH IIIB sites identified by surface survey alone made their presence known through the medium of kylikes, deep bowls and stemmed bowls, often by a combination of sherds from all three shapes. Since the stems of the kylikes and stemmed bowls are particularly durable and eye-catching, it is theoretically possible that the apparently high relative density of population in Lakonia in LH IIIB is a mirage arising from an accident of cultural choice in the ceramic sphere. Fortunately this inference can be checked against evidence of other kinds and from other areas and is unlikely to be correct. But it is not beyond a doubt incorrect, and the possibility underlines the urgency of the need for more excavation.

Mycenaean IIIB pottery was diffused very widely. ‘Developed LH IIIB is the great period of the *koine* and mass production’ (Wace 1957, 222). On the mainland it enjoyed common currency as far north as Thessaly, though it was imported only desultorily into the mountainous interior of Epirus. Overseas it was used in the east and the west both by non-Greeks and by temporary or permanent Mycenaean expatriates. The concentration of exports, which had begun to gather momentum during LH IIIA, may be somehow connected with the fall of Knossos c.1375 or more directly with the establishment of Mycenaean traders in semi-permanent overseas emporia, for example at Scoglio del Tonno in the instep of Italy (near the later Spartan settlement of Taras: [Chapter 8](#)), ugarit in Syria and various places in Cyprus. However, along with the increasing weight of production and breadth of distribution there developed a striking homogeneity of fabric and style which makes it difficult to discover the provenance of individual pots or sherds. Thus the hope expressed by Wace and Blegen (1939) that it would one day be possible to differentiate Lakonian and Corinthian LH IIIB pottery in the same routine way as their Archaic successors has so far proved vain, although some progress has been made through optical emission spectroscopy and neutron-activation analysis. There is, however, a certain amount of regional differentiation, visible to the naked eye and apparent to the touch, in both clay and paint.

So far thirty-five sites in Lakonia have certainly yielded LH IIIB pottery, and four more doubtfully so ([Figure 7](#)). Of the maximum of thirty-nine, however, only five are scientifically excavated habitation-sites. I shall return to these in due course, but first I want to dwell

briefly on Pavlopetri in the Malea peninsula, the chief site in the Vatika plain and so the prehistoric forerunner of classical Boiai. This would have been the sixth excavated habitation-site were it not now underwater, where natural conditions prevented the recovery of more than a bare outline. But even this outline is instructive, in three main ways. First, the divers located only two chamber-tombs, which are usually considered the customary receptacles of dead Mycenaeans, as against thirty-seven cist-graves, which had been typical of the MH period. In view of this find (if the cists are indeed Mycenaean) and of recent discoveries of cist-grave cemeteries in Boiotia and Thessaly, it is perhaps prudent to suspend judgment on what was normal Mycenaean burial practice. Second, the settlement came to an end in LH IIIB and was not apparently reoccupied for many centuries. This experience is repeated throughout Lakonia. Finally, and uniquely, it was possible to get some idea of the total area of the settlement (at least 45,000 m.²) and to rescue something of its plan, including rectilinear streets with their frontages of houses. These details bear directly and informatively on our discussion of Renfrew's estimate of the population of prehistoric Greece which we left hanging in the air in [Chapter 4](#).




Figure 7 Late Helladic IIIB Lakonia

For Renfrew assumed that Late Bronze Age settlements in the Aegean were typically 'of urban or proto-urban nature'. This assumption may perhaps not be contradicted by Pavlopetri; but his second assumption, that the average size of a Mycenaean settlement was 20,000 m.², certainly seems to be. The difficulty of course is to decide whether Pavlopetri was of 'average' size, since what Renfrew keeps well hidden is that in the absence of total excavation or survey

there is no scientific way of estimating the size of an ancient settlement with any precision. True, Hope Simpson (in Loy 1970, 149–55) has attempted a self-confessedly subjective classification of some ninety Mycenaean sites in Messenia as Small, Small-Medium, Medium, Medium-Large or Large on the basis of the scatter of surface sherds. But the sherd-scatter is a wildly unreliable criterion: for example, the area of some 200,000 m.² assigned on this basis to the Palaiopyrgi hill near Vapheio, which thus becomes the largest known site in prehistoric Lakonia, seems utterly disproportionate. However, to be fair to Hope Simpson, a cursory comparison of his individual classifications with the evidence of the sherd-scatter ostensibly supporting them reveals no strict correlation. In other words, factors besides sherd-scatter – such as extent of arable land (by far the most important), strategic/commercial position and available water supply – were equally and rightly taken into account. Thus, to sum up our long discussion, Renfrew's estimate of 50,000 inhabitants for Mycenaean Lakonia may or may not correspond to reality. We just cannot say for certain. However, since this is the figure attributed by McDonald and Hope Simpson to the larger and far more intensively surveyed region of Messenia in LH IIIB, I should suppose it to be a considerable overestimate, at least on present evidence.

The five excavated LH IIIB habitation-sites in Lakonia are Amyklai and the Menelaion complex in the Spartan basin, Karaousi and Ay. Stephanos on either side of the Helos plain, and Anthochorion in west Vardhounia. The results from Karaousi and Anthochorion were relatively disappointing, but the other three were interesting in their different ways. Amyklai's chief significance lies in its evidence of late Mycenaean cult (below). The akropolis of Ay. Stephanos was fortified, perhaps more than once, during LH IIIB (to judge from the associated pottery). It thereby takes its place with Mouriatadha in northern Messenia among fortified settlements in the southern Peloponnese, and its identification with the Helos of the Homeric 'Catalogue of Ships' ([Appendix 2](#)) is a definite possibility. Certainly the site was strategically placed to guard both the western side of the lower Eurotas valley and the approach to Lakonia via the Lakonian Gulf and was advantageously situated to exploit marine resources. On the other hand, the surrounding arable land is extremely poor, a deficiency which was remedied maybe through symbiosis with 'the land-locked Panayiotis community around the extensive Neogen soils on the north-east corner of the plain' (Bintliff 1977, 476). Thus the main focus of interest must be the apparently unfortified settlement on the site of the historical sanctuary dedicated to Menelaos and Helen.

As we have seen, the archaeological picture for the Mycenaean occupation has been clarified by the recent (and not yet finally

published) British excavations, but there is still no conclusive corroboration of the widespread view that this was the palatial seat of a Mycenaean Menelaos. The settlement was undoubtedly the central place of Mycenaean Lakonia, but archaeologically all we have is a well-appointed 'mansion' reoccupied partially, after a gap of more than a century, during LH IIIB ('Dawkins House') and then destroyed by fire, together with its store of sealed wine-jars, towards the end of the same phase. The agents and motive of the destruction are alike unknown, and it would be incautious as yet to link this destruction of a single building with those attested on a number of the major Mycenaean centres elsewhere on the mainland in LH IIIB or C, let alone to think of the settlement as a whole in terms of Mycenae, Tiryns or Pylos. An isolated find complicates the picture further. This is a fibula (safety-pin) of the 'violin-bow' type which Blinkenberg in his classic synoptic study (1926, 50) deemed to be the earliest of the class and of LH IIIB/C origin. Our example could have come from a late Mycenaean tomb. Alternatively, like a handful found in the Orthia sanctuary at Sparta itself, it was dedicated in the eighth century or later and had survived the interval perhaps as an 'antique' heirloom.

The evidence for cult in LH IIIB Lakonia is even less extensive than that for habitation, being practically confined to the site at the historical sanctuary of Apollo at Amyklai four to five kilometres south of classical Sparta. There was a Bronze Age settlement here from EH times but this seems to have been temporarily interrupted at the close of the MH period. In LH IIIB a sanctuary was established, as is shown by the large number of terracotta figurines of stylized 'goddesses' and animals found, together with two fragments of almost life-sized human figures in clay. The motive for setting up the cult is of course unknown, and, given the nature of our evidence for Mycenaean religion – inferences from archaeological material, later literary testimony and in some cases Linear B tablets – it is always hazardous to conjecture the identity of Mycenaean deities, let alone their possible powers and attributes. But Amyklai is one of the places where the evidence has seemed to justify bolder hypotheses. Since this has a more immediate bearing on the 'Dorianizing' of Lakonia, discussion has been deferred to the next chapter.

The remainder of the excavated LH IIIB evidence comes from tombs distributed throughout Lakonia, nearly all of the chamber-type (Melathria, Krokeai, Tsasi, Mavrovouni, Pellana, Kotroni, Epidauros Limera and Kythera). Krokeai, however, in east Vardhounia has also produced a slab-covered shaft-grave in use from LH II onwards. The associated settlement was probably connected with the 'antico verde' or 'lapis Lacedaemonius' (i.e. labrador porphyry) quarries at the appropriately named Psephi. The stone was widely used in Mycenaean

Lakonia; worked cores have been found, for example, at Ay. Stephanos. Indeed, it was certainly being used in Crete by LM I for both vases and sealstones (Warren 1969, 132f.). Like the 'antico rosso' from Kyprianon in south Mani, it was employed to face the thirteenth-century tholos tomb known as the Treasury of Atreus at Mycenae. Neither stone, however, appears to have been used in Lakonia between the thirteenth century BC and the Roman period, although there may be a reference to 'verde antico' in Theophrastos (*De Lapidibus* 4.25, if the emendation *Lakainon* is adopted). The tholoi at Analipsis and Kambos may just have remained in use until LH IIIB, suggesting the continued existence of local nobilities. The other side of the social coin may be represented by the abovementioned cists from Pavlopetri and some single inhumations from Ay. Stephanos.

This leaves twenty-one sites where occupation is attested by surface finds alone and one, classical Sparta, where LH IIIB has indeed turned up in excavation on the akropolis hill but (despite the intensity of exploration) in such minute quantity as to suggest a minor and perhaps not even a permanent settlement. This is of considerable significance, as we shall see in the next chapter.

The resulting settlement-pattern suggests a relatively high density of population in thirteenth-century Lakonia, concentrated unsurprisingly in the Eurotas valley but extending suggestively into upland and sometimes mountainous country too. As Bintliff (1977, 699) has noticed, the major settlements in the Sparta plain are regularly spaced at intervals of five kilometres so as to exploit the adjacent terrain with maximum efficiency. If we include those sites whose surface pottery cannot be more precisely classified than LH III, the total of sixty-three does not lag so conspicuously behind that obtained for south-west Peloponnese after several seasons of intensive and coordinated survey work. The latter region too shows a maximum density of settlement in the LH IIIB period, as one might have inferred from the plentiful archaeological and documentary evidence from the 'Palace of Nestor' not far north of classical Pylos. However, the Messenian evidence is perhaps significantly richer and more variegated: the palace has its mortuary correlates in a finely constructed and lavishly endowed tholos and impressive chamber-tombs for which the only real Lakonian parallel, Vapheio, belongs to an earlier epoch. The correspondence, in short, is only of a very general nature.

Nevertheless, one aspect of this generally weak correspondence has been heavily stressed in some recent 'historical' accounts of the Mycenaean period, perhaps with good reason, namely the exponential decline in the number of Lakonian sites attested for the LH IIIC period (seven certain, another eight possible) in contrast to the LH IIIB peak of thirty-nine (max.). The corresponding figures for Messenia are

thirteen certain and another three possible LH IIIC sites as against sixty-seven (min.) LH IIIB. It therefore seems a fair inference that 'in the twelfth and eleventh centuries this fertile and well-watered area was occupied by scarcely more than 10 per cent of the people who had lived there in the thirteenth century B.C.' (*MME* 143). The rest of this chapter will be addressed to an attempted explanation of this massive problem.

First, though, the evidence for LH IIIC occupation of Lakonia ([Figure 8](#)). At Amyklai there is actually an observable increase either in population or perhaps just in cultic activity; continuing external contact is shown by one sherd and a fragment of a wheel-made terracotta statuette, both decorated in the 'Close Style' of the Argolis. Occupation may have continued in the area into the eleventh century, but thereafter, archaeologically at any rate, there is a break in continuity – to whose significance I return in [Chapter 7](#). Geraki yielded three 'goddess' figurines apparently of the 'psi' type, but these may not even be Mycenaean (French 1971, 139). A little LH IIIC pottery has been excavated at Karaousi and Anthochorion and found on the surface at Apidia. The excavated tomb-sites are slightly more promising. A kernos of unique form from a chamber-tomb at Krokeai shows that life was still supportable in eastern Vardhounia. Seven LH IIIC vases from two chamber-tombs at Pellana (Kalyvia Georgitsi) and one whole pot and some sherds from Ay. Stephanos indicate the same for the northern and southern ends respectively of the Eurotas furrow.

But most impressive and revealing of all in their richness and chronological range, together with their evidence of external contacts, are the finds from chamber-tombs at Epidauros Limera. These may be thought to represent some general trends of the period in Greece as a whole. The area undoubtedly received an influx of settlers during LH IIIC. We cannot be sure whether their Aegean connections (below) were established before or after their arrival, but in view of the evidence for depopulation elsewhere in Lakonia it is reasonable to suggest that the newcomers were displaced Lakonians. The most obvious point of origin is the Spartan basin, which has easy routes of communication with Epidauros Limera ([Chapter 10](#)) and suffered apparently the greatest depopulation. It is at least highly suggestive that this area was precisely the place of refuge selected by the inhabitants of the Sparta area in face of the Slav invasions of the late sixth century AD (Pavlopetri was another). Once established at Epidauros Limera, these Mycenaeans formed part of an Aegean *koiné* embracing sites like Perati in Attika (probably another refugee-settlement), Asine in the Argolis and Naxos in the Kyklades. Indeed, their pottery in the earlier stages of LH IIIC shows contact even with Crete. The cemetery, moreover, remained in use into sub-Mycenaean

times, perhaps as late as c.1050. When the other members of the *koine* dropped away, the potters of Epidauros Limera may have turned for their continuing inspiration to the communities of central Greece. The latest finds, however, fail to bridge the all-important transition from the sub-Mycenaean to the Protogeometric period, and the subsequent fate of the erstwhile refugees is unknown. In fact, Epidauros Limera ceases to exist, archaeologically, until the seventh century.




Figure 8 Late Helladic IIIC Lakonia

To sum up, the LH IIIC settlement-pattern marks a radical departure from that of LH IIIB in Lakonia. The number of inhabited sites is reduced by about 62.5 per cent overall and by a greater percentage in the Eurotas valley. Some habitation, it is true, is apparent in all the main geological areas of the region, but it is on an enormously reduced scale. Conversely, Amyklai possibly and Epidauros Limera certainly increased in size. After c.1100, however, Lakonia to all outward appearances was uninhabited for the first time since Middle Palaeolithic times, but that is a problem to be considered in [Chapter 7](#).

The phenomenon of late Mycenaean decline, if correctly identified, is by no means peculiar to Lakonia. The parallel situation in Messenia has already been noted and in fact it extends to all the major regions of Mycenaean settlement. Equally the internal redistribution of population inferred from the Epidauros Limera evidence is written large in the influx of settlers during LH IIIC to previously marginal areas such as Achaia and the Ionian islands of Ithaka and Kephallenia, not to mention those who went as far afield as Cyprus and Crete. Indeed, there is later literary evidence which suggests that Lakonians figured prominently among the emigrants. However, these parallels should not perhaps be pressed. The Lakonian evidence is provisional, and in particular there is only the destruction of the 'Dawkins House' at the Menelaion site to compare to the disasters which overtook Thebes, Gla, Iolkos, Mycenae, Tiryns and Pylos (to name only the more prominent centres) during LH IIIB and C. None the less, the mainland Greek disequilibrium coincides broadly with the upheavals that engulfed the entire east Mediterranean basin at about the same time, and it would be anomalous, I think, if the Lakonian development were wholly independent of them.

At first blush a hypothesis which accounted for all these geographically disparate yet superficially similar and roughly contemporary phenomena would appear to have the merits of simplicity and economy. But in the present state of our knowledge no such hypothesis can be convincingly advanced. That of Rhys Carpenter, for example, which postulates a shift in the trade winds bringing on an extended drought and consequential famine, disease and possibly riots, seems unsupported and possibly falsified by what relevant evidence there is from Greece ([Chapter 1](#)). Nor does the documentary evidence of famine at Hattusas and Ugarit c.1200 prove that there was a climatic change then either in the central Anatolian plateau or anywhere else in the Near East, let alone Greece. Conversely, the theory of a widespread epidemic of bubonic plague cannot be evaluated for lack of evidence. Nor can it be shown that the peoples who confronted the Egyptian Pharaohs were directly responsible for the downfall of the Hittite empire or the destructions

of Ugarit and other sites in the Levant and Greece.

It is therefore permissible to look for more localized and specifically Greek explanations. Using the evidence of archaeology and the Linear B inscriptions, it could be argued that the intensification of settlement, large-scale pasturage and expansion of overseas trade during LH IIIB had led to extensive forest-clearance and the exhaustion of marginal land, and that the resulting deforestation and erosion had had a critically deleterious effect on the vegetational climax. Thus the depopulation in LH IIIC could have been the consequence both of flight to less heavily settled areas in search of food and of the death by famine and disease of many of those who remained behind.

Deforestation and soil-erosion, however, are not a sufficient explanation of the material record: they leave out of account the destructions. Since these were inflicted by people who have left no other distinguishing mark of their presence, and since the Mycenaean way of life continued thereafter, albeit on a reduced scale, it follows that the attackers either were themselves Mycenaeans or were outsiders whose material accoutrements were either Mycenaean or perishable or hitherto unrecognized or not left behind. Unfortunately, the Linear B tablets – despite the ingenuity of those who regard a possibly extraordinary requisition of bronze, the disposition of a coastal watch and possible human sacrifice as signs of a military and social crisis in the Pylos kingdom – cannot shed further light on the nature of the crisis or the identity of the destroyers. The wall across the Isthmus of Corinth (if, as it surely is, it is a fortification-wall and spanned the entire Isthmus) is ambiguous too: it was built in the LH IIIB/C transition by users of Mycenaean pottery and, like the attempts to safeguard water-supply at Athens, Mycenae and Tiryns, seems to betoken exceptional concern for defence; but the dispute over relative pottery chronology at this critical point leaves open the possibilities that it was constructed after some, most or even all of the LH IIIB destructions in the Peloponnese.

Two competing hypotheses, which are not in fact mutually exclusive, have therefore been proposed to explain the archaeological ‘facts’ of destruction followed by dispersal and reduction of population. The first, which brings invaders by land from north of the Isthmus and indeed of Greece, suits the LH IIIC picture of relative prosperity in the Aegean and influxes of population into Achaia, the Ionian islands and further afield to south and east. It might also account for a number of intrusive artefacts of vaguely ‘northern’ type, especially hand-made pottery, which made an appearance in southern Greece around the LH IIIB/C transition. On the other hand, the marked increase in cist-burials after c.1150, which has been claimed as another indication of northern intruders, could be a purely

endogenous phenomenon. More important still, though, this hypothesis fails to explain satisfactorily why the postulated invaders confined their attention in western Peloponnese to the 'Palace of Nestor' and why they did not settle in Greece - unless, that is, they were in fact Mycenaeans and so archaeologically indistinguishable.

It is this latter possibility which has given rise to the second main explanatory hypothesis, embraced for example by Hooker (1977), namely civil war. For if the destroyers were Mycenaeans, then they could be either the common people in opposition to the palace-bound ruling class in each region, or disaffected members of the ruling stratum and their supporters, or rulers (or coalitions of rulers) of other regions. Further speculation could be, and usually is, conducted on the basis of the material remains alone. But as a rule it is not long before recourse is had to the very much later literary sources to eke out the archaeological evidence. For the reasons set out in [Chapter 5](#) and [Appendix 2](#) I do not believe such recourse is legitimate.

However, if pressed to provide an explanation I would adopt elements of the two main hypotheses outlined above and combine them with my starting-point in this chapter, the wider upheavals in the east Mediterranean basin. Thus a domestic economic slump aggravated by the disruption of overseas trade could have weakened the authority of the Mycenaean rulers and impelled them to solve their problems, in a manner familiar to students of the eighth century ([Chapter 8](#)), at the expense of the cultivable land of their neighbours. The resulting warfare, perhaps accompanied by civil strife and influxes of barbarian intruders, might have destroyed the finely balanced economic and social system which the palace-bureaucracies administered, together with the palaces themselves. Once their centripetal force was gone, the unified regions of the Mycenaean cosmos will have dissolved once more into isolated islands of population adrift in an uncharted political sea and forced back on their own immediate resources much as at the beginning of the MH period.

Notes on further reading

The problem of correctly characterizing the political and economic structure of the (tablet-using) Mycenaean state can only be complicated by the use of misleading analogies or loose terminology, above all that of feudalism: Finley 1957. On the other hand, that mediaeval analogies can elucidate Mycenaean economic development is shown in Hutchinson 1977, even if many of his historical conclusions are unconvincing.

The 'philological game of hopscotch' referred to by Rhys Carpenter is best exemplified in Astour 1967, ch. 1. Like hopscotch, this sort of

approach explains nothing and gets you nowhere. For artistic interrelations between Greece and the Orient see Kantor 1947 and Smith 1965. The mechanisms of foreign trade, however, are opaque: it could perhaps be argued that the need for metals impelled the Mycenaeans to take to the sea, but the equally crucial Athenian corn-supply in the Classical period was by no means in Athenian hands exclusively; and the only excavated wreck of the period, really a travelling bazaar, is probably Syrian or Palestinian (Bass 1967).

For the absolute chronology of the Late Bronze Age I have followed Thomas 1967 and Rowton 1970. The destructions and upheaval in the east Mediterranean basin are discussed by Hooker (1977, 156–60). I agree with his rejection of ‘the picture of the Sea Peoples as a powerful army, moving irresistibly and of set purpose, until their final defeat at the hand of the Egyptians’ and with his explanation of the ferment as stemming from the collapse of the Hittite empire; on the ‘Sea Peoples’ see now the intelligent synthesis of Sandars (1978).

The standard textbook of Mycenaean pottery is still Furumark 1941. For the LH IIIA and B phases at Mycenae a stream of articles by E. French is indispensable reading, but the details of the sequence elsewhere are still controversial: ‘when we say Mycenaean IIIB pottery, what exactly do we mean?’ (Mylonas 1964, 373). For more recent developments in scientific analyses of Mycenaean pottery see Bieber et al. 1976.

The most convenient reference work on Mycenaean sites is Hope Simpson 1965; a second edition by Hope Simpson and O. Dickinson is in preparation.

For the stoppered wine-jars from the Menelaion see Vickery 1936, 32, 59. *Pace* Oliva (1971, 16), there is no evidence that they were ‘clearly ready for despatch’.

Mycenaean cult-places are conveniently listed in Hägg 1968. For some sensible remarks on the difficulties of discussing Mycenaean religion see Hooker 1977, 192ff. (but even he succumbs to the desire to know).

The evidence of destructions in LH IIIB is given in Buck 1969. For the decline in population in LH IIIC in Greece generally see the table in Ålin 1962, 148 (now considerably out of date).

Chapter seven

The first Dorians c. 1050–775

The middle word of this chapter's title, like my agnostic discussion of the destructions and depopulation in southern Greece during the latest Mycenaean period, conceals a *parti pris*. For although an impressive roll-call of scholars has attempted to explain the archaeological facts (if they are facts) set out in [Chapter 6](#) in terms of the 'tradition' concerning the Dorians and their movements (Buck 1969, 280 n. 31; Rubensohn 1975), most of these have not perceived that the 'tradition' must itself first be evaluated on its own merits before it is appropriate to apply external tests. When the 'tradition' is thus evaluated, it is seen that the literary evidence is so far removed from the 'Dorian invasion' in time and so distorted according to the bias or ignorance of the speaker or writer that an extreme sceptic like Beloch (1913, 76–96) could even legitimately deny its very occurrence. I shall argue that scepticism need not be carried so far, but a glance at the main items of literary evidence (Hooker 1977, 213–22) will help to explain Beloch's stance. The deceptively coherent narrative of the Dorian migration and occupation of the Peloponnese produced by a rationalizing mythographer like Apollodoros in the second century represents 'only the main element in the tradition'; and there are other elements recorded by various authors at sundry times and places which are 'conflicting and even contradictory' (Tomlinson 1972, 59–61).

The history of Sparta was particularly badly mauled in this regard, not at all without Spartan connivance, in a manner made possible by the attitudes to preservation of knowledge about the past described in [Chapter 5](#). We may perhaps distinguish four main levels in the process of systematic distortion. In the first place, as Edward Gibbon put it, 'some decent mixture of prodigy and fable has, in every age, been supposed to reflect a becoming majesty on the origin of great cities'. Since the real Dorian Sparta could hardly be called a 'great city'

before the eighth century, it was presumably then that ‘prodigy and fable’ in the guise of the myth of the ‘Return of the Herakleidai’ (Tigerstedt 1965, 28–36) were first laid under contribution to shed their retrospective glory. Next, the power and territory acquired by force of arms were justified, again in the language of myth but also with the aid of Delphic Apollo, as merely the taking of what anyway belonged to the Spartans by right of their rulers’ ‘Achaean’ descent. Third, and by a less obvious process, the king-lists of the two Spartan royal houses transcended their local significance to secure a cardinal position in the chronography and historiography of the post-heroic age of Greece as a whole ([Appendix 3](#)). The surviving narrative accounts of the ‘Return’, the earliest of which is that of Ephorus (70F117), all show signs of contamination from this source. Finally, the Sparta which emerged into the light of history as the most powerful state in Greece possessed customs and institutions that seemed alien and antiquated to those interested in recording them. Revivalist movements in the third century and again during the early Roman Empire naturally served to reinforce this conservative image (Bourguet 1927, 21), and Sparta came to be regarded as archetypally ‘Dorian’. This aspect of the ‘Spartan mirage’, as we shall see, is perhaps the hardest of all to penetrate with assurance.

The most hopeful method of demolishing the more extravagant claims of ‘tradition’ is a sober statement of the archaeological record, fragmentary and one-sided though this undoubtedly is. Before examining it closely, however, it is necessary to reiterate that, as with the Trojan War ([Appendix 2](#)), disbelief in the elaborated details and alleged attendant circumstances of an event does not entail disbelief in the event itself. For by one of those quirks of scholarly fashion Beloch’s formerly generally discredited denial of a ‘Dorian invasion’ has recently received seemingly powerful and independent support from philology, archaeology and the history of religion.

First, then, philology. In the last chapter I asserted dogmatically that the Linear B tablets were unable to shed light directly on the destructions which accidentally ensured their preservation. However, Chadwick (1976b) has now argued that the presence of Dorians in the Peloponnese already in the Mycenaean period may be inferred from certain linguistic features of the tablets. To be more precise, Chadwick is even prepared to argue on this dialectological basis that the oppressed majority in each of the Mycenaean kingdoms spoke Doric (or rather proto-Doric) and that it was these proto-Doric speakers who overthrew their ‘Mycenaean’ masters, burned their palaces and emerged later as the historical Dorians.

I am no philologist, let alone Mycenologist, and we must wait to see what considered reactions this startling theory provokes from the

experts in the field (initial reaction, I understand, has been far from unanimously favourable). It is, however, fair for me to point out that it is extremely dangerous to draw far-reaching inferences of a dialectological nature from the Linear B tablets. This should be obvious simply from their fragmentary preservation and the character of the information they convey, but it is worth stressing that current philological views of their dialectal significance are highly heterogeneous, leaving aside those which do not even accept the decipherment as Greek. At one end of the spectrum there is the view that Linear B is merely a 'common trading language,... some kind of lingua franca, or commercial "jargon"' (Hooker 1977, 77), which may bear little or no relation to the language or languages actually spoken in the Mycenaean kingdoms or elsewhere in Greece. At the other end scholars like Bartonek (1973) hold that the language of the tablets is the dialect common to all areas of Mycenaean culture (apart perhaps from Thessaly and Boiotia, where proto-Aeolic may have been spoken) but distinct from the dialect of north-west Greece, which was early Doric. (The hypothesis that of the historical dialects Ionic and Aeolic but not Doric are post-Mycenaean formations was first proposed by Ernst Risch and is now commonly accepted.) It will become clear later on why I incline to place myself at Bartonek's end of the spectrum. Here I shall confine myself to what seem to be the fatal historical and archaeological objections to Chadwick's new theory.




Figure 9 Protogeometric Lakonia

First, and most obviously, although the Dorians could have invented the idea of an immigration into the Peloponnese to hide their subjection to Mycenaean overlords, the theory does not explain why they invented the myth of the ‘Return of the Herakleidai’ if in fact the Heraklid rulers of the Dorian states could have claimed hegemony in their respective areas of the Peloponnese as the just reward of their revolutionary efforts. Nor does it account for the fact that the ‘Return’ myth applied only to those Dorians who could claim descent from Herakles. For Thucydides (1.12.3) does not, *pace* Chadwick (1976b, 105), call the Dorians Herakleidai but, like Tyrtaios (fr. 2.13–15), our earliest surviving source, expressly distinguishes between the Dorians and the returning Herakleidai. In other words, both of these ancient sources clearly believed that there were no Dorians at least in the Peloponnese before the fall of Troy, a belief which is consonant both with the claim of the Arkadians to be the only ‘autochthonous’ population in the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23; cf. Hdt. 2.171.3; 8.73.1) and with the clear affinity between Linear B and the historical

Arkado-Cypriot dialect. Third, the theory presupposes not merely continuity of settlement but identity of culture between the Mycenaean and historical Peloponnese. This may be demonstrable in some sense for the Argolis (Tomlinson 1972, 64), but the archaeological evidence for the other Dorian areas of the Peloponnese indicates a sharp, though not of course a complete, cultural break after c.1050. For example, Lakonian Protogeometric pottery, as we shall see, notoriously does not 'grow out of Submycenaean' (Chadwick 1976b, 104); strictly speaking not even continuity of settlement can be proved archaeologically for Lakonia; and the central place of Dorian Lakonia was significantly different from its Mycenaean predecessor.

Bearing this in mind, let us turn to the specifically archaeological arguments of the neo-Belochians. It has of late become an acknowledged scandal that the Dorians, archaeologically speaking, do not exist. That is, there is no cultural trait surviving in the material record for the two centuries or so after 1200 which can be regarded as a peculiarly Dorian hallmark. Robbed of their patents for Geometric pottery, cremation burial, iron-working and, unkindest prick of all, the humble straight pin, the hapless Dorians stand naked before their creator – or, some would say, inventor. For, it is argued, if they cannot be identified archaeologically, this is because they had been in the Peloponnese all the time – or at least for a considerable time before 1200. How then did they obtain their political and linguistic dominance in the Peloponnese? It was, according to Hooker (1977, 179), the 'Doricspeaking subjects' who were 'responsible for the overthrow of the palatial system (and perhaps for the destruction of the palaces themselves)'; and 'it is these insurrectionists who are commemorated in the traditions about the Return of the Heraclids'.

This hypothesis is clearly vulnerable to the same objections as Chadwick's philologically based theory; indeed, it is more obviously vulnerable inasmuch as it was not the mass of the insurrectionists but primarily their later rulers who are commemorated in the 'Return' myth. It should, however, also be noted that invasions do not necessarily leave recognizable material traces, often because the conquerors have taken over the culture of the conquered when the latter stood on a higher level. We might cite the Slav invasions of Greece in the early Byzantine period as an instance. Thus continuity of material culture despite a series of man-made destructions such as is attested for the Argolis during LH IIIB and C does not by itself exclude the possibility of an invasion by non-Mycenaeans. But such an *argumentum ex silentio* is no more susceptible of proof and no less hazardous than the one on the other side drawn by Hooker from the non-intrusion of 'Dorian' cultural traits into the Peloponnese at this or a later time. Again, the crucial point is the fact of cultural

discontinuity after the Mycenaean period, at least in Lakonia.

The argument from the history of religion is even more complex in its ramifications and is based explicitly on Lakonian evidence. As stated in [Chapter 6](#), it is impossible to be too precise about the identity, powers and attributes of Mycenaean deities. None the less, evidence from Amyklai has been used to support confident hypotheses. In the historical period, after Amyklai had become the fifth constituent village of Dorian Sparta ([Chapter 8](#)), the chief deity here was Apollo, worshipped in martial guise. His cult, however, coexisted happily, if to us rather obscurely, with that of Hyakinthos: the three days of the annual Hyakinthia festival, whose importance will emerge in later chapters, were divided between them, the first being consecrated to Hyakinthos, the last two to Apollo. Now Apollo was of course a key member of the celestial Olympian pantheon. But Hyakinthos, a more shadowy figure, may originally have been a vegetation deity, and his worship was clearly chthonic (earth-bound) in character. How, then, when and why did the cult of these disparate immortals become associated in this way?

According to the mythical account, Apollo killed his favourite Hyakinthos with an accidentally misdirected discus-cast. This type of myth 'may reflect dimly Apollo's increasing popularity during the Dark ages' (Starr 1961, 182), and that may be thought to answer the why of the question posed above. It does not, however, tell us how and when the two cults first came into contact or collision. The pooled resources of philology, archaeology and the history of religion produced a solution along these lines (e.g. Desborough 1972, 280). The name Hyakinthos contains the -nth- suffix which is not merely pre-Dorian but pre-Greek; the name itself perhaps referred to a natural topographical feature. Thus Hyakinthos was the aboriginal deity of Amyklai taken over by the Indo-European speakers when they arrived in Lakonia around the turn of the third millennium. It was to Hyakinthos that the archaeologically attested cult was being paid at Amyklai late in LH IIIB and/or in IIIC. The date of Apollo's entry upon the Greek scene and his place of entry cannot be firmly ascertained, but his close association with Dorian communities in the historical period suggests that it was the incoming Dorians who amalgamated the Bronze Age cult of Hyakinthos with that of Apollo some time after the inauguration of a non-Mycenaean, Dorian culture in Lakonia.

This looks a plausible and economical hypothesis. It is not in fact so secure as it seems. For a start, the date and manner of the 'coming of the Greeks' are controversial ([Chapter 4](#)), and the exclusively Dorian affiliation of Apollo has been exaggerated, most conspicuously by Müller (1839). More specifically, there are two major obstacles to accepting the hypothesis as it stands. First, the historical Hyakinthia

remained pre-eminently a local Amyklaian rather than a generally Spartan festival, which suggests that the Dorian/Mycenaean and Apollo/Hyakinthos antitheses have been misconceived or are irrelevant in this context. Second, the distribution of the month Hyakinthios in historical times (Samuel 1972, 93, 291) indicates an exclusively Dorian rather than a broadly Mycenaean Greek attachment: Hyakinthos, in other words, is more likely to be ‘Dorian’ *par excellence* than Apollo, and if any elements in the Hyakinthia may be considered intrusive they are those associated with Apollo. For these reasons therefore (and others which could be adduced by advocates of either hypothesis) Dietrich (1975) has argued that Hyakinthos was already a Dorian cult-figure in the Late Bronze Age and that his cult, which began at Amyklai, was diffused thence by Dorians. In other words, there was no ‘Dorian invasion’ of Lakonia as usually conceived, either at the end of the Bronze Age or in the immediate post-Bronze Age period.

There is much of value in Dietrich’s article. In particular, he has attacked the ‘traditional’ picture of an ethnically distinct and mutually antagonistic ‘Dorian’ Sparta and ‘Achaean’ Amyklai at its weakest spot, religious practice, and his attack has struck home. On the other hand, neither he nor Chadwick nor Hooker has yet persuaded me to stop flogging the old warhorse of a Dorian invasion of some kind. For all three are obliged to appeal to archaeological evidence, and this is really their Achilles heel. It may be true, as Dietrich argues, that archaeology need not signify an actual break in cult for a century or more at Amyklai, though formally, as we shall see, it does just that. But archaeology undeniably does signify a break in cultural continuity at the site, and the picture is repeated throughout Lakonia. It is time therefore to examine the archaeological evidence more closely, and in particular the stratification and pottery-sequence of Amyklai, which happens also to be the type-site for Protogeometric (PG) and Dark Age Lakonia as a whole. (The significance of these labels will emerge in due course.)

The hill of Ay. Kyriaki, one of the central chain running down the Spartan plain on the right bank of the Eurotas, was occupied, though not perhaps continuously, from the early Bronze Age. What concerns us particularly here is a small layered deposit uncovered in the German excavations of 1925 at one point immediately outside and below the terrace-wall which wholly or partly enclosed the historical sanctuary (Figure 10). The uppermost layer contained a little Byzantine and other material. Below came the ‘Aschenschicht’ permeated by charred earth with objects ranging in date from Hellenistic back to Archaic. Under this was the layer of clay, one metre deep, which is the crucial one for our purposes. The top twelve

or so centimetres contained 'Geometric' pottery, the bottom few some pre-fourteenth-century ware; in between fell the 'Protogeometrische Schicht' characterized by PG pottery but contaminated at varying levels by three small Mycenaean sherds, one Mycenaean terracotta 'goddess' figurine and a fragment of a large Mycenaean terracotta animal statuette. The layer also held several artefacts of bronze of post-Mycenaean manufacture.




Figure 10 Stratification at the Amyklaion sanctuary

The problem of interpretation results from the fact that this is not the stratification of a settlement, with recognizable and continuous floors of occupation, but an isolated votive deposit (no sanctuary building was recovered) formed by the discarding of accumulated votives. The question is whether we are to suppose that votives were continuously washed or thrown down this same part of the hill. Discontinuity seems inevitable as between the Byzantine layer and the 'Aschenschicht', but how does the PG layer relate to those immediately below and above?

There are a couple of footholds in this slippery moraine. First, the 'Geometric' pottery above the PG layer is in fact what we now call Late Geometric in style. Thus the supposition of continuous deposition would entail the view that Lakonian PG pottery continued to be made or dedicated until roughly the mid-eighth century. Second, although there was no purely Mycenaean stratum below the PG layer, the Mycenaean material found in the latter or closely associated with PG pottery on the surface included sherds, animal statuettes and 'goddess' figurines of the latest (LH IIIC) phase. Thus if the 'stratigraphical' and surface associations imply direct continuity between LH IIIC and PG, then Lakonian PG pottery should have begun not later than 1050, giving a timespan for the fabric of some three centuries. However, detailed stylistic analysis, of which a highly condensed summary follows here, does not bear out the truth of either the protasis or the

apodosis of the preceding sentence.

The fundamental study of the PG style of pottery in Greek lands is still Desborough 1952. Thanks to this, we are able to say that the style is not merely an amalgam of shapes and decorative motifs antedating and perhaps prefiguring the full Geometric style but comprises shapes and decoration that would have been impossible but for two, possibly Athenian, technical innovations of the eleventh century, the faster wheel and the use in conjunction of a multiple brush and dividers. It is not possible to say much about Lakonian PG shapes for lack of complete profiles, and the multiple brush and dividers were used here in a highly individualistic fashion. Nevertheless the substantive point remains that Lakonian PG shares after its own manner the two fundamental technical ideas of the style.

I have spoken of 'Lakonian' PG. This is meant to convey that the conclusions of Desborough – namely that there existed a local pre-Geometric PG style at Amyklai and 'related' or comparably early wares at the sanctuaries of Athena and Orthia in Sparta – may now be expanded into the assertion that a PG style was common to much if not most of Lakonia ([Figure 9](#)). Surface finds have been made at Stena near Gytheion, Apidia in the west Parnon foreland, Daimonia (ancient Kotyrta) in the Malea peninsula, Volimnos (sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis) in the west Taygetos foreland (ancient Dentheliatis) and perhaps also Phoiniki (temple of Apollo Hyperteleatas) in the Malea peninsula. Indeed, Lakonian PG found its way outside Lakonia to Tegea and perhaps the Argive Heraion, and sherds of Lakonian PG type have been picked up at Kaphirio and Hellenika (ancient Thouria) in south-east Messenia. The possible historical significance of this distribution will be considered at the end of this chapter. Here we must first discuss the origins, development and chronology of the style.

It should be stressed straightaway that any discussion is necessarily provisional and tentative, since no stratified occupation levels have yet been excavated in an early post-Mycenaean Lakonian settlement. So far only three sites have produced both LH IIIC and PG material: Amyklai, Anthochorion in west Vardhounia and Apidia. The last can safely be discounted, since there is only a handful of relevant sherds and the finds are sporadic. The other two have at least revealed some form of stratification in controlled excavation, but at Amyklai certainly and at Anthochorion possibly the stratification is that of votive accumulations, and both sites show disturbance in the levels that concern us here. The test of continuity therefore resolves itself into the question of the stylistic relationship between the latest Mycenaean and the PG pottery. Can the latter be said to grow out of, be derived from or throw back to the former?

Since we are dealing with levels in which indubitably Mycenaean and indubitably PG ware was found in association, we cannot without begging the question answer it with reference to artefacts whose stylistic attribution is uncertain. A special problem, however, is posed by the wheel-made animal statuettes from Amyklai. These bulls, horses and so on were first made some time in the late thirteenth century, but they certainly continued into the twelfth, and one Mycenaean example may be from the early eleventh. In a masterly survey of Greek terracotta votive statuettes between c.1200 and 700 Nicholls (1970, 10) stated that there are fragments of this type with PG ornament from the PG level. In fact, though, the only example he cites is not beyond a doubt PG, and there are no others so decorated from the PG level. I do not therefore think it justified to use this one piece as evidence of continuity except to corroborate such a finding based on other evidence. To this we must now turn.

The criterion of shape is barely considerable, since we have only two wholly preserved profiles: the hydria (water-jar) and the trefoil-lipped oinochoe (wine-jug). The former was developed during the sub-Mycenaean, not the full Mycenaean, period. The latter makes its first appearance in early LH IIIC (an example has been excavated at Epidauros Limera), but the developed conical foot of the example from the Heroon sanctuary in Sparta is apparently a PG innovation. For the rest, the fairly common deep skyphos (drinking cup) is probably derived from the 'Granary Class' LH IIIC deep bowl of the Argolis, but the decoration of the best preserved Lakonian PG example, again from the Heroon, isolates it somewhat from the main Lakonian series. The neck-handled amphora, a good example of which was found at Stena ([Figure 11c](#)), is 'plainly an adaptation of a Mycenaean type' (Desborough 1952, 6), but the adaptation took place in Attika.

If we move from shape to decoration, the signals are equally muted. The use of horizontal grooving, whether tectonic or decorative in function, is one of the two most distinctive Lakonian PG traits and is unambiguously not of Mycenaean ancestry. On the other hand, the system of panelling and the use of cross-hatched triangles ([Figure 11a,b](#)) do have forebears in the latest local variants of the Mycenaean style. Formal similarity, however, is not a guarantee of derivation, and the Lakonian way with these was substantively different. Thus the treatment of the panelling in a rigidly compacted manner contrasts with the more relaxed Mycenaean approach; the triangle is greatly outnumbered by the un-Mycenaean horizontal or vertical lattice as a configuration for cross-hatched ornament; and the overwhelming predilection for cross-hatching *per se*, the other peculiarly Lakonian PG characteristic, is foreign to Mycenaean. Lastly, but perhaps most

important, there is the question of the conception of the pot as a whole. Lakonian PG is 'an entirely dark-ground system not to be found in Mycenaean' (Desborough 1952, 287). If these arguments are thought inconclusive, a comparison between the Lakonian and Ithakan PG styles, as suggested by Desborough, should settle the matter. Despite significant points of mutual contact (to be considered further below), the Ithakan relates to its Mycenaean predecessorb in a discernible way that the Lakonian does not. In sum, the origins of Lakonian PG are not to be found in the local LH IIIC or the (barely attested) sub-Mycenaean styles. The significance of this is enhanced by the absence of anything later than sub-Mycenaean at Epidauros Limera (cf. previous chapter).




Figure 11 Lakonian Protogeometric and Geometric pottery a-d PG (a-b Amyklaion; c-d Stena, near Gytheion) e LG (Orthia)

Are its origins then to be sought in the leading PG regional styles of Thessaly, Attika or the Argolis, for each of which an originating or

inspirationally independent role has been claimed? Thessaly could be ruled out on grounds of geography alone, but there are in fact no grounds for suggesting a link with Lakonia in any case. The influence and often the inspiration of Attic PG have been demonstrated for many areas of Greece, but for Lakonia neither can even be argued with confidence. As for the Argolis, the shape and decorative scheme of the Heroon skyphos, together with its conical foot, may well be derived from here, but otherwise evidence of such contact, so rich in the succeeding period ([Chapter 8](#)), is conspicuous by its absence, even if we allow that Attic influences (such as they are) may have been transmitted indirectly through the Argolis. We must therefore answer the above question in the negative. Nor ought this to surprise us. For in each of these areas continuity or virtual continuity of settlement from the Mycenaean into the historical period is assured, and there is a corresponding congruence between the relevant pottery styles. Lack of such congruence in Lakonia suggests the possibility of a break in occupation or at least external communications.

If this possibility is admitted, whatever form the break may have taken, then we have grounds for looking away from the three 'mainstream' styles to discover the source or sources of the PG elements in the Lakonian style. In practice this means either to those styles which stand in some demonstrable relation to the mainstream (the 'related' group) or to those whose individuality argues some degree of independence from it (the 'independent' group). Crete apart, geography alone tends to exclude the members of the 'related' group as potential inspirers or influences; and Cretan artistic development appears somewhat esoteric after the Mycenaean/Minoan period. Let us therefore direct our attention to the 'independent' group, which embraces Ithaka, Aitolia, Achaia and Messenia besides Lakonia itself.

Gratifyingly we find immediately satisfied here two *a priori* criteria of inspiration, geographical proximity and stylistic affinity. The latter is worth dissolving into its constituent parts: the mug shape, especially common in Achaia but also frequent on Ithaka and in Aitolia; the shape and decoration of a skyphos from Tragana just north of Navarino Bay; grooving and cross-hatching at Nichoria in south-east Messenia; a special fondness for cross-hatched ornament in Achaia, Ithaka and perhaps Aitolia; a singular triangular motif from Derveni in Achaia, paralleled at Medeon in Phokis and perhaps Aetos on Ithaka; the enclosing of cross-hatched triangles in metopes in Achaia; concentric circles with few arcs and a suggestively similar total decorative approach at Aetos. The exports, if they are exports, to Thouria and Kaphirio are perhaps also relevant. However, and this is the salient fact, for all these points of resemblance Lakonian PG still remains a law unto itself. Admittedly we still have scanty evidence of

PG from the western Peloponnese or Ionian islands (see Desborough 1972, 243–57); but there is perhaps enough to justify their classification stylistically as a ‘West Greek’ group and enough to see that Lakonia cannot be neatly slotted into it.

So the outcome of this extended discussion is that Lakonian PG cannot be simply derived either from an antecedent Mycenaean style in Lakonia or from a contemporary PG style elsewhere. Contact with the ‘West Greek’ group may have been a necessary, but it was not a sufficient, condition of its origin. Some further factor or factors must be postulated, and it is not wholly frivolous nor (*pace* Hooker 1977, 173) merely reactionary to suggest that, had we not been told that newcomers made their way to Lakonia some time after c.1200, we would have had to invent them to explain their pottery. Since the style could not have originated within Lakonia in total isolation, the most economical hypothesis from the archaeological side would so link the newcomers with the new style of pottery as to explain both the PG and ‘West Greek’ elements. This is done most easily by postulating that the ‘West Greek’ area was where they became acquainted both with the techniques of the PG style in general and with particular local shapes and decorative motifs.

I am of course keenly aware that it can be ‘highly simplistic and misleading’ to explain ceramic change in terms of a movement of population, in view of the range of factors (excluding invasion) which are known to precipitate it (Nicklin 1971, 47) – for example, the quality of the craftsmen, local fashion or utilitarian considerations. Moreover, I appreciate that the stylistic range of a ware is more likely to have a geographical than a tribal or ethnic significance, and that I must seem to be imposing an intolerable burden of inference on ceramic evidence. Above all, I am only too conscious of the irony in my holding the views expressed in [Chapter 5](#) and yet also in some sense defending ‘tradition’ against Beloch, with whose sceptical outlook I am in general sympathy. Still, the hypothesis outlined above seems to me to account best for the stylistic anomalies of Lakonian PG and in particular to explain how the craft of pottery-making, which is highly traditional and resistant to political disturbance, was apparently interrupted and restarted in Lakonia. Furthermore, this hypothesis may be accommodated within a larger historical scheme. However, before pottery can become fodder for the historian a further ingredient, chronology, must be added to the farrago.

In this connection the student of early post-Mycenaean Lakonia is confronted by one of those dispiriting paradoxes with which all students of Sparta must make their peace. The archaeological contexts which have produced apparent links with the more securely dated mainstream styles, the Heroon and Stena, are unstratified and without

chronological anchors, whereas the 'stratified' Amyklai and Anthochorion deposits betray no chronologically significant external relations.

To take the unstratified material first, it seems on balance unlikely that such knowledge of Aegean styles could have been displayed in quite this way very long after PG in Attika and the Argolis had given way to Early Geometric c.900. It is, however, worth emphasizing that these vases stand apart from the main Lakonian PG series both in technique and in decoration. For example, they lack the metallic gleam of the paint produced both at Amyklai and (on a lesser scale) in Sparta by firing at high temperatures. The Heroon vases, seemingly the earliest of any, perhaps represent an unrepeatable attempt to translate mainstream styles into a Lakonian idiom. The Stena group ([Figure 11c](#) and [d](#)) may show the fruits of maritime contact with the Aegean through nearby Gytheion, but, if so, this would be the earliest evidence for the occupation of Gytheion since the thirteenth century and there is none thereafter until the sixth.

For the main series we must rely on the stratification at Amyklai, and it is salutary to reflect that we do not know either whether this isolated votive deposit contains the earliest PG material or what proportion of the total PG dedications it represents. Our only control lies in the overlying stratum with Late Geometric pottery. This, taken with the absence of a settled Early or Middle Geometric phase in Lakonia, allows us to be fairly sure that the PG and Geometric layers are immediately successive. We thereby arrive at a terminal date for Lakonian PG of c.750, which is perhaps confirmed by the indiscriminate mixture of PG and Late Geometric in the 'Geometric' levels at the Orthia sanctuary (cf. [Chapter 8](#) and [Appendix 5](#)). For the upper terminus we have a date of c.950–900 to allow for the non-derivation from Mycenaean and the presumed imitations of Attic or Argive PG.

The question then arises whether we can conceive the style lasting upwards of a century and perhaps as much as two. There are a number of arguments, individually weak but reasonably cogent in conjunction, to suggest that we can. Droop (in *AO* 66 n. 16) thought he could detect a chronological development from Amyklai (no slip, few concentric circles) through the sanctuary of Athena on the Spartan akropolis (some slip, more concentric circles) to the Orthia sanctuary (mainly slip, many concentric circles). He was writing before PG had been distinguished from 'Geometric', and he may have been wrong to explain the development in terms of the order in which the cults were founded, but there is still something to be said for the developmental scheme itself. A second argument is based on the natural inference from the character of Lakonian PG that the potters and painters were

considerably isolated from their counterparts in other regions, an inference corroborated by the metallic dedications at Amyklai (below). In conditions of cultural isolation or deprivation there is a tendency towards conservatism or at least an absence of stimulation to innovate. Finally, we may argue from the simplicity and monotony of the decorative repertoire that the style could have lasted a relatively long time, since as a rule it is where decoration is complex that there is a propensity to variation and style changes relatively fast. Thus, I suggest that Lakonian PG began in the later tenth century, at least at Amyklai, and ended around the middle of the eighth, thereby spanning between one and two centuries.

Let me correct any misapprehensions created by my concentration on pottery by examining the metal artefacts 'stratified' with PG pottery or typologically similar to independently datable contemporaries from other areas. The immediate post-Mycenaean era in Lakonia is often described as the 'Early Iron Age', but it must be realized how far this equation is merely conventional. For, whatever the cause, the quantity of known iron artefacts from Lakonia becomes considerable only in the seventh century and even thereafter remains slight. This is surprising, for two main reasons. First, as the later literary sources such as the third-century Daimachos (65F4) stress, Sparta was fortunate in possessing extensive amounts of workable iron ore within its own territory. This testimony is corroborated by geological and archaeological study: ores are widely distributed, and the chief ancient workings were situated near Neapolis (ancient Boiai), whose ores show the highest percentage of iron content in Greece. Second, by c.700 Sparta controlled not only Lakonia but a sizable chunk of trans-Taygetan Messenia, and the latter was, to use the Greeks' expression, 'obtained by the spear'; by that date spearheads, like swords, daggers, knives and axeheads, had for some time typically been made of iron. In short, the apparent dearth of iron artefacts in 'Early Iron Age' Lakonia must surely be put down to the chances of survival and discovery.

However, the supersession of bronze by iron for cutting implements is not in any case a straightforward process. It is true that iron in its various natural states is distributed more plentifully than copper and tin in Greece as elsewhere (Muhly 1973); in fact, both copper and tin had to be imported. On the other hand, the techniques of iron-working are more intricate and differ in kind from those relevant to the production of serviceable bronze. Thus while the ideal superiorities of iron artefacts are easy to state – larger and local supplies potentially cheapened production; greater rigidity, lightness and ability to take an edge increased efficiency and working life – it is more difficult to say by what steps and over what period these superiorities were realized

in finished Greek goods. The case of Lakonia must be dismissed for lack of evidence, but there is enough to attempt to interpret the overall Greek experience.

This has been done, to put it schematically, according to two mutually incompatible hypotheses, which envisage respectively a long, drawn out, piecemeal process extending over several centuries (Pleiner 1969) and a relatively sudden and great leap forward c.1000 (Snodgrass 1971, ch. 5). The divergence stems partly from disagreement over the definition of an Iron Age, in part from the uneven character of the evidence; and neither hypothesis perhaps is wholly persuasive. That of Pleiner goes beyond the archaeological evidence and rests on a false distinguishing criterion of diversity in usage. In fact, Greek blacksmiths (significantly called bronze-smiths, *chalkeis*) never learned to cast iron; and bronze was retained for almost all large objects of beaten metal even after the beginning of the Iron Age (on any definition). Snodgrass's hypothesis, on the other hand, has limited conceptual and geographical applicability. The evidence forbids us to judge whether the known sample of his 'fundamental classes' of edged implements is statistically significant; above all, there are insufficient agricultural implements for comparative purposes. However, if an approximate date for the beginning of the Iron Age in Greece should still be sought, then perhaps Hesiod's iron-shod plough of c.700 (Kothe 1975) provides a feasible *terminus ante quem*.

To return to Lakonia and darkness from the confused light of the outside world, we find just one iron artefact securely dated to the PG period. Its preserved length is 32 cm., but it is so poorly preserved that its identification as a spearhead is no more than plausible. It was found at Stena with the two PG pots already discussed, so we should probably infer that we have here a male burial. In fact, this is almost the only burial of the period known from Lakonia, but both the burial rite and the form of grave are unrecorded. The only other possibly PG iron artefact from Lakonia is a sword from Amyklai assigned to this period on typological grounds. The material at least conforms to that of the majority of PG swords.

The bronze artefacts from the PG stratum at Amyklai are perhaps marginally more informative. There were two small spearheads, but their material and size suggest they never saw the front line. Certainly too they are remarkably primitive in technique, and Snodgrass's date of c.800 (1971, 245 and fig. 88) may be appreciably too low. There were also several ringlets of rolled sheet bronze, some with a midrib, others decorated with repousse dots. A few at least may have been used to hold locks of hair dedicated on the occasion of a perilous undertaking such as a long journey, war or a *rite de passage*. The

magical significance of hair is well attested in ancient as in modern Greece (and elsewhere), and the Spartans' interest in capillary matters was notorious. Finally, some strips of sheet bronze have been interpreted as the legs of simple tripod-cauldrons which, as we know from Homer and archaeology, served as a symbol and store of wealth and were regarded as particularly acceptable dedications to Zeus and his son Apollo.

The impression of isolation and relative cultural deprivation conveyed by the pottery is thus amply corroborated by the metal-work. Referring to the spearheads, Snodgrass (1971, 246) has remarked that 'the bronzes would have looked very old-fashioned even at the earliest possible date suggested by their associations; and this . . . suggests such a period of restricted and somewhat primitive metallurgy, with partial dependence on Bronze Age heirlooms, as we have inferred elsewhere.' It is, I think, not irrelevant that the areas with comparably backward metallurgy include Achaia and Kephallenia, both within the ambit of the 'West Greek' PG pottery group.

We may sum up the historical implications of the archaeological evidence as follows. First, the Amyklai 'stratigraphy' and the stylistic analysis of Lakonian PG pottery demonstrate a sharp cultural break between Mycenaean and PG Lakonia and strongly suggest an influx of newcomers, immediately from 'West Greece', some time in the tenth century. On the other hand, if taken at face value the pottery evidence would also indicate that, following the apogee of prosperity in the thirteenth century and the exponential decline of population in the twelfth and early eleventh, Lakonia was actually uninhabited between c.1050 and 950. For reasons to be given below I do not believe that the pottery should be so taken in this regard. Undoubtedly, though, the small number of sites known to have been occupied in PG times (nine) and the backward character of the pottery and metal-work do suggest that the label 'Dark Age', which has been vindicated by Snodgrass (1971) for Greece as a whole at least between c.1100 and 850, is nowhere more appropriate than in Lakonia.

Too much retrospective doomwatching, however, would not be appropriate. For the years from c.950 to 775 were also, as we can say with hindsight, the formative period of historical Lakonia and specifically of Dorian Sparta. We are bound therefore to make what we can of the literary evidence and attempt to spin some 'gossamer ... out of legend and the weakest of tradition' (Starr 1968, 19), using the archaeological evidence as a kind of quality control on the flimsy product. The following summary account is necessarily provisional and highly speculative, but it may claim to have used all the available evidence. In accordance with the aim of the book as a whole I shall be

less concerned with internal political developments in Sparta itself than with the relationship between Sparta and the rest of Lakonia.

The three Dorian tribes of the Hylleis, Dymanes and Pamphyloi, whose existence in Sparta is directly attested for the first and only time by Tyrtaios (fr. 19.8), almost certainly joined forces before the long march south. Their most likely point of immediate origin is the Illyrian-Epirote region of north-west Greece, which had been for the most part untouched by Mycenaean civilization; some have seen an etymological link between the names Hylleis and Illyria. But the Dorians may have been impelled and even joined by peoples from still further north. (One thinks of the hand-made pottery mentioned in [Chapter 6](#).) The etymology of 'Dorians' is unclear, but their alleged connection with Doris in central Greece was probably invented or at least enhanced by later propaganda from as early as the seventh century (Tyrtaios fr. 2.14).

The route or routes the Dorians took are not certainly ascertainable, but the suggestion that those who became Spartans or Lakonians followed a westerly course may, I believe, be supported by reference to the ceramic evidence discussed earlier. If this suggestion is correct, they will have proceeded southwards through Aitolia, crossed the Corinthian Gulf from Antirhion to Rhion (a crossing supposedly commemorated by the carrying of model rafts at the annual Karneia festival in Sparta: Huxley 1962, 99 n. 34), then continued down the western Peloponnese to the Alpheios valley, across to the headwaters of the Eurotas and finally along the Eurotas furrow to Sparta.

The very choice of this low hill site may be thought to corroborate the inference of a dramatic change in political and economic conditions, if not of population, in Lakonia. For under the Mycenaean régime the site of classical Sparta had not been important, if indeed it had been permanently settled; and the central place of Lakonia had been situated on and around the Menelaion hill to the south-east on the other, left, bank of the Eurotas. The considerations governing the Dorians' choice will have included at least the following factors, apart from the absence of an existing settlement: first and foremost the availability of adequate arable and pasturage; then a constant supply of fresh water; third, good communications north and south; fourth, distance from potentially hostile mountain-dwellers; and finally the settlement a few kilometres south at Amyklai, to whose political relationship with Sparta I shall return in the next chapter.

The date of the Dorian settlement of Sparta is an open question, but archaeology, that is pottery, indicates a *terminus post quern* of c.950. This flatly contradicts the central article of the much later 'tradition' embodied in the 'Return of the Herakleidae' myth and the Spartan king-lists, namely that Dorians occupied Lakonia under Heraklid

leadership a couple of generations after the Fall of Troy or, in our terms, within the twelfth century. 'Tradition' should in this case be rejected, but it is harder to say how far excision and oblivion should be carried. Indeed, it is almost impossible to conjure up any sort of picture of what was happening in Sparta and Lakonia between the Dorian settlement and what I take to be the next certifiable event in Spartan history, the conquest or rather assimilation of Amyklai in the first half of the eighth century.

Certainly there can be no question of describing personalities, even though the literary sources generally put the wondrous reformer Lykourgos somewhere in the ninth century in our terms (Kiechle 1963, 183). But our ignorance of fundamentals is more difficult to have to admit. For instance, we do not know the size and nature of the original settlement or the number of settlers; the 2,000 suggested by Isokrates (12.255) in the fourth century is merely a guess (cf. [Chapter 14](#)). We do not know the extent of surrounding land utilized directly or indirectly by the Spartans nor, despite the ingenuity of those scholars who have tried to salvage something from the mess left by the 'Spartan mirage', on what conditions it was originally distributed and held. Nor do we know whether the settlers were predominantly agriculturists or pastoralists. And so the basic problems continue. Not that our ignorance is greatly diminished for the period after 775, but here it is well-nigh total. However, despite the correct warning that, in regard to early Spartan history, 'we are, I fear, sometimes in danger of becoming Hellenistic rumor-mongering historians' (Starr 1965, 258), I shall tentatively offer some suggestions on the process of the Dorian settlement and on the origins and status of the Helots and Perioikoi.

At the risk of being dismissed as a reactionary traditionalist by Hooker, I suggest that the old picture of the Dorians as Vlach-type transhumance pastoralists (e.g. Myres 1943, 41) still has something to commend it. At any rate in Byzantine times the Koutsovlachs from the eleventh century regularly travelled from the Pindus to Cape Matapan (ancient Tainaron); and the Dorians' suggested place of origin, north-west Greece, together with the apparent gap in time between the Dorian settlement of Argos (eleventh century) and Sparta, may be indications of a primarily pastoral orientation. Possibly relevant is the name *bouai* meaning 'herds' given by the Spartans to the age-classes into which the youth was divided for educational purposes. If a more recent parallel be sought, the case of the Bahima or Bahuma in Uganda comes to mind: these invading pastoralists enslaved the resident agricultural population (Oberge 1940).

If this suggestion is cogent, then the political vacuum ensuing after the Mycenaean debacle would certainly have provided a perfect opportunity for such an infiltration of pastoralists into the

Peloponnese. What was it, then, that chiefly encouraged the Dorians to settle permanently in Lakonia? The answer, I suggest, is ‘the cultivation of useful trees – a culture long in maturing, which requires great care both against the crafty hands of men and the voracious teeth of animals’ (Febvre 1925, 294). In particular, it was perhaps the cultivation of the useful olive which played the decisive role. There is no direct evidence from Lakonia to support this suggestion, but it is at least not contradicted by pollen evidence from the Osmanaga lagoon near Pylos (Wright 1968, 123–7; but see Bintliff 1977, 70) nor by the olive-press of c.700 found above the ruins of the Mycenaean palace nearby (Coldstream 1977, 162). It is therefore worth digressing briefly to consider the merits of the olive and the history of its cultivation in Greek lands, especially as the olive without doubt occupied an important position in Spartan life subsequently ([Chapter 10](#)).

Seeds of the less productive wild olive (oleaster) have been found in the Mesolithic levels of the Franchthi cave (cf. [Chapter 4](#)), but it was not apparently firmly established in its domesticated form before the Early Bronze Age. Indeed, production may not have become significant, at least in the Peloponnese, until Mycenaean times, when the role of olive oil as lighting fuel may be inferred from lamps found, for example, in the Vapheio tholos. However, between c.1100 and 700, according to the palynological evidence just mentioned, the olive became not merely important but actually the single most important agricultural product in western Messenia, taking the place held previously by cereals. The radiocarbon date should perhaps be calibrated and so raised somewhat, but the evidence is still, I feel, highly suggestive of changed agricultural conditions in the Dark Age. However that may be, the calcareous soils and climatic conditions of south-eastern Greece in particular are ideally suited to olive-production. Today some 95 per cent of all olives are crushed for oil. The percentage will have been even higher in antiquity, when olive oil provided not only food but light and unguent. Besides, olive wood is a suitable material for building and fuel, and cereals can be grown in among olive trees (*cultura promiscua*) to maximize the use of Greece’s restricted arable soil.

My second set of tentative suggestions concerns the human aspect of the economic basis of Sparta’s future power, the Helots. Archaeologically, as we saw, it is not possible to demonstrate that Lakonia was inhabited between c.1050 and 950. There are, however, several reasons why I am unwilling to reject out of hand the literary evidence for continuity of settlement between the ‘Achaean’ and ‘Dorian’ periods. First, Hyakinthos, whatever his ethnic affiliation, was probably worshipped continuously from the Bronze Age at Amyklai. In the archaeological intermission of a century or so his cult must have

been perpetuated with perishable offerings or in media we have not yet found or recognized. Second, the evidence of dialect (Solmsen 1907) and religion (Kiechle 1963, 95–115) in historical Lakonia indicates a thorough interpenetration of Dorian and non-Dorian elements. For example, a bronze fish found near Amyklai was dedicated in the sixth century to Pohoidan (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 34). This Lakonian form of the Earthshaker Poseidon's name is clearly related to Arkadian Posoidan and so to the language of the Linear B tablets, whereas the normal Doric form is Poteidan. Other cults of Pohoidan are attested epigraphically, from the sixth century (restored) at Akovitika in south-east Messenia, from the fifth at Tainaron (a recognized asylum for Helots) and Helos. These last two are especially suggestive. For my chief reason for believing in the survival of a remnant of the Mycenaean population is that this seems to explain most plausibly the origin of the Lakonian Helots.

The ancients were no less fascinated by this problem than the moderns, and the variety and mutual incompatibility of their views are displayed in [Appendix 4](#). As usual, however, it is the modern tools of geoarchaeology and philology which have made the decisive contributions to our still incomplete understanding. In the time of Thucydides (1.101.2) most of Sparta's Helots were descendants of the Messenians enslaved in the eighth and seventh centuries; indeed, the terms 'Helots' and 'Messenians' were by the late fifth century more or less interchangeable. Consideration of the geomorphology of Lakonia, as recently explicated by Bintliff (1977), confirms that the numerical balance will always have been tipped in favour of the Messenians. There just was not enough arable land in the lower Eurotas furrow in our period to accommodate as many Helots in Lakonia as could the Pamisos valley in Messenia. Presumably, though, it was in the Helos plain, as this stood in antiquity, that most of the Lakonian Helots were always concentrated. The Heleia was the most fertile region of Lakonia (Polyb. 5.19.7), and a recurrent ancient aetiology derived the name 'Helots' from a place called Helos.

In reality, however, the name was almost certainly derived from a root meaning 'capture', and this is a powerful hint that the status of the Lakonian Helots, like that of the Messenians and indeed of the other serf-like populations of the classical Greek world, was acquired through conquest. At all events, there is nothing in the ancient literary sources to suggest that the status of the Lakonian Helots differed from that of the Messenians, whose origins are not in this respect controversial. The transformation of the inhabitants of the lower Eurotas furrow into Helots occurred, I believe, not only long before the full development of chattel slavery (the characteristic form of forced labour in Greece down to the later Roman Empire) but early

enough for them, unlike their Messenian fellows, to have forgotten their ‘nationality’ by (at latest) the fifth century. In other words, I am prepared to suggest that the relatively few Lakonian Helots acquired their status soon after the Dorian settlement of Sparta, perhaps as early as the tenth century. Again, the Bahima analogy may be worth recalling or, closer to home, the fate of the Thessalian Penestai. Thus the ‘narrative’ of Pausanias’ third book may be nowhere more seriously misleading than in its suggestion that Sparta did not secure its Lakonian Helots until the eve of the invasion of Messenia c.735 (cf. [Chapter 8](#)). On the other hand, for the reasons given in [Chapter 5, 1](#) would not wish to adduce as ‘proof’ of my dating the ‘traditions’ ascribing the conquest of the Lakonian Helots to either Agis I or Soos (who was in fact fictitious: [Appendix 3](#)).

We shall return to the status and functions of the Helots, Messenian as well as Lakonian, in later chapters. To conclude the present chapter on the formative period of Lakonia, some suggestions will be made concerning the ‘third force’ in Lakonian political and economic development, the Perioikoi. Whereas the ancients agreed that the institution of Helotage was a once-for-all affair (though they disagreed over the modalities), they offered no such Unitarian solutions to the problem of the origin of the Perioikoi. Indeed, with rare and axe-grinding exceptions, they can hardly be said even to have addressed themselves to it systematically. We are therefore mostly reduced yet again to speculation, constrained only by our suggested view of the origin of the Lakonian Helots and by the archaeological evidence.

Of one thing, however, we may be sure: the Perioikoi of the classical period had not all arrived at their shared half-way political status ([Chapter 10](#)) by the same route. Of the supposedly 100 Perioikic communities in Lakonia and Messenia (Androtion 324F49, with Jacoby’s commentary) at least two were the outcome of Sparta’s resettlement of refugee populations. The earlier of these, Asine (modern Koroni), suggests that already by the end of the eighth century Spartan writ ran as far as the southern tip of Messenia. But what was the situation in Lakonia prior to Spartan intervention in Messenia, which was said to have occurred first in the reign of Teleklos (perhaps 760–740)? Given that the Lakonian Perioikoi of the classical period were indistinguishable ethnically, linguistically and culturally from the Spartans, there are three main ways whereby a Perioikic community could have been created. First, a formerly independent pre-Dorian or Dorian community could have been conquered or otherwise politically subjected by Sparta or even perhaps have submitted to Spartan suzerainty voluntarily. Second, a settlement could have been established *ex nihilo* by Sparta with Perioikic or perhaps rather proto-Perioikic status. Third, a pre-Dorian

community could have received an influx of Dorian settlers, the latter perhaps constituting themselves a ruling stratum.

Each of these three possibilities has received vigorous support in the modern scholarly literature, and parallels of varying degrees of plausibility from both Greek and Roman history have been produced. In the present state of our evidence, however, it is illegitimate to come down heavily in favour of any one of them. For example, if we were to take the archaeological record of total depopulation at face value, we might argue that all the Perioikic communities in Lakonia were new foundations sponsored or adopted by Sparta on the lines of the Roman colonization of Italy. However, as already suggested, the archaeological evidence should not be so taken. On the other hand, the apparently circumstantial accounts of the fate of such 'Achaean' communities as Helos cannot in my view form the basis of a historical reconstruction either. On balance therefore I would tentatively accept the third of the possible solutions outlined above, but I would lay less emphasis on such speculation than on the distribution of PG pottery in Lakonia outside Sparta and Amyklai.

The number of sites involved is admittedly very small, but their geographical range may none the less be significant. For it suggests, what we might have suspected on other grounds, that 'Lakedaimon' or 'Lakonike' did not yet encompass the east Parnon foreland by c.775. True, a 'PG necropolis' was reported in the 1920s from Astros in the Thyreatis (Wrede 1927), but this report has never been corroborated by published finds, and the pottery is anyway more likely to have been in the Argive than in the Lakonian style. Moreover, despite the migration of a few Lakonian PG pieces to Tegea and possibly one to the Argive Heraion, I cannot accept the 'tradition' that Sparta was in contention for the Thyreatis as early as the reign of Labotas (c.850?: Paus. 3.2.3). As Kelly (1976) has forcefully, perhaps even too forcefully, argued, much of early Argive history was distorted retrospectively by the idea that the mainspring of the foreign policy of Dorian Argos was from the start rivalry with Dorian Sparta for leadership of the Peloponnese. Whether Spartan influence or control had been extended as far south as the Mani by 775 cannot be tested archaeologically, but the inclusion in the 'Catalogue of Ships' ([Appendix 3](#)) of Oitylos and Messe (if it is to be located at modern Mezapos) may indicate at least a Spartan claim to control them during the Dark Age.

What we are left with, then, is the core of historical Lakedaimon between the Taygetos and Parnon ranges, together with one site in the west Taygetos foreland whose marginal situation was pregnant with future developments. Anthochorion, just south of the Spartan plain and somewhat off the beaten track from Sparta to Gytheion ([Chapter](#)

10) has not been securely identified with an ancient site. Stena, however, is near Gytheion, which, thanks to its role as Sparta's port, became the single most important Perioikic community at latest by the sixth century. (Toynbee 1969, 192f., has not convinced me that Gytheion was a Spartan town between c.750 and 195.) Apidia is generally, and probably rightly, identified with Palaia (Paus. 3.22.6) or Pleiai (Livy 35.27.3), but its political status, presumably Perioikic at least by the seventh century, is not known for certain. In the Malea peninsula the PG (or LG?) pottery reported from the Hyperteleton (Skeat 1934, 34 n.4) is of uncertain style; I failed to locate the sherds in the Sparta Museum. In Roman times, following the liberation of the Perioikoi from Sparta in 195, the sanctuary became the centre of the Eleutherolakonian League ([Chapter 15](#)); under the Spartan domination there may have been a Perioikic community called Leukai here. Daimonia further south is Perioikic Kotyrta, presumably linked to the Eurotas valley chiefly by sea at this time. Finally, the Volimnos site is that of the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis on the ancient border with Messenia. The alleged assassination of king Teleklos here c.740 provided the Spartans with a *casus belli* for their invasion of Messenia.

In conclusion we may, I think, fairly infer from the conquest of Aigys (to which I return at the beginning of the next chapter) that by c.775 the northern end of the Eurotas furrow, including the Skiritis and the important Perioikic communities of Sellasia and Pellana, was also under Spartan control. Thus by the second quarter of the eighth century the disunion of LH IIIC and sub-Mycenaean Lakonia had been healed by the military and diplomatic physic of the Spartans. Economically speaking, however, we can do little more than apply to Sparta and the Eurotas valley, *mutatis mutandis*, the words of Braudel (1972, 101): 'while a plain is coming to life, overcoming its dangerous waters, organizing its roads and canals, one or two hundred years may pass by.' Clearly, though, by about the middle of the eighth century the stage was set for perhaps the most remarkable century or so in all of Sparta's long and chequered history.

Notes on further reading

'Dorian' probably did not acquire its adulatory or pejorative connotations until after the Persian Wars of the early fifth century, and the reason for this semantic development was a political, not a cultural, dichotomy: Will 1956; Rawson 1969, esp. 57–9, 318–20; Oliva 1971, 9–11. Will and Rawson note how comparatively recent racist 'theorizing' has further distorted perspective.

Vitalis 1930 and Kiechle 1966 are notable exceptions to the rule that the 'tradition' about the 'Dorian invasion' is not evaluated on its own merits. I cannot, however, accept many of their substantive

conclusions.

Chadwick's new hypothesis concerning Dorian origins (1976b) has already made at least two other appearances. It is incorporated in his résumé of the contribution of philology to the reconstruction of early Greek history (1976c); the responses of Schachermeyr, Pittioni and Kirsten, which are printed after Chadwick's paper, are uniformly unfavourable. I am in general sympathy with Kirsten's position, especially his picture of the Dorian new-comers as shepherds; cf. Sarkady 1975, esp. 121. Second, the new hypothesis is hinted at in Chadwick's survey of the Mycenaean world (1976a). Here the historical Helots are explained as 'presumably the subject class of Mycenaean times, a people of non-Greek origin' (62: but where then are the Late Bronze Age Dorians? or were there two 'subject classes' in Mycenaean Lakonia?); the Perioikoi are regarded as being 'very likely the pre-Dorian Greeks of Lakonia, the descendants of the Mycenaean population' (62: but if, as Chadwick argued in 1976b, there was not room in north-west Greece to accommodate the number of Dorians required to complete the 'Dorian invasion' of 'tradition', then it seems to me even less likely that there were enough ex-Mycenaeans to go round the numerous Perioikic communities of historical Lakonia).

Burkert (1977, 228) has suggested that the form in which Apollo was represented at Amyklai may have been borrowed in the twelfth century from the Syro-Hittites via Cyprus, but that Apollo as such originated in the Peloponnese.

The most recent published study of Lakonian PG pottery is Desborough 1972, 241-3; I added some details in my unpublished doctoral dissertation (1975, 87-99). On the problems of method involved in interpreting pottery evidence see Desborough 1972, ch. 19. Nicklin 1971 is a stimulating review article discussing the sociological approach to the potter's craft.

For the geological properties of Lakonian iron see *ESAG*, no. 401.

Snodgrass 1971 is probably the finest historical discussion of the Greek Dark Age, although his chronological limits (c.1100-700) are too wide at the lower end. Desborough 1972 ends the Dark Age too soon (c.900). For an intermediate position see Coldstream 1977. Also useful is Bouzek 1969, but this somewhat exaggerates the undoubted connections between Greece and central Europe.

On the 'Dorian invasion' see Starr 1961, ch. 4; Bengtson 1977, 50-66; and with special reference to Sparta Oliva 1971, 15-23. Of the older accounts Busolt 1893, 201-62, is perhaps the most valuable.

For the cultivation of the olive see *ESAG*, no. 316. In 1961 the eparchy of Gytheion came ninth in the whole of Greece with 9.58 per cent of its cultivated area being devoted to the fruit, that of Lakedaimon (roughly the Eurotas valley) nineteenth with 6.78 per

cent.

On Pohoidan see Solmsen 1907, 332f.; Gschnitzer 1962; the discoveries at Akovitika are published in Themelis 1970. The case for continuity of occupation in southern Lakonia, especially the Mani, has been stated forcefully, if somewhat uncritically, by Kiechle (1963, 95–115). For reasons given in [Chapter 8](#), I cannot accept his picture of Amyklai (49–67) as the bulwark of ‘Achaean’ Lakonia resisting the Dorian intruders.

Modern views on the Helots are cited in the notes to [Chapter 10](#); so too for the Perioikoi.

Chapter eight

The Lakonian Renaissance c. 775–650

George Grote, taking his cue from Eratosthenes, sub-divided the ancient Greek past into a ‘mythical’ and a ‘historical’ portion. The dividing-line he put at 776, the traditional date established by the Sophist Hippias of Elis (c.400) for the foundation of the Olympic Games, which were a truly panhellenic festival open to all and only Greeks. I should myself put the dividing-line rather later, but recent scholarship has in a sense vindicated Grote by demonstrating that the years around 775 did indeed mark the beginning of a new epoch in Greek history. First, ‘after centuries of illiteracy ... the country got a script once more: the simple, practical, easily-taught alphabet from which all our western scripts descend’ (Jeffery 1976, 25). Second, the movement of western ‘colonization’ began about this time, with the settlement of Euboian islanders on the island of Pithekoussai (modern Ischia) off the bay of Naples. Third, a great advance in metalworking was made, visible initially in the production of solid bronze figurines but culminating within a couple of generations in the manufacture of sophisticated armour of hammered bronze and such agricultural implements as Hesiod’s iron-shod plough. Finally, the Homeric epics, with all their ethical, religious and national significance, were being shaped into their monumental form.

Lakonia in fact did not play a leading role in any of these four developments, despite some unreliable ancient testimony to the contrary. The Lakonian Doric dialect had presumably evolved into its historical form by the eighth century, but the earliest known example of the Lakonian local script is of mid-seventh-century date (below). L.H. Jeffery (1961, 185) suggested that the alphabet was transmitted to Olympia from Sparta, but, if true, this would merely serve to confirm doubts held on other grounds that a contemporary written record of victors was kept at Olympia from 776. Still more dubious is

the role of co-founder of the Olympic Games assigned to the Spartan lawgiver Lykourgos by Aristotle (fr. 533 Rose) on the basis of an inscribed discus he had seen at Olympia. Regrettably too the story that Lykourgos was responsible for bringing the Homeric poems from Ionia to the Greek mainland (Plut. *Lyk.* 4.4) must be dismissed as a fable of the kind which tended to accrete around such legendary figures. However, the establishment of the Menelaion sanctuary c.700 (below) suggests that the Homeric poems had by then reached Sparta, and the language of Tyrtaios is heavily influenced by the epic. As far as metal-work goes, worked iron is conspicuous by its dearth in Lakonia before the seventh century. On the other hand, it was perhaps as early as c.775 that the first bronze animal figurines made by Lakonian craftsmen were being dedicated at Olympia. Finally, Sparta barely participated in the colonization of the west (or indeed elsewhere) for reasons to be explored in the present chapter. It is possible though that the settlement of Lakonians on Thera c.800 or shortly after reflects economic pressures similar to those which stimulated the Euboian pioneers.

From what has been said so far it would be justified to infer that in c.775 Lakonian horizons did not extend beyond Olympia in north-west Peloponnese at the very furthest. On the whole, I think, this fairly reflects the continuing isolation of Lakonia from the wider Greek or even Peloponnesian world down to the middle of the eighth century. There is, however, one piece of evidence suggesting this was not the whole story. For in the joint reign of Archelaos and Charillos the Delphic Oracle is said to have given its blessing to the Spartan conquest and annihilation of Aigys in the north-west angle of Lakonia (Parke and Wormell 1956, I, 93; II, no. 539). Chronologically, this is just possible. The joint reign may be dated c.775–760, and this seems to have been about the time the Oracle began to attract ‘international’ attention on the political plane. Moreover, as with Olympia, the Spartans undoubtedly established an early and continuing ‘special relationship’ with Delphi of a religious-cum-political nature. My chief reason, however, for believing in the authenticity of this oracle is that it was delivered to both the Spartan kings jointly. Indeed, the conquest of Aigys is the first enterprise of the Spartan state recorded to have been undertaken by both kings, a circumstance which has prompted the suggestion (most recently Jeffery 1976, 114) that Archelaos and Charillos were in fact the first joint kings of Sparta.

It is outside the scope of the present book to discuss internal political developments at Sparta in any detail, but a brief comment on the dual kingship may help to bring the political background of the Lakonian renaissance into sharper focus. In the long view the Spartan kingship was remarkable on two main counts: first, it was a collegiate

kingship with hereditary succession to the thrones through two distinct royal houses, the supposed descendants of Agis I (Agiads) and Euryp(h)on (Eurypontids); second, it was a by no means titular kingship, which lasted in something like its traditional form (at least as we know it from the sixth century) until the second half of the third century, thereby surviving the general extinction of hereditary monarchy in Greece in the early Archaic period as well as the establishment of extra-constitutional personal rules known as tyrannies. The fact of kingship in Dark Age Sparta calls for no special comment: the process of the Dorian settlement and subsequent survival of Sparta in an alien and potentially hostile environment will have called for strong, centralized leadership. But the origin of the dual kingship, thanks to its uniqueness (Molossian and still less Iroquois parallels are not really convincing) and the poverty of the evidence, is and will remain a vexed question. From the welter of speculation both ancient and modern I would distinguish only two hypotheses as more than merely plausible, namely that the founders of the royal lines were the eponymous Agis and Euryp(h)on, not (as the 'Return of the Heraklids' myth demanded) Eurysthenes and Prokles or even, as the Spartans uniquely believed, Aristodamos (Hdt. 6.52.1); and that succession was from the start hereditary within each family or clan.

There are, however, good reasons for thinking that the two royal houses did not rule jointly as early as the lifetimes of the eponyms. The Eurypontid Soos is almost certainly a 'spuriynym' and is omitted from the most reliable Eurypontid king-list ([Appendix 3](#)). No less unreal, to judge from their names and association with Lykourgos, are Prytanis and Eunomos, supposedly the son and grandson respectively of Euryp(h)on himself. Thus, if we strike out these three and the eponym, there is just one Eurypontid predecessor for Charillos compared with four or five for the Agiad Archelaos. The source of the discrepancy should be sought in reality: the fact that the Agiads were reckoned, apparently with Delphic approval (Hdt. 6.52.5), to be the senior of the two royal houses (Hdt. 6.51) suggests that they had been in some sense royal before the Eurypontids, perhaps indeed as early as the second half of the tenth century, when Sparta may have been settled by Dorians ([Chapter 7](#)). This at any rate corresponds to a genealogically plausible modern dating of Agis I (930–900).




Figure 12 The villages of Sparta

The questions therefore arise how, when and why the two houses came to rule jointly. I have no new hypothesis to add to those collected by Oliva (1971, 23–8), but I suggest that an explanation in terms of the amalgamation of two communities makes the best historical sense. In the fifth century it was a cause for remark (Thuc. 1.10.2) that the town of Sparta had never been fully ‘synoecized’. That is to say, the separate identity of the four villages of Sparta town –

Limnai, Kynosoura (or Konoooura), Mesoa and Pitana-had never been entirely reduced. Indeed, the fifth village of Sparta, Amyklai, to whose incorporation I shall shortly turn, was physically separated from the other four by several kilometres. Now the two royal houses were based in the original Sparta, the Agiads in Pitana, the smartest village, the Eurypontids in Limnai. At least, this was where they had their respective burial-grounds, burial within the settlement area being permitted in Sparta contrary to normal Greek custom. Thus the joint kingship could have been established when Pitana and Limnai coalesced politically to form the *polis* of Sparta, the former taking with it Mesoa, the latter Kynosoura/Konoooura-if topography is any guide (Figure 12). That the amalgamation of these four was completed before the absorption of Amyklai is strongly suggested by an institutional survival; the important cult of Orthia in Limnai was common only to the original four villages (Paus. 3.16.9), whereas the cult of the patron deity of the state Athena Poliachos was naturally shared (after the absorption of Amyklai) by all five. The dates at which these cults were established cannot be precisely determined, but one would expect the cult of the state's patron to have come first, an expectation that is not belied by the archaeological evidence, if Droop's relative chronology of Lakonian PG pottery is accepted (Chapter 7). Both at any rate were certainly in existence by the joint reign of Archelaos and Charillos. Thus, to conclude this discussion of the early history of the Spartan monarchy, the suggestion that Archelaos and Charillos were the first joint monarchs is consistent with the literary and archaeological evidence deployed above and so should perhaps be accepted as a working hypothesis.

Let us make it work first to help explain the political status of Classical Amyklai. According to the dominant tendency of the much later literary evidence, conveniently represented by the narrative' in Pausanias' third book, 'Achaean' Amyklai and 'Dorian' Sparta were locked for centuries in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation in the Spartan basin. Their route to the south thus effectively blocked, the Spartans eventually turned their aggressive attention to the north and, as we have seen, under Archelaos and Charillos destroyed Aigys. In the reign of Teleklos, son of Archelaos, Amyklai at last fell to Sparta through treachery and armed attack. The way now lay open to the rest of Lakonia – and even Messenia, on whose borders Teleklos met his end. Pharos and Geronthrai were also taken by Teleklos, Helos by his son Alkamenes despite Argive intervention.

Thus far 'tradition' – geographically not impossible perhaps, but historically worthless, notwithstanding the claims of Pausanias' modern supporters. For, leaving aside the question of Pausanias' sources, it is unlikely that Teleklos would have been dabbling in

Messenia before getting Helos (or the Helos region) under his belt. Moreover, as argued in [Chapter 7](#), the conquest of the area of which Helos was the chief place is more likely to have occurred in the tenth or ninth century. Second, the notion of Amyklai blocking Sparta's progress southwards is anachronistic for the eighth or any earlier century. Third, the alleged captures of Pharis (site unknown) and Geronthrai are probably no more than a clumsy attempt to accommodate the data of the Homeric 'Catalogue' ([Appendix 2](#)) in a coherent historical picture. Finally, and most seriously, the 'Dorian'/'Achaean' antithesis is greatly overdone. This point has already been made in connection with the Hyakinthia ([Chapter 7](#)); we may add here that, so far as the evidence of archaeology goes, there is nothing to justify the idea that Sparta and Amyklai were after c.900 culturally distinct. How then should we interpret the 'tradition' of conquest by Teleklos?

An inscription of Roman date *UG* V.1.27) proves that Amyklai became one of the 'obes' of Sparta, but there is considerable controversy both over the number of the 'obes' and over their relationship to the 'villages' of Thucydides and the 'tribes' referred to in the Archaic document known as the 'Great Rhetra' (Plut. *Lyk.* 6). To cut a very long story short, I follow the line of argument proposed by Wade-Gery (1958, 37–85), to the effect that there were in all five 'obes', namely the four 'villages' of Sparta plus Amyklai. The most economical hypothesis to explain the 'traditional', archaeological and epigraphical evidence is to suppose that Amyklai, already considerably 'Dorianized' and perhaps politically subordinated, was incorporated as the fifth 'obe' of the enlarged Sparta by Teleklos c.750. The precise location of the 'obe', however, is still unclear. Several pieces of evidence, including the Roman inscription, suggest that it lay at Sklavochori (now, typically, officially renamed Amyklai); but this location tallies neither with the distance of Amyklai from Sparta given by Polybius (5.19.2) nor with the historian's description of the sanctuary of Apollo as lying on the seaward side of the settlement. One solution might be that Amyklai extended in an arc from the range of hills north and north-west of the sanctuary to the site of modern Amyklai.

We need not of course believe the story of an actual military conquest involving the pitched battle and fifth-columnry characteristic of the fifth and subsequent centuries rather than the eighth. In particular, the leading military role assigned to Timomachos may owe more to mid-fourth-century Theban propaganda than to mid-eighth-century Spartan reality (cf. Toynbee 1913, 251–4). On the other hand, there is no good reason to reject the 'traditional' view that the incorporation was far from being a painless and smooth operation.

The cult of Apollo/Hyakinthos remained a pre-eminently Amyklaian affair, in contrast to the Spartan cult of Orthia. This may have been part of the price Sparta had to pay to persuade Amyklai, or rather its leading aristocrats, to come over quietly. Above all, the king of Amyklai, if such there was, may not have taken too kindly to losing his throne.

The other main group of dissidents in Amyklai seem to have been the so-called Minyans, whose story is told so picturesquely by Herodotus (4.145ff.) in connection with the settlement of Thera, the island whose massive eruption in c.1500 we noticed in [Chapter 4](#). It is hard to disembed fact from fiction in Herodotus' account, but the Minyans were presumably survivors of the Bronze Age population of Lakonia, who had taken to the hills (Taygetos) during the Mycenaean 'time of troubles' and returned to the plain when the dust had settled. Archaeology may provide a clue to the date of their migration to Thera, led by the suspiciously eponymous Theras; for the earliest evidence of post-Mycenaean habitation on the island belongs around 800. It is therefore tempting to see the settlement as a consequence of increasing political disagreement between Sparta and Amyklai which ended in the latter's partial loss of its separate identity or formal independence.

There may, however, have been more narrowly economic factors involved too. In the fifth century Thera regarded itself as a colony of Sparta, a claim backed by its Doric dialect and perhaps also by its possession of Ephors (cf. Kiechle 1963, 83–95). The same claim was advanced by the nearby Melos (Thuc. 5.84.2, 89, 112.2), by Knidos in southern Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.174.2) and by Kythera (Thuc. 7.57.6). Not all of these can have borne the same relationship to the alleged mother-city, and Kythera at least, as we shall see later in this chapter, shows no organic connection with Sparta in the eighth century. But it is at least possible that the settlement of Melos (traditional date 1116) like those of Amyklaion near Gortyn and Amyklai on Cyprus, is to be associated with a ninth- or eighth-century rather than a twelfth-century emigration from Lakonia and so to be regarded as an anticipation of the fullblown colonization movement of the 730s onwards, from which the enlarged Sparta preferred to abstain.

However that may be, the reign of Teleklos (c.760–740) was clearly a time of movement in other respects. In archaeological, specifically ceramic, terms it witnessed the transition from PG to Late Geometric (LG) pottery in Lakonia – or rather the abrupt break between them. For after some two centuries of what looks for the most part like conservative stagnation the native pottery tradition was transformed by a deluge of external influences emanating above all from the Argolis and the Corinthia. Only a few items from the old stock

managed to keep their heads above water and that at the cost of varying degrees of metamorphosis. The new synthesis, the local Lakonian LG style, was generally colourless and insipid, enlivened by few sparks of native ingenuity (Figure 13). But at least it was new, it was in line with changes elsewhere in Greece, and the fabric achieved a far wider distribution than its PG predecessor both inside and outside Lakonia, particularly within Sparta itself (Figure 13).

The causes of change in ceramic style are complex and hard to discover, even where both the literary and the archaeological evidence are rich, but broadly speaking they are social. No artist is an island. His (one assumes that specialist potters and painters were male) thought-patterns, potentialities and techniques alike reflect and reveal the level of development attained by the society of which he is a part. Indeed, we are entitled to assume that the Greek Geometric artist, no matter what his medium, was more firmly affixed to his cultural matrix than his modern counterpart through direct social, economic and psychological ties. Thus a change in style so profound as that from PG to LG pottery in Lakonia (and elsewhere) presupposes equally radical changes in Lakonian society affecting the relationship between Lakonia and the wider world outside. If the stagnation of PG was fostered by geographical isolation, insecurity and a low level of technology, then the re-establishment of communication by land and sea and the rising standard of technique should be at least part of the explanation of the change from PG to LG. Certainly, the Spartan ruling aristocracy, as we have seen, had begun to display an interest in the world beyond their immediate purview during the first half of the eighth century. 'Governmental' action, however, is unlikely to have preceded the activities of individuals and small groups who, in transacting their daily business, established peaceful, stable and routine channels of intercourse, at first within Lakonia (witness the distribution of Lakonian PG) and then between Lakonia and other regions of the Peloponnese.




Figure 13 The distribution of Lakonian Late Geometric pottery

The decisive contacts, artistically speaking, were with the Argolis, another major area of Dorian settlement entering an expansionist phase. On present evidence the medium of Argive influence was not imported pottery, although a few Argive MG pieces did make their way to the Orthia sanctuary. So, if pots were not travelling, people must have been; and I see no difficulty in visualizing Lakonian potters and painters visiting Argive workshops and sanctuaries or, if the Argolis is thought to be too distant, at least Tegea, where Argive pottery was imported for dedication in some quantity. (I cannot support the political explanation of Argive ceramic influence proposed by Coldstream 1977, 156, 163.) From the Argives the Lakonians borrowed the essential LG motifs like the meander (including the characteristically Argive step-meander), the lozenge or diamond, and the zigzag. These and the ‘metopal’ scheme of composition they applied to the larger, cruder shapes such as the krater (mixing-bowl) and amphora. It was also under Argive inspiration that the Lakonians inaugurated a somewhat clumsy and inchoate figure-style, depicting chiefly horses, the aristocratic hallmark, and rows of dancing men and women.

Corinthian influence was less marked to begin with. For whatever reason, the Corinthians did not follow the Argives in developing a Geometric figure-style, but their LG was exceedingly competent and may well have influenced Lakonian at least by its characteristic system of fine banding. It was, however, the revolution implied by the Early Protocorinthian (EPC) linear and orientalizing styles that was most keenly felt in Lakonia from c.720. A few bolder spirits flirted with the new black-figure technique in blatant imitation of Corinthian work,

but the majority sensibly decided that the time was not yet ripe for moving into a full-blown black-figure style. Instead, they turned to Corinth for the fine ‘half-tone’ ornament which they applied to the smaller, thin-walled shapes like the skyphos and lakaina (both drinking-vessels). New shapes like the globular aryballos (scent-bottle) and lekythos (oil-flask) were also borrowed from the same source. Utilizing our understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, Lakonian LG and, on the other, Argive LG and Corinthian LG and EPC, we may justifiably argue that Lakonian LG began c.750 and ended c.690. Neither date unfortunately receives independent corroboration from the stratigraphy of the Orthia sanctuary in Sparta, the site which, for the reasons summarized in [Appendix 5](#), provides the basis of our knowledge of all Lakonian archaeology from the mid-eighth century onwards.

Lakonian LG pottery was, as I remarked earlier, far more widely distributed than PG, though this need not of course mean in each case that the site in question had previously been unoccupied. Outside the two main Spartan sanctuaries of Athena and Orthia, it has been excavated in a ‘domestic and commercial’ area of the village of Pitana, at several sites in Limnai (including the Heroon sanctuary) and a couple of places in Mesoia. Across the Eurotas, LG pottery dates the inauguration of the important cult of Menelaos and Helen, whose significance will be considered further below. At Amyklai in addition to the continued worship of Apollo/Hyakinthos another new LG cult was established near the modern chapel of Ay. Paraskevi. The recipient deity was probably Alexandra, whom the Amyklaians identified with Trojan Cassandra in Pausanias’ day (3.19.6); but her worship may only have been associated with that of the heroized Agamemnon from the sixth century, when such ‘Achaean’ connections were found politically expedient ([Chapter 9](#)). ‘Geometric’ pottery is reported confidently from Analipsis (perhaps ancient Iasos) on the northern frontier, and from Helleniko (ancient Eua) and Chersonisi in Kynouria, more doubtfully from Geraki (ancient Geronthrai). Since I have not seen these pieces, I cannot say whether they are to be assigned to the Lakonian LG style properly so called; perhaps, like those from Kastri/Palaiopolis on Kythera, they are strictly local products. Outside Lakonia, though, certainly Lakonian LG ware has been excavated at Volimithia in Messenia, at Tegea and Asea in Arkadia, and at the sanctuary of Poseidon north of the Isthmus of Corinth; the suggested pieces from Nichoria, Mantinea and Delphi, however, are doubtfully Lakonian.

Of all these finds the most directly relevant in the immediate context is the two-handled cup or tankard from Volimithia. It was found, together with two local Messenian pots and seven Corinthian

LG I imports, in the dromos of a Mycenaean chamber-tomb, part of an offering to a bygone hero. This humble tankard is thus proof positive of relations between Sparta and Messenia c.740–730 (Coldstream 1977, 162, 182), although we cannot of course say precisely how or why it made the journey to its place of discovery. It may not, however, have been the first Lakonian pottery to make the trip. In [Chapter 7](#) we noticed the certainly Lakonian PG from the border sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis at Volimnos and the sherds of Lakonian PG type at Kaphirio and perhaps Hellenika (ancient Thouria). These, together with some suggestive stylistic analogies at Nichoria, also in the same general area of south-east Messenia, may indicate that contact between Messenia and Sparta had been firmly established before 750.

This indication receives apparently powerful support from a notice in Strabo (8.4.4, C360) that Teleklos established colonies in south-east Messenia at Poieessa, Echeiai and Tragion (none of these has been identified archaeologically). Indeed, the sober Busolt (1893, 229–32) was prepared to argue that south-east Messenia, or the part of it probably to be identified with the ancient Dentheliatis, was actually under Spartan control in the time of Teleklos before the full-scale invasion of Messenia from the north-east c.735. If so, then the three towns will presumably have been of Perioikic status, and their foundation will have had a direct bearing on the outbreak of Spartano-Messenian hostilities.

The route taken by Teleklos into Messenia is not recorded, but, if Kiechle (1963, 100) is right, he did not take the short cut over Taygetos from Xirokambi to Kardamyli, which would have been hazardous for an army. Instead perhaps he will have marched down the Eurotas valley, across Vardhounia to Gytheion, then along the 246 m.-high Karyoupolis divide to the site of modern Areopolis before continuing up the coast via Oitylos and Kardamyle to Pharai (modern Kalamata). The latter Teleklos may have brought into the Spartan sphere, again as a Perioikic dependency; at any rate, it was later regarded as a Spartan colony. In the end, however, Teleklos appears to have overreached himself and was assassinated by dissident Messenians – or so the Spartans claimed – at the border sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis.

It is now time to consider what may have prompted this first intervention of the Spartans in Messenia in the light of their full-scale invasion a generation or so later. First it must be made abundantly clear how poor is the available literary evidence for this crucial moment in Lakonian history. Apart from a few scraps of the fourth-century Ephorus, we are chiefly dependent on the fourth book of Pausanias, who utilized, directly or indirectly, the prose *Messenika* of

Myron of Priene and the verse epic of Rhianos of Bene, both third-century writers, correcting or supplementing them from the poems of Tyrtaios. This is a dispiriting reversal of the proper historical procedure, but then Pausanias was of course no more a historian than the writers upon whom he chiefly drew. There is, however, also a wider problem of evidence. For the Spartan conquest and annexation of Messenia introduced a new and enduring facet of the Spartan ‘mirage’ ([Chapter 5](#)), what we might more properly call the ‘Messenian mirage’.

The chief causes of the distortion of early Messenian history were threefold (apart from those applicable to all early Greek history). First, as the Greek expression ‘Messenian War (or Wars)’ implies, the conflict has usually been viewed from the Spartan side of the barricades, like, for example, the struggle between Rome and the Etruscans; and the main – some would say the only – reliable literary source is the Spartan Tyrtaios. Second, as with the ‘Tourkokratia’ from AD 1453, the harshness of the Spartan occupation stimulated among the vanquished Messenians (including those of the Diaspora) a flourishing folklore of resistance, of which the exploits of Aristomenes are but the most conspicuous products. Third, the liberation of Messenia from the Spartan yoke and the (re-)foundation of the *polis* of Messene in 370–369 ([Chapter 13](#)) transferred the war from the physical to the verbal plane. Every aspect of the post-Mycenaean past of Messenia became raw material for political propaganda and ‘creative’ historiography in a fiery debate whose strength can be gauged from the embers raked over for us in Pausanias’ travelogue. In short, while our sources give us a variety of unconvincing and mutually inconsistent *aitiai kai diaphorai* (causes of complaint and clashes of interest) before the outbreak of hostilities, they provide us with no cogent *alethestate prophasis* (truest explanation).

We are forced, therefore, to look elsewhere, and the most fruitful line of approach is undoubtedly to view the Spartan initiative in the context of Greek, and especially Peloponnesian, development as a whole. The sudden increase in direct and indirect external contacts around 750 suggests that at this stage Sparta was in some sense becoming one of the more advanced mainland Greek communities. Some fifteen years later Corinth, another Dorian city and then perhaps the most advanced of all, followed the lead given by the Euboians, though perhaps for different purposes, and despatched settlers to the west (Kerkyra and Sicily). Since this was just about the time, according to a plausible chronology inferred from the Olympic victor-lists, that the Spartans invaded Messenia, there is a case for asking whether these events had anything in common. Despite large differences of geographical situation and political organization, the

answer, I believe, is that the common factor was overpopulation – or, to be precise, relative overpopulation. Hypothetically, the causal nexus was roughly as follows. The fertile Eurotas valley had been somehow distributed among the Spartans, but inequality of ownership allied to an increase in population had created an unacceptable level of social discontent and physical hardship. The settlement of more marginal areas of Lakonia and of the fertile (but politically far more sensitive) south-east Messenia had proved ephemeral palliatives. A more drastic solution was required, and the conquest of Messenia or rather the Pamisos valley filled the bill.

Several theoretical objections might be raised to this hypothesis, but they can all be met so long as it is remembered that the overpopulation in Lakonia was relative and that it was in any case a necessary not a sufficient condition of such a giant undertaking. The ancient sources, needless to say, are more interested in personalities than in what we might call social pressures, but an eccentric apophthegm attributed to the Agiad king Polydoros (Plut. *Mor.* 231E) provides a whisper of support for the view that land-hunger was the primary motivation. If we were to treat seriously the story of the quarrel between the Messenian Olympic victor Polychares and the Spartan Euaiphnos (Paus. 4.4.5–5.7), which was the Messenians' reply to the Spartan claim to be avenging the death of Teleklos, we might perhaps infer that a dispute over transhumance rights was a contributory factor. It remains true, however, that the case in favour of the hypothesis outlined above must be argued in terms of probabilities.

Let us first approach the question negatively. If for the sake of argument it is granted that there was critical overpopulation in the Eurotas valley, what other remedies besides the conquest of the Pamisos valley were open to the Spartans? 'Internal colonization', of the kind successfully practised in comparably spacious Attika, Boiotia and the Argolis in this period, had already been tried in Lakonia and found wanting. Moreover, it was ruled out for the future by political considerations, since the bait of land in exchange for the loss of citizen rights (however ill-defined at this primitive stage) was not so attractive to the poor Spartan as it later proved to be for the poor Roman of the early Republic, for two main reasons: first, the land available was less desirable agriculturally; and, second, the divide between Spartan and Perioikic political status was in decisive respects absolute, unlike that between Latin and Roman status. On the other hand, overseas colonization was not a natural choice for an inland state like Sparta (compare, for example, Thebes), as is amply demonstrated by the circumstances in which Sparta's only true colony, Taras, was later established (below). Third, the importation of

essential foodstuffs to offset any shortfall there may have been in domestic production was not a practical proposition in the second half of the eighth century, for both economic and political reasons.

Negatively, therefore, the acquisition of new land was the only feasible solution. There were strong positive arguments in its favour too. The Spartans had already demonstrated skill both in war and in the control of dependent populations. They had proved in Lakonia that they could compel their subjects to yield up a surplus of agricultural production which they were unable or perhaps unwilling (Hesiod apparently attests the regular employment of slaves in Boiotia by 700) to extract by other means. Furthermore, the potential source of new land was one of the most fertile areas of all mainland Greece, Messenia 'good for ploughing, good for growing', as Tyrtaios (fr.5.3) succinctly put it. However, the final and, for me at least, incontrovertible proof of the kind of pressing need created by overpopulation lies in two further considerations. First, between Sparta and Messenia runs the Taygetos massif, a formidable deterrent to communication, let alone conquest and permanent subjugation, even if such strategic advantage as it offers does lie on Sparta's side. Second, the treatment meted out to the unfortunate Messenians was unparalleled in the whole of Greek antiquity, being comparable perhaps only to the treatment of the Irish by England in more recent times. I conclude, therefore, that the so-called First Messenian War (c.735–715) was triggered by relative overpopulation in the Eurotas valley.

Before we look briefly at the course of the war it is necessary to consider the physical setting and post-Mycenaean history of Messenia (Figure 14). The northern boundary is marked by the valley of the River Nedha (Chapter 1), the eastern by Taygetos. The area thus delimited may be sub-divided in the following manner. On the north-west south of the River of Kyparissia there begin the Kyparissia mountains, which extend southwards in the Aigaleon and other ridges, Mount Ithome being the easternmost. Southwards again lies the plateau east of Pylos, which continues to the foot of the Messenian peninsula. East of the Kyparissia mountains is the central valley of Messenia, essentially a northward projection of the Messenian Gulf, whose geomorphology appears not to have been so drastically altered by late Roman and mediaeval alluviation as its counterpart in Lakonia. It is this valley which occasioned the eulogies of Tyrtaios and later writers such as Euripides (fr. 1083 N). The valley itself is further sub-divided by the Skala ridge east of Ithome into a lower portion, known in antiquity as Makaria (Blessedness), and an upper, the plain of Stenyklaros. To west of the latter extends the Soulima valley, while the east of the central plain as a whole is blocked by Taygetos.




Figure 14 Messenia in the eighth century BC

This region had been among the most populous and important of all Greece during the Mycenaean heyday of the thirteenth century (Chapter 6). By the tenth century, however, the dismal picture we have painted for the region on the other side of Taygetos was mirrored here, although it should be stressed that the participants in the University of Minnesota Messenia Expedition were concentrating on the Late Bronze Age and so may have missed some Dark Age material. Instead of perhaps over 200 occupied sites there were now only about a dozen, concentrated in the Pylos area and the Pamisos valley. Turning to the ‘traditional’ literary evidence, we find that Messenia had supposedly been allotted to the returning Heraklid Kresphontes, but that the successor dynasty of the Dark Age was known as the Aipytyds, whose capital lay in the Stenyklaros plain. In other words, Messenia too received an influx of Dorian settlers, but hardly as early as ‘tradition’ suggested. On the other hand, unlike

Lakonia, Messenia can at least boast archaeological continuity from the Bronze Age into the historical period at excavated sites like Nichoria on the north-west shore of the Messenian Gulf. However, there is no archaeological support for the view that the Stenyklaros plain was the centre of a unified and prosperous kingdom; and the alleged activities of Teleklos in south-east Messenia suggest that Dark Age Messenia was considerably more politically heterogeneous even than Lakonia. The extent to which Messenia had been 'Dorianized' before the Spartan takeover is problematic, but the fact that the Messenians laid so much stress on their Dorian ancestry and retained Dorian institutions even after their liberation from Sparta in 370 (Chrimis 1949, 276f.) may indicate that it was not negligible.

The course of the First Messenian War is barely recoverable from our sources. Their few topographical indications suggest that the invasion was launched through the recently annexed and desolate 'bridgehead' of Aigytiis and that the Spartans limited the aim of their aggression initially to the capture of the Stenyklaros plain. Neither suggestion, however, receives archaeological support. Moreover, the precise route followed by the Spartan army to Aigytiis is controversial. Most scholars prefer to think of it as proceeding up the Eurotas valley to the southern edge of the Megalopolis plain and so skirting the northern extremity of Taygetos. Bölte (1929, 1343f.), however, argued cogently for a shorter, more southerly route actually crossing Taygetos from modern Georgitsi to Neochori and Dyrrhachi. According to Tyrtaios (fr. 5.7), the fighting was spread over twenty years, but this figure is suspect as being twice the length of the Trojan War. There is no reason, however, for doubting that the war was a long drawn out affair nor that (not for the last time) the final resistance centred on the low mountain bastion of Ithome. The generalship of the victorious Eurypontid king Theopompos (Tyrtaios fr. 5.1f.) is an unknown quantity, but his employment of Cretan mercenary archers (Paus. 4.8.3, 12; 4.10.1) is perhaps supported by the find of an as yet unpublished bronze helmet of Cretan type. The only other pieces of archaeological evidence which may be directly connected with the war are a warrior's pithos burial of c.725 excavated at Nichoria (Coldstream 1977, 162, 163f.) and two rather earlier inhumations in a possibly Mycenaean chamber-tomb from the same site (Coldstream 1977, 161). Unfortunately, though, we cannot tell which side our heroes had fought on.

For the moment, then, the Spartan snake had triumphed over the Messenian fox. The consequences were dramatic. The Stenyklaros plain and perhaps also the western half of the Makaria were seized by Sparta, and some of the former owners, it seems, were compelled 'like asses exhausted under great loads to bring their masters full half the

fruit their ploughed land produced' (Tyrtaios fr. 6). Other Messenians were more fortunate and escaped either to other parts of Greece (Arkadia was a natural haven) or perhaps overseas (to Sicily and south Italy). Yet others, outside the Pamisos valley, acquired or had confirmed the then status of Perioikoi. We should not perhaps envisage Sparta as controlling all Messenia as early as 700, but the founding of a New Asine at modern Koroni about the same time (in the circumstances described below) implies that Sparta was at liberty to intervene at least in the foot of the Messenian peninsula. This Asine, together with Mothone ([Chapter 9](#)), were illuminatingly described by Professor Wade-Gery in a marginal note to his copy of Parati 1917 as 'the Ulster of the Messenian Ireland'.

The conquest made the Spartan state – or rather certain Spartans – the wealthiest in Greece, and we could ask for no clearer indication of the influx of riches to Sparta than the finds from the sanctuary of Orthia. G. Dickins (in AO 163) convincingly linked the building of the second, all-stone temple of Orthia to a notice in Herodotus (1.65.1) concerning Spartan military success in the joint reign of Leon and Agasikles (c.575–560), a link reinforced by the revised dating (Boardman 1963, 7) of the second temple to c.570–560. Precisely the same connection can be posited for the construction of the first temple on the site, correctly downdated by Boardman to c.700. For, as Pritchett (1974, 1,100) has aptly remarked, 'without wars, few of the temples and other sacred buildings of Greece would have been built.'

Like warfare, the construction of a temple was always a public enterprise in Greece, but in the Archaic period it was regarded pre-eminently as an opportunity for the rich to display their wealth in a gesture of apparent piety towards the gods and goodwill towards the community as a whole. The early temples, in fact, were among the first known examples of that system of liturgies or 'giving for a return' which was to be politically institutionalized in the Athenian democracy and later throughout the Roman Empire. They also had important side-effects. The existence of a permanent roofed structure was an inducement to dedicate objects in precious perishable materials. The desire to make such dedications created a demand for skilled labour which could not always be satisfied by local resources. The introduction of foreign artisans to carry out specific commissions provided a tremendous stimulus in ideas and expertise to the native tradition. This, I suggest, explains how in the last quarter of the eighth century Lakonia was for the first time brought within the orbit of trade in luxury goods and raw materials and introduced to the most progressive ('orientalizing') artistic currents of the day.

In other words, it is the conquest of Messenia, or at least the upper Pamisos valley, which accounts for the presence at the Orthia

sanctuary from c.700 of expensive and exotic ex-votos in imported materials like gold, silver, ivory, glass, faience and amber, as well as a variety of bronze manufactures from within and outside the Greek world. The certain or probable provenances of the bronzes alone include Macedonia, central Greece, the Aegean islands, East Greece, Phrygia, the Near East and Cyprus, together with other regions of the Peloponnese. Of the local schools of craftsmen thus stimulated we might single out the workers in ivory and bronze for the quantity and quality of their production. For example, bronze horse figurines of Lakonian style datable c.750 to 700 have been found not only in Messenia (at Akovitika) but in Attika, Boiotia, Achaia, Phokis, Arkadia and perhaps even Egypt. Indeed, by 750 the makers of such figurines were established in workshops in the Altis at Olympia, a sign of fairly advanced organization of the craft; their products were no doubt dedicated principally by the outstandingly successful Spartan aristocratic competitors in the Games. Taken as a whole, the finds from Orthia will stand comparison with the contemporary votive assemblages to Hera at Corinthian Perachora and the Argive Heraion. The sanctuaries of Athena on the Spartan akropolis and Apollo/Hyakinthos at Amyklai are admittedly less well appointed, but this may be simply because there was no protective layer of sand at these sites to seal in the earliest finds. For the bronze cauldron-attachments found here do suggest wealth comparable to that displayed at the Orthia sanctuary.

Moreover, about the same time as the building of the first temple of Orthia the Spartans established a new sanctuary with interesting implications. This was the Menelaion, dedicated to Menelaos and Helen on the site of the most important Late Bronze Age settlement in Lakonia. The sanctuary had been excavated on and off since the 1830s and long since identified from the fairly abundant literary sources. But it was not until 1975 that incontrovertible proof of the identification was discovered in the shape of bronze artefacts inscribed with dedications to Helen (Catling and Cavanagh 1976). The earlier of the two, a pointed aryballos of c.650, provides the earliest evidence of Lakonian alphabetic writing.

Helen is arguably a faded version of the 'Great Mother' or, less grandly, a tree-goddess; her brothers, the Dioskouroi, who were supposed to live underground at Therapne (Alkman fr. 7) and generally played a major role in Lakonian cult and politics, may have been house-spirits before they became heroes. But Menelaos' only previous existence had been in the world of Homer ([Appendix 2](#)). On one level, therefore, the establishment of a sanctuary of the Homeric king of Lakedaimon, brother of Agamemnon and alleged occupant of a fine palace, was a matter of political convenience for Dorians seeking

to bolster their claim to rule the south-east Peloponnese by right. On another level, though, this was simply a variation on a theme being played in widely separated parts of the Greek world at this time, the veneration of the heroes of the past.

There is, however, no other archaeologically attested Lakonian site of the late eighth century which remotely rivals the Menelaion in its apparent display of wealth and prosperity. This dearth of evidence is especially disappointing in the case of Perioikic communities like Pellana, Geronthrai, Boiai and Prasiai, whose early importance is strongly suggested by literary evidence. Pellana disputed with little Pephnos in north-west Mani the privilege of being the birthplace of the Dioskouroi ([Chapter 10](#)). Geronthrai, as we have seen, was reportedly conquered and resettled by Teleklos. Boiai was said to have been ‘synoecized’ by the Heraklid Boios at an unspecified, but presumably early date (Moggi 1976, no. 5). Finally, Prasiai was an independent member of the Kalaureian Amphiktyony (Strabo 8.6.14, C374), a primarily religious association for the worship of Poseidon centred on what is now the tourist island of Poros, before Sparta assumed Prasiai’s responsibilities. Unfortunately, though, the date of the origins of the Amphiktyony is uncertain. Some would put it as early as the ninth century (Coldstream 1977, 54 n. 65), others as late as the seventh (Kelly 1966). The earliest archaeological evidence from Prasiai belongs perhaps to the second half of the seventh century. Apart from these, in some ways the most disappointing archaeological gap of all is the lacuna in our evidence for Gytheion between the PG period and the sixth century. For it must have been through this port that most of the expensive raw materials and finished manufactures referred to above (and perhaps some foreign craftsmen too) made their way to the Spartan basin.

Again, though, as in the third and second millennia ([Chapter 4](#)), Kythera served as a window on the wider Aegean world and indeed on that disturbed Near East which indirectly stimulated what is referred to in art-historical terms as the ‘orientalizing’ period of Greek history. By the fifth century Sparta sent out officials called ‘Kytherodikai’ or harmosts to supervise Kytheran affairs ([Chapter 12](#)), and the islanders were regarded as colonists of Sparta; indeed, a remark attributed to the sage Chilon (discussed in [Chapter 11](#)) suggests that the island had already become of some strategic concern to Sparta by the mid-sixth century. But between c.1200 and c.550 the history of Kythera is opaque; archaeologically, there is nothing known between the thirteenth and the early eighth centuries. However, Homer (*Iliad* 10.268) does mention Skandeia, the port of Kythera town, which is almost certainly to be identified with the Kastri/Palaiopolis area on the east coast. Kythera town itself, according to Pausanias (3.23.1),

lay ten stades inland and has accordingly been identified with the area centring on the hill of Palaiokastro.

In the present context, however, undoubtedly the most intriguing piece of literary evidence is the passing mention by Herodotus (1.105.3) that the temple of Aphrodite at Kythera town had been founded by Phoenicians. Should this report be believed? First, let us consider the role of the Phoenicians. After briefly summarizing the archaeological evidence for the resumption of contact between Greece and the Near East after the Mycenaean period Boardman (1973, 36) comments: 'It is none too easy to fit the Phoenicians into this picture of relations in the Aegean in the Early Iron Age – or at least to fit in the reputation which the Phoenicians had acquired as mariners and traders.' None the less, he accepts cautiously that 'they may have been the carriers of what little did travel into the Greek world from the east before the eighth century.' None of that little has yet turned up in Lakonia, but a comprehensive survey of the archaeological and literary evidence bearing on the Phoenicians (Muhly 1970) indicates that, if they were ever active on Kythera, this should have been between the eleventh and eighth centuries rather than before or after.

In the light of these conclusions the very absence of direct corroborative evidence from Kythera is perhaps significant. Greek Aphrodite could of course have supplanted the Phoenician Astarte (Biblical Ashtoreth), but nothing is known of the cult before some wholly Greek dedications of the sixth century and the *disiecta membra* of a Doric temple of c.500 (the site of the temple itself is not yet agreed). The harbour called Phoinikous (probably modern Avlemonas bay) mentioned by Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.7) need have nothing to do with Phoenicians. No Phoenician inscriptions have been found anywhere on the island. In fact, the only sign of life in eighth-century Kythera is provided by a provincial Geometric pottery, unrelated to Lakonian LG, and a couple of Argive imports. The latter (*pace* Coldstream 1977, 84) can hardly be used to support the view (highly improbable on other grounds as we have seen) that Kythera was controlled by Argos at this time. In short, the report of Herodotus is something of a puzzle. The only suggestion I can bring in its support is that it was Phoenicians who introduced or reintroduced the purple-dye industry to the island (discussed further in [Chapter 10](#)).

The rest of this chapter will consider Sparta's external relations and cultural development between c.715 and 650. So far the picture I have painted of the consequences for the Spartans of their victory in Messenia has been fairly rosy. In reality, it was rosy only for some, as the circumstances of the foundation of Taras will adequately reveal. The traditional date of settlement, 706, is not contradicted by the earliest archaeological finds (below). The rest of the ancient evidence,

however, is almost entirely worthless, and my tentative reconstruction of the process departs from it in several particulars.

A war of long duration is almost bound to exacerbate, if not create, internal social tensions, and the origins of the colony certainly lie in social discontent, whose focus may have been a group enigmatically known as the Partheniai. We shall never know exactly who they were, but the common opinion of the ancient sources, that they were in some sense impure in birth, deserves respect. The shake-up of the eighth century could well have led to a questioning of fundamental values: why should a family-tree – and preeminently descent from Herakles – give a man the right to cheat, oppress, dominate and impoverish his fellows? It is no accident that the Partheniai were contemporaries of Hesiod. For them too land was a part, perhaps the major part, of their grievance. It was, however, probably only one aspect, if a crucial one, of a broader political discontent, ‘political’ precisely in the sense that the birth of a concept of citizenship and the full development of the *polis* were phenomena of the decades around 700. This was why, as Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b 29–31) correctly saw, the Partheniai represented potential revolution. But there may have been a further contributory grievance, Amyklaian ‘nationalism’: for the settlers took with them to Taras the cult of Apollo Hyakinthios.

Plato (*Laws* 735f.) observed with hindsight that one solution to such social discontent is to export the discontented, and traditionally this is what occurred in the case of the Partheniai. My own view, however, is that Taras was not originally sanctioned by the Spartan state, but was a foundation as it were ‘from below’ effected by a few enterprising families, whose success was only later given the official seal of approval. The contradictory evidence concerning the supposed ‘oikist’ (leader of the colony) Phalanthos may be thought to support this interpretation. So too may the Delphic Oracle which advised settlement, not at Taras, but at Satyrion twelve kilometres further south-east in the heel of Italy (Parke and Wormell 1956, 1,71–3; II, no. 46). At any rate LG pottery has been found here, as it has at Scoglio (or Punto) del Tonno on the other side of the lagoon entrance from Taras, and these sites may represent temporary stopping-places before the occupation of Taras itself (Figure 15). The latter, however, was the real prize. The best harbour in Italy (the modern Mar Piccolo), protection by the sea on three sides and good communications inland – these are only some of its advantages. The only trouble was that the native Iapygians were already occupying it. With some difficulty, however, they were dislodged, and perhaps before 700, to judge from the find of Lakonian LG pottery on the site of the akropolis of the ancient city (Lo Porto 1971, 356–8). The relations of Taras with Sparta, though not with the Iapygians, were

exceptionally close thereafter: the archaeological, epigraphical and literary evidence is at one on this.

The conquest of Messenia was presumably the main reason why Taras remained Sparta's only colony, but it would be wrong to follow the sensationalist bent of our sources and so isolate Taras from the general wave of agrarian colonization of south Italy and Sicily initiated a quarter of a century or so earlier. Messenia after all was still unfinished business in 706. Indeed, if we can trust Pausanias and others, the Spartans' search for new land – and perhaps now also for wider political influence – in the Peloponnese was still on, and the next target was the Thyreatis or Kynouria. To repeat, I do not believe in the pretended Argive control of the eastern seaboard of Lakonia and of Kythera at any time. Nor can I accept that Sparta and Argos had come to blows before the First Messenian War. It does, however, seem feasible that after its initial successes in Messenia Sparta, already presumably in control of Skiritis, following the conquest of Aigytiis, should have attempted to seal off its frontier in the north-east against a power whose might in the second half of the eighth century is amply attested in both the literary and the archaeological record. Moreover, the Partheniai were perhaps not alone in their disappointment at the unfair distribution of land in Lakonia and most recently Messenia.




Figure 15 The colonization of Taras c .706

The Thyreatis, because of its relative fertility (especially in olives) and more especially its strategic location, was the appointed scene of physical conflict between the rival Dorian states. However, the earliest more or less reliably attested clash between them occurred when the Argives conquered and destroyed Asine in the last decade of the eighth century (Coldstream 1977, 154 and n. 57; but see Styrenius 1975, 183), and Sparta resettled the refugees in a new Asine in

southern Messenia (Paus. 4.14.3). Whether or not this action was regarded as provocative by the Argives, it was also in the reign of Theopompos (c.720–675) that the first battle for the Thyreatis that I would accept as historical (Paus. 3.7.5) took place.

Pausanias (2.24.7) is also the only source to mention the subsequent battle of Hysiai (dated 669), but a fragment of Tyrtaios (*P. Oxy.* 3316)* confirms Sparta's military preoccupation with Argos in the mid-seventh century. I therefore accept the battle as historical and as having important implications and consequences. For a start the site of the battle – near modern Achladokambos and north of the Thyreatis – clearly shows that Sparta was the aggressor. Second, that the defeat was severe may be inferred both from the institution of the Gymnopaidiai, traditionally in 668, to commemorate it (Wade-Gery 1949) and from Sparta's avoidance of another military showdown with Argos for more than a century. The reasons for the defeat can only be surmised, but part of the explanation may be that Sparta had been slower than Argos to adapt to the new hoplite mode of infantry warfare (Cartledge 1977, 25).

However that may be, Argive power in the second quarter of the seventh century seems to have been at a peak, perhaps under the aegis of its revolutionary king Pheidon (Tomlinson 1972, ch. 6). Sparta's fortunes were in a correspondingly low trough. The demand for the redistribution of land attested by Tyrtaios (as reported by Aristotle) and the murder of king Polydoros, who was credited with attempting to satisfy the demand, are political expressions of grave social conflicts which fit most naturally into this post-defeat context. The effect on Messenian morale can be easily imagined; and it was this combination of circumstances, according to a plausible modern theory, which stimulated the Messenians to revolt. The silence of the ancient sources is far from being a fatal objection to this theory; for with few exceptions they are primarily interested in the web of myth and fantasy that surrounded the supposed leader of the revolt, the Messenian folk-hero Aristomenes. Thus the evidence for the revolt or Second Messenian War is if anything worse than that for the First War, despite our one anchor, Tyrtaios, a participant.

The *floruit* of Tyrtaios, the second or third quarter of the seventh century, makes it almost certain that the Second War began appreciably later than Pausanias' source believed (685); this accords with the 'tradition' (Paus. 4.15.3) that the revolt occurred in the reign of Anaxandros, who ruled in the sixth generation before Xerxes' invasion. But there Tyrtaios' direct utility more or less ends, apart from the certain inference from his battle-exhortations that the fighting was between hoplites (a warrior-grave of the seventh century from Pyla in western Messenia may be that of a Spartan) and his

mention and perhaps description of a battle at or near a trench (fr. 9; cf. Paus. 4.17.2–9), which may have marked a turning-point in the struggle.

The names of those supposed to have fought on the Messenian side are with one exception superficially plausible, but their alleged participation is perhaps more likely to be a product of the ‘Messenian mirage’. Sparta’s alleged allies are no less problematic. The Corinthians, whether ruled by the Bacchiads or Kypselos (who became tyrant c.657), would perhaps have in either case sided with Sparta against Argos. The Lepreates of Triphylia might have taken the opposite side to Elis, but Elis, the exception referred to above, was unlikely to have been on the Messenian side at this time. Samos (Hdt. 3.47.1) is at first sight the least likely ally of all, although at least one Lakonian Subgeometric amphora found its way to the island about this time. Perhaps some individual Samians came by ship in the hope of collecting booty. On the other hand, there is nothing intrinsically implausible in the story that the main focus of resistance was Andania in north-east Messenia towards Arkadia (site not certainly identified) and that the last stand was made, not on Ithome this time, but on Mount Hira not far from Andania. The Arkadian involvement presaged Spartan reprisals in succeeding reigns.

The Spartan victory should perhaps be interpreted as a gradual process of pacification including the spread of Spartan control to the west coast of Messenia south of the Nedha, which may not have been completed much before the end of the seventh century. This would at least accord with a remark attributed to Epameinondas (Plut. *Mor.* 194B; Aelian, *VH* 13.42), that he had (re-)founded Messene after 230 years. I do not, however, think that we need to postulate a Third (‘Hira’) War to account for this figure. Indeed, the loose ends of the conquest can only be said to have been properly tied up with the treaty of c.550 between Sparta and Tegea, whose one known clause ([Chapter 9](#)) symbolizes the nerve-racking consequence of the Messenian War: Sparta, in G.B. Grundy’s adaptation of an expression of the emperor Tiberius, had ‘a wolf by the throat’.

To conclude this chapter, however, let us look briefly at Sparta’s cultural development in the first half of the seventh century. It is immediately apparent that this was as little affected by the almost uninterrupted warfare as was that of Athens in the fifth. Terpander of Lesbos, traditionally the first victor in the musical contest at the reorganized Karneia in 676 (the date worked out by Hellanikos of Lesbos in the late fifth century), inaugurated a succession of visits by foreign poets who found Sparta a congenial – and no doubt lucrative – field for the display of their talents. After c.690 Lakonian vase-painters under Aegean influence made their first forays into an orientalizing

style, but ‘third-rate and unpretentious’ (Cook 1972) is probably a fair description of their products in this unsettled and confusing epoch. However, as we have seen, at least one Lakonian Subgeometric pot travelled abroad, and it was presumably pottery of this transitional phase (described as ‘orientalizing Geometric’) which was found at ancient Hippola in the Deep Mani, the first material evidence of settlement so far south in Lakonia in the historical period. Simultaneously, the Lakonian bronze-workers began to show an increasing interest in human subjects; perhaps their most engaging product is the so-called ‘Menelaion goddess’ of c.675, crude in conception but competent in execution. Following a generation or more of preparation Lakonian ivory-carving began to flower shortly before 650. No less technically competent, if more parochial in flavour, was the output of the coroplasts, who were among the earliest in Greek lands to borrow the Syrian mould and create a local ‘Daedalic’ style with strong Cretan affinities. At a humbler level still, the ‘mass-production’ of mould-made lead figurines, perhaps using the ore found near Kardamyli, also began in the first half of the seventh century: we might single out the representations of hoplite warriors which were first dedicated at the Orthia sanctuary around 650. In short, the cultural picture for Lakonia between c.775 and 650 has no features in common with the image of sterility beloved by the ancient and – more reprehensibly – the modern ‘mirage’.

Notes on further reading

Perhaps the best discussion of the Greek world as a whole in the period covered by this chapter is still Starr 1961, [part III](#); cf. Starr 1977. Bouzek 1969, Snodgrass 1971 and Coldstream 1977 deal with all aspects of the archaeological record down to about 700; a comparably comprehensive work for the succeeding period is a desideratum. Jeffery 1976 is a survey, by region, of the entire Archaic period (to c.500); the chapter on Sparta (111–32) includes a good discussion of Lakonian art.

The office of the Pythioi, who were permanent and hereditary ambassadors to Delphi (Hdt. 6.57, 60; Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.5), may have been instituted in the eighth century: Cartledge 1978.

On the (incomplete) ‘synoecism’ of Sparta see Toynbee 1969, 171–4; Moggi 1976, no. 6 (with very full bibliography). On the status of Amyklai as an ‘obe’ I agree with Ehrenberg 1924, 28f. (= 1965, 165f.) against e.g. Grote, who believed that Amyklai was Perioikic.

The basic study (in default of new information from grave-groups or stratified settlement-deposits) of Lakonian LG pottery is Coldstream 1968, ch. 9 (cf. pp. 330, 364f.). I have filled in more details in my unpublished thesis (1975, 139–67), where I also attempt to elucidate

the 'Transitional' pottery of c.690–650.

Ephorus (*FGrHist* 70F216) may have been the first to write in terms of more than one original war of conquest in Messenia, but Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b38) still uses the singular form, which, historically, is perhaps the less misleading of the two. Against the notion that the early history of Messenia was created *ex nihilo* after 369 see Shero 1938, esp. 504, 511; Treves 1944. But Pearson (1962) rightly shows that much of the tradition is 'pseudohistory', and Niebuhr (1847) long ago exposed the deficiencies of Pausanias' fourth book. For the view that Tyrtaios is the only real source see the works cited in Tigerstedt 1965, 347 n. 306. Among the many modern accounts of the war(s) see Kiechle 1959, 65ff.; Oliva 1971, 102–14; J.F. Lazenby in *MME* 84–6.

My very brief summary of the physical setting of Messenia is drawn from W.G. Loy and H.E. Wright, Jr in *MME* ch. 3. For some important qualifications of their picture in detail see Bintliff 1977, II, ch. 5.

On the cult of Helen at the Menelaion see Wide 1893, 340–6; on the type of cult accorded Menelaos see Coldstream 1976, esp. 10, 15; and 1977, esp. 346–8.

The foundation of Taras is discussed by Pembroke 1970; earlier bibliography in Tigerstedt 1965, 340 n. 261; add now Moretti 1971; Carter 1975, 7–14. The Spartans were allegedly particularly interested in stories about the foundations of cities (Plato *Hipp. Ma.* 285D). For the close links between Sparta and Taras see e.g. Jeffery 1961, 279–84 (dialect and script); Pugliese Carratelli 1971 (cult and myths); Pelagatti 1957 (Lakonian pottery at Taras). On western colonization in general see Bengtson 1977, 88–127; the contributions to *Dialoghi di Archeologia* for 1969; and Jeffery 1976, ch. 4. The latest archaeological discoveries are reported in the *Acts* of the annual congresses of Magna Graecia Studies held in Taranto and of the Centre Jean Bérard in Naples.

Concerning the power of Argos in the early seventh century, Kelly (1976, ch. 6) has mounted a sustained attack on a widely accepted modern view that Pheidon should be dated to this period. However, while I agree that the ancient evidence is hardly inspiring or inspired, I cannot agree that Hdt. 6.127.3 is a sufficient ground for dating the great Pheidon to c.600; Herodotus might after all, as Jeffery (1976, 137) has suggested, have got his Pheidons muddled.

* I am greatly indebted to the Finance and General Purposes Committee of the Egypt Exploration Society for permission to refer to this papyrus in advance of publication.

The consolidation of Lakonia c. 650–490

I have succeeded thus far in confining my notice of the ‘Great Rhetra’ to a single, oblique reference. For if anything justifies the description of the study of early Sparta as ‘intellectual gymnastics’ (Ehrenberg 1973, 389), it is surely this document of some fifty words preserved for us by Plutarch (*Lyk.* 6), over which more scholarly ink has been spilt than over any other Greek text of comparable length. None the less, for two main reasons, the ‘Great Rhetra’ must now be pulled out from under the carpet, dusted off and, if only briefly, held up to the light of historical scrutiny. First, it represents in kernel the political solution which has been precisely characterized by Andrewes (1956, ch. 6) as the ‘Spartan alternative to tyranny’. Second, it was the attainment of internal political equilibrium at an early date which, as Thucydides(1.18.1) saw, enabled the Spartans to intervene in the affairs of other states – and, we might add, to control their own *Perioikoi* and *Helots* in the manner analysed in the next chapter. Two questions, however, remain to be answered: at how early a date was this triumphantly successful solution devised and acted upon, and to what problems did it offer a solution?

Two overlapping and mutually reinforcing aspects of the ‘Spartan mirage’ have played havoc with our evidence for early Spartan political history. The first in point of time and significance was the ‘*Lykourgos* legend’, which held that Sparta was the paradigm of a state owing all its institutions to the legislative enactments of a single lawgiver – in this case to the wondrously omniprovident *Lykourgos*, for whom dates ranging (in our terms) from the twelfth to the eighth centuries were offered. The second distorting aspect of the ‘mirage’ was the theory of the ‘mixed constitution’, developed perhaps in the

fifth century but not apparently applied to Sparta until the fourth (Rawson 1969, 10). This theory contended that the best, because most stable, form of state was either one which combined ingredients from each of the basic constitutional types (monarchy, aristocracy/oligarchy, democracy) in a harmonious whole (the ‘pudding’ version) or one in which the different elements acted as checks and balances to each other (the ‘seesaw’ version). The combined effect – and, no doubt, the object – of the ‘Lykourgos legend’ and the theory of the ‘mixed constitution’ was to suggest that Sparta had achieved an internal political equilibrium considerably earlier than could in fact have been the case. Indeed, the devoutly pro-Spartan Athenian exile Xenophon could even, by making Lykourgos contemporary with the (Return of the) Herakleidai (*Lak. Pol.* 10.8), contrive to suggest that there had never been *stasis* or civil strife on the political plane in Sparta since the Dorian foundation.




Figure 16 Archaic sites in Lakonia and Messenia

Happily for us, however, not all of our sources were equally persuaded of the truth of every aspect of the ‘mirage’, and Xenophon’s optimistic and partisan view was eccentric. Even Plutarch was unable to keep *stasis* (civil strife) out of his biography – or rather hagiography – of the lawgiver (*Lyk.* 5.4f.). More instructive, though, are the sources who were not a party to the mirage. Herodotus (1.65.2) went so far as to say that before Lykourgos’ reforms Sparta had suffered the worst *kakonomia* (lawlessness) of any Greek state, while Thucydides (1.18.

1), without mentioning Lykourgos by name, agreed for once with Herodotus that there had been *stasis* followed by *eunomia* (orderliness). (I shall bring out the significance of these antonyms presently.) But perhaps the most impressive testimony of all is that of Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306b29–1307a4), who knew of no fewer than five potentially revolutionary situations in Sparta between the late eighth and early fourth centuries. Had it not been for what Thucydides (5.68.2) calls the ‘secretiveness’ of the Spartan state, he might conceivably have learnt of more. It is no accident that two of these – the Partheniai affair and a demand for the redistribution of land, both cited in [Chapter 8](#) – fell in the reigns of Theopompos and Polydoros.

The Eurypontid Theopompos and the Agiad Polydoros, who reigned jointly during roughly the first quarter of the seventh century, are the first two individuals known to us as distinct personalities in Spartan history. We need not of course accept all the elaborated details of their reigns, but it was certainly remembered in Sparta that they had played active and decisive roles, and the general tenor of their rule has perhaps been accurately enough conveyed. Theopompos was known to Tyrtaios (fr. 5.1f.) as the general who led the Spartans to victory in the ‘First’ Messenian War. In much later authors, the first known being Aristotle (*Pol.* 1313a26f.), he displaced the Lykourgos of Herodotus (1.65.5) as creator of the Ephorate. This innovation was represented as a major concession to non- or rather anti-monarchist sentiment and allegedly justified by its author as a pragmatic device to ensure the monarchy’s perpetuation. The original purpose and functions of the office are in fact by no means clear, but it seems likely that it did not from the start possess the extensive executive, judicial and administrative powers symbolized by the oaths exchanged monthly between kings and Ephors in the fourth century (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.7). At any rate, there was no place for the Ephorate in the ‘Great Rhetra’ (below).

The evidence for the career of Polydoros is of a more unambiguously inflammatory character, but the chief difficulty in assessing its value is that Polydoros was looked back to as, or transmogrified into, a prototype by revolutionary Spartan monarchs of the third century (when, perhaps, his supposed image was first employed as the official state seal). Thus he was alleged to have espoused the cause of the ordinary Spartan and to have initiated some form of land-distribution, only to be murdered for his reformist pains by a disgruntled noble called Polemarchos (Paus. 3.3.3). In reality, his populist politics are unlikely to have been ideologically motivated or even wholly altruistic, although it is open to argument how far they were dictated by reason of state (the Argos crisis) or concern for his personal position as king, which was perhaps being undermined in

Sparta as elsewhere by the jealous non-royal nobility. But whatever the motivation, the defeat at Hysiai in 669 – if indeed Polydoros was the defeated general – would have added weight to the opposition, and it is to be assumed that Polydoros' schemes were robbed of fruition by his death. This, at any rate, is how I would explain the demand for land-redistribution recorded by Tyrtaios.

Two events, however, could have served to breathe fresh life into the Polydoran corpse, the revolt of the Messenian Helots and the establishment of tyrannies on either side of the Isthmus of Corinth c.650. These, I suggest, provided the context in which the 'Great Rhetra' was either produced or – if the whole document and not just the appended clause (4) is to be attributed to Theopompos and Polydoros – acted upon. The text may be translated thus:

Having established a cult of Syllanian Zeus and Athena, having done the 'tribing and obing', and having established a Gerousia of thirty members including the kings, (1) season in season out they are to hold Apellai between Babyka and Knakion; (2) the Gerousia is both to introduce proposals and to stand aloof; (3) the *damos* is to have power to (in Plutarch's gloss on a badly garbled Doric phrase) 'give a decisive verdict'; (4) but if the *damos* speaks crookedly, the Gerousia and kings are to be removers.

At a moment of supreme crisis at home and abroad this formula offered something, politically, to all the contending groups. As a result of its enactment the monarchy survived, though with diminished power. The Gerousia (Senate), which included the two kings *ex officio*, became the supreme political organ in effect, but its membership was limited numerically and (except for the kings) formally subjected to the constraint of public election though not to public accountability. The non-aristocratic *damos* was granted political recognition, indeed formal sovereignty, but its power of initiative was effectively bridled. Such a reform might well have been characterized as the institution of *eunomia*, and it is to be noted that towards the end of the seventh century Alkman (fr. 64) made Eunomia the sister of Fortune and Persuasion and the daughter of Foresight. Finally, the authority of Apollo (the 'Great Rhetra' was represented as a Delphic oracle) and the prestige of Theopompos and Polydoros was invoked to provide the necessary cement of loyalty.

No less important, however, than what the 'Great Rhetra' (to us opaquely) states was what it left unsaid. The exclusion of the Ephorate was presumably due to its relative unimportance at this date or, what Tyrtaios' paraphrase of the document (fr. 4) implies, to the stress placed by official propaganda on the traditional hierarchy with the kings at the top of the political pyramid. Second, and yet more

important, provision must have been made for the redistribution of land in a separate initiative, perhaps in the form of a reward offered for success against the now revolted Messenians. (I cannot agree with Chrimes 1949, 424 that 'having obeyed the obes' implies a redistribution of land.) Thus the carrot of land-allotments in Messenia for the poor, together with the stick of the likely consequences of defeat for all Spartans alike, would have helped to ensure that success was achieved. By tying citizen-rights to the exploitation through Helot labour-power of the land distributed in *kleroi* (allotments), Sparta created the first (and only) all-hoplite citizen army, truly a 'new model'. The elite order of Homoioi ('Peers') came into being.

Eventual victory in the 'Second' Messenian War and the spread of Spartan control to all south-west Peloponnese gave Spartan society an enormous fillip. The second half of the seventh century witnessed the apogee of Lakonian ivory-carving, when the products of Spartan workshops achieved an extraordinarily wide distribution in the Greek world – to Tegea, the Argive Heraion and Perachora within the Peloponnese; to Athens and Pherai beyond the Isthmus of Corinth; to the islands of Delos, Siphnos, Chios, Samos and Rhodes; and even to Taucheira in north Africa. In the first half of the sixth century, however, the quantity (and quality) of ivory artefacts dedicated at the Orthia sanctuary fell off sharply, and ivory was to some extent replaced by bone as the medium of fine carving (apart, that is, from carving in wood, which is attested in the literary sources but naturally has not survived the Lakonian soil and climate). Since this phenomenon was not confined to Lakonia, it has been suggested that the trade in ivory tusks may have been interrupted by the fall of Phoenician Tyre to Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon in 573; the Syrian port of A1 Mina on the Orontes, where actual tusks have been excavated, may also have been destroyed about this time.

The leading position occupied by ivory-work in Lakonian craftsmanship was assumed by the bronzesmiths, but not apparently much before the sixth century, when they produced a series of fine hammered and cast vessels, also widely disseminated. Contemporary with the apogee of ivory-carving was the slow metamorphosis of the Lakonian pottery from a 'third-rate and unpretentious' fabric into a full-blown orientalizing black-figure style by c.625. By the end of the century work of good quality and lively conception was being not only dedicated in Sparta but exported as far as Sparta's south Italian colony, Taras. The two delightful cups from Grave 285 at Taranto with their interior designs of sea-fish betray a maritime interest that is also evident from the well-known ivory of c.625 depicting a warship and, not least, from the poems of the contemporary Alkman (Huxley 1962, 108 n. 124). The latter represents perhaps the jewel in the

crown of Spartan high culture.

It was not, however, by sea that the Spartans chose to extend the long arm of their suzerainty. With Messenia under their belt one might have expected them to complete the unfinished business of the Thyreatis or at least to absorb the east Parnon foreland politically. The power of Argos, after all, was not what it had been under Pheidon or at the time of the battle of Hysiai (if these two were chronologically distinct). Instead, however, Sparta seems to have elected to repeat the Messenian trick in Arkadia. There were, it is true, grounds for representing the aggression as a 'just war': the Arkadian king Aristokrates (of Orchomenos or Trapezous), who was the grandfather of the wife of Periander tyrant of Corinth, had fought on the wrong side in the 'Second' Messenian War; and traditionally Sparta had been defeated at Phigaleia, again in south-west Arkadia, in 659 (Paus. 8.39.3). Moreover, Arkadia offered to Messenian refugees a natural haven, if not a continuing incitement to revolt.

However, the Spartan objective was apparently not merely to punish and neutralize Arkadia but to turn the Tegeans, the nearest Arkadians to Sparta with desirable land, into Helots and the Tegeate plain into *kleroi*. This at least is the inference to be drawn from the story as preserved in our earliest source, Herodotus (1.66), who describes the overconfident Spartans (trusting, typically, in a Delphic oracle) as marching on Tegea with chains to shackle the future Helots and with measuring-rods to parcel out the plain. With true dramatic irony the Spartans, defeated in battle, ended up working the Tegeans' land as war-captives bound in their own chains. A century or more later Herodotus was purportedly shown the very chains hanging as a trophy in the temple of Athena Alea; indeed, they were still on display more than seven centuries later – or so the cicerone assured Pausanias (3.7.3; 8.47.2). So unsuccessful in fact may have been the Spartans' Arkadian venture that the 'Battle of the Fetters' was not perhaps their only defeat here in the first half of the sixth century. Combining scattered references in later sources to regions further to the south-west than the Tegeate plain, Forrest (1968, 73–5) has suggested that Sparta may also have been frustrated in an attempt to annex the Megalopolis plain.

However this may be, it is doubtful whether the defeat or defeats were as severe as Herodotus' Arkadian informants liked to think. For, as Herodotus himself put it (1.65.1), though with infuriating vagueness, the Spartans under the Agiad Leon and the Eurypontid Agasikles (c.575–560) were successful 'in all their other wars'. I have already remarked in [Chapter 8](#) that the construction of the second temple of Orthia at Sparta c.570 is probably to be interpreted in the light of this comment. We might add that the second quarter of the

sixth century was also the heyday of the Lakonian painted pottery, which was exported as far north as Olbia in south Russia, as far west as Ampurias in north-east Spain and as far south as Naukratis in Egypt, with especially heavy concentrations occurring at Taras, Taucheira and Samos. However, the only 'other' war that we may fairly confidently assign to their reign is the struggle for the control of Olympia, in which Sparta helped Elis oust the local Pisatan dynasty (possibly in 572).

Our general ignorance of Spartan foreign policy at this time is particularly disheartening in view of another highly controversial statement of Herodotus (1.68.6), that in the next generation, under kings Anaxandridas and Ariston, Sparta had already 'subjugated most of the Peloponnese'. The context of this statement is the request by king Croesus of Lydia for an alliance with Sparta against the rising power of Persia following Sparta's eventual triumph over Tegea (below). The alliance was granted and sealed, in suitably archaic fashion, by a prestation. Croesus had previously donated Lydian gold to the Spartans, who used it to face the statue of Apollo at Amyklai. Now in return Croesus was sent – though he did not receive – an elaborate bronze bowl, presumably fashioned by Lakonian craftsmen and perhaps of the type of the stupendous bowl buried with a Celtic princess at Vix in France c.500. Thus by c.550, according to Herodotus, Sparta had extended its control from the southern two fifths of the Peloponnese to at least one of the remaining three, so that its strength was such as to attract the notice of a foreign, if philhellene, potentate. Yet all we learn from Herodotus of this sea-change in Lakonian affairs is contained in his considerably mythical story of the transfer of the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta, whereafter, he says, Sparta proved superior to Tegea in battle (1.67f.). There is no mention of other military exploits, and the significance of the recovery of the relics is restricted by him to the military sphere. Ancient and modern scholarship has done rather better than the Halikarnassian.

It is of course hazardous to correct Herodotus from later sources, but it is reasonable to supplement him in such matters as diplomatics and constitutional history in which he displays distressingly little interest. It is not therefore surprising that he should have omitted to mention the stele set up 'on the (banks of the) Alpheios', which recorded the pledge of the Tegeans to Sparta not to make the Messenians 'useful', i.e. give them citizen-rights in Tegea (Jacoby 1944). We owe our knowledge of this stele proximately to Plutarch (*Mor.* 292B), ultimately to Aristotle (fr. 592 Rose); but unfortunately we know little more than its existence (Bengtson 1975, no. 112). The very place at which it was erected has been disputed, some (like

Beloch) arguing that it was at Olympia, where the gods could act as witnesses and guarantors, others believing that it was on the borders of Spartan and Tegeate territory. What does seem probable is that the document inscribed on the stele should be distinguished from the treaty of military alliance concluded between Sparta and Tegea, which was among the earliest (the first may have been with Elis) of those unequal alliances by which Sparta built up its commanding position in the Peloponnese.

As for the recovery of Orestes' bones from Tegea, and perhaps also those of his son Teisamenos from Achaia (Paus. 7.1.3), this symbolized and emphasized the shift in Spartan policy from aggression to peaceful coexistence, from 'Helotization' to diplomatic subordination. The Spartans could now give preponderant emphasis in their propaganda to their claim to be the legitimate successors to the 'Achaean' rulers of the Peloponnese and even represent themselves as champions of all Hellas. The poet Stesichoros (West 1969, 148) lent his voice to the change of policy; and it may have been about 550 that Agamemnon, brother of Menelaos and father of Orestes, began to be worshipped as a hero at Amyklai. If any one Spartan was chiefly responsible for the new direction, he may have been Chilon, eponymous Ephor c.556 and one of the 'Seven Sages' of ancient Greece, to whom may also be given some of the credit for elevating the status of the Ephorate (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.68). A tantalizing fragment of a sixth-century relief bearing the name of [Ch]ilon found at Sparta is perhaps to be associated with the much later report (Paus. 3.16.4) that the Spartans established a hero-cult to Chilon.

Tegea, then, had been 'subjugated' through a quintessentially Spartan combination of magic, military might and diplomacy. But what about the rest of the Peloponnese, and in particular Corinth and Argos? Corinth was certainly allied to Sparta on some basis by c.525, when the two states undertook a major naval expedition against Polykrates tyrant of Samos (below); but we know little or nothing of relations between the two states before that date. The alleged Corinthian aid to Sparta in the 'Second' Messenian War is doubtful, and the statement (Plut. *Mor.* 859D) that Sparta terminated the Kypselid tyranny at Corinth is incorrect either in fact or in MS. transmission. There is nothing very surprising about this. Distance and an accident of geography had prescribed different and separate destinies for the two Dorian states down to the seventh, if not the sixth, century. However, once Sparta became involved with Argos and concerned about communication into and out of the Peloponnese, Corinth was bound to become of particular importance. If there is anything to Herodotus' statement that Sparta had 'subjugated most of the Peloponnese' by c.550, then it is possible that Corinth was

received into alliance following Sparta's deposition of Aischines, last of the Orthagorid tyrants of Sikyon, in c.556. However, the evidence for this latter transaction is extremely suspect, partly because Sparta acquired a reputation as a tyrant-slayer, partly because the sources – a second-century papyrus perhaps transcribing Ephorus (*FGrHist* 105F1) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 859D) – are unreliable and far removed in time. Its date too is uncertain (some prefer c.510), but c.556 receives some support from the mention by the papyrus of Chilon as acting in a military capacity with king Anaxandridas.

We are rather better informed on relations between Sparta and Argos. Not, that is, that we hear directly of any contact between them after the battle of Hysiai down to the struggle for the Thyreatis in the mid-sixth century; but Sparta's resettlement of the exiles from Argive Nauplia at Messenian Mothone (Paus. 4.35.2) probably belongs to the late seventh century (Huxley 1962, 59f.). However, the 'Battle of the Champions' in c.545 caught the imagination of Herodotus (1.82) – and indeed remained indelibly stamped on the consciousness both of the Argives, who actually proposed a return match on the same terms in 420 (Thuc. 5.41.2), and of the Spartans, who took to wearing 'Thyreatic crowns' at the Gymnopaidiai (Sosibios, *FGrHist* 595F5); possible representations of these crowns appear in two bronze figurines found at Amyklai and Kosmas (Perioikic Glympeis or Glyppia).

According to Herodotus, the Spartans had in fact seized the Thyreatis before the ritualistic battle, but he unfortunately omits to say how long before. This is important for the history of Lakonia, because for Herodotus it was only after Argos had been comprehensively defeated in the full-scale engagement subsequent to the 'Battle of the Champions' that Argos was deprived of the territory east of Parnon to the south of the Thyreatis, the eastern seaboard of the Malea peninsula and the island of Kythera. If we rule Herodotus' testimony to such an Argive 'empire' out of court, as I think we should, then we must admit that we have no direct literary witness to the process whereby Sparta completed the enlargement of Lakonia. To be strictly accurate, a reference to it has been detected in the second-century papyrus cited above, but this is too fragmentary to illuminate the nature of the process or to fix the date of its completion. There is, however, a little indirect evidence – archaeological and epigraphical as well as literary – which may be thought relevant.

For the Thyreatis itself there is nothing known between, on the one hand, Spartan campaigns and the 'Geometric' pottery of the late eighth or early seventh century and, on the other, a handful of bronzes (one inscribed) and a stone head of the last third of the sixth century. But this sixth-century material is wholly Lakonian, which

suggests either that the alleged 'Dorianizing' of Kynouria by the Argives (Hdt. 8.73.3) had not been a process affecting high culture or that the Argive veneer was stripped off remarkably soon after c.545.

As for the east Paros foreland, there are only two sites which merit consideration. The first, Prasiai, was cited in the previous chapter as originally an independent member of the Kalaureian Amphiktyony, whose role therein was later assumed by Sparta. If Kelly (1976, 74) is right in dating the foundation of the Amphiktyony to the mid-seventh century, this would of course support his view that Argos was not in control of the foreland at this time. We need not, however, follow him in thinking that Sparta's involvement in the Amphiktyony began only after the defeat of Argos in c.545. At any rate, the only Archaic finds from the site of which we may speak with confidence – a four-sided bone seal of the seventh century and a fine bronze mirror with a handle in the form of a draped woman of the late sixth – are both of Spartan manufacture. The other site, the sanctuary of Apollo Tyritas, lay north of Prasiai on the coast near the modern Tsakonian village of Tyros. Controlled twentieth-century excavations followed tardily on the illicit diggings of the nineteenth, but although nothing of the foundations of the temple was discovered, a handful of architectural fragments indicated that the earliest version was built around 600. What is particularly interesting is that the disc akroterion which surmounted the pediment is of undoubtedly Spartan type (used in at least six other Lakonian sanctuaries, as well as at Bassai and Olympia) and that all the inscribed dedications (none, though, certainly earlier than 545) are in the Lakonian local script.

The sole site on the east coast of the Malea peninsula for which there is archaeological evidence prior to the fifth century is Epidaurus Limera, but even this is hardly revealing. An island gem of the seventh century is reported to have been found here, suggesting Aegean contacts; and a fine handle from a bronze hydria made at Sparta in the sixth century has turned up at nearby Monemvasia. Let us therefore move swiftly on to Kythera. Such cultural connections with the Argolis as the island may betray before 650 disappear completely thereafter. A striking, if crudely executed, bronze figurine of a draped woman datable c.630 reminds me somewhat of the 'Menelaion Goddess' (Chapter 8), although its most recent publisher, J.N. Coldstream (Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 271), thinks rather of Crete. There then ensues an archaeological and epigraphical gap of a century or so. To the last third of the sixth century belong, for example, a marble lion, which perhaps served as a grave-marker; a bronze figurine of a draped woman dedicated, presumably to Aphrodite, by one Klearisia; and a fine bronze head of a youth. Only the latter reveals strong affinity with the Lakonian main-land, and the quasi-Lakonian lettering of an

inscription from Kastri bearing the single word 'Malos' (c.525–400) confirms that down to the fifth century Kythera stood somewhat apart from cultural developments in the rest of Lakonia. Its political position, however, is another matter – a salutary reminder that material artefacts do not yield straightforward political conclusions.

To conclude this discussion, I do not believe it is possible at present to say when Sparta absorbed the east Parnon foreland politically into the polis of Lakedaimon. The same goes for the east coast of the Malea peninsula and Kythera. The testimony of Herodotus, however, when we have subtracted the element due to Argive propaganda, almost proves that the process had been completed by c.540. Kelly (1976, 74f., 87) has argued that Sparta would not have moved to annex the Thyreatis until after it had established its superiority securely over Tegea, since the route from the Eurotas valley to the Thyreatis passes uncomfortably close to Tegeate territory. This may well be so, but geography alone cannot exclude *a priori* the possibility that the territory south of the Thyreatis had been absorbed politically, as it had undoubtedly been influenced culturally, by Sparta at an earlier date. On balance, though, I am inclined to think that this incorporation, like the favourable accommodation with Tegea, belongs to the reign of Anaxandridas and Ariston (c.550–520) rather than to the 'other wars' of their immediate predecessors.

The only external event of the joint reign of Anaxandridas and Ariston related by Herodotus (3.39.1, 44–8.1, 54–8) – although, as with the battles for the Thyreatis, he does not introduce the kings into his narrative – is the naval expedition to Samos in c.525. This was undertaken ostensibly to restore some Samian aristocrats but perhaps had longer-range, anti-Persian ends in view. Sparta, as already noted, was aided by Corinth, who may have provided the bulk of the 'large' (Hdt. 3.54.1) fleet. Sparta, however, was perhaps not a complete stranger to naval activity. One of the five Archaic regiments of Sparta was called Ploas, which may mean 'Seafarers' (Burn 1960, 275). We have already cited the depiction of a warship at Sparta before 600. The far-flung export of Lakonian pottery between c.575 and 550 suggests nautical skill at least on the part of some Perioikoi. The alliance with Croesus, moreover, seems to indicate a Spartan preparedness to undertake an expedition by sea c.550, even if in the event only a token penteconter actually reached Asia Minor (Hdt. 1.152f.). Finally, the incorporation and control of the eastern seaboard of Lakonia and of Kythera presumably involved the use of a fleet. However that may be, an expedition of the kind undertaken in c.525 certainly implies military co-operation of some nature between the Spartans and Perioikoi, for all naval muster-stations or ports in Lakonia were located in Perioikic territory ([Chapter 10](#)). We are not

told where the fleet sailed from, but there was presumably a harbour of sorts at Tainaron in c.600, when Arion of Methymna landed there (Hdt. 1.24.6), and we hear of fleets at anchor off Gytheion, Las and Messenian Asine in the fifth century.

We should not, however, distort the perspective. In 480 Sparta contributed a paltry ten ships to the Hellenic fleet at Artemision (Hdt. 8.1.2); and the series of Lakonian bronze figurines of hoplite infantrymen, which belong principally to the third quarter of the sixth century, confirms that the expedition to Samos was an exceptional undertaking. (I consider the alleged Spartan 'thalassocracy' of 517–515 below.) Most important of all, though, the naval expedition was also both costly and unsuccessful. Hence perhaps Sparta's failure to seize the opportunity to become the dominant naval power of mainland Greece before Themistokles persuaded the Athenians in the 480s that their future lay on the sea (Thuc. 1.93.3f.).

Regrettably, our main source for the period c.525–480, Herodotus, was less impressed by this momentous failure than by the outcome of Anaxandridas' marital irregularities (5.39f., esp. 40.2). His eldest son and successor, Kleomenes I, was undoubtedly the most powerful Spartan king since Polydoros, and his like was not to reappear until the Eurypontid Agesilaos II. But Herodotus' impressionistic and distorted account of his reign makes it abundantly clear that his information was derived over-whelmingly from hostile informants – the descendants, we may surmise, of Kleomenes' half-brothers (Dorieus, Leonidas and Kleombrotos) and those of the Eurypontid colleague whose deposition he engineered in c.491 (Damaratos). For Kleomenes himself failed to leave behind a son and heir, and, although his daughter Gorgo was married to Leonidas, in the pages of Herodotus she serves merely to show her father up rather than to vindicate his sullied reputation. Moreover, the one man whose descendants would have been most likely to give Herodotus a favourable account, Latychidas (Damaratos' cousin and replacement), had died a disgraced exile (Hdt. 6.72). The extent of Herodotus' bias against Kleomenes may be gauged from the fact that he is prepared to present a highly sympathetic picture of a proven 'medizer' (Damaratos) and an unsuccessful colonizer (Dorieus). To add to our problems, there are also major chronological difficulties in his account. Thus, since Herodotus provides us with practically all our information on Kleomenes, it is impossible for us to reconstruct with confidence the main lines of his – and so, in the main, Sparta's – domestic and foreign policy in the late sixth and early fifth centuries.

I labour Herodotus' inadequacies because the reign of Kleomenes was crucial not only for Lakonian but for all Greek history and as such demands the closest possible scrutiny. In the course of it Sparta

became firmly established as supreme in the Peloponnese and a leader of the Greek world generally, through the control of what we call the 'Peloponnesian League' and the crushing of Argos. Athens, in spite of and to an extent because of Kleomenes' best efforts, became a democracy (the world's first) and later, this time with the backing of Kleomenes, set its face successfully against Persian expansion. Finally, and more parochially, it was in Kleomenes' reign that the peculiar system of Perioikoi and Helots elaborated over the centuries underwent its first real testing on a wider stage. Since space forbids me to deal in detail with the reign as a whole, I shall concentrate on these three main issues.

A.H.M. Jones opens his history of Sparta (1967) by remarking that 'the Spartans had short memories'. As an illustration he cites Herodotus' picture of Kleomenes: 'on a simple point of fact he says that his reign was short (5.48), while from the information he gives it appears that he must have ruled for nearly thirty years.' Kleomenes was certainly on the throne in c.517, when the Samian Maiandrios unsuccessfully appealed to him to eject the pro-Persian puppet Syloson (Hdt. 3.148), and he may have acceded before 519, the date given by Thucydides (3. 68.5) for the alliance between Plataia and Athens. For, according to Herodotus (6.108.2-4), it was 'the Spartans', then coincidentally in the vicinity (Megarid) under the leadership of Kleomenes, who had advised the Plataians to seek this alliance, in order to make trouble for the Athenians. But the Athenians were not of course obliged to ally themselves to Plataia, and Herodotus' explanation looks anachronistic: for the real sufferers from such an alliance would have been the Thebans, whose claim to control all Boiotia was thereby undermined. If the Spartans were really in the Megarid to procure an alliance for themselves with Megara in 519 (Burn 1960, 265) this would be a further reason for their wanting to keep Athens – with whose rulers, the Peisistratids, they were apparently then on good terms (below) – well disposed; for Athens and Megara were traditional enemies. On the other hand, should Athens and Sparta fall out, a possibility not to be overlooked given Athens' increasing power and its hostility to Megara and Aigina (also perhaps already allied to Sparta), then Thebes would be likely to take Sparta's side anyway. Herodotus does not attribute the advice given to Plataia specifically to Kleomenes, but such a masterstroke of diplomacy would not be inappropriate for a descendant of Chilon (the family-tree is plausibly reconstructed in Huxley 1962, 149).

The words with which Kleomenes reportedly resisted the arguments and bribes of Maiandrios are consistent with Sparta's claim to the hegemony of the Peloponnese, even if they are in fact the invention of Herodotus: 'it was better for Sparta that the Samian stranger should be

removed from the Peloponnese' (not just Lakedaimon). However, according to Eusebius (*Chronikon* I, 225 Schoene), or the source upon which the good bishop drew, it was just about this time that Sparta was enjoying a period of 'thalassocracy', i.e. 517–515. The reliability of the 'thalassocracy list' is highly questionable, at least in all its details (Jeffery 1976, 253f.), and attempts to explain the Spartan 'thalassocracy' in terms of its alleged deposition of Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos (Plut. *Mor.* 859D), involve postulating a naval expedition nearly as far as the one to Samos which Sparta simultaneously declined to undertake. In fact, Lygdamis is more likely to have been deposed during the expedition to Samos of c.525.

If therefore the attribution of a 'thalassocracy' to Sparta has any justification, or explanation, a more likely one is to be found in the activities of Dorieus in the central Mediterranean, unsuccessful though these ultimately proved. According to an ingenious emendation of Pausanias 3.16.4f., proposed by Edgar Lobel, Dorieus took with him to the west men from Perioikic Anthana in the Thyreatis (modern Meligou?), a community whose existence is otherwise first recorded by Thucydides (5.41.2). The entry in the sixth-century AD lexicon of Stephanos of Byzantium under 'Anthana' states that Kleomenes flayed alive the eponymous hero of the place and wrote oracles on his skin. This evidence is hardly impeccable, but it is possible that Dorieus was attempting to play on discontent in this recently Perioikized region in order to bolster his frustrated claim to the Agiad throne. As we shall see, however, there is no discernible trace of Perioikic discontent in the Thyreatis twenty years later.

The next major episode in Kleomenes' turbulent career concerned relations between Sparta (and its allies) and Peisistratid Athens. Herodotus goes out of his way to stress that prior to the outbreak of actual warfare Sparta had been on friendly terms with Athens' tyrant rulers (5. 63.2; 90.1; 91.2) and that it was Spartan religiosity, in the form of unquestioning obedience to the injunctions of Delphic Apollo, which prompted the change of heart. However, if one thing is clear about Kleomenes' career, it is his remarkably flexible, not to say unorthodox, attitude to religion. A man who in 491 could bribe the Delphic priesthood itself (he more or less admitted his guilt by his flight from Sparta) was surely not one to be over-impressed by Delphic commands – unless they coincided with his own views. Thus the modern suggestion that the Peisistratid Hippias' medism was the cause of Spartan hostility may be more than a 'post hoc, ergo propter hoc' explanation. Interestingly, the first Spartan expedition to unseat Hippias travelled to Attika by sea. It was led in c.512 by one Anchimolios or Anchimolos, possibly the first Spartan navarch (Sealey 1976, 339), presumably in Perioikic bottoms and perhaps with

Perioikic marines. The expedition, however, was an unmitigated disaster, and its admiral was killed. About two years later the Spartans sent a larger force, this time by land and under the command of Kleomenes (Hdt. 5.64f.). But even this was successful only through the chance capture of the children of the Peisistratids.

The status of Athens after the overthrow and expulsion of Hippias, who duly went over to the Persians, is unclear. There is no ancient evidence for the modern suggestion that it became a subordinate ally of Sparta on similar terms to those allies who later formed the 'Peloponnesian League'. On the other hand, the head of the Alkmaionid family, Kleisthenes, and 700 other families did leave Athens after Kleomenes' personal intervention in c.508 with a lack of fuss surprising if Athens was in no way bound to Sparta (Hdt. 5.70; 72.1). This, however, marked the end of Kleomenes' success. However much he may have been impelled originally by anti-Persian sentiment, his predilection for the Athenian noble and would-be tyrant Isagoras (or, so rumour had it, for Isagoras' wife) proved scarcely politic, his imprisonment in Athens scarcely flattering. The democratic reforms sponsored by Kleisthenes (508/7) might well have been passed anyway, but the speed and smoothness with which they were adopted and implemented owed much to the hostility of the Athenian assembly towards Kleomenes' political schemes.

Thus it was specifically to avenge himself upon the Athenian *demos*, according to Herodotus (5.74.1), that Kleomenes in c.506 mounted the largest Spartan expedition against Athens so far. It comprised all Sparta's Peloponnesian allies, the Boiotians (Thebes and its allies), and the Chalkidians of Euboia, as well as the Spartans (including presumably Perioikic hoplites) themselves. Yet this invasion of Attika too was a complete failure, largely because Damaratos and the Corinthians abandoned Kleomenes before the fighting began. It was not, however, a wholly unproductive failure. The reputations of Sparta and Kleomenes were heavily tarnished, but the law subsequently passed by the Spartan assembly that only one king should command on campaign prevented a recurrence of the fatal disagreement in Attika between Kleomenes and Damaratos. (One thinks, for example, of the situation in 403.) Perhaps more important still, a couple of years or so later (c.504?) a rudimentary formula for collective decision-making was put into operation and the 'Peloponnesian League' more or less properly so called was born, destined for an active life of nearly a century and a half.

To put it another way, the allies of Sparta had won a collective right of veto denied to the Perioikic towns, whose relations with Sparta in other respects provided both the precedent and the model for the series of individual, unequal alliances Sparta had built up in the

Peloponnese and outside (Megara, Thebes, Aigina) since around the middle of the sixth century. (I shall return to this point in the next chapter.) We are very poorly informed on the dates at which Sparta had contracted its various alliances, and we know virtually nothing of the obligations and rights of members of the 'League' before the Peloponnesian War. Indeed, our most extensive source is the Athenian Xenophon writing in the 350s, who witnessed and recorded its demise. It may, however, be worth briefly summarizing here what we do know, for there do not seem to have been any momentous innovations between 500 and the 380s ([Chapter 13](#)), and it was as leader of the 'League' that Sparta became the automatic choice as leader of the Greek resistance to Persia in 481.

The 'League' was known simply as 'the Lakedaimonians and their allies'. Its members were all officially autonomous allies of Sparta, though Sparta in practice took care to ensure that they were mostly controlled by pro-Spartan oligarchies of birth or wealth. In peacetime wars were permitted between members, but if one was attacked by a non-member Sparta was bound to come to its aid 'with all strength in accordance with its ability'. The clause binding the ally to 'follow the Spartans whithersoever they may lead', wherein lay the ally's formal subordination, was modified in practice after c.504 to mean that, if the Spartan assembly voted to go to war, its decision had to be ratified by a majority decision of a 'League' Congress, in which each ally regardless of size had one vote. If the decision for war was ratified, Sparta levied the 'League' army, decided where the combined force was to muster, contributed the commander-in-chief (normally a king) and provided officers to levy the allied contingents. Peace, like war, was subject to a majority vote, but an individual member might claim exemption on the grounds of a prior religious obligation. Finally, there was possibly contained in each individual treaty a clause binding the ally to provide Sparta with assistance in the event of a Helot revolt.

The purpose for which the first 'Peloponnesian League' Congress was convened in c.504 was to debate the Spartan proposal (not ascribed by Herodotus specifically to Kleomenes) to reinstate Hippias as tyrant of Athens (Hdt. 5.90–3). This proposal is important for two reasons. First, it destroys the myth of Sparta's principled opposition to tyranny. Second, perhaps for the first but certainly not the last time, Corinth led a majority of allies to reject a Spartan decision. Hence, with the Athenian question temporarily shelved, the next major episode in Kleomenes' reign involved Sparta's attitude to the Ionian revolt envisaged by Aristagoras (tyrant of Miletus) about 500. This time Kleomenes' resolve to resist bribery needed stiffening – or so Herodotus was told – by his eight-year-old daughter Gorgo, which may mean that Kleomenes was in fact inclined to support Aristagoras.

Scholarly opinion is rather sharply divided over the wisdom of Kleomenes' refusal. But the Delphic Oracle, which had been 'medizing' since c.540, was in no doubt that Aristagoras' designs were misguided – if, as I think we should, we accept as genuine the unique double oracle delivered to the Argives and, in their absence, the Milesians (Hdt. 6.19; 77). A possible occasion for its delivery was when Aristagoras was in Sparta canvassing support; Argos would naturally have been interested in the transaction.

Usually, however, the oracle is regarded as *post eventum*, the conjoint doom prophesied for Argos and Miletos arising from the coincidence of their disastrous defeats in 494 – the former at the hands of Sparta, the latter inflicted by the Persians or rather their Phoenician fleet. But if the double oracle is genuine, then of course we have no sure way of dating Kleomenes' massively successful campaign against Argos. In Herodotus (6.75.3.82) the episode is allowed to float freely in time. On balance I prefer a date late in Kleomenes' reign, after rather than before the Athens affair of c.512–504. But I leave open the question whether Sparta's aim was simply to nullify its major rival for Peloponnesian hegemony or also in the process to remove a possible source of aid and comfort to an invading Persian army (Tomlinson 1972, 96).

In sharp contrast to the invasion of Attika in c.506, the Argos campaign was a purely Spartan affair. For Herodotus describes Kleomenes' army as 'Spartiatatai', by which, if he was being precise (but see Westlake 1977, 100), he meant citizens of Sparta as opposed to the Perioikoi (a mixed force should have been called 'Lakedaimonioi'). We are not told exactly how large the force was, but it numbered above 2,000 since the 1,000 troops retained by Kleomenes after the main engagement in the Argolis constituted a minority of the total (Hdt.6. 81). They were accompanied by Helots, perhaps one for each hoplite, whose function was to carry their masters' armour and look after their other needs. The route taken to the Thyreatis from Sparta was presumably the one used in reverse by Epameinondas in 370 ([Chapter 13](#)), past Sellasia through the Kleissoura pass and the bed of the Sarandapotamos to the territory of Tegea, rather than the more difficult route over north Parnon via Arachova, Ay. Petros, Xirokambi and Ay. Ioannis to Astros. Herodotus, however, provides no geographical indications until the Spartans reached the River Erasinos, well into Argive territory, to whose god Kleomenes duly sacrificed. Since the omens were inauspicious – or perhaps more prosaically, since the narrow passage between mountains and sea was blocked by the Argives – Kleomenes withdrew to the Thyreatis and took ship for the Argolis. Again, we are given no geographical indications for the point of embarkation, but the bay of Astros alone provides suitable

anchorage. This must have been the port of ancient Thyrea, a settlement which, though frequently mentioned by Pausanias, cannot be precisely located. Of the possible sites in the area only Ay. Triada, some three kilometres inland to the south-west of Cape Astros, suits the information of Thucydides (4.57.1) that Thyrea lay ten stades inland. Presumably, therefore, the Perioikoi of Thyrea provided at least some of the ships to transport the Spartan troops, but we learn from Herodotus (6.92.1) that Aigina and Sikyon also lent naval assistance, either further transports or warships to convoy them.

Kleomenes was careful to land well to the east of Argos at Nauplia (robbed of its separate political existence perhaps a century earlier: see above) and in the territory of Tiryns, which was also subject to Argos. The pitched battle took place at Sepeia near Tiryns, and the Spartans won; but by far the majority of the Argive force, to the (surely exaggerated) number of 6,000, took refuge in a sacred grove nearby. Then in what Tomlinson (1972, 94) has rightly called an 'un-Greek' act of treachery and sacrilege, some fifty of the Argives were lured out of the grove by Kleomenes and killed, while the rest were burned to death in the grove itself. The fire, however, was applied by Helots, presumably to absolve the Spartans themselves technically from any possible taint of ritual pollution. Kleomenes then dismissed the majority of his army and, instead of marching on Argos, proceeded to the Argive Heraion, possibly (a suggestion of A. Blakeway) to parley with the men of Mykenai. On being refused permission by the priest to sacrifice to Hera, Kleomenes had the man whipped – again by Helots.

The consequences of the Sepeia campaign made themselves felt during the Persian invasion of 480–479. Argos itself preserved a spineless neutrality, while Tiryns and Mykenai, briefly independent again, sent hoplites to Thermopylai (the Mykenaians only) and Plataia. Their names were duly inscribed on the Serpent Column erected at Delphi. But between Sepeia and Plataia a very great deal had happened. The defeat of the Ionians in 494 paved the way for Persian intervention in first Thrace then the southern Greek mainland. The envoys sent by the Great King in c.492 to demand earth and water (the customary tokens of submission to Persia) were rejected without ceremony by both Sparta and Athens, but they were received treacherously by Aigina. Athens, threatened with the use of Aigina as a base by the Persian fleet, appealed to Sparta. It is not entirely clear that Aigina was already a member of the 'Peloponnesian League' (I personally believe it was), but Kleomenes' response to the appeal of his former opponents and to the medism of Aigina was unambiguous and unhesitating, according to the account of Herodotus (6.48–51; 61.1; 64–67.1; 73). He went in person to Aigina and demanded

hostages as a guarantee of Aigina's loyalty, only to be rebuffed – perhaps on a technicality on which Damaratos, hostile to Kleomenes since at least c.506, had advised the leading Aiginetans to insist (but see Carlier 1977, 78f.).

Kleomenes now stretched his cavalier attitude to religion to the limit – or rather beyond it: for he bribed the Delphic Oracle to pronounce Damaratos a bastard and so had him deposed. Most Greeks, Herodotus (6.75.3) says, imputed Kleomenes' gruesome end (below) to this sacrilege, and the pious Herodotus naturally could hardly have approved such an action. But even he, despite the hostile sources he used, explicitly remarked of Kleomenes' first intervention in Aigina that he was 'striving for the common good of Hellas' (6.61.1). We of course may feel free to apply this comment to the sequel also, in which Kleomenes returned to Aigina with his new co-king Latychidas and not only extracted the required hostages (the ten most powerful and wealthy Aiginetan aristocrats) but actually handed them over to their bitterest enemies, the Athenians. Nothing was better calculated to prevent Aiginetan medism, and, when the Persian fleet sacked Eretria and landed in Attika in 490, Aiginetan aid to Persia was conspicuous by its absence.

Had Kleomenes died after handing over the hostages, he might not have received quite so sweeping a 'damnatio memoriae' at Sparta. Damaratos, after all, did go over to the Persian side in 491, and it is doubtful whether those in authority at Sparta at the time thought so highly of him as Herodotus did, despite his prestigious victory in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia in about 500 (Ste. Croix 1972, 355 n. 5). (Damaratos' direct descendants were excluded from the Eurypontid throne thereafter until the elevation of Nabis in the late third century.) Besides, the Spartans themselves rather curiously ascribed Kleomenes' mode of death to his habit of taking wine neat (Hdt. 6.84.1), not to his tampering with the Delphic Oracle. However, when Kleomenes' sacrilege became known in Sparta, he at any rate feared for his throne (or his life) and withdrew from Sparta.

According to the manuscripts of Hdt. 6.74.1, Kleomenes went to Thessaly (Forrest 1968, 91, says to the Aleuadae of Larissa, though on what authority I do not know). But the emendation of 'Thessalia' to 'Sellasia' (proposed by D. Hereward) is attractive: Sellasia was the first perioikic town Kleomenes would reach on his way north from Sparta. Sellasia, however, proved too close to Sparta for Kleomenes' liking (or Thessaly proved too far), and he is next heard of in Arkadia engaged in the revolutionary activity of uniting the Arkadians against Sparta and binding them by the most awful oaths to follow him whithersoever he might lead them (Hdt. 6.74). Herodotus, typically, quickly loses interest in this small matter of royal revolution and, after

spending the rest of his space on Arkadia in discussing a minor point of geography, goes on to describe Kleomenes' recall and death. We, however, must fill out the picture.

Arkadia is an upland area of central Peloponnese, difficult of access and yet of crucial strategic importance. It was no coincidence that the historical dialect most akin to the language of the Linear B tablets should have been developed here nor that so many decisive battles were fought in the plain of Mantinea. For Sparta, once it had gained control of Messenia and pushed its frontier in the north-east as far as the northern boundary of the Thyreatis, Arkadia was the single most important area with which it had to deal. Its boundaries marched with those of the Messenians in the south-west and those of the Argives on the north-east, in other words, with those of Sparta's most important internal and external enemies. It was through Arkadia that Sparta was bound to proceed in the event of war in central or northern Greece. Conversely, Arkadia served as a buffer-zone against any enemies who might be interested in invading Lakonia or Messenia. The full significance of the role of Arkadia was expressed soon after the battle of Leuktra in 371: Sparta's Arkadian allies defected, taking with them the Perioikoi of the Belminatis, Skiritis and Karyatis on the northern frontier of Lakonia, and constituted themselves the Arkadian League (Tod 1948, no. 132); Epameinondas led the first-ever invasion of Lakonia since the 'Dorian invasion' of the Dark Ages and liberated the Messenian Helots; finally, the *polis* of Megalopolis was created out of forty Arkadian villages as a permanent watchdog on Messenian independence and a rival claimant to the Belminatis. It is only if we keep this longer perspective in view that the full import of Kleomenes' behaviour in Arkadia in 491 can be grasped.

Kleomenes, however, may not have been responsible for uniting the Arkadians in the first place. Rather, he may have placed himself at the head of a 'nationalist' conspiracy, in much the same way as Catiline was forced to lead the Italians in 63. For Herodotus (5.49.8) makes Aristagoras in c.500 refer to Spartan difficulties with the Arkadians, and it was just about then or perhaps ten or fifteen years later that the coinage bearing the legend 'Arkadikon' was first minted at Heraia. The propaganda significance of these coins cannot have escaped the Spartan authorities: the Arkadians were announcing that in some sense they wished to act and be treated as 'the Arkadians', whereas Sparta's consistent policy towards their allies from the mid-sixth century onwards was (anticipating Rome) to divide and so rule. The really extraordinary and paradoxical thing, therefore, about Kleomenes' behaviour was that the very same man who had been instrumental in keeping the Boiotians divided in 519 should also have been prepared to foster the unity of the Arkadians some thirty years

later.

Herodotus does not explain this *volte-face* of Kleomenes, but I prefer to think of it as yet another instance of his political opportunism rather than as a sign of mental imbalance. In the words of Herodotus (6.75.1), however, Kleomenes had always been 'slightly touched'; and on his return to Sparta he went stark staring mad. He took to poking his staff in the face of anyone he chanced to meet, until his relatives (one suspects his surviving half-brothers) clapped him in the stocks. Here he persuaded his Helot guard to lend him his iron dagger (some Helots at least were trusted to carry offensive weapons in Sparta) and proceeded to butcher himself from the calves upwards. Such a suicide is not, I understand, unexampled in the psychoanalytical literature, but I prefer to follow the amateur detectives who suspect foul play on the part of the Spartan authorities. The case of the Maigrets would certainly be greatly strengthened if Sparta in 491 was faced with not only Arkadian dissidence but a revolt of the Messenian Helots to boot.

Such a revolt is not mentioned by Herodotus. He does, however, make Aristagoras (in the passage just referred to) describe the Messenians as 'well-matched' enemies of Sparta; and it has been argued that a Helot revolt makes a better explanation than an alleged religious scruple (Hdt. 6.106.3; 120) for Sparta's failure to arrive at Marathon in time for the historic battle of 490. Moreover, about twenty years later a Spartan ruler (Pausanias the Regent) could plausibly be accused of conniving at a Helot revolt. However, the Spartans undoubtedly were monumentally superstitious (see above all Hdt. 6.82), and we should, I think, take a lot of convincing that Herodotus ignored, deliberately suppressed or was ignorant of so crucial an event in Spartan history. Since I have an open mind on the question, I shall simply set out the evidence and arguments that have been mustered in favour of its occurrence.

First, Plato (*Laws* 698DE) specifically states that there was a Messenian revolt at the time of Marathon. Second, if the so-called 'Rhianos hypothesis' (a tissue of interdependent conjectures without direct external corroboration) is correct, the war starring Aristomenes the Messenian and celebrated by Rhianos was a war fought in the early fifth century, not (as Paus. 4.15.2) the 'Second' Messenian War of the seventh. Third, a dedication of war-spoils at Olympia by the Spartans belongs epigraphically perhaps to the first, rather than the second, quarter of the fifth century (M/L no. 22). Pausanias (5.24.3) apparently knew that the inscription referred to spoils from the Messenians, but he wrongly believed it to have been inscribed at the time of the 'Second' or perhaps the 'Third' (the revolt of the 460s) Messenian War. Fourth, the bronze tripods wrought by the Lakonian Gitiadas (*flor.* c.550) and the Aiginetan Kallon, which Pausanias

(3.18.7f.) saw at Amyklai, cannot both have commemorated the same Spartan victory over the Messenians, let alone a victory in the 'Second' Messenian War; but that of Kallon, who is known to have been active at Athens in the 480s, could have commemorated a victory in the early fifth century. Fifth, the statue of Zeus made by the Argive sculptor Ageladas could not have been originally made for the Naupaktos Messenians, as Pausanias (4.33.2) was told, since Ageladas worked in the early years of the fifth century, not c.460 or later. It might, however, have been commissioned at a time when the Messenians were in a state of revolt. (A large dedication by the Messenians at Delphi in the first half of the fifth century is even more problematic: Jeffery 1961, 205.) Finally, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegion in the early fifth century, settled some Messenians at Zankle in north-east Sicily, according to Pausanias (4.23.6), who, however, wrongly dates Anaxilas to the seventh century by connecting the resettlement with the 'Second' Messenian War.

It should be obvious that singly none of these scraps of evidence is incontrovertible or even compelling; but taken together they do at least add up to an arguable case, though not an 'overwhelming' one, as J.F. Lazenby believe (*MME* 87). A Helot revolt in the 490s would have been the red light as far as Spartan expansion was concerned and a powerful argument for abandoning the extra-Peloponnesian adventures (as they may have seemed to the more conservative members of the Spartan ruling class) favoured by Kleomenes. As we shall see in [Chapter 11](#), Sparta was considerably reluctant to commit large numbers of its troops north of the Isthmus of Corinth in the defence of Greece in 480–479, and one reason for this reluctance may well have been Helot disaffection.

I cannot leave Archaic Sparta and Lakonia without contributing to the perennial debate on Spartan 'austerity' or the supposed 'death' of Spartan (or, as I prefer, Lakonian) art. One of the most alluring and enduring aspects of the Spartan 'mirage' has been the idea of an austere, barrack-like Sparta, hostile to the higher arts. The 'mirage' as a whole of course was (and is) a myth, in part a groundless fabrication, partly a half-conscious distortion of the realities. But its cultural aspect seemed more firmly anchored in fact than some others, the more so because it seemed to be independently confirmed by Herodotus (2.167.2) and Thucydides (1.10.2). Furthermore, it appeared that participation in the manual crafts was not merely despised in Sparta but legally prohibited to citizens, at least by the early fourth century.

However, this resilient aspect of the 'mirage' suffered a near-fatal blow from the British School excavations at Sparta in the first decade of the twentieth century. These proved that the 'austere' Sparta of the

myth had had no counterpart in reality before the mid-sixth century at the earliest. The 'mirage' was accordingly revised, and Chilon, a veritable Lykourgos *redivivus*, was credited with sponsoring c.550 a sort of Spartan Arusha Declaration, a self-denying ordinance through which Spartan society abandoned its fun-loving ways and transformed itself, overnight, into the familiarly philistine barracks. Unfortunately, subsequent archaeological and art-historical research has shown that the revised picture will not do either, at least not when it is presented in this black-and-white form.

In the first place, the literary and archaeological evidence will not support the hypothesis of a sudden and comprehensive change of attitude. It is true that Alkman (c.600) was possibly the last representative of a native tradition of poetic creativity, but it was not perhaps a very deep-rooted tradition in any case; and Sparta continued to be visited by poets at least to the end of the fifth century, for example by Stesichoros, Simonides, Eupolis and Kratinos. But even if creative poetry was no longer being produced by Lakonians after the early sixth century, there was no comparable shutdown in the visual arts. Ivory-work may have ceased by c.550, but this was not due to 'austerity' (see above). Bronze-work continued well after the mid-century, the series of bronze vessels to the last quarter of the sixth century, the figurines into the fifth. Stone sculpture was never highly developed in Lakonia, whether in the form of statues or of public buildings, but c.550 Theodoros of Samos allegedly designed the Skias in Sparta; towards the end of the sixth century Bathyklēs of Magnesia was commissioned to remodel the Amyklaion and employed Lakonian masons (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 32); the third Menelaion was built in the first third of the fifth century, perhaps about the same time and for the same reason as the Persian Stoa in Sparta; and in the 480s the Spartans were prepared to pay for the marble group to which the misnamed 'Leonidas' belongs. Besides, the series of stone 'hero reliefs' found all over Lakonia ran from c.550 into the Hellenistic period. The Lakonian painted pottery continued to c.520, its demise, like that of the Corinthian fabric, being due to Athenian competition rather than Spartan 'austerity'; and black-painted Lakonian ware of high quality continued to be produced into the fifth century and found its way as far afield as Olympia.

Second, the decision not to coin silver, which must have been taken around 550, should not be interpreted as either implying an attitude of or leading inexorably to 'austerity'. Coinage was not invented or introduced elsewhere in Greece for primarily economic reasons, and its use did not become synonymous with trade until the later fifth century. The Spartan state could always use coins minted elsewhere, as other states did, and there is no evidence that the retention of iron

spits as a store of wealth and standard of value prevented internal economic exchanges. In any event, Sparta through its control of the Eurotas and Pamisos valleys was extraordinarily autarkic in essential foodstuffs; and its possession of abundant deposits of iron ore within its own frontiers may have been a contributory factor in the decision not to import silver to coin.

However, even if there was no sudden death of Lakonian art c.550, the question remains how, when and why did the transformation occur that culminated in the philistine fourth-century Sparta presented by Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, in which citizens were debarred from manual crafts and the products of craftsmen were at a discount? The answer, I believe, lies in what Finley (1975, ch. 10), has called the 'sixth-century revolution', a complex and gradual transformation of the Spartan social system designed to perpetuate Spartan control over the Helots and Perioikoi without abolishing the wide and growing disparities within the citizen-body itself. Thus it was the Spartans, for example, who took the lead in adopting a simple and uniform attire and 'in other ways too did most to assimilate the life of the rich to that of the common people' (Thuc. 1.6.4). The new social system, in operation by the time of Herodotus, was characterized by an overriding emphasis on military preparedness and a reduction of non-military wants to the barest minimum. In this new Sparta there was no longer any room for expensive private dedications to the gods or the ostentatious trappings of the 'good life'. Here alone could Wealth be described by a comic poet as 'blind like a lifeless picture'.

With the decay of patronage, craftsmanship and attitudes towards it in Sparta took an irreversible dive. Lakonian craftsmen were not slow to perceive and reflect the change: as early as c.525 some bronzesmiths emigrated to a more congenial yet somewhat familiar environment, Taras in southern Italy; and Lakonia had no part in the cultural efflorescence of the fifth century. Instead of conspicuous consumption in food, clothes, personal possessions or dedications to the gods, the Spartan plutocrats from c.550 onwards displayed their riches with enormous success and rare gusto in that 'most expensive, most aristocratic and most glory-bringing of all events in the Greek games' (Finley 1968a, 45), the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia (Ste. Croix 1972, 354f.). For victory here satisfied the claims both of personal prestige and of patriotism.

The Spartan social structure, however, was fatally flawed. The gap between rich and poor Spartans widened, and eventually by the early fourth century moral pressure grew inadequate to suppress differences in life-style at home. The most serious and glaring symptom of internal contradictions was the catastrophic decline in the full citizen population, that *oliganthropia* through which, as Aristotle (*Pol.*

1270a33f.) laconically put it, 'Sparta was destroyed.' This will be the major theme throughout the rest of this book.

Notes on further reading

The older bibliography on the 'Great Rhetra' may be found in Busolt 1893, 511f. (n. 1), the more recent in Oliva 1971, 71–102. Still fundamental is Wade-Gery 1958, 37–85 (originally published 1943–4). The most recent study I know is Levy 1977.

On the historicity of Lykourgos (as opposed to that of 'his' laws) see Toynbee 1969, 274–83; Oliva 1971, 63–70. The theory of the 'mixed constitution' in antiquity is discussed generally in Aalders 1968; its application to Sparta from antiquity onwards is examined in Rawson 1969 (Index s.v.).

On the Ephorate see generally Oliva 1971, 123–31; on the Ephor-list, Jacoby 1902, 138–42; Samuel 1972, 238–41.

For tyranny in the seventh and sixth centuries see Andrewes 1956; Berve 1967; on Sparta's avoidance of it, Andrewes 1956, ch. 6 (to be read with his earlier study of *eunomia*: 1938). The connection between the institution of hoplite warfare and the emergence of tyranny is discussed, with differing emphases and conclusions, in Salmon 1977 and Cartledge 1977.

For all aspects of Lakonian ivory-work see the meticulously thorough, if chronologically over-precise, Marangou 1969. The study of Lakonian bronze-work is bedevilled by the problem of stylistic attribution: for the hydriai see Diehl 1964; for the hoplite figurines Jost 1975, 355–63. Leon 1968 is among other things a pioneering attempt to isolate regional workshops within Lakonia and Messenia. The fundamental study of the development of the Lakonian pottery in the seventh century is still Lane 1934; for the sixth century see now Stibbe 1972. Rolley 1977 provides an admirable conspectus of Archaic Lakonian art.

On the dispute over Alkman's place of origin see Page 1951, 102–70; for his language see Risch 1954. His date is discussed in West 1965 and Harvey 1967, 69, on the basis of a recently published papyrus (*P. Oxy.* 2390). Treu 1968 is a useful review of all aspects of Alkman's life and work. The modern literature is exhaustively cited in Calame 1977.

For Sparta's relations with Arkadia and especially Tegea in the seventh and sixth centuries see the works cited in Kelly 1976, 176 n. 13; for the character of the Tegeate plain see briefly Howell 1970, 88f. Forrest 1968, ch. 6, is a typically stimulating account of the 'Second' Messenian War and its Arkadian aftermath.

The 'Bones of Orestes' policy is looked at in Leahy 1955; Griffiths (1976) has detected a trace of it in Herodotus 7.159 (where he would

emend 'Pelopides' to 'Pleisthenides'). The policy is attributed to Chilon by Forrest (1968, 75–7); for the papyrus in which Chilon is yoked with Anaxandridas see Leahy 1956 and 1959.

The Argos vs. Sparta struggle for the Thyreatis is discussed in Tomlinson 1972, 87–90 (but his implication that the 'Battle of the Champions' took place in the seventh century is not cogent) and Kelly 1976, 137–9 (but it is unnecessary to deny that the relationship between Sparta and Argos after the Spartan capture of the Thyreatis was for the most part one of mutual hostility).

On Lakonian akroteria of the type found at Tyros etc see now Lauter-Bufé 1974; add Catling 1977, 36 (the 'Old Menelaion' of c.600).

A relatively recent discussion of the Spartan navarchy is Sealey 1976, who argues that it did not become a regular, annual office until after the Battle of Kyzikos in 410. The expedition to Samos of c.525 is briefly considered in Jeffery 1976, 216f. Forrest (1968, 80–2) discounts the view that Sparta was pursuing a consistently anti-Persian policy from the time of its alliance with Croesus, but his tentative reconstruction of a loose 'Argive-inclined' grouping is not an adequate explanation of Spartan actions either. Perhaps here we must allow purely personal considerations some weight: the extraordinarily wide distribution of Lakonian pottery on Samos in the sixth century (it had been imported since the early seventh) and the dedication of a bronze lion at the Samian Heraion by 'Eumnastos a Spartiate' (Jeffery 1976, p1. 14) seem to betoken strong ties of *xenia* (guest-friendship) between Spartan and Samian aristocrats of the kind attested by Herodotus (3.55.2) for the fifth century. We recall the tradition that Samians had helped Sparta in the 'Second' Messenian War ([Chapter 8](#)).

The most stimulating and convincing recent account of Kleomenes' reign is Carlier 1977. He, like Jeffery (1976, 123–7), rightly holds that Kleomenes was a strong king; whether his strength was used for the good or ill of Sparta or indeed all Greece is of course another matter. On all aspects of the origin, character and development of the 'Peloponnesian League' see Ste. Croix 1972, ch. 4.

The Sepeia campaign is handled in Tomlinson 1972, 93–5, and Kelly 1976, 140f.; the epitaph of the Argive Hyssematas (Daly 1939) should perhaps be connected with the battle.

On the role of Kleomenes in Arkadia see Wallace 1954. The fifth-century 'Arkadikon' coinage, however, has been more recently studied by Williams (1965; cf. Kraay 1976, 95–8), and it seems not to have begun until some ten or fifteen years after Kleomenes; it may betoken a religious not a political organization.

Of modern attempts to read back the 'austerity' vaunted by the

‘mirage’ into the historical record the most successful to date is Holladay 1977a.

Chapter ten

Helots and Perioikoi

By the time Kleomenes I died, the process of internal construction in Lakonia, including now what Thucydides (4.3.2; 41.2) accurately described as ‘the land that was once Messenia’, had been completed; and Spartan hegemony was recognized generally within the Peloponnese and to some extent outside it. A decade later Sparta was the automatic choice as leader of loyalist Hellas against the invading forces of the Persian Empire. Since this military and political supremacy can only be explained against its Lakonian background, I propose to pull together the threads of the foregoing chapters by discussing systematically the status and functions of first the mainspring and then the essential complement of the Spartan power, respectively the Helots and the Perioikoi. As far as the archaeological and epigraphical evidence goes, 500 will be taken as an approximate terminus. But it will be necessary to draw on literary and environmental evidence from a far wider period than the seventh and sixth centuries.

I

Plato* had occasion to remark that the Helots afforded the subject for the liveliest controversy in Greece; the remark was noted and repeated some six centuries later by the learned Naucratic Athenaios. The controversy was not of course conducted primarily on the moral plane, for the number of Greeks who argued that slavery was not merely not in accordance with nature but actually contrary to it and wrong was small; slaves found a place even in some of the literary utopias which envisaged a general liberation from backbreaking toil and a superabundance of the good things of life (Finley 1975, ch. 11; Vogt 1975, ch. 2). The question rather was one of practical management, and it was in this sense that in the eyes of Aristotle (*Pol.*

1269), for example, the Helot-system was one of the seven most defective elements in the Spartan polity.

What struck non-Spartans from at least the fifth century was, in the first instance, the sheer number of the Helots in comparison to the surprisingly small, and shrinking, master class. Secondly, it was noted that the Helots were Greeks who, at least in the case of the Messenians, were being denied their legitimate political aspirations – political precisely because the Messenian Helots wished to become the *polis* of ‘the Messenians’. Modern scholarly controversy, which can afford to stay neutral on the moral and political aspects, has arisen chiefly from the inadequacies of the ancient sources. The origin of the (Lakonian) Helots, a vexed question already in antiquity, has been considered above ([Chapter 7](#)). Here I shall be concerned with the further problems of their juridical status, their economic functions within the complex system of Spartan land-tenure, and the way in which the juridical and economic aspects of Helotage conditioned Spartan political practice.

Unlike the Romans, the Greeks lacked a ‘developed jurisprudence’ (Finley 1973, 64). But even the Roman lawyers were not always able to articulate the complexities of social status and structure in precise and unambiguous legal language. Particularly instructive is the case of the late Roman colonate. We need not here consider its origins, which so nicely express the transformation of economic life in the Roman Empire during the first three centuries AD. What matters is that after Diocletian the ‘*colonus*’ though formally free was in a condition so close to slavery that only the (technically inappropriate) vocabulary of that institution was found adequate to describe his subject status. The Helot, by contrast, was formally unfree, but yet he or she apparently enjoyed aspects of life normally associated with the status of a free person rather than a slave – or, to be precise, a chattel slave. Hence there was coined, perhaps by Aristophanes of Byzantium in the third century, the expression ‘between free men and slaves’ to characterize the Helots and several other unfree populations scattered over the Greek world from Sicily to the Black Sea.

Unfortunately, though, Pollux, a lexicographer of the second century AD, is our only source for this expression, and he fails to tell us exactly in what respects these populations were thought to resemble each other. It seems to me therefore to be in principle wrong to regard this unclear and ambiguous expression as the most useful classificatory label. Rather, I suggest, we should follow the lead of the Spartans themselves and most of our non-Spartan literary sources, who describe the Helots simply as ‘slaves’, whether using the most general word *douloi* or terms which more strictly refer to their place of work (*oiketai*) or mode of acquisition (*andrapoda*). Indeed, Kritias, the

pro-Spartan Athenian oligarch ([Chapter 13](#)), reportedly said that in Lakedaimon could be found the most free and the most enslaved of all Greeks. It is this formulation, rather than the one recorded in Pollux, which deserves consideration above all.

For one of the key questions in Greek history, as I see it, is whether the propertied class ('the rich' or 'richest' in Greek parlance) derived their surplus wealth mainly from the exploitation of unfree and especially slave labour. As far as the propertied classes of most Greek states are concerned, the evidence is scattered, allusive, slight. But for the Spartiates (to use the technical term for Spartan citizens of full status) the evidence is relatively full and unambiguous. Spartan citizen-rights were tied strictly to the ability to contribute a certain amount of natural produce to a common mess in Sparta (below). This produce was procured by Helots who were bound, under pain of death, to hand it over to the individual Spartan on whose land they worked. Thus were Spartiates wholly freed from agricultural production and able – indeed, in a sense compelled – to devote their lives to the one practical craft to which no social stigma was ever attached, the craft of warfare.

Two passages will sufficiently illustrate this peculiar feature of Spartan society. The first comes from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (4.20–5), a disquisition on good husbandry probably composed in the 350s. In accordance with the then ideology of the Greek propertied class, Sokrates is here made to commend agriculture as the only one of the mechanic arts worthy to be cultivated. In passing he recounts the story of the visit by the Spartan Lysander to the home of his friend Cyrus, the Persian prince (cf. Anderson 1974, 68f.). What particularly amazed Lysander were not so much the sweet smells and beautiful colours of Cyrus' garden as the fact that Cyrus had actually laid it out and planted it with his own hands. The other passage occurs in the *Rhetoric* (1367a28–33) of Aristotle, according to whom the wearing of long hair in the Spartan manner is the mark of a 'gentleman', since long hair is incompatible with manual labour.

What Kritias was saying, then, is that the Spartans were the 'freest' of the Greeks because they had taken the exploitation of slave labour to its logical limit and contrived to perform no productive labour themselves whatsoever. It should be noted in this connection that Aristotle did not criticize the Spartans for thereby securing an abundance of leisure but for misusing the leisure thus obtained. The Spartans, he thought, through devoting themselves exclusively to military matters and neglecting the arts of peace had become little better than wild beasts (passages cited in Ste. Croix 1972, 91). For Aristotle shared the view generally accepted in Greek (and Roman) antiquity that to be a fully free man almost necessarily involved being

able to utilize slave labour.

The Helots therefore were properly called slaves in this basic economic sense. But it was also recognized from the fifth century that they differed from the more characteristic chattel slaves in important respects. Since the Spartans had no written laws, we have no Spartan equivalent of the Cretan Gortyn Code inscribed c.450 (Willetts 1967), and we cannot therefore establish precisely the regulations governing the marriages of Helots or their ownership of property. So far as marriages are concerned, in fact, we have just a single reference to Helot wives (Tyrtaios fr. 7) to prove that they were effected, though not necessarily recognized at law. Some kind of family life, however, is implied by the fact that, like slaves in the Old South, they apparently managed to reproduce themselves or at least to maintain themselves in sufficient numbers to constitute a permanent and indeed growing threat to the diminishing body of Spartiates.

This self-reproduction is of great interest in view of the modern debate over the economics of slavery, particularly slavery in the western hemisphere. But already in the eighteenth century David Hume had remarked in his essay 'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations' that 'the only slaves among the Greeks that appear to have continued their own race, were the Helotes (sic), who had houses apart.' It is uncertain whether their 'houses apart' were all scattered on the *kleroi* (allotments) to which they were attached or might also be grouped in villages. Strabo's *katoikiai* could refer to either mode of habitation; Livy's *castella* could be either forts or farms; and the Helos of Thucydides (4.54), Damonon (*IG* V.1.213) and Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.32) could be either a village or a cult-centre. Since the archaeological evidence does not resolve the matter, we can only speculate that in both Lakonia and Messenia the Helots were forced to abandon the villages of their ancestors and kept dispersed on the land of their masters (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.5) as a precaution against rebellious combination.

It does seem certain, however, that the Helots could in some sense own or perhaps rather possess personal property. Whether or not they possessed instruments of production is unclear and perhaps unimportant, but it appears that in 425 some Messenian Helots had their own boats (Thuc. 4.26.6f.); and in 223 or 222 6,000 Lakonian Helots were allegedly able to raise the five Attic minas required by Kleomenes III for the purchase of their freedom (Plut. *Kleom.* 23.1, with Welwei 1974, 163–8). Moreover, the Helots not only enjoyed private rights of religious practice, like slaves in other states, but they were also granted at least one public religious guarantee, that of asylum at the sanctuary of Poseidon at Perioikic Tainaron (though this might be violated: [Chapter 11](#)).

Such elements of 'freedom' in the Helot way of life may have suggested the first term of the designation 'between free men and slaves'. We are more surely informed as to the reasons why the Helots could not be called 'slaves' without qualification. The main one, to continue the quotation from Hume, was that they were 'more the slaves of the public than of individuals'. That is, relations between a Spartiate and the Helots attached to his land were as it were mediated through the state, in the sense that the Spartiate 'owned' Helots only in virtue of his membership of the Spartan citizen-body. This is why, incidentally, Diakonoff (1974) has appropriated the term 'Helots' as a generic classification for state-owned direct producers in the Ancient East.

Thus the informal agreement existing among other Greek slaveowners 'to act as unpaid bodyguards of each other against their slaves' (Xen. *Hieron* 4.3) was formalized in Sparta, where the state, represented by the Ephors, declared war annually on the Helots – a typically Spartan expression of politically calculated religiosity designed to absolve in advance from ritual pollution any Spartan who killed a Helot. The Spartan state alone had the power to manumit Helots and release them from the land to which they were forcibly bound (Thuc. 5.34.1 is an example). And any Spartan who exacted from 'his' Helots more than the maximum rent was liable to a public curse. Conversely, every Spartan citizen had the right to use the Helots attached to the service of any other, in the same way that he was entitled to use another Spartiate's horses and country-stores on hunting expeditions.

Following this lead, therefore, Pausanias described the Helots as 'slaves of the community'. Strabo, however, was yet more exact: the Spartans, he says, held the Helots as 'in a certain manner public slaves'. The qualification, which applies to the epithet and not the noun, is crucial. For although no individual Spartiate owned Helots as other Greeks owned their chattel slaves, yet it was to an individual Spartan master that the Helots working a particular estate handed over their rent in kind, out of which the Spartiate paid his mess dues and so exercised the rights of citizenship. It is because the Helots were thus 'tied to the soil' and bound to pay a rent that the terminology of serfdom may be employed to describe their legal status as that of 'state serfs'. That this does not necessarily imply any close similarity between Helotage and mediaeval feudalism will emerge as we examine in some detail the Spartan system of land-tenure.

Let us first be clear that we are being sucked into a bog: the problem of Spartan land-tenure is 'one of the most vexed in the obscure field of Spartan institutions' (Walbank 1957, 628). Part of the reason for this is that of the surviving sources none was writing before

Sparta lost Messenia in 370. But the major complicating factor is the twist given to the Spartan 'mirage' in the third century by the revolutionary kings Agis IV and Kleomenes III, who claimed, inevitably, to be restoring the 'Lykourgan' system. The essential problems seem to me to be twofold: from what date was there private and legally alienable landed property in Lakonia and Messenia? and did this include, or was it coextensive with, the *kleroi* worked by Helots?

The first point to establish is that the literary sources from at least Tyrtaios onwards are unanimous that there were rich and poor Spartans. This literary evidence is fully corroborated by archaeology (from the eighth century) and epigraphy (from the mid-seventh). Again, we might cite the string of victories won by Spartans in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia. For king Agesilaos II, according to the presumably well-informed Xenophon (*Ages.* 9.6), pointed out that such victories depended on the ownership of private wealth; and being the brother of a victor – or rather victrix (Kyniska) – he should have known.

The specific problems posed by the sources on Spartan land-tenure concern above all the precise meanings of certain technical or semi-technical terms. We are told by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a19–21) that Lykourgos (for Aristotle an eighth-century figure) had declared it immoral for a Spartan to buy or sell landed property. It may be anachronistic to think of ownership in juridical terms at so early a date, but, given the congruence at Sparta between what was customary and what was legally permitted, we might assume that Spartans practically never bought or sold privately owned land. This assumption seems to be supported by Aristotle himself, since he then points out that the lawgiver in effect frustrated his own intention by allowing anyone complete freedom to donate his land away from the heirs by gift or bequest.

It is important to realize that Aristotle is here discussing only one category of land, legally alienable private property. But in a passage of the Aristotelian *Lak. Pol.* preserved by Herakleides Lembos (373.12 Dilts) a different distinction is drawn. While it was deemed shameful for a Spartan to sell any land whatsoever, it was forbidden, presumably by law, to sell the 'ancient portion'. However, although the notion of two different categories of land is introduced, the two passages are not formally irreconcilable. For it is not denied that the 'ancient portion' might also be alienated through gift or bequest. We might recall Aristotle's definition of ownership as 'alienation consisting in gift and sale' (*Rhet.* 1361a21f.). This 'ancient portion' reappears in slightly different wording in Plutarch (*Mor.* 238E).

Polybius (6.45.3), however, introduces a further complication.

Writing in the second century and discussing the allegedly unique features of the ancestral Spartan polity, he says that the first of these, according to the fourth-century writers Ephorus, Xenophon, Kallisthenes and Plato, was the landed property régime: no Spartan citizen might own more land than another, but all must possess an equal quantity of the 'politike' land. Unfortunately, 'politike' is ambiguous, since it could be the adjective of either *polis* (city) or *politai* (citizens). Most scholars have in fact derived it from *polis* and argued that Polybius provides evidence for a pool of state property distinct from the land owned privately by the citizens. It seems to me, however, that Polybius is most easily interpreted as referring only to land owned by the citizens. For this would be a natural distinction to make in the case of the Spartans, whose own land was not coextensive with the territory of the *polis* as a whole, which embraced also the land of the Perioikoi.

At all events, this interpretation would bring Polybius into line with Plutarch (*Lyk.* 8.3), who, perhaps drawing ultimately on a common source, agrees with Polybius in the matter of equal shares. Significantly, though, he adopts a different criterion of equality, according to yield of produce rather than surface area; and he is far more explicit and detailed than Polybius. In his account Lykourgos conducted a thoroughgoing land-redistribution and carved up Spartan territory into *kleroi*. Plutarch was uncertain how many of the 9,000 *kleroi* had been created by Lykourgos (Polydoros had a reputation for distributing *kleroi* too), but he was certain that 9,000 was the eventual total and that the corresponding number of 9,000 citizens, one per *kleros*, had remained constant down to the reign of Agis II at the end of the fifth century (*Lyk.* 29.10; cf. *Agis* 5.2).

The implication that all Spartan land was distributed into *kleroi* and that these *kleroi* were somehow in public control is consonant with Plutarch's description of the process whereby a Spartan acquired his *kleros*: the allocation was made at birth, provided that the 'eldest of the tribesmen' had passed the infant as fit to be reared. Here, however, Plutarch is undoubtedly in error, and the error is instructive. For he has conflated two separate procedures, the enrolment of the new-born into a tribe and the allocation of a *kleros*. The latter, even if we accept that it was a tribal matter, could only have been effected at a later stage, when a man had passed through the controlled system of public training called the *agoge* and been elected to a common mess. The simplest explanation of Plutarch's error is to suppose that he has tried to reconcile the fact (made unambiguous by Aristotle) of hereditary succession to a privately owned and legally alienable *kleros* with his false belief in a publicly owned and controlled system of equal and inalienable *kleroi*.

This explanation of the error, to whose source I shall shortly return, is confirmed in my view by his description, apparently following the third-century Phylarchos, of the *rhetra* of Epitadeus (*Agis* 5.3). This measure is said to have provided that anyone who wished might legally dispose of his household and *kleros* by gift or bequest. Most scholars have automatically identified the freedom of gift and bequest criticized by Aristotle as the consequence of this measure. Aristotle, however, as we saw, attributed the dispensation to Lykourgos, and there is reason to suspect that the *rhetra* of Epitadeus may be an invention designed to explain away the failure of ‘Lykourgos’ to foresee the drastic fall in citizen numbers during the fifth and early fourth centuries ([Chapter 14](#)). For no matter what measures had been taken to forestall the alienation of *kleroi*, these had been circumvented long before the date usually assigned to Epitadeus’ *rhetra*, the early fourth century. As Forrest (1968, 137) has succinctly put it, ‘Epitadeus, if he existed, does not belong to the fourth century or, if he does, did not create the trouble.’

I cannot therefore accept that there had ever been a pool of equal and inalienable *kleroi* owned or controlled by the state. On the other hand, I do not of course mean to deny that there had ever been a redistribution of Spartan land before the redistributions of Kleomenes III and Nabis in the third century. Some form of distribution was indispensable to provide the economic basis for transforming all Spartan citizens into hoplites in the seventh century. Moreover, if we can give any sense to the expression ‘ancient portion’, I feel this must refer to the land owned in Lakonia, mostly by aristocrats, prior to the creation of what we might call the ‘new portions’ in Messenia. An attempt must have been made to achieve a rough equality between these new *kleroi*, since it was on the produce from a *kleros* that a Spartan’s citizenship and membership of the hoplite army was made to depend – in a manner to be discussed shortly.

For two reasons, however, I do not believe there is any way we can rationally calculate the size or number of the *kleroi*. First, we lack the requisite ancient evidence for all the relevant factors; in particular, the recent demonstration that the geomorphology of the Eurotas and Pamisos valleys has changed significantly since our period ([Chapter 2](#)) makes it impossible to estimate with any precision the ancient agricultural potential of the Spartans’ land, besides automatically ruling out of court all modern calculations based on existing conditions. Second, such ancient evidence of a quantitative nature as we do possess is either relevant only to the third-century reforms or, if relevant to the period from c.650 to 370, is not sufficiently reliable or precise. It may none the less be useful to set out this evidence in some detail, if only to demonstrate that the host of wildly fluctuating and

mutually incompatible modern estimates are indeed built on sand.

According to Isokrates (12.255), the original number of Dorians who 'invaded' Lakonia was 2,000. This figure can only have been a guess, perhaps related to the number of Spartan citizens at the time (339 BC) – an even smaller figure. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a36f.), however, about the same time as Isokrates referred vaguely to a report that there had once been as many as 10,000. Obviously he is referring to the period before 370, when Sparta controlled Messenia as well as Lakonia, and indeed to a time well before 370, since he knew that then there were only about 1,000 Spartan citizens. It would be rash to place much trust in such a round number thus allusively cited, although it is possible that Aristotle's 10,000 is a rounding up of Herodotus' 8,000 given for 480 (Hdt. 7.234.2). Certainly, though, Herodotus' figure is the earliest reliable figure we have.

Whether or not it is absolutely correct, when taken with Aristotle's figure for the second quarter of the fourth century it is sufficient to prove that, despite Plutarch, there was no necessary one-to-one correspondence between the number of citizens and the number of *kleroi*. In other words, even if each Spartan paterfamilias had been allocated a *kleros* in the seventh-century distribution, that number of *kleroi* did not determine the size of the citizen body for all time. Yet this was precisely what Plutarch wrongly but revealingly believed. We may now turn to consider the possible source or sources of his error.

First, we recall a serious discrepancy between Plutarch and Polybius. The latter, naming four fourth-century sources, gave size as the criterion of equality among the holdings of 'politike' land. Plutarch, however, is confident that the *kleroi* were so carved out as to yield an equal amount of produce, from which the Spartan master and his wife might receive respectively seventy and twelve medimnoi of barley and a corresponding amount of fresh fruits. The simplest explanation of the discrepancy is that Plutarch has followed the sources implicitly rejected by Polybius, namely those of the third century who swallowed or indeed formulated the propaganda of Agis and Kleomenes. This explanation is perhaps supported by the number 9,000 given by Plutarch for the *kleroi* distributed by Lykourgos and Polydoros. For Agis proposed to raise the citizen body from 700 to 4,500 by redividing Spartan land in the Eurotas valley, and this land was thought to be roughly equal to the land once held in Messenia.

It could of course be argued that Agis' projected figure was based on the number of citizens known or believed to have existed in the 'Lykourgan' heyday. But for me this would only reinforce the suspicion that Plutarch was using Agis-tainted sources, as there was in fact no one-to-one correspondence numerically between citizens and *kleroi* in the fifth and fourth centuries at least. A second clue pointing

in the same direction is Plutarch's statement that Lykourgos had also redistributed the land owned by the Perioikoi into 30,000 *kleroi*. Since there is no evidence, and no reason to suspect, that the Spartans had interfered with Perioikic land before the third century – apart from assigning 'choice precincts' to their kings (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 15.3) – this figure can only be explained as a doubling of the 15,000 Perioikic allotments envisaged by Agis. In short, it seems highly probable that Plutarch's figure for the *kleroi* and citizens under the 'Lykourgan' dispensation is a backwards projection of the figure envisaged by Agis and almost achieved by Kleomenes.

It is far harder to handle the figure of eighty-two *medimnoi* of barley given by Plutarch as the (maximum) annual rent to be paid by the Helots to a *kleros*-holder and his wife. On the one hand, the fact that in Plutarch the rent was to be paid just to a Spartan master and his wife corresponds to the situation immediately following or envisaged in the third-century redistributions rather than to the one criticized by Aristotle in the *Politics*, in which the sons of such a couple were falling into poverty and forfeiting citizen-rights through division of the inheritance (cf. [Chapter 14](#)). Moreover, it was only after a relatively large number of approximately equal *kleroi* had been created that an average rent could have been fixed. On the other hand, these arguments would apply no less to the situation following the seventh-century distribution, and it could be argued further that Agis aimed to produce *kleroi* commensurate with the payment of the 'Lykourgan' mess dues.

For in the case of the latter Agis could have been genuinely following rather than setting a precedent. That is, the quantities given by Plutarch (*Lyk.* 12) for the monthly mess contributions so correspond to those given by the fourth-century Dikaiarchos (fr. 72 Wehrli) that both must have been drawn from a common source (Kritias or Aristotle has been suggested). This does not of course mean that we may extrapolate from these quantities the size and yield of a 'Lykourgan' *kleros*. For it is unclear precisely which land was redistributed in the seventh century; we do not know the ratio between rent and yield (the proportion of one half cited in Tyrtaios fr. 6, even if it is a rent paid by Helots, does not necessarily apply to the situation after the 'Second' Messenian War); and the minimum contributions to the mess do not exhaust the commodities produced on Spartiate land. None the less, these contributions do provide our best evidence for the economy certainly of Lakonia and probably of Messenia too before the third century.

According to Dikaiarchos, the prescribed minimum contribution was: one and a half Attic *medimnoi* (roughly bushels) of barley flour; eleven or twelve *choes* of wine; an unspecified weight of cheese and

figs; and ten or so Aiginetan obols to buy extras. Plutarch gives: one *medimnos* of barley; eight *choes* of wine; five minas of cheese; two and a half minas of figs; and an unspecified sum of money for extras. In other words, Dikaiarchos has translated Lakonian measures and weights into their Attic equivalents where he was reasonably sure of the ratio. Let us consider each item in turn, incorporating other literary, archaeological and epigraphical evidence.

Barley today is merely a major feed grain for animals and is ingested by humans only indirectly; in Lakonia, for example, it is grown widely, especially in the Malea peninsula and east Helos plain (ESAG no. 304). In antiquity, however, it was used as well for human food as for animal feed (Moritz 1955; 1958, xxi, 167). Indeed, it appears that until perhaps as late as the fourth century barley, eaten as a 'kneaded thing' (*maza*: Plut. *Kleom.* 16.5 etc.), was widely preferred to wheat as food in Greece, partly for technological reasons and partly because tastes in food are always partly irrational (the ancients were aware from experience that wheat was more nutritive). The stipulated mess contribution being in barley suggests therefore that the rule had been established before the fourth century; 'home' rations for kings in the fifth century were also provided in barley (Hdt. 6.57.3). However, by the first half of the fourth century rich Spartiates were contributing wheaten bread to their messes (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 5.3), although Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 8.4.5; *Caus. Plant.* 4.9.5) remarked on the lightness of Spartan wheat at the end of the century.

A Spartan *medimnos* of barley a month, perhaps seventy-three or seventy-four litres in volume, undoubtedly constituted a living ration for an adult male; this can be seen by comparing our other evidence for rations, especially those sent over to the men trapped on Sphakteria in 425, although we must allow for exceptional circumstances here (Thuc. 4.16). Thus the rent of eighty-two *medimnoi* per annum maximum should have fed at least six or seven persons. Presumably, if the figure applies to our period and not just the third century, the surplus was either consumed by the members of the Spartiate's household or put into a public store. We are not told how the barley made its way from field to mess, but there may have been a central mill at a place near Sparta called 'the grindings' (Alesiai: not yet certainly located). Alkman (fr. 95a) mentions a mill, and stone suitable for millstones occurs near Mistra in the Taygetos piedmont west of Sparta.

The grapevine can flourish in droughty, rocky and calcareous soils, on level and sloping ground, and at considerable altitudes (up to 1,219 m. today in the Peloponnese). The Mediterranean type of climate normally provides sufficient moisture for its spring vegetative phase and the dry, sunny weather to ripen the fruit. Both in relief and

in climate Lakonia (especially) and Messenia are admirably suited to viticulture, although we should note that vines 'require a greater degree of tendance and control of the environment than any other Mediterranean crop' (White 1970, 229). The recent discovery of grape-seeds at the Menelaion site should confirm that the wine in the stoppered jars found in the Mycenaean mansion was locally produced. Pedasos (Mothone?) was noted for its vines by Homer (*Il.* 9.152). By 600 Alkman could write as a connoisseur of five local wine-growing districts (fr. 92d: Oinous, Dentheliatis, Karystos, Onoglos, Stathmis) and even suggest an intimacy with viticulture by referring to the grubs that destroy the 'eyes' of vines (fr. 93). The districts, however, where they can be securely located, were in Perioikic territory. Perhaps the Spartans' own Helot-produced wine was *vin ordinaire*, a potent enough brew to dement Kleomenes I if taken neat too often no doubt.

Cheese will have been made from the milk of sheep and goats rather than cows. 'Pasture' in the northern European sense does not exist in Greece today, and since cultivable land is a maximum of 20 per cent of the surface area per annum, livestock may merely graze the stubble to manure the soil for the next planting. Normally they must make do with the terrain between the 'cultivable' and the totally barren (30 per cent of the surface area in 1961), and on this basis Kythera in 1961 was reckoned to have the highest pro-portion of 'pasture' of any eparchy (ESAG no. 319). Ancient conditions will not have differed greatly. None the less, in 1961 the eparchy of Lakedaimon (roughly the Eurotas furrow) had the seventh largest number of goats, and it seems from the Pseudo-Platonic *Alkibiades* (1.122D) that Lakonia and Messenia were no less well equipped with small stock animals in antiquity. Indeed, it has been suggested that land in Messenia planted to wheat in the Mycenaean period was turned over to pasture under the Spartan domination. Apart from cheese, sheep and goats will have provided skins, wool, hair, animal fat and, to a minor degree, meat.

The fig, like the grapevine, was pre-eminently well adapted to the Lakonian and Messenian environment. Today the first crop in June-July is mostly eaten fresh, the second in August-October is used for drying. Charmis, Spartan victor in the prestigious *stadion* foot-race at Olympia in 668, is said to have trained on a special diet of dried figs. Aristophanes (fr. 108) provides a typically humorous political explanation of the relatively small size of the 'Lakonian' fig, but this may be a generic name rather than a reference to the figs actually grown in Lakonia or Messenia. Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 2.7.1) adds that irrigation improves the fruit of the Lakonian fig.

The last of the items mentioned by Dikaiarchos and Plutarch is money. As we have seen, Sparta did not coin silver as early as most other states – in fact not until the early third century. Exchanges,

however, did take place in Lakonia, in which iron spits seem to have been somehow involved. This subject is too complex to go into here, but Dikaiarchos may have translated into the Aiginetan standard monetary contributions that were in fact made in the form of iron spits. It should, however, be added that at least one Aiginetan coin has been found in an Archaic context on Spartan territory, at Anoyia in the Spartan plain (perhaps the Dereion of Paus. 3.20.7). Spits, square in section, have been excavated at all the major Spartan sanctuaries, but it is unclear whether they are monetary or purely functional.

The items mentioned so far exhaust the range neither of the food consumed in the mess nor of the plants and animals raised in Lakonia and Messenia by Helots. The first notable omission is the third member of the 'Mediterranean dietary triad' ([Chapter 4](#)), the olive, whose possibly crucial role in the Dark Ages has been considered in [Chapter 7](#). In fact, Dikaiarchos does mention the olive earlier in the same passage, where he indicates the range of food actually consumed in the mess. We may add that, according to Thucydides (1.6.5), the Spartans were the first Greeks to anoint themselves with olive oil and scrape themselves off after athletic exercise. This presumably betokens an abundance of the oil in Lakonia.

The same passage of Dikaiarchos also introduces another dietary staple, pork, from which the Spartans made their state speciality, the bloody black broth that so disgusted a visiting ruler and so delighted Hitler (Rawson 1969, 7, 343). The Spartan kings were privileged to receive the hides of all sacrificed animals (Hdt. 6.57.1), and Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 15.5) refers to pigs in the context of royal sacrifices.

Dikaiarchos notes that exceptionally fish, a hare or a ring-dove might be eaten in the mess. The fish were presumably sea-fish caught by Perioikoi and perhaps dried, but the hare and the dove were prizes of a favourite Spartan pastime, hunting. The chief prize, however, was the wild boar, to the capture of which the Spartans apparently devoted considerable thought. The specially bred 'Lakonian' hound was valued as a scenter; horses, dogs and provisions were made available on demand to all Spartans, though they were no doubt owned only by the rich; and a hunting party was one of the only two legitimate excuses for being absent from the common meal. The popularity of boar-hunting with the Spartans is demonstrated by archaeology. Lakonian artists represented boars and sometimes hunting scenes in vasepainting, terracotta, bronze and stone during the sixth century and later. A funeral mound of c.600, to which we shall be returning in various connections, contained bones of wild boar. The chief hunting area near Sparta seems to have been the region of the lower eastern slopes of central Taygetos known as Therai (Paus. 3.20.5). The area was no doubt more densely wooded than it is

today.

The horse deserves separate mention, for it occupied a special place in Lakonian life. Small bronze representations of the animal were fashioned by Lakonian craftsmen and dedicated in Spartan sanctuaries from c.750. Alkman (fr. 1.51, 59; 58.2; 60.3) displays a virtuoso familiarity with the various regional breeds and mentions galingale, which was particularly used as horse-fodder. Probably it was in Alkman's lifetime that horses were sacrificed on the funeral mound just mentioned. Finally, there are the horses bred for racing. Being extremely expensive to maintain, horses were the prerogative of the rich and often aristocratic few. Since they require extensive pasture and abundant water, conditions in the ancient forerunners of the modern Helos plain and Pamisos valley appear to have been most suitable. The Pseudo-Platonic *Alkibiades* suggests there was a remarkably large number of horses kept in Lakonia and Messenia, and it is no surprise to meet a Messenian supplying horses to Alexandria in the third century (Plut. *Kleom.* 35.3).

Three more life-sustaining creatures deserve a mention. The bee, first represented in Lakonian art on a four-sided ivory seal of 700–675 and beautifully evoked by Alkman (fr. 89.4), yielded the essential sweetener honey and the multi-purpose wax. Second, migratory quails were presumably netted in antiquity, as they are shot today, at the foot of the Tainaron and Malea peninsulas; Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.3f.) commented that their sexual ardour made them easier to catch. Third, the domesticated fowl, besides providing meat and eggs (the symbol of Helen, represented for instance on a sixth-century relief from Sellasia: below), was also a suitable object for sacrifice.

Finally, let us turn from animal to vegetable. Another unknown forbidding us to use the available quantitative evidence as a sufficient basis for estimating the size of a *kleros* is the amount of land planted to legumes. That they were important in the Spartan diet is suggested by Alkman's references (fr. 17.4; 96) to a porridge of mixed pulse (perhaps pea, lentil, lupine and vetch), the food of the common man, and by Theophrastos' citations (*Caus. Plant.* 7.4.5f.) of 'Lakonian' types of vegetable (lettuce and cucumber). Alkman also mentions sesame, a soil-improver whose seeds might be used both to flavour bread (fr. 19.2f.) and to feed animals. Flax, which is labour-intensive and requires much water for its growth and processing, was grown for its fibre in Messenia in late Mycenaean times, but for the historical period we hear only of edible linseed (Alkman fr. 19.2f.; Thuc. 4.26.5). I would guess, however, that the linen used, for example, in hoplite tunics was locally produced.

Those then are the crops and animals raised by Helots in Lakonia and Messenia for Spartan use at home and abroad. We cannot estimate

with precision or even roughly the size of a *kleros*. It is clear, however, both from the imbalance in numbers between Spartiates and Helots and from a crucial passage in Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11, fully discussed in [Chapters 13](#) and [14](#)) that more than one Helot family worked each *kleros*. Unfortunately, though, only one source gives a numerical ratio, and that for a military not an agricultural context. In 479 each Spartiate who fought at Plataia was accompanied by seven Helots (Hdt. 9.10.1; 28.2; 29.1). If the figure has been correctly transcribed by Herodotus or his copyists, this would certainly be the largest number of Helots ever known to have left Lakonia. In fact, to many scholars it has seemed implausibly high. Clearly it was not demanded on strictly military grounds, although Welwei (1974, 120–4) has properly stressed the supply problem of this campaign and suggested that Helots were used to solve it. Moreover, even if the Spartans were afraid of revolution in their rear – a plausible suggestion in view of the evidence mustered for a possible Helot revolt c.490 ([Chapter 9](#)) – it is highly unlikely that they would have risked taking so many potential enemies with them on a vital campaign. It is worth remembering Xenophon's statement that on campaign the Spartans took the precaution of debarring the Helots from the arms-dump. So if Herodotus' seven-to-one proportion has any validity, it seems more likely to represent the ratio of the Helot to Spartan populations as a whole than the proportion at Plataia.

However that may be, all our evidence indicates that at least by the fifth century the Helots were vastly more numerous than the Spartans and that this very numerical disproportion was an important factor governing relations between the two. However, the precise character of these relations is harder to discover. Thucydides in a celebrated passage (4.80) fully discussed in [Chapter 12](#) regarded the liquidation of some 2,000 Helots in 425 or 424 as an instance, if a spectacularly horrific one, of the normal precautionary attitude of the Spartans towards the Helots. Myron too, who is of course a less reliable witness, treats the killing of Helots as a regular mode of control. Then there is the evidence for the 'Krypteia', which has been illuminated by Jeanmaire (1913) with a wealth of comparative anthropological material. This too appears to have been a routine institution, whereby youths who had passed through the *agoge* (the state educational system) completed their apprenticeship by going out into the country, lying low by day and killing Helots by night. Plutarch is emphatic that this exercise in brutality was no part of the 'Lykourgan' order, but only became general after the revolt following the great earthquake of c.465. Herodotus, however, in a rarely noticed passage (4.146.2) almost casually remarks, ostensibly with reference to a context of c.800, that the Spartans perform their official killings by night; and

Isokrates (12.181), admittedly with hyperbole, claimed that only the Spartans denied the wickedness of all homicide.

Some modern scholars, on the other hand, have preferred to follow Plutarch and minimize the role played by hatred, fear and judicial murder in Spartano-Helot relations. As Grote put it (though he was careful to distinguish between domestic and agricultural Helots in this regard), 'the various anecdotes which are told respecting their treatment at Sparta betoken less of cruelty than of ostentatious scorn – a sentiment which we are noway surprised to discover among the citizens of the mess-table.' This milder interpretation has been followed most recently by Ducat (1974), who suggests that it was because the Helots were in some ways so similar to the Spartans that the latter were anxious to exaggerate the differences. For example, it was because the Helots were in a sense 'within the city' that war was declared upon them annually in order to render them legally outsiders. And the murder of Helots, Ducat argues, was essentially a magical rite, a symbolic representation intended to reaffirm the norm that Helots were not and could not become Spartans. In short, the characteristic attitudes of the Spartans towards the Helots were scorn and contempt. Hence the beatings, the intoxications, the enforced wearing of a dogskin cap and rough animal pelts – all measures designed to remind the Helots of their 'alterity'.

No doubt there is truth in both versions. The main point, however, remains: Helotage had been initiated and maintained to serve the class interests of the Spartans. The proper question to ask then is why the Spartans, unlike other Greek master classes, found themselves constantly menaced by revolt and felt compelled to resort to such extreme repression. There is no single answer.

In the first place, as Finley (1973, 63, 68) has emphasized, the Helots were in comparison to chattel slaves a privileged group, enjoying 'all the normal human institutions except their freedom'. Of course the context in which these institutions were forced to function was highly abnormal, but their relative privilege in such matters as family-life and the possession of personal property could have encouraged them to lay claim to greater rights and freedoms, especially since they were Greeks.

Second, the Messenian Helots, who at least by the time of Thucydides (1.101.2) greatly outnumbered the Lakonian, were politically motivated men. In fact, they were precisely what Vernant (1974, 28) denies to have been possible in ancient Greece, 'an active and unified social force, a group of solidary men intervening on the historical stage to orient the course of events in a direction conformable to their interests and aspirations'. They lived, moreover, far from Sparta and separated from it by a formidable mountain

barrier. For these reasons no doubt it was against them rather than the Lakonian Helots that Spartan repression was more particularly directed. We should, though, recall that in 465 it was the Lakonian Helots (if Diodorus may be trusted) who began the revolt, that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries the Athenians devoted some attention to disaffecting the Lakonians as well as the Messenians, that Kinadon's conspiracy of c.399 may have been a primarily Lakonian affair, and, finally, that Aristotle's often quoted comparison of the Helots to 'an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartans' was made after the liberation of Messenia.

Third, however, and for me decisively, the relationship between the Spartans and the Helots had been conceived in conquest, and it was essentially as a defeated enemy that the Spartans treated the Helots, whose very name perpetually recalled the fact. The relationship, however, was dialectical. The militarism which Aristotle deplored was the price Sparta inevitably paid for maintaining a uniquely profitable system of economic exploitation.

II

The origins of the Perioikoi, as already stressed in [Chapter 7](#), were more heterogeneous than those of the Helots, but their status, as it had been gradually defined by the end of the seventh century, was no less uniform in relation to the Spartans. They were the inhabitants of the towns in Lakonia and Messenia apart from Sparta and Amyklai, free men but subjected to Spartan suzerainty and not endowed with citizen-rights at Sparta. Their free personal status and disfranchisement are not controversial. Disagreement abounds over the character of their subjection, and the social and political organization of their own communities.

According to Larsen (1938, 818), the Perioikoi stood somewhere between Helots and free allies of Sparta. According to Oliva (1971, 62), they occupied a station between Spartan citizens and foreigners or allies. The latter, I suggest, is the more fruitful perspective. For on the one hand the Perioikic communities were regarded as *poleis*, not only by inexact writers like Herodotus (7. 234), Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.21; *Lak. Pol.* 15.3; *Ages.* 2.24) and Stephanos of Byzantion, but even by Thucydides (5.54.1). The same idea that they were in some sense politically autonomous is conveyed by the formally incorrect description of Pharai, Geronthrai and Kythera as 'colonies' of Sparta. (However, the apparently corroborative epigraphical evidence for magistracies in Perioikic towns belongs to the second and first centuries and may not therefore be relevant to the period before 195, when Flamininus completed the political liberation of the Perioikoi from Sparta: see [Chapter 15](#).) On the other hand, it was a peculiarity

of the Spartan *polis* that its territory was not identical with the land owned by its citizens, and that the name of the state was not ‘the Spartiates’ but ‘the Lakedaimonians’, which in military contexts embraced the Perioikoi as well. Xenophon indeed several times refers to a mixed force as ‘the citizen army’ (*Hell.* 4.4.19; 5.4.41, 55; 7.4.20, 27). In what then did the subjection of the Perioikoi lie?

The answer, I suggest, is that they were bound, as it were, ‘to follow the Spartans whithersoever they might lead’. We do not in fact know the terms of any individual treaties between the Spartans and a Perioikic community, and their mutual relationship need not ever have been so formalized. Undoubtedly, though, they were obligated to submit without question to Spartan direction in foreign policy, and in this respect their position resembled that of the allies of Sparta outside Lakonia and Messenia before the formation of the Peloponnesian League. Indeed, I would argue that it was Sparta’s experience in dealing with its Perioikoi which provided the model for the Peloponnesian League. Unlike the League members, however, the Perioikoi never won and may never have sought the right of collective veto of a Spartan decision provided by a majority vote of the League Congress. The King’s Peace of 386, which guaranteed ‘autonomy’ to every separate Greek city, was only once interpreted to support Perioikic independence from Sparta. And the ‘haughty roughness’ (*Grote*) dealt out by the Spartans to their foreign allies may have been felt the more strongly by the Perioikoi.

Thus in order to explain their subjection we need not believe (*pace* Parke 1931; Bockisch 1965, 131–7) that the twenty harmosts mentioned in an ancient commentary on Pindar were imposed on the Perioikoi (the harmosts at Kythera and perhaps Thyrea and Aulon were exceptions due to strategic exigencies) nor that the Ephors, as Isokrates (12.181) claimed, could have any Perioikos put to death without trial. We do not, however, know when the military burden was first imposed nor when Perioikoi first fought with Spartans against an external enemy. The suggestion that the *gymnetes* of Tyrtaios (fr. 11.35; cf. *P. Oxy.* 3316) were Perioikoi is unconvincing. But the bronze figurines and grave stelai depicting hoplites found in Perioikic territory (below) suggest a *terminus ante quern* of c.525. Our earliest literary evidence concerns the campaigns of 480–479, but by 418, and probably by 425, Perioikoi were brigaded individually with Spartiates in the hoplite phalanx ([Chapter 12](#)).

The Perioikoi in question will have been drawn from the ranks of the wealthy, who, as elsewhere in Greece, will have included but not been coextensive with the ‘true gentlemen’ (presumably aristocrats) who volunteered for hoplite service in 380 (*Xen. Hell.* 5.3.9; cf. *Plut. Kleom.* 11 for this stratum). Again like other Greeks, these rich

Perioikoi will have derived their surplus from the exploitation of chattel slaves (not Helots: see below). We have unfortunately no positive ancient evidence that they did so, but there are four pieces of evidence which strongly suggest this.

First, a fifth-century inscription cut into the living rock of Mount Koumaro (ancient Larysion) at Gytheion (*IG* V.1.1155) forbids anyone, whether free or slave (*doulos*), to quarry stone. Second, five manumission stelai of the late fifth and early fourth centuries from the sanctuary of Poseidon at Tainaron (*IG* V.1.1228–32), which dedicate the freed persons to the god, must be attributed to Perioikoi. It is true that the transactions are dated by the eponymous Ephor at Sparta and that Helots used Tainaron as an asylum, but from all we know it was the Spartan state alone, and not individual Spartiates, that could manumit Helots. Third, a famous anecdote concerning Agesilaos (*Plut. Ages.* 26.5 etc.) implies that in the early fourth century there were no craftsmen among the Perioikic hoplites; they must therefore have been farmers but freed by slaves from the necessity to labour constantly with their own hands. Finally, in c.240 a raid by the Aitolian League on Lakonia allegedly netted no fewer than 50,000 slaves (*Plut. Kleom.* 18.3). The raid was directed at least in part against the Perioikoi (*Polyb.* 4.34.9), so if the figure is to be trusted it seems necessary to postulate that some at least of the captives were slaves of the Perioikoi rather than Helots.

A second related function of the Perioikoi, but antedating the seventh century, was to serve as a kind of territorial reserve against the Helots. The general lack of military co-operation between the Perioikoi and the Helots against the Spartans may or may not betoken different ethnic affiliations, but it is true that only once before the liberation of Messenia did Perioikic towns join a Helot revolt (in c.464) and that in this instance both were Messenian. The majority, however, was in Lakonia, where they served to separate the Helots from the Arkadians and Argives in the north and to keep an eye on the lower Eurotas valley from their less favoured situations in Vardhounia and the Tainaron and Malea peninsulas. Forts at Kosmas and Trinasos prevented the Helots from communicating with the outside world respectively across Parnon and by sea. Similarly in Messenia the fort at Vasiliko divided the Messenians from the south-west Arkadians, and Aulon blocked the way to Triphylia and Elis. All this may become clearer after the review below of Perioikic towns archaeologically attested by c.500.

The third main function of the Perioikoi was broadly economic. There is no good reason to believe that they actually paid tribute to Sparta: the 'royal tribute' mentioned in the *Alkibiades* (1.123A) is a mystery, and the comparable reports in Strabo (8.5.4, C365) and

Hesychius (s.v. *kalame*) are inconclusive. They may, however, have been required or encouraged to make monetary or other contributions on an individual and *ad hoc* basis. However this may be, it is quite certain that the chief rock, mineral and marine resources of Lakonia and Messenia lay in Perioikic territory, that imports to Sparta and other commercial relations with the outside world had to pass through Perioikic hands, and that Perioikoi played a major role in Lakonian craftsmanship.

Most of the marble used for the sculpture now in the Sparta Museum was won from Spartiate land on the eastern slopes of Taygetos in a quarry difficult of access between Anavryti and Mistra. But Lakonia was not distinguished at any period for its buildings or sculpture of marble. Subsidiary marble quarries are known at Vresthena in northern Lakonia, Chrysapha in the west Parion foreland and Goranoi in west Vardhounia. In its uppermost course the marble from Dholiana just north of the Spartan frontier resembles Pentelic, but in Lakonia it seems only to have been used at Tyros in the east Parion foreland. Transport was presumably too expensive for it to be used at Sparta. In fact the stone most widely used for buildings in Lakonia and Messenia was local limestone of varying quality. The chief sources for other than local use seem to have been the quarries in north-west Mani at ancient Thalamai, Leuktra and Kardamyle. Finally, poros, which was used for monumental carving in Sparta, occurs in the plain of Molaoi.

Iron ores are widely distributed throughout Lakonia. Apart from the important deposits at Neapolis ([Chapter 7](#)), we might cite those at Kollinai in the Skiritis and Porto Kayio (ancient Psamathous) in south Mani. The quantity of small, mould-made lead figurines dedicated at Spartan sanctuaries in Lakonia (over 100,000 at Orthia alone) and exported, probably by Spartan pilgrims for the most part, to sanctuaries elsewhere in Lakonia (Anthochorion, Analipsis, Tyros) and the Peloponnese suggests an extensive local supply of the ore; there were certainly ancient workings in the Kardamyli district. Finally, O. Davies in 1935 made a tantalizing reference to the known location of copper ore at Alagonia, at the western end of the Langadha pass over Taygetos; but the localities in question have been shown to contain 'very small, low-grade sulfide deposits with little or no copper mineralization' (*MME* 232).

Lakonia, then, was remarkably self-sufficient in useful rocks and minerals as well as agricultural potential, and overseas trade in essentials was relatively unimportant. From one standpoint this was fortunate. For although the borders of Lakonia and Messenia are washed on three sides by the Mediterranean, communications inland are generally poor (below), and the number of harbours offering both

protection from winds and heavy seas and a holding anchorage is small compared to the extent of coastal frontage. The only harbours of any practical significance on the long eastern coastline of Lakonia were, north to south, Astros (ancient Thyrea), Tyros, Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai), Kyparissi (ancient Kyphanta), and Palaia Monemvasia (ancient Epidaurus Limera). On the Lakonian Gulf Gytheion was the chief port of Sparta; the next best anchorages were Neapolis (ancient Boiai) and Skoutari Bay (ancient Asine). In the Messenian Gulf Kardamyle served as Sparta's port after Gytheion had become independent in the second century; Kalamata (ancient Pharai) did not become important until the modern breakwater was built. On the west coast of Messenia the best natural harbour was of course Navarino Bay (ancient Pylos), but the Spartans made little or no effort to develop its strategic or commercial potential.

However, despite this dearth of good harbours, there were still of course Perioikoi who engaged in fishing and trade. The economic significance of fishing in the Mediterranean world generally is often grossly inflated (cf. Braudel 1972, 140, 145); and we should regard it as of secondary importance even for most coastal settlements. There is, however, one marine resource, the murex mollusc (trunculus or brandaris), which merits special mention. As Edward Gibbon remarked, 'by the discovery of cochineal, etc. we far surpass the colours of antiquity.' But of the latter 'royal purple', obtained by processing the milky secretions of the murex, exercises a certain fascination (Reinhold 1970). Its production in antiquity was primarily associated with the Phoenicians of Tyre, but among the Greeks the Lakonians and Tarentines were leading producers. Murex shells have been excavated in prehistoric contexts at Kastri on Kythera and Ay. Stephanos, and the waters off Kythera and Gytheion are still major sources of the mollusc. I suspect, however, that it was the Phoenicians calling at Kythera in the eighth century or earlier who firmly established the production of the dye, which in historical times was used to colour the *phoinikis* or short cloak worn by all members of the Spartan hoplite army (Cartledge 1977, 15 and n. 38).

The problem of Perioikic trade and traders is more complex. As already remarked, overseas trade will have been relatively restricted. Apart from the copper and tin needed for bronze artefacts, it will have been concerned mainly with the import and export of fine ceramic tableware or bronzes for display or votive dedication. This trade will undoubtedly have been in Perioikic hands to some extent, but, when it more or less disappeared in the course of the fifth century, we should not imagine that this precipitated an economic crisis in the Perioikic communities, of which Gytheion was the most important in this regard. For even if Gytheion had acted as a sort of 'port of trade'

linking the closed and archaic Spartan system with the more open and developed economic systems of the Greek world, most Perioikic communities were no doubt dominated by the same land-oriented values as the Spartans themselves. A possible index of this is the fact that, although Perioikoi were presumably not forbidden to handle coined money, pre-Hellenistic coins have been found on only two Perioikic sites (Prasiai and Kythera). On the other hand, trade within Lakonia between Spartans and Perioikoi was crucial, not merely for the procurement of chariots for horseracing but for the very maintenance of the military machine. This leads us naturally, and finally, to consider the role of Perioikoi in Lakonian craftsmanship.

I have been careful hitherto to speak of 'Lakonian' art and artefacts. That label must now be unpacked, and the discussion placed within the modern debate over the status of craftsmen and craftsmanship in ancient Greek societies generally. This debate is focused on two main problems: how typical of Greek sentiment as a whole was the hostile attitude towards 'banausic' (manual) enterprise manifested by intellectuals and aristocrats like Sophokles, Xenophon and Plato? Second, if their attitude was typical, was it long or recently established? Briefly, my own view is that the attitude was largely confined to the propertied classes, whose members did not have to work for their living, and that it only took on its acrimonious overtones with the rise of democracy (cf. R. Schlaifer in Finley 1968b, 99ff.). Sparta, thanks to the exploitation of the Helots, was somewhat peculiar, though not unique, in its official hostility to manual craftsmen (Hdt. 2.167.2; Plut. Ages. 26.5). However, as we saw in [Chapter 9](#), neither the belief of the 'Spartan mirage' in archetypal Spartan austerity nor its modern substitute, the belief that Lakonian art suddenly 'died' around 550, is consistent with the facts. In the same way the problem of craftsmanship in Lakonian society must clearly be reappraised.

According to the conventional wisdom, perhaps most pithily expressed by Cook (1962), craft production at Sparta and *a fortiori* in the rest of Lakonia was from a very early period exclusively in the hands of the Perioikoi. I have already tried to show elsewhere that the picture is more complex (Cartledge 1976b); space forbids much more than a summary of those arguments here. In the first place, Pausanias expressly distinguishes two Lakonian craftsmen of the sixth century as Spartan citizens. Unreliable evidence, no doubt, but I wonder if they, like the 'local' man Gitiadas, would have secured such firm remembrance had they been Perioikoi. Second, there are two scraps of epigraphical evidence possibly tending to the same conclusion. One of the masons working at Amyklai under Bathykleas at the end of the sixth century had the extraordinary – indeed, so far unique – name

Technarchos (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 32), whose suffix is more usually associated with aristocrats. In the first quarter of the fifth century a sculptor called Kyranaios executed an expensive and perhaps royal commission at the Hyperteleton sanctuary (Jeffery 1961, 201, no. 43). If he was a Lakonian, as the script of the inscription may suggest, his name recalls those like Athenaios ([Chapter 11](#)) and Chalkideus ([Chapter 12](#)) and seems more appropriate for a citizen than a Perioikos.

The evidence cited so far hardly constitutes proof that Spartan citizens had once practised a manual craft. Inferences from archaeological evidence, however, are more compelling. To begin with, the dogma that only Perioikoi were responsible for Lakonian art founders on the rock of the continuity of Lakonian art from the tenth century. Spartan citizenship may not have been precisely defined before the eighth century (the Partheniai episode), but it is hard to believe both that none of the craftsmen working in Sparta before the seventh century was a descendant of the Dorians who had settled Sparta in the tenth and that all craftsmen working in Sparta in the eighth century were automatically excluded from the citizen body. At any rate, we know that cooks, like heralds and flautists, enjoyed hereditary citizen rights in the fifth century (Hdt. 6.60).

We need not, however, rely on speculation alone. A burial-group has been excavated in what was the village of Mesoia at Sparta, comprising four cistgraves marked by a terracotta relief amphora of c.600 and covered by an earthen tumulus (Christou 1964). This group has already been cited for the bones of horses and wild boar found in the earth. We can now add that nearby were discovered the remains of a house-wall and – the point of the story – a potter's kiln. The location of the graves, the elaborate nature of the funeral rites, possible ancestor-worship, the hunting-scene depicted on the amphora – these can only mean that the occupants of the graves were of citizen status. Thus, as far as Spartan citizens' involvement in craft-production is concerned, the proper question to ask is the one to which I sketched an answer at the end of [Chapter 9](#).

I do not, however, wish to deny that Perioikoi, at least from the seventh century, played the major role therein. Far and away the most important function they will have performed in this connection was the manufacture and repair of armour and weapons. Copper and tin for the bronze protective armour had to be imported, but iron for swords and spearheads was available locally. Metalworking in Lakonia, however, remained backward down to the eighth century ([Chapter 7](#)), although it is illegitimate to infer from the story of the Spartiate Lichas marvelling at a Tegean blacksmith (Hdt. 1.67) that forges were unknown in Lakonia as late as c.550. Armour and

weapons, I assume, were manufactured in Sparta itself as well as the Perioikic centres where iron slag has been found (below). But a problem arises over the mechanism whereby a Spartan hoplite acquired his equipment.

Most scholars have assumed that he did so by direct individual purchase in the same way as hoplites in other states – and indeed Perioikic hoplites. It seems to me, however, more likely that the Spartan state made itself somehow responsible for supplying citizens – as from 424 it certainly supplied Helots and Neodamodeis ([Chapter 12](#)) – with their arms and armour. For then the qualification for hoplite service for a Spartiate would have been on a par with that for membership of the citizen body, namely election to a common mess and the ability to contribute to his mess the minimum fixed quantities of produce and money discussed earlier in this chapter.

III

I shall conclude my study of Archaic Lakonia and Messenia by passing in review the Perioikic sites identifiable archaeologically by 500. There were many more sites than the thirty or so for which we have archaeological evidence, but precisely how many is unclear. Herodotus (7.234.2) says vaguely that there were many, Strabo that in his day (the turn of our era) there were about thirty *polichnai* apart from Sparta itself. But Strabo was referring only to Lakonia. In ‘ancient times’, when Sparta had also controlled Messenia, there were reportedly around 100 Perioikic communities. This report goes back at least to Androtion (324F49) in the fourth century, but the eighty or so known by name, mostly contained in the lexicon of Stephanos, represent a more likely number.

The vast majority of these were in Lakonia. Their small size as a rule was a natural consequence of the restricted quantity and quality of the arable land left to them after the Spartans had taken the most fertile for themselves. Indeed, it was no doubt precisely because their land was less desirable that the Perioikoi had not been transformed into Helots – a line of argument which would, incidentally, rule out the suggestion of Hampl (1937, 35f.) that Perioikoi too had Helots. Sparta did not actively encourage, and may have generally discouraged, combinations between the Perioikic communities; it is noticeable that independence in the second century was swiftly followed by some form of confederation. But no attempt was made to disband the ‘synoecism’ of Boiai ([Chapter 9](#)) or the ‘Tripolis’ in northern Lakonia to which Pellana belonged (Polyb. 4.81.7; Livy 35.27.9).

Where possible, in my survey I shall follow the lines of the ancient routes ([Figure 17](#)). For although Lakonia was notoriously hard to

penetrate from outside (Eur. fr. 1083; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.24; Anth. *Pal.* 7.723.1), it was of paramount strategic and economic importance to the Spartans to be able to communicate both within Lakonia and with Messenia. The importance can be gauged from the fact that it was the responsibility of the kings, presumably *qua* generals, to 'give judgment in all matters concerning public highways' (Hdt. 6.57.4). These highways, however, were probably the handful of arterial routes suitable for the transport of Helot produce or military supplies by wooden cart or waggon (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.22). Theophrastos (*Hist. Plant.* 3.16.3) mentions a type of oak used for carts in Lakonia. The remainder perhaps approximated more nearly to the Greek norm, being hardly more than footpaths or bridlepaths, many barely suitable even for pack-animals.




Figure 17 Routes in Lakonia and Messenia

The most convenient route linking Sparta with central Peloponnese followed the Eurotas furrow northwestwards as far as the small plain at the foot of Mount Chelmos, the site of ancient Belmina, where it split and continued either to the plain of Asea or to the Megalopolis basin. *En route* it took in the unidentifiable Charakoma and Perioikic Pellana (Paus. 3.21.3). The latter lay at Kalyvia Georgitsi about twenty-seven kilometres by road from Sparta. The settlement was probably centred on the hill of Palaiokastros, where the walling of a small ruined mediaeval fort may incorporate earlier Greek work and

black-painted sherds have been found on the surface. Trial excavations yielded a small black-painted oinochoe and an iron spearhead. The site is favourable, lying in a fertile plain and fed by a nearby perennial spring. Pellana's claim to be the birthplace of the Dioskouroi was challenged by little Pephnos in north-west Mani, but Alkman (fr. 23) sensibly sought a compromise, no doubt chiefly to conciliate the strategically vital Pellana when Sparta was turning its aggressive attentions to Arkadia.

Belmina was also strategically crucial. Mount Chelmos overlooks the whole upper Eurotas valley. On its summit are preserved the extensive remains of fortification walls some of which go back to the third-century or earlier 'Athenaion' (Polyb. 2.46.5; Plut. *Kleom.* 4.1). Remains of house-walls associated with Classical black-painted pottery were found a short way south, and from the village of Petrina about four kilometres north-west comes a limestone relief of 500–475 depicting a naked youth with a snake rearing up before him. This must belong to the series of such funerary reliefs made in Lakonia in the last six centuries BC and found all over the region.

To reach Tegea, a route *via* the old Khan of Krevata and bypassing Sellasia was followed through the Kleissoura pass and the bed of the Sarandapotamos. Perioikic Sellasia, which lay on the border of the territory held directly by Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.13, 19), was situated most probably on the hill of Palaioioulas, some twelve kilometres north of Sparta and close to the west bank of the Kelephina (ancient Oinous). Excavation has revealed a rubble circuit-wall and sherds from the fifth to second centuries. A stone relief of the sixth century, dedicated by a Pleistiadas to the Tyndaridai (Jeffery 1961, 200, no. 24), was found in modern Sellasia further west.

At the old Khan of Krevata the route joins up with those leading to the villages of north Parnon and the Thyreatis; Chateaubriand in 1806 bitterly noted that they were among the roughest and wildest in Greece. Since drinking water is not available in the Kleissoura, the muletrack *via* Arachova (ancient Karyai) was sometimes preferred for journeying to Tegea. Ancient Karyai lay on the border of Lakedaimon (Thuc. 5.55.3), but has not been certainly located. K. Rhomaïos, a native of the area, initially placed it at Analipsis, the hill about four kilometres west of Vourvoura close to the junction of the routes from Sparta to Tegea and the Thyreatis. Later, he preferred to identify Analipsis with Iasos or Iasaia (Paus. 7.13.7; 8.27.3). The hill was the site of an extensive Classical and Hellenistic settlement, encircled by a wall of polygonal style. Earlier occupation is attested by Geometric pottery ([Chapter 8](#)) and a few Archaic finds, including terracotta figurines and small lead wreaths. In the Sarandapotamos river west of Vourvoura a tiny bronze 'bucket' was fished up at the end of the

nineteenth century, inscribed 'Alphios' in lettering of c.500 (cf. [Chapter 1](#)).

The pass over Parnon to the Thyreatis continues northeast from Karyai to Ay. Petros. Just before the crest of the ridge forming the watershed of water flowing to the bay of Astros, Tegea and Sparta are three heaps of stones, each about five metres in diameter, the whole forming a triangle. Their identification with the Hermai (Paus. 2. 38.7) is not proved, but there was an Archaic sanctuary here. Rhomaïos excavated a schist slab bearing a sixth-century inscription, a small fragment of an Archaic terracotta gorgoneion, a broken spherical aryballos and some scraps of roof-tiles and black-painted pottery.

From Ay. Petros (the site of a well-preserved fourth-century kiln) the route leads to Xirokambi, Helleniko (ancient Eua), Meligou (? ancient Anthana) and Astros (near ancient Thyrea). The sixth-century finds from Meligou and Astros have already been cited ([Chapter 9](#)). A secondary route leads from Helleniko *via* a monastery of St Luke to the foot of Mount Zavitsa, the northern boundary of the Thyreatis. An inscription of c.500 from Mount Zavitsa (*SEG* XIII.266) marked an Argive cenotaph commemorating an otherwise unrecorded battle with the Spartans, perhaps to be connected with the Sepeia campaign. Communications within the Thyreatis are difficult by land, so most traffic will have been by sea. Ancient Tyros well illustrates the point: it lies between Astros, whose natural lines of communication are to the north, and Leonidhion (ancient Prasiai), whose links are southwards; and the routes across Parnon from the Eurotas valley lead to Astros and Leonidhion.

On the principal pass across Parnon, from Chrysapha or Geraki (ancient Geronthrai) to Leonidhion, lies modern Kosmas, which is possibly to be identified with ancient Glympeis or Glyppia. Bronze figurines have been found sporadically here, the most notable being a resplendent hoplite dedicated to Apollo Maleatas by one Charillos c.525 (Jeffery 1961, 200, no.37). A considerable scatter of black-painted sherds on the hill Proph. Elias prompted an excavation, which revealed the existence of a Classical fort stocked with iron spearheads and arrowheads, small knives and pointed bronze objects (apparently missiles).

The only other Perioikic site on the east coast of Lakonia known to have been inhabited by 500 is Epidauros Limera ([Chapter 9](#)), whose epithet is probably a tribute to its harbour. The town could be reached from Sparta by skirting Parnon *via* Chrysapha, Goritsa, Geraki and Apidia (?ancient Palaia); ancient wheel-ruts have been detected between Goritsa and Geraki. Chrysapha lies twenty kilometres south-east of Sparta and has been doubtfully identified with ancient

Therapne ([Appendix 2](#)). About three kilometres south of the village is a hill which is the reported provenance of a fine hero-relief of 550–530 (now in the Pergamon Museum, Berlin). One of the two dead portrayed holds a pomegranate in her hand, as does one of the two diminutive worshippers; the other worshipper bears a cock. The hill itself is scattered with iron slag and a good deal of Classical pottery, and I would therefore adjudge the site to have been Perioikic.

Geraki has yielded several of the series of hero-reliefs, including what seems to be the earliest of all. Yet more important, however, are the fragments of two Archaic korai, the only such figures known from Lakonia (Ridgway 1977, 90, 114), and an inscription of c.500 concerning Apelon, the Doric form of Apollo (Le Roy 1974, 220–2). Also worth mentioning are three lists of names of the same date, one certainly a victor-list (*SEG* XVII.189), the others possibly so (Jeffery 1961, 201, nos 45–6). One of the names recorded is Tebukios, which has been interpreted as an epichoric form of Homeric Teukros. A tomb near Gouves not far away has produced aryballoi described as ‘orientalizing’ and so possibly Archaic; the settlement to which the tomb belonged probably lay on the Geronthrai-Palaia route. About sixteen kilometres east-north-east of Geraki across Parnon lay ancient Marios. Near the ancient akropolis there are fine springs, and a small bronze horse and another list of names of c.500 were discovered close by. On the akropolis itself some of the roughly squared walling may go back to the first half of the fifth century.

The ‘Hyakinthian Way’ (Athen. 4.173F) between Sparta and Amyklai, along which the common messes lay, ran on a short distance to Vapheio. A little south of here the road bifurcated, the left fork continuing along the Eurotas to Mount Lykovouni, crossing the river by ruined Vasilio-Perama and thence following the left bank to what is now the Helos plain. Below Vrondama the ancient route can be followed in sections for almost the whole way between Grammousa and Tsasi. About 200 m. west of Tsasi a hill is sprinkled with sherds, including perhaps some Archaic.

Near Tsasi there is a second fork in the road, one branch going eastwards to ancient Helos (general region of Vezani), the other continuing south to Gytheion and skirting the Helos plain. From Vezani the road continued through the pass of Mount Kourkoula to Molaoi and thence either to Epidauros Limera or *via* Plytra (ancient Asopos) to Neapolis (ancient Boiai).

In the hills surrounding the Molaoi plain, midway between the plain and Monemvasia, lies the village of Angelona. A short distance east of here an Archaic and Classical heroon was excavated, which yielded for example miniature votive kantharoi, a few terracotta figurines and two loomweights. The surface finds were even more impressive, in

particular a bronze snake and the base of a marble statue, both late Archaic. The heroon perhaps belonged to the territory of Epidauros Limera.

Not far north-east of Asopos lay the Hyperteleaton, which may once have been attached to Perioikic Leuke or Leukai (Polyb. 4.36.5; 5.19.8; Livy 35.27.3). Numerous inscriptions have been found here, mainly Hellenistic and Roman in date, although some bronze vessels and a stone lustral basin were inscribed before 500 (*SEG* XI.908). The most interesting Archaic finds, however, are the temple itself, a long narrow structure; and a bronze figurine of an oldish man carrying a hydria, whom one is tempted to identify as the owner of a hydria workshop (but see Rolley 1977, 130 and fig. 7).

In the small plain on the coast south of Plytra lies Daimonia (ancient Kotyrta), where a rare black-figure sherd has turned up. In the Vatika plain behind Neapolis a fragmentary Archaic kylix has been reported from Ay. Georgios. Perioikic Boiai will presumably always have been in fairly close contact with Kythera. Iron slag from Vithoulas not far from the northern harbour of Ay. Pelayia corresponds to the slag from Neapolis. The sixth-century finds from Kythera town and a coin-hoard (buried c.525–500) have already been mentioned. Worth adding here is a black-painted mug of c.500 from Gonies inscribed ‘hemikotylion’ (IG V.1.945).

The direct route from Sparta to Gytheion has been outlined above. An alternative route skirted Taygetos *via* Bryseiai (not precisely located: see [Appendix 2](#)), the Eleusinion at Kalyvia tis Sochas and Xirokambi. The settlement at Anthochorion ([Chapter 7](#)) lay about two kilometres southeast of Xirokambi. Archaic finds included lead figurines, suggesting the existence of a sanctuary.

Thirty stades before Gytheion, according to Pausanias (3.21.5), to the right of the road lay Aigiai. This has been plausibly located at Palaiochora, where farmers have unearthed Archaic terracottas and bronzes, the latter including a figurine of Zeus (?) and a bowl dedicated apparently to Athena. At Gytheion itself, however, sixth-century archaeological evidence is rather slight: a bronze figurine of Hermes, an engraved gem (perhaps made on Euboea), and two inscriptions in the living rock (one already cited, the other a dedication to Zeus Kappotas). The floruit of the town seems not yet to have arrived.

The obvious route from Gytheion into the Tainaron peninsula, perhaps taken already by Teleklos ([Chapter 8](#)), followed the modern road to Areopolis *via* the Karyoupolis divide. Along this lay ancient Las (modern Chosiario), whose sixth-century products include a pyramidal stone ‘herm’ of a ram-headed deity, probably Apollo Karneios, and a fragmentary hero-relief. At Dichova near Kamares on

the west coast of the Lakonian Gulf between Ageranos (probably ancient Arainos) and Skoutari (ancient Asine) disiecta membra of an Archaic temple to Aphrodite have come to light.

Communications in south Mani were perhaps always desultory. Between Oitylon (ancient Oitylos) and Mezapos (ancient Messe?) a sixth-century marble hero-relief (now in the Sparta Museum) was built into a mediaeval church at Charouda. It depicts a nude male figure with his hoplite equipment on the ground before him. Another Perioikic hoplite, then, but hardly from barren Charouda and so perhaps from Messe. South of Messe at ancient Hippola, occupied certainly by the seventh century ([Chapter 8](#)), there has been found Lakonian black-figure pottery of the sixth.

From Oitylon an ancient road may have run along the coast to Kalamata (ancient Pharai). Wheel-tracks, but of uncertain date, have been noted between Koutiphari (ancient Thalamai) and Platsa; near Levтро (ancient Leuktra); and north of Kardamyli (ancient Kardamyle). The main attractions of Thalamai's site were two natural springs. Sixth-century finds include a Doric capital in the local limestone and the elaborate handle of a bronze hydria, but for the historian the main significance lies in the oracular shrine of Ino-Pasiphae, in which the Spartans took a direct, political interest (Oliva 1971, 131 n. 1). The cult is attested for the fifth century (*IG* V.1.1316), but it is not known when or why the Spartan involvement began. A fourth-century dedication by a member of the Spartan Gerousia (*IG* V.1.1317) presumably gives a *terminus ante quern*.

Kardamyle was blessed with a defensible akropolis as well as the harbour, limestone and lead-deposits already mentioned. Sixth-century objects from here include a Doric capital and a bronze figurine of a bull. Another such figurine has been found in Kalamata, as well as a sherd from a black-figure krater. In the valley of the Nedon close by several names of uncertain significance were incised c.500 on a smoothed surface of rock (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 5).

From Kalamata main routes radiated north along the eastern side of the Pamisos valley *via* Hellenika (ancient Thouria) and Ay. Floros to the Leondari pass into Arkadia; north-west to Ithome and the Stenyklaros plain; and west to Pylos *via* Akovitika, Nichoria and Chandrinou.

At Ay. Floros was built the temple of the river-god Pamisos. (Compare perhaps the bucket inscribed 'Alphios' and Kleomenes' sacrifice to the god of the Erasinios.) This has yielded the earliest known Messenian inscription, a dedication of c.550 (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 1). Akovitika on the east bank of the Pamisos was of great prehistoric significance ([Chapter 4](#)). In historical times it was the site of a sanctuary of Pohoidan (Poseidon), the identification being

guaranteed by dedications inscribed on sixth-century and later pottery. It was presumably here that the Pohoidaia festival managed by Thouria was held. Of the other sixth-century dedications particularly noteworthy are the bronze figurines apparently made by a school of local craftsmen (Leon 1968).

The latter may also have been responsible for the bronze figurine of Hermes dedicated to Zeus at Ithome c.525 (Athens, N.M.7539: Lamb 1926, 138, no. 9; I cannot accept Miss Lamb's attribution to an Arkadian workshop). This figurine is perhaps the sole material evidence that the cult of Zeus Ithomatas was maintained between the late eighth century (attested by an ithyphallic terracotta) and the mid-fifth, and one wonders whether a Helot would have been able to afford so costly a dedication.

Nichoria (?ancient Aipeia) is exceptionally well situated for both agricultural and strategic purposes, but was apparently abandoned c.750, perhaps following the intervention of Teleklos (Coldstream 1977, 164). Chandrinou, however, has produced an Archaic bronze figurine of a horseman (now in the National Museum, Athens).

To the south of Nichoria ran the route to Koroni (ancient Asine) bypassing the sanctuary of Apollo Korynthos, which may have been attached to the predecessor of ancient Kolonides (founded in the 360s). This Apollo received a sixth-century bronze figurine of a hoplite second in quality only to the one dedicated to the Apollo of Kosmas. An inscribed spear-butt of the early fifth century maintains the martial flavour. A PC sherd is reported from Koroni, but there is nothing from the sixth century, although the harbour may already have been used by the Spartans before 500 (cf. Hdt. 8.73.3). North of Nichoria ran another route to the Stenyklaros plain.

From Chandrinou a route led south-westwards to ancient Mothone, where late Archaic pottery has been found in cist-graves. A road presumably linked Mothone to Pylos, whence a coastal route led *via* Kyparissia (ancient Kyparissia) to Aulon ([Chapter 13](#)). An Archaic head has been found at Kyparissia, and on the offshore island of Prote graffiti begin in the sixth century (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 2). Most of these are concerned with sailing ventures, but ironically it was the arrival of an Athenian fleet in 425 which put the area on the map and gave it a significance most unwelcome to the landlubbing Spartans.

Notes on further reading

Helots

Most of the ancient sources and a representative selection of the more influential modern views are brought together in Toynbee 1969, 195–203, and Oliva 1971, 38–48. For the use of Helots in war, not directly

attested before 494, see Welwei 1974, 108–74, which also touches on many other aspects of their status.

The groups of dependent labourers classified as ‘between free men and slaves’ are discussed in Lotze 1959 (26–47 on the Helots), Finley 1964, and Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, ch. 4. For chattel slavery, with which Helotage is to be compared and contrasted, see the studies reprinted in Finley 1968b, and Finley 1976 (a succinct summary of its essential character). The quantity of excellent work on chattel slavery in the Old South is prodigious: see the bibliography in Weinstein and Gatell 1973, 411–39. Degler 1970, a comparative survey of slavery in Brazil and the southern States in the nineteenth century, is full of suggestive analogies and contrasts to the ancient experience on such matters as reproduction, family-life, religion and revolts.

For work on Spartan land-tenure see Oliva 1971, 32–8, 48–54; his discussion of the ancient evidence is less satisfactory. Lotze 1971 tries to determine (1) the boundaries of the land held directly by Spartan citizens and the Spartan state; (2) the number of *kleroi* or at least citizens; (3) the quantities of produce handed over by Helots; and (4) the proportion of Spartiates to Helots. He rightly stresses that the literary evidence is reliable, if at all, only for Agis and Kleomenes, but, like Roebuck 1945 (on Messenia, mainly after the liberation), he makes insufficient allowance for our ignorance of crucial quantitative data; and, like Jardé (below), he is not aware of the altered geomorphology of modern Lakonia and Messenia.

On cereal-growing in ancient Greece generally see Jardé 1925; but his attempt (109–15) to calculate the size of yields in Lakonia and Messenia fails to distinguish between Spartiate and Perioikic land. The view that there was a marked shift from pasturage to cereal-growing in the eighth century has been most persuasively advanced by Snodgrass (1977, 12–15). The instruments and techniques involved are discussed in Moritz 1958 and by W. Schiering in Richter 1968, 147–58.

On olive-cultivation in modern Greece see *ESAG* no. 316; also Richter 1968, 137–40 for ancient Greece, and White 1970, 225ff. for ancient Italy.

For early Greek hunting in general see Buchholz 1973. The ‘Lakonian’ hound in literature is considered in Hull 1964, 31–4; in visual art by Freyer-Schauenburg (1970).

Perioikoi

Useful summary accounts of their origins, status and functions may be found in Toynbee 1969, 204–12, and Oliva 1971, 55–62. Gschnitzer 1958, 66ff., 188, is a useful collection of the ancient evidence, but his interpretation suffers from the thesis, adopted from Hampl 1937, that

the Spartans were an aristocratic group, the Perioikoi the Dorian commons. The fullest periegesis of the individual towns is Niese 1906; see also Bölte 1929, 1303–21.

The military functions of the Perioikoi will be looked at more fully in [Part II](#). For their economic role see now Ridley 1974; it seems, however, he has set up an ‘Aunt Sally’ by arguing against ‘the still standard view that they were basically an industrial and commercial class’. For even if most Perioikoi were somehow engaged in agriculture, this would not exclude the existence of Perioikic mining contractors, merchants, small traders, craftsmen and so on. As for Ridley’s doubts that the Perioikoi could have so faithfully reflected Spartan values, Holladay (1977a, 123) has rightly observed that ‘subjected groups have often tended to accept and emulate the values ... of dominating groups’. I am not, however, sure I agree with Holladay that life in a Perioikic town might not have differed substantially from life at Sparta.

* Where no specific reference is given, the ancient sources cited in this chapter may be found translated in [Appendix 4](#).

III

Classical Lakonia c. 500–362 BC

The crisis of Lakonia 490–460

Herodotus is generally acknowledged, even by thoroughgoing sceptics like C. Hignett (1963), as our primary source for Xerxes' invasion of Greece. It is no less generally recognized, however, that his account of its immediate antecedents – the period from Marathon to the Isthmus Congress of 481, punctuated by the death of Darius in 486 – is wholly unsatisfactory. Herodotus assumes, perhaps rightly, that a full-scale Persian campaign of conquest in Greece was inevitable after 490, but instead of discussing in detail the attitudes and responses of the Greeks to the barbarian menace he indulges his theological and dramatic bent by casting Xerxes' expedition in the form of a tragedy with full supernatural apparatus. Part of the reason for this one-sided approach was no doubt the kind of Greek sources he had available or chose to use. The treatment of the role of Themistokles is only the most notorious product of biased reporting. However, the history of Sparta is equally personalized and distorted by being presented, fitfully, through the medium of Damaratos, one of Herodotus' most audaciously exploited *dramatis personae* (and sufficiently impressive to excite the muse of C.P. Cavafy).

Damaratos, it will be recalled, had been deposed from the kingship in c.491 at the instigation of Kleomenes, who was then – as even Herodotus conceded – pursuing a thoroughly 'panhellenic', anti-Persian foreign policy. The motive for Damaratos' opposition to Kleomenes' coercion of medizing Aigina is not specified and probably not creditable, but not even Herodotus could turn a blind eye to Damaratos' subsequent, unambiguous medism. I put it this way because Herodotus' account of Damaratos' career after his deposition is quite remarkably sympathetic. Both the alleged suicide of Kleomenes in c.491 (6.84.3) and the death in exile over twenty years later of Latychidas (6.72.1) are explained as retribution for their

engineering of the deposition of Damaratos. His self-imposed exile from Sparta soon after being dethroned is ascribed to an intolerable insult from Latychidas (6.67), and he is made to say that the insult will be the source of countless blessings or (what Herodotus clearly believed) troubles for Sparta. His flight to Persia is represented as enforced upon him because the Spartans would not permit [Figure 18](#) Classical sites in Lakonia and Messeniahis exile in Elis (6.72), although Herodotus does not say why they would not nor why Damaratos chose to go first to Elis (see below). His extremely favourable treatment at the hands of Darius is recorded without comment (6.70.2; 7.104.2), and he is then introduced at several important junctures in the narrative of Xerxes' invasion to serve as a mouthpiece for Herodotus' ideas, even when this results in the psychologically implausible situation of the unjustly exiled king lauding Sparta to the skies for embodying the rule of *nomos* (law: 7.102.2).




Figure 18 Classical sites in Lakonia and Messenia

The reason for this favourable and circumstantial account of Damaratos' medism is doubtless that Herodotus had talked to Damaratos' descendants in the Troad, where they were still ensconced in the time of Xenophon (Lewis 1977, 54 and nn. 29–30). But revealing though this is of Herodotus' historical methods it is less important in the immediate context than Damaratos' alleged role in bringing the proposed Persian invasion to the notice of the Greeks. The chapter describing the concealed message sent by Damaratos to Sparta (7.239) has in fact been suspected as an interpolation, but it

poses no more difficulties than the formally similar story of how the Milesian Histiaios, also at Susa, allegedly urged the Ionians to revolt from Persia; and it accords perfectly with the generally favourable picture of Damaratos that Herodotus is so anxious to paint. However, whether or not it was Damaratos' doing, it is not implausible that the Spartans should have been the first of the Greeks to hear of the Great King's design on their land. For as leaders of the Greeks their reaction to this intelligence would have been one of the first to be canvassed, and the Greeks, we are told (7.138.1), had ample advance warning of the invasion.

Xerxes took four years to prepare his expedition, so it was perhaps not long after 485 that the Spartans sent to Delphi, as was their wont, to ask Apollo what attitude they should adopt (7.220). The god's response, in accordance with his general line at this time, was blatantly medizing: either Sparta would lose a king in battle or the Persians would overrun Lakonia. Since Sparta had never yet lost a king in battle, the message was plainly intended to discourage resistance. It was at this awkward juncture, I believe, that the Spartans took the extraordinary – indeed, so far as we know, unique – step of holding repeated assemblies, at which the sole agenda was 'Is anyone willing to die for the fatherland?' (7.134). Herodotus does not link the news from Susa with these assemblies. He is primarily interested in the 'wrath of Talthybios', whereby two Spartan heralds paid the penalty in 430 for the Spartans' impious treatment of Darius' herald in 492; and it is somewhat incidental that the fathers of these two heralds were the men who had volunteered to die for the fatherland between 485 and 481. However, as the Spartans 'esteemed the things of heaven more highly than the things of men' (5.63.2), it is just conceivable that the volunteers, who were leading aristocrats and so not lightly dispensable, were sent as a kind of expiatory and at the same time apotropaic sacrifice to Xerxes. Alternatively, and more prosaically, they went as ambassadors in the ordinary way to discover whether Xerxes was prepared to consider a diplomatic rather than a military settlement.

When it was learned that he was not, it is to Sparta's credit that (so far as we know) no attempt was made to give earth and water. For most of the Greek states which had not been incorporated into the Persian empire by Darius were medizing, whether positively (7.138.2) or negatively (by remaining neutral: 8.73.3); and there must have been more than a few Spartans who believed that the Athenians should suffer for a war they had provoked without consulting the Spartans (8.142.2). As it was, Sparta was unanimously adopted as leader of the loyalist Greeks who met at the Isthmus of Corinth in autumn 481 to form what is usually known today (from Hdt. 7.205.3)

as the 'Hellenic League', to distinguish it from the pre-existing Peloponnesian League and the subsequent Delian League. Herodotus, however, is typically unhelpful in dealing with the organization of the loyalist alliance. He speaks generally of mutual pledges, but mentions only two specific decisions, those to suspend internal disputes and to send ambassadors to persuade the Argives, Gelon of Syracuse and the Cretans to join the alliance (7.145). The remaining details have to be inferred from Herodotus' narrative.

The Hellenic League was an offensive and defensive alliance with one state, Sparta, recognized as the overall leader. If we can believe Herodotus, Sparta had been regarded as 'leader of the Greeks' since the middle of the previous century (1.69.2; 141.4; 152.3; 5.49.2); but for the period 481–479 he simply assumes Sparta's position (cf. Thuc. 1.18.2), and allows it to emerge indirectly. Thus the claims of Argos and Athens to joint, and of Gelon to sole, command are all rejected out of hand by Sparta and the other allies, if indeed they were seriously (or actually) put forward; and Spartans hold the supreme command of either the naval or the land forces and once (Latychidas briefly in spring 479) of both at the same time. On the other hand, although the decisions eventually taken by Spartan commanders are regarded as final and binding on the other Greek states in the alliance, Herodotus makes it abundantly clear that the Spartans were by no means always responsible for initiating strategy and tactics. Indeed, on the central issue of which Greek state deserved the most credit for preserving Greek independence, Herodotus silently rejects the claim of Sparta. The fairness of this judgment may be assessed from the following account, which will concentrate on the main engagements and in particular on the way in which Sparta's conduct of the war was conditioned by its position in Lakonia and the Peloponnese.

Herodotus does not comment on the choice of the Isthmus of Corinth as the general headquarters of the loyalists, but it presumably recommended itself in the first instance for its geographical centrality. From here the first allied force of some 10,000 hoplites was sent out by sea to the Pass of Tempe separating Thessaly from Macedonia, in order to secure the militarily exposed and politically divided Thessalians for the loyalist cause (7.173). It returned a few days later, mission unaccomplished, to be replaced by the first serious attempt at resisting the Persians in a joint land-sea operation. It is not, however, entirely clear that Herodotus fully appreciated the Persian strategy of keeping the fleet and land-army in close communication with each other (7.49, 236.2; 8.60a) or the necessity for the Greeks to counter this strategy by adopting it themselves (8.15.2). He may therefore have misunderstood the objective of the defence of the Thermopylai pass from Thessaly into Phokis undertaken in conjunction with the

fleet stationed off northern Euboia. But even if he did not, his account is full of other puzzles, which have only been exacerbated by the relatively recent discovery at Troizen of the possibly forged 'Themistokles Decree' (Fornara 1977, no. 55).

First, there is the question of numbers. Those on the Persian side (7.60, 89, 184–6) are of course hugely exaggerated (Cawkwell 1968); faced with Herodotus' 1,700,000 land troops, one is tempted to remind him of his own scathing comment that 'neither the Ionians nor any of the other Greeks know how to count' (2.16.1). But this comment is even more apropos when we consider his woeful mishandling of the numbers on the Greek side at Thermopylai. He quotes (7.228) an honorific inscription which quite plainly states that 4,000 Peloponnesians had fought there, but later (8.25.2) appears to take this figure as the number of those (not only Peloponnesians) who died in the pass. Moreover, in his own enumeration of the Greek force sent to Thermopylai (7.202) the Peloponnesian contingent adds up to only 3,100. The simplest explanation of the discrepancy is that Herodotus in his enthusiasm for the derring-do of Leonidas and his 300 picked Spartiates has forgotten the 900 or 1,000 'Lakedaimonians' (i.e. Perioikoi) mentioned in Diodorus (11.4.2, 5) and Isokrates (4.90). These Perioikoi would be the first known from literary evidence to have participated with Spartans on campaign.

The other major problem concerns the composition of the Greek forces under Leonidas' command. The presence of eighty hoplites from Mykenai is to be explained as a consequence of the liberation of this town by Kleomenes from Argos, which in 480 was in effect medizing. The absence of men from Tiryns is slightly surprising, especially as they turn up alongside the Mykenaians at Plataia. But the biggest question-marks are these: why was more than half the Peloponnesian contingent drawn from Arkadia, while Corinth, in whose territory lay the general headquarters, provided a mere 400 men (some hoplites may of course have been serving at Artemision)? And why did Sparta send even fewer of its citizens than Corinth? The first of these questions, both of which are unanswerable, is less crucial than the second, which introduces the 'final problem' of Thermopylai.

According to Herodotus, the Spartans through Leonidas (who had succeeded his half-brother Kleomenes) claimed that this force was merely an advance guard (7.203). The Spartans would be sending a full contingent when the Karneia was over; the other allies, a minority of whom were Dorians, were to follow suit after celebrating the Olympic Games (7.206). However, Leonidas clearly interpreted his mission as being in effect akin to that of a Kamikaze squadron. For although he took with him 300 men, which was the number of the Hippeis (the crack royal bodyguard selected from the ten youngest

age-classes), he deliberately chose men who already had sons and so men who were not all Hippeis. Had he really been meant to hold the pass until the Karneia and the Olympics were over, he would presumably have taken, if not more troops, at least the best Spartan warriors rather than the best of those who had sons. Here is the first concrete sign of that drastic fall in citizen manpower which had become critical by 425.

Sparta has therefore been accused of pursuing a narrow and Peloponnesian policy in sending an inadequate force to Thermopylai. To this charge, however, three replies are possible. First, it might be argued that the force was adequate for its stated purpose, and that the cardinal though excusable error was that of Leonidas in posting the unreliable Phokians to guard the pass (discussed in Gomme 1956, 397f.) through which the Greek position was eventually turned. Second, believers in the authenticity of the Themistokles Decree or disbelievers in Herodotus' chronology could point out that Themistokles had already persuaded the Athenians to envisage the abandonment of Attika even before the defence of Thermopylai was undertaken, whereas in Herodotus the retreat to the Isthmus appears as the necessary consequence of the pass being forced sooner than anticipated. Third, those who still think that Leonidas' force was inadequate and are not convinced that the Themistokles Decree is authentic can yet argue that Sparta's policy was narrow and Peloponnesian from necessity rather than choice and that within the constraints imposed Sparta did the best possible.

For, as even Herodotus' generally unsympathetic account makes clear, Sparta genuinely did have difficulties in the Peloponnese at this time, not only from Argos, but also from Peloponnesian League allies. Some time in the 480s Tegea was hostile to Sparta (9.37.4); in 479 Elis (significantly, the first refuge of Damaratos) and Mantinea were suspiciously late for Plataia, apparently because their leaders had been medizing (9.77); and within a decade all these were in open revolt from Spartan hegemony assisted by a somewhat revitalized Argos. Besides – a point Herodotus fails to mention – Perioikic Karyai is reported, admittedly only by Vitruvius (1.1.5), to have medized. The strategic importance of Karyai to Sparta has been emphasized already, an importance symbolized by the fact that Spartan girls participated in the cultic dancing at the temple of Artemis Karyatis (Burkert 1965, 172). Here we need only repeat that Karyai lay on the border with Tegea and *en route* to medizing Argos.

Seen in this light, the despatch of 300 picked citizens and a king in effect to their deaths acquires an almost heroic aura; and this is certainly how the behaviour of these men struck most other Greeks (cf. Simonides fr. 26 Page)– and indeed the Persians. We, however,

should not forget the Perioikoi, who alone remained with the Thespians and the reluctant Thebans to withstand the final assault, nor indeed the Helot shield-bearers (8.25.1, with Welwei 1974, 125 and n. 21), not all of whom emulated the one who took to his heels after leading his blinded master to the fray (7.229.1).

The Greek fleet at Artemision was commanded by Eurybiadas, who like his predecessor at Tempe and Anchimolios in c.512 was not of royal blood. A mere ten of the 271 ships were provided by the Lakedaimonians, and these were presumably manned by Perioikoi or Helots. The skirmishes with the Persian fleet, weakened already by losses in storms, were surprisingly successful from the Greek standpoint, but the forcing of Thermopylai rendered the station at Artemision untenable. Withdrawal was anyway apparently greatly to the taste of Eurybiadas, who cuts a poor figure in Herodotus. For even before the defeat at Thermopylai he had contemplated withdrawal (8.4.2) and had had to be bribed to stay put (8.5.1, 3). Then, after ruling out fighting off Attika (8.49.1) and voting to fight 'on behalf of' or 'at' the Isthmus (8.56), he is only reluctantly persuaded to remain at Salamis (8.64.1). Presumably he shared the views of most Peloponnesians, who were now encamped under the command of Leonidas' brother and successor Kleombrotos at the Isthmus and desperately throwing a fortification wall (which has left no certain archaeological trace) across its six-kilometre narrowest width (8.40.2, 71). Herodotus, however, insists, rightly, that such a wall would have been futile without a fleet to counter the Persians at sea. Indeed, it is on this very point that he felt 'constrained to deliver an opinion, which most men, I know, will dislike, but which, as it seems to me to be true, I am determined not to withhold... . the Athenians were the saviours of Greece' (7.139). By this he means that without the Athenian contribution to the fleet the Spartans would have had their allies removed from them one by one as the Persian fleet sailed at will round the Peloponnese (cf. Thuc. 1.73.4).

In case any reader might be either unclear as to what Herodotus' view of the matter was or doubtful as to its truth, Herodotus makes his point in several ways in addition to this directly expressed personal judgment. For example, he puts into the mouth of Damaratos the advice to Xerxes to occupy Kythera (7.235). This would, he says, distract the Spartans, without whose aid the cities of the other Peloponnesian Greeks would be easily taken. Scholars like Fornara (1971, 33f.) have thought this passage was written by Herodotus in or after 424, when Kythera was in fact seized by the Athenians and the spectre of a Helot revolt was raised in the minds of the Spartans (Thuc. 4.53–6). But Kythera had already been taken by the Athenians under Tolmides in 456 ([Chapter 12](#)), and Damaratos is made to imply

that Chilon in the mid-sixth century had already anticipated such a use of Kythera by a foreign power. Above all, if there had indeed been a Helot revolt in the late 490s, then Damaratos' advice (or at least the idea he is made to express) would have been particularly opportune. Xerxes, however, seems to have been anxious to settle matters once and for all with the Greek fleet. At least this would help to explain his rash plunge into the straits of Salamis and his ensuing defeat. Sparta needless to say did not contribute greatly to that defeat with its sixteen ships (8.43). But at least their flotilla had managed to round the awesome Cape Malea, unlike the considerably larger and avant-garde (Thuc. 1.14.2) Kerkyraian fleet, which after putting in at Pylos and Tainaron pleaded inability to pass Malea as its excuse for absence from Salamis (7.168; cf. 4.179.2 for the wind off Malea).

The other main way in which Herodotus brings out the futility of the Spartans' faith in the Isthmus wall is again through a speech, this time of a more Thucydidean character and placed in the mouth of the Tegean Chileos, said to be the foreigner with the greatest influence at Sparta (9.9.1). The occasion of Chileos' homily is the Athenian threat to come to terms with the Persians in 479 if the Spartans persist in their failure to send troops into Boiotia; and, like Herodotus himself, Chileos argues that the Peloponnese cannot be protected by the Isthmus wall alone. The alleged cause of the Spartan delay was not this time the phase of the moon (Marathon) or the Karneia (Thermopylai) but the Hyakinthia. However, on hearing the words of Chileos, whose Tegean nationality will have carried as much weight as his personal influence, the Spartans moved swiftly, thereby illustrating Thucydides' general rule (1.118.2) that they were 'traditionally slow to go to war, unless they were forced into it'. The compulsion in this case was a combination of Athenian blackmail and Peloponnesian unrest.

The details of the Spartans' eventual response give us our greatest insight to date into the Spartan state at war. The Ephors made the decision to despatch the troops. Pausanias, son of the now dead Kleombrotos and Regent for his under-age cousin Pleistarchos, was given the command, in which he associated with himself Euryanax, the perhaps illegitimate son of his uncle Dorieus. Five thousand Spartiate soldiers were sent off overnight, perhaps 1,000 from each of the five Spartan villages, putting into practice their deliberately fostered familiarity with movement in darkness (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 5.7; Plut. *Lyk.* 12.14). They constituted about two thirds of the Spartiates of military age (20–59), if 'Damaratos' was correct in saying that the Spartan citizen-body in 480 numbered 8,000 (Hdt. 7.234.2). Two thirds was a normal figure for a state's full levy on an allied campaign (Thuc. 2.10; 3.15). To each of the 5,000 there were reportedly

attached seven Helots, but I have suggested in [Chapter 10](#) that this figure is inflated. More likely to be right is the figure of 5,000 given for the Perioikic hoplites who were sent off after the Spartiates the following morning. Since these are said to have been picked men (9.11.3), it is possible that they had been quartered in Sparta for the duration of the war and had been training with the Spartiates. Herodotus, unfortunately, is not interested in such mundane details, and he fails to elucidate the relationship between the Spartiate and Perioikic troops at the battle of Plataia itself (9.28, 47f. etc.). But perhaps the fact that the two contingents were despatched separately is enough to show that Perioikoi and Spartiates were not yet commingled in the same regiments as they were (or so I argue in [Chapter 12](#)) at Mantinea in 418. Each Perioikic hoplite had just one batman (an inference from Hdt. 9.29, 61.2), possibly his personal slave. This was the usual ration, obtaining, for instance, for the Spartiates at Thermopylai.

The route out of Lakonia taken at least by the 5,000 Spartiates went *via* Orestheion, which appears to have been situated in the centre of the Oresthis in Arkadian Mainalia (Thuc. 4.134.1; 5.64.3) and to have been the same as the Oresthasion of Pausanias (8.44.2) that was later called Oresteion (Paus. 8.3.2). If these identifications are correct, then the Spartans were following the route taken by Agis in 418, not, as has been suggested, to avoid the Argive frontier, but because this was the easiest way out of Lakonia for an army travelling with waggons. Although Orestheion must have lain a short distance south-west of Megalopolis (not of course built until the 360s), it seems not to have been unusual for Spartan armies to march north-northwest to here and yet still turn back eastwards towards Tegea (A. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 91–3).

The bulk of Pausanias' Lakedaimonian army waited at the Isthmus for the other Peloponnesians to rally to the loyalist cause (9.19.1), but 1,000 men were sent on ahead into the Megarid (9.14.1). Mardonius, the Persian general left behind by Xerxes, had meanwhile withdrawn to Plataia, and here after much manoeuvring for position and preliminary skirmishing (the problem of supplies was perhaps the greatest the Greeks as a whole ever faced) the Greek and Persian forces eventually met in a decisive battle. The Helots are reckoned among the 'light-armed troops' by Herodotus (9.28.2, 29.1, 61.2), but even if armed they did no fighting and served as supply troops, armour-bearers and baggage-carriers (Welwei 1974, 3, 120–6). The laurels clearly belonged to the heavy-armed citizen hoplites, above all the disciplined and skilful Spartans. The generalship of Pausanias has been criticized, but it was well thought of at the time (Thuc. 1.130.1). The seers on both sides also deserve a mention, honourable in the case

of Teisamenos, who with his brother had been received into Spartan citizenship perhaps at Pitana (Huxley 1975a, 29f.) shortly before 480, a unique grant in the view of Herodotus (9.35.1); slightly less honourable in that of Hegesistratos, another Eleian, who seems to have put the liberation of his own city from Spartan domination before the 'common good of Greece' and so hired himself out to the Persians (9.37). Herodotus' casualty-figures (9.70.5) seem improbably low, but they may not have been meant for grand totals. Apart from anything else, both here and in describing the Spartans' burial arrangements (9.85) he has again forgotten the Perioikoi. Finally, the booty. We do not know if the Spartans had yet created the office of the 'booty-sellers' (Pritchett 1974, I, 90), because Herodotus is only interested in an earlier stage in the booty's distribution. Pausanias ordered the Helots to bring in the Persians' gold and silver articles (9.80. 1; cf. 7.119.2, 190; 8.8, 41; 9.106), but they allegedly managed to withhold a fair amount and later sold what they could not hoard to the Aiginetans, who had not participated at Plataia (9.85.3). The Aiginetans paid knock-down prices, since the Helots could not tell gold from bronze. Thus Herodotus, but the whole story is revealed as a malicious Athenian joke by Herodotus' obviously false view that it was from this bargain purchase that the Aiginetans became extremely wealthy. The innocence of the Helots, though, is perhaps true to life, but whether they could have been involved in such a sale of valuable metal-work is more than doubtful.

According to the loyalist mythology, the remainder of the retreating Persian army was defeated at Mykale, on the mainland of Asia Minor opposite Samos, on the same day as Mardonius was beaten at Plataia (9.100). The leader of the Greek fleet was Latychidas – the first (and nearly the last) Spartan king to be appointed admiral – who had succeeded Eurybiadas in spring 479. Despite the fervent appeals of an Ionian delegation for 'the Greeks' to liberate Ionia (8.131.1f.), the fleet had proceeded from Aigina with the utmost caution and at first only as far as Delos. Here it was greeted with further 'Hellenic' appeals from a Samian delegation, through whom Samos was admitted to the Hellenic League (9.90–2). After yet more indecision the Greek force, more than half of which was provided by Athens, at last engaged the Persians on land at Mykale and won. 'Ionia therefore on this day revolted a second time from the Persians' (9.104). Next on the agenda were the Hellespont and the islands (9.101.3).

Now for the first time the Spartans, represented by Latychidas, were faced with a wider issue than resistance to a Persian invasion; and, if Herodotus' account is accurate, they failed the test signally. A proposal was made by 'the Peloponnesians' to remove the Ionians from Asia and settle them in the coastal towns of the mainland Greek

medizers (9.106.2f.). This was scarcely diplomatic. The Ionians' fears of such a transfer had been aroused in 499 by Histiaios, who had lied to them that Darius planned to place them in Phoenicia (6.3); and in 494 and 490 the Milesians and Eretrians respectively had indeed been resettled by the Persians (6.20, 101.3). The 'Peloponnesian' proposal was, however, in line with a strand of Spartan thinking stretching back to the origins of Graeco-Persian relations. For although the Spartans had repeatedly claimed to champion all Greeks against Persia, Mykale was in fact the first time (despite Hdt. 3.56.2) that they had fought the Persians in Asia, which the Great King in some sense considered his own preserve (e.g. Hdt. 1.4; 9.116.3).

The speech attributed to Eurybiadas after Salamis (8.108) precisely captures this Spartan attitude: he would not follow Themistokles in advancing to destroy the Hellespont bridge, but he did envisage challenging the Persian king for his empire at some future date. Likewise Latychidas, after the 'Peloponnesian authorities' had withdrawn their proposal to transfer the Ionians to European Greece and the islanders had been admitted to the Hellenic League (9.106.3), yet declined to follow the Athenians in liberating the cities of the Hellespont. The attitude of Herodotus himself emerges from his description of an essentially Athenian force at Sestos as 'the Greeks' (9.116.3), but he would have given a more balanced picture if he had remarked upon the importance of the Hellespont for the Athenian wheat-supply: Sestos was the 'meal-table of the Peiraieus' (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 48).

It is at this point that Thucydides takes up the story in his tantalizingly brief excursus on the 'Pentekontaetia' (1.89–118), the fifty or so years prior to what has come to be known as 'the' Peloponnesian War. For Herodotus, everything after the liberation of Sestos was 'after the war against the Medes' and so outside his brief. However, apart from a score of references in passing to individual incidents after 479, he does also make a general comment on this period: as in the forty or so preceding years 'Greece suffered more misery than in the 600 years before Darius was born, partly from the wars against the Persians, partly from its own internal struggles for supremacy' (6.98.2). It is precisely the latter, seen from the standpoint of Athens' growing power, with which Thucydides' excursus is concerned; and he begins it with a richly symbolic episode, the rebuilding of the walls of Athens masterminded by Themistokles.

In Herodotus Themistokles is presented in an ambiguous light, thanks to the generally hostile sources the historian chose to follow. Thucydides, silently reacting as so often against his predecessor, put the record straight at the end of another excursus (1.126–38), to which we shall return in a different connection. Two sentences in his

encomium are particularly relevant here: 'in estimating what was likely to happen his forecasts were always more reliable than those of others ... he was particularly remarkable at looking into the future and seeing there the hidden possibilities for good or evil' (1.138.3). Written with hindsight, this can only mean that in Thucydides' view Themistokles had in effect foreseen (among other things) the Peloponnesian War. He realized, in other words, that Sparta not Persia was the more likely to pose a threat to Athens in the long run. Indeed, Themistokles seems to have come to this conclusion as early as 479.

Herodotus (8.124) gives us only half the story, when he describes how in the winter of 480–479 Themistokles had been feted in Sparta and granted a guard of honour to escort him from Sparta to the Tegean border. For in 479, despite his alleged appeal to the common good of the Hellenic League, Themistokles was prepared to risk an open breach with Sparta by resisting with trickery the 'request' made by the Spartans, at the urging of their allies, that the Athenians should not rebuild their walls (Thuc. 1.90–3). One suspects that Themistokles will have gained from his two visits to Sparta a rather different impression from the one held by the international aristocrats who were welcomed to the annual Gymnopaïdiai festival; and one wonders whether that 'guard of honour' might not have been designed to ensure that Themistokles went where the Spartan authorities wished (cf. Thuc. 2.12.2). In the light of his subsequent career it is not irrelevant to observe that his trips through the Peloponnese will have taken him through Arkadia and the Argolis.

So far in this [chapter 1](#) have stuck closely to Herodotus and Thucydides. Hereafter, although I shall generally attribute the greatest weight to the testimony of the latter, it will be necessary to use other sources, ranging in date from the fifth century BC to the second century AD. It is often difficult to evaluate their reliability when they include events omitted by Thucydides. For example, did Themistokles really propose the burning of the Greek fleet (except presumably the Athenian ships) at Pagasai in 480–479 (Plut. *Them.* 20.1) or even just the Spartan ships at Gytheion (Cic. *Off.* 3.11.49)? Did he, presumably early in 478, oppose the Spartan proposal to expel the medizers from the Delphic Amphiktyony (Plut. *Them.* 20.3f.)? However, whether he did any of these or not, it is clear that he took no part in the 'Delian League', whose foundation constituted for Thucydides the second major step in the growth of Athenian power between 478 and 431.

The details of the 'constitution' of the League need not concern us here, except in so far as the Spartans attempted to use it as a propaganda weapon against the Athenians perhaps from as early as 465. What does concern us are the immediate circumstances in which the League was founded. Sparta, as we have seen, had been less than

responsive to the Ionians' appeals for aid towards their liberation from Persia. But it would be a mistake to regard Spartan foreign policy as clearcut and monolithic at this or any subsequent time until perhaps the second decade of the fourth century (Ste. Croix 1972, 151). In 479 Sparta was faced with three choices: to continue the war against Persia by sea, as the Ionians had requested; to extend the crusade against the medizers north of the Isthmus with a view to possible consolidation of Spartan influence here on a permanent basis; or to adopt a 'little Spartan' policy and concentrate on retaining the Peloponnese in a pacified and submissive condition. In practice, the first two options were successively exercised, but with such signal lack of success that the third was brought into play perforce.

Regent Pausanias seems to have stood for the first option. In 478 he led the Hellenic League in a naval expedition of liberation first to Cyprus and then to Byzantion. From the latter, however, he was recalled by the Spartan authorities to stand trial, and here our source-problem begins in earnest. For our primary account is the excursus mentioned above, whose Herodotean flavour and un-Thucydidean linguistic usage have provoked the suggestion by Westlake (1977) that Thucydides is here reproducing, with uncharacteristic credulity, the account of a written source, perhaps Charon of Lampsakos.

However that may be, Pausanias at this first trial was apparently condemned for various acts of injustice against individuals but acquitted on the more serious charge of medism (for which Thucydides says there seemed to be very good evidence, although Herodotus, 5.32, preferred to suspend judgment). The next year Pausanias returned to the Hellespont off his own bat, allegedly intending to make himself governor of Greece in the Persian interest. The Athenians, who had clearly been the ones to object to his behaviour in 478 and were now leaders of the Delian League, this time drove him out of Byzantion. Indeed, Herodotus (8.3.3) links the behaviour of Pausanias in 478 with the seizure of the hegemony of the Greeks by the Athenians. In Thucydides (1.95) the loss of hegemony is accepted philosophically by the Spartans, but a remarkable passage in Diodorus Siculus (11.50), a first-century historian who mainly reproduced the fourth-century Ephorus, throws much light on internal Spartan wrangling. On losing the hegemony a great majority of the Spartan citizen body, above all the younger men, was in favour of declaring war on Athens to recover it, but they were dissuaded by a distinguished member of the Gerousia.

After his expulsion from Byzantion, Pausanias took up residence in the Troad. It is unfortunately unclear how long he remained here, but before his return Latychidas – and with him the second of Sparta's three options in foreign policy – had also fallen out of favour with the

home authorities. Again, there is an uncertainty over the date (476/5, according to Diod. 11.48.2), but it seems clear that when on campaign against the medizing Thessalians Latychidas was discovered to have embezzled public funds (Hdt. 6.72). Recalled to Sparta, found guilty and banished (though not perhaps formally deposed), he went into exile at Tegea, where he died in c.469. The significance of his chosen place of asylum will emerge shortly.

Between 474 and 470 Pausanias was summoned back to Sparta and summarily incarcerated. He was, however, released, but his offer to stand trial again was turned down because neither the state nor his personal enemies had sufficient evidence to condemn the victor of Plataia and the only active king of Sparta. Such evidence, though, was not long in appearing, and Pausanias was accused not merely of medism this time but also of intriguing with the Helots, to whom he was said to have offered citizenship as well as freedom. The charge of medism, according to Thucydides or his (written?) source, was the one that sealed his doom; but modern scholarship has generally, if sometimes intemperately, placed greater emphasis on the other one (Oliva 1971, 146–52; Welwei 1974, 122 n. 7). As with Kleomenes and the Arkadians in c.491, Pausanias' offer to the Helots, whatever it was, would have been at the least a potent method of silencing his enemies.

There may, however, have been more to it than that. For I find it extraordinary that Pausanias should have gone to the sanctuary of Poseidon at Tainaron to incriminate himself in the naive manner described by Thucydides. Rather, I would connect his presence there with the sacrilege to which the Spartans themselves attributed the great earthquake of c.465, the dragging of Helot suppliants from Poseidon's altar to be murdered. The information that the Tainaron sanctuary could be used as an asylum by Helots is interesting in itself (Bömer 1960, 18f; cf. Hdt. 2.113.2, for an Egyptian sanctuary for deserting slaves). But the real question is why the Spartans should have attributed the earthquake to this particular affront to Poseidon (who was generally held to be responsible for sending earthquakes). I suggest that the 'secretiveness' of the Spartans (Thuc. 5.68.2) may have concealed from Thucydides or his source an abortive Helot uprising of c.470, in which Pausanias was somehow implicated.

One argument in favour of this hypothesis is based on Aristotle's general statement that the Helots as it were lay in wait for their masters' misfortunes. For the late 470s and the early 460s (the general period in which the death of Pausanias, synchronized with the flight of Themistokles to Persia, is to be placed) threw up the greatest crisis the Spartans had faced since their decisions first to base their power and wealth on the exploitation of Helots and then to protect their economic base with a network of alliances in the Peloponnese. Such a

crisis would help to explain the extraordinarily savage reprisals taken against Pausanias, treatment which even Delphic Apollo, usually so agreeable to the dictates of the Spartan authorities, found himself unable to sanction. Moreover, as Thucydides (1.132.5) parenthetically observed, the Spartans were habitually cautious in taking action against any Spartan citizen regardless of his rank – another hint that the problem of citizen numbers was already being felt before the mid-fifth century.

The crisis is summarily and artistically referred to by Herodotus (9.35.2) in one of his rare flash-forward passages. Teisamenos, the Eleian seer who had won Spartan citizenship (above), helped Sparta to five victories. The first and last were Plataia in 479 and Tanagra in 458–457. Sandwiched between these, presumably in chronological order, are a battle near Tegea against the Tegeans and Argives, one at Dipaieis (or Dipaia) against all the Arkadians except the Mantineians, and one at ‘the Isthmos’ against the Messenians. Our other sources do not elucidate the background or dating of these battles, and it is chiefly due to the scholarly acumen and ingenuity of Andrewes (1952) and Forrest (1960) that a coherent account can be attempted.

In the 480s Tegea had been hostile to Sparta, and Forrest believes that with Tegea we should understand the whole Arkadian League. Andrewes argued that during and immediately after the Persian Wars Tegea was reconciled to Sparta once more. However, the retirement of Latychidas to Tegea by 475 suggests that hostility continued. Indeed, it may not be fanciful to connect the presence of Latychidas with the Arkadian troubles. The issue was presumably the same as it had been in the 490s: the Arkadians wished to be recognized and treated as such, whereas Sparta preferred to divide and rule, fostering above all the rivalry and mutual suspicion between Mantinea and Tegea. Latychidas, the creature of Kleomenes, will not have been above using the same tactics as his mentor to effect his recall, whatever his private feelings about the justice of the Arkadian cause may have been.

Elis and Mantinea had arrived late for Plataia. It was alleged that their generals had favoured the Persian cause, an allegation perhaps to be connected with the fact that Damaratos had regarded Elis as a congenial asylum. But the establishment of a democracy at Elis before 470 (A. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 60f.) suggests that there were wider and deeper socio-political issues involved as well. Mantinea too received a democratic constitution, certainly before 421 (Thuc. 5.29.1) but not necessarily as early as Elis. Forrest would also place the synoecism of Tegea around 470. This extraordinary conjunction of political revolutions coincided with the revitalization of Argos, which fought with Tegea against Sparta. Whether Forrest (1968, 100) is right to postulate an actual alliance against Sparta between Elis, the bulk of

the Arkadian cities and Argos I am doubtful. But his suggestion that the hand of Themistokles lay heavy on this anti-Spartan activity is cogent. He was apparently a convinced democrat and certainly since 479 an opponent of Sparta. After his ostracism at Athens (late 470s?) he based himself at Argos, from where he made frequent trips around the rest of the Peloponnese (Thuc. 1.135.3): as Tomlinson (1972, 106) tersely remarks, 'there is no reason to suppose that he was engaged in mere sightseeing.'

Space forbids discussion of internal political developments at Argos since its defeat at Sepeia in 494 or of the circumstances and date of Themistokles' ostracism. But I would like to apply the 'hand of Themistokles' hypothesis to a remarkable piece of inscriptional evidence from Argos (Jeffery 1961, 169, no. 22). Some time around 470 epigraphically, the Argives erected in their agora a bronze tablet in honour of Gnosstas, their proxenos (political representative) in the Perioikic town of Oinous, which has not been certainly located but presumably lay near the river of the same name. That the tablet should refer to Gnosstas as 'Oinountios' (of Oinous) and not 'Lakedaimonios' has rightly been interpreted as a deliberate affront to Sparta. But the fact that the Argives should have thought it worthwhile to make a citizen of an otherwise insignificant Perioikic town their proxenos has not received the comment it deserves. Gnosstas may not in fact have been the only Perioikos who acted as proxenos for a foreign state; a fourth-century proxeny-list from Keos (*IG* XII.5(1).542) has been restored to include a citizen of Kyphanta. But his favoured treatment, I suggest, could represent a deliberate attempt to create or exploit sympathy for Argos at least among the Perioikoi of northern Lakonia, perhaps with a view to detaching them from their Spartan allegiance. We recall the medism of Karyai about a decade earlier.

At any rate the Spartans certainly felt sufficiently strongly about the activities of Themistokles to suspend their latent hostility towards the Athenians and co-operate with them in hounding Themistokles out of Greece. As we have seen, his flight to Asia Minor is synchronized with the death of Pausanias, but this scarcely helps us to penetrate the chronological obscurity, since the date of his flight is perhaps the major difficulty of the first half of the Pentekontaetia (White 1964, 140). If there was a change to a more oligarchic regime at Argos in the early 460s following on the defeat of the Tegeans and Argives by Sparta, and if Themistokles left Argos as a result of the change, then the battle near Tegea could have occurred about 470. The next battle took place at Dipaieis in west Arkadia (for its suggested site see Howell 1970, 100, no. 49) and is apparently synchronized by Diodorus (11.65.4) with the great earthquake of c.465. An interval of

about five years allows plenty of time for Mantinea and Argos to abandon the entente of c.470, but our sources give no other insight into the reason for the Spartan victory. Archidamos, to whom a stratagem perhaps to be assigned to the battle is attributed by Polyainos (1.41.1), must have been in command of the Spartan forces. He had reigned *de facto* since Latychidas' exile, *de iure* since the latter's death (Diod. 11.48.2; cf. 12.35.4). His Agiad co-king Pleistarchos may still have been under age. At all events it was reputedly the resolution and authority of Archidamos which saved the day for Sparta immediately after the great earthquake of c.465 (Diod. 11.63.5–7; Plut. *Kim.* 16.6f.; Polyain. 1.41.3).

This earthquake is directly relevant to the major themes of this book in two main respects. First, it is said to have caused enormous loss of life at Sparta and so has been held in varying degrees responsible for the catastrophic drop in citizen numbers (Chapter 14) and for a major reform of army organization. Second, it either occasioned or intensified the Helot revolt otherwise known as the Third Messenian War, a revolt rightly characterized as 'not only the greatest upheaval in Sparta during the classical period, but one of the most significant social outbreaks in ancient Greece altogether' (Oliva 1971, 163). For these reasons the earthquake and revolt deserve the closest possible scrutiny, but, unlike many of my predecessors, I shall try not to allow the chronological problems to overshadow the more important – and, I believe, more problematic – issues.

The relationship between the earthquake and the revolt is made unambiguous by Thucydides' use of a relative clause indicating simultaneity (1.101.2). Thucydides, however, also says that the revolt lasted ten years (1.103.1), as does Diodorus (11.64.4). Since on this reckoning the revolt would still have been in progress at the time of the Battle of Tanagra in 458 or 457, it has been felt that Thucydides' text must have been corrupted either palaeographically or by the 'editorial' insertion of the ordinal 'tenth' to accord with the text of Diodorus. The latter explanation of the alleged corruption is not cogent: in the *Pentekontaëtia* excursus Thucydides gives only seven figures indicating duration of time, but three of these concern the duration of sieges and two of them (our passage and 1.117.3) are precisely parallel in form (after so much time the besieged were unable to hold out and surrendered). Thus the corruption, if it is a corruption – as on balance I am inclined to believe, principally because of the strict chronological sequence adhered to by Thucydides in the *Pentekontaëtia* excursus as a whole – must be explained palaeographically; and 'fourth' or 'sixth' seem to be the most plausible emendations of 'tenth', giving a terminal date for the revolt of c.460. What is not permissible, however, is both to maintain that the text of

Thucydides should not be tampered with and at the same time to ignore his explicit statement of simultaneity between the earthquake and the revolt, in order to put its outbreak back to c.469 and so link it directly with the death of Pausanias. There may have been an abortive Helot rising at the time of the death of Pausanias, but Thuc. 1.103.1 is not evidence for it.

More important, however, is the problem of how far Diodorus can be used to supplement or correct Thucydides. For although his account (11.63f., 84.7f.) is far more detailed and even circumstantial, it is also at variance with that of Thucydides in crucial respects. According to Thucydides, the Helots, most of whom were of Messenian origin, revolted immediately after the earthquake and seceded to Ithome, supported by the Messenian Perioikoi of Thouria and Aithaia. The siege went on for some time until the Spartans, feeling their inadequacy in this department of warfare (cf. Hdt. 9.70.1f.), summoned their allies, especially the Athenians, whom they thought were expert in taking fortified positions by assault. When, however, the siege did not have quick results, the Spartans suspected the Athenians of revolutionary sympathies towards the Helots and dismissed them forthwith. With their remaining allies (below) they compelled the rebels to surrender after a siege lasting ten (or, as I prefer, four or six) years in all.

According to Diodorus, however, great earthquakes (in the plural) hit Sparta and continued for some time, razing the dwellings to their foundations and killing more than 20,000 'Lakedaimonians'. The (Lakonian) Helots and the Messenians, emboldened by this loss of life, joined together in revolt. Their first idea, to march upon Sparta itself, was thwarted by Archidamos, whereupon they decided to secure a strong base in Messenia (Ithome). The Spartans summoned their allies (only the Athenians are named), but after some fighting in which the Athenians at first distinguished themselves the Spartans dismissed them for sympathizing with the rebels. Then and only then the Spartans and the remaining allies marched to lay siege to Ithome, whereupon the (Lakonian) Helots revolted in full force in support of the Messenians. After ten years the Messenians from Ithome were sent away under a truce; the ringleaders of the Helots were punished (presumably with death).

Other sources provide further details, some of which are journalistic, some plausible but problematic. None, however, resolves a major inconsistency between Thucydides and Diodorus. For the former the revolt was a Messenian, indeed almost a 'nationalistic', affair. Diodorus, on the contrary, distinguishes between the Messenians and the (Lakonian) Helots throughout and ascribes a not insignificant role to the latter. It has been suggested that Ephorus

made the distinction because he was writing after the liberation of the Messenians in 370, at a time when the only Helots were the Lakonians. But even if this suggestion is true (it is certainly plausible), it is unclear why Ephorus or his source should have invented a distinct role in the rebellion for the Lakonian Helots. I have already intimated in [Chapter 10](#) that modern scholars have underestimated the potential hostility of the Lakonian Helots towards the Spartans; this Diodoran passage is one of the pieces of direct evidence to be adduced in favour of my view. For only the Lakonian Helots would have been in a position to take such quick advantage of an earthquake in Sparta, and it will have been they who communicated the news of their masters' disaster to their brothers on the other side of Taygetos.

For the rest, Thucydides' more sober account is surely preferable, although his severe concision requires expansion and exegesis. In the first place, it is implausible that all the Messenian Helots should have revolted and then retired at once to Ithome without a blow being struck. More likely only a proportion rebelled and only a proportion of these resorted to Ithome after skirmishing in the fields. This at any rate would make sense of Herodotus 9.64.2, where we learn in passing that the Spartan credited with felling Mardonius at Plataia was himself killed 'in Stenyklaros' during 'the Messenian War' together with the detachment of 300 men under his command. Such a feat could have been effected by an ambush of Helots armed with agricultural implements. On the other hand, Teisamenos' victory 'at the Isthmos' (9.35.2) is presented as if it were a regular pitched battle. The reading 'Isthmos' has in fact usually been emended to 'Ithome', but the Isthmos in question could be the nearly continuous Skala ridge stretching from Ithome to Taygetos and dividing the upper (Stenyklaros) plain of the Pamisos valley from the lower (Makaria). Either way, however, the Helots would seem to have required less rustic weapons. These could have been supplied by their Perioikic supporters or conceivably by dissident Arkadians or Eleians.

As for the allies on the Spartan side, I assume that hoplites among at least the Perioikoi either volunteered or were drafted as a matter of course, and I suspect that the 'planters' of Mothone and Asine were conspicuously loyal to Sparta. But of Sparta's foreign allies apart from the Athenians (who require separate treatment) we hear explicitly only of Aigina (Thuc. 2.27.2, 4.56.2) and Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3), who were members of the Peloponnesian League, and of the Plataians (Thuc. 3.54.5). If the revolt was on a smaller scale than Thucydides implies, then there may not have been need for help from other allies, and Thucydides does say that the Athenians were summoned specifically for their reputed skill in siege-warfare. Probably, though, it is just by chance that other allies, especially those of the

Peloponnesian League, are not recorded. We may, however, suggest some special reasons for the presence of those that are known. The Plataians may have acted out of a double sense of gratitude, to the Spartans for suggesting their alliance with Athens in 519/18 ([Chapter 9](#)), to the Athenians for being good allies. The Aiginetans were no doubt jealous and fearful of the growing naval power of the Athenians and perhaps also anxious to atone for their non-appearance at the Battle of Plataia. The Mantineians had declined to join the rest of the Arkadians against Sparta at Dipaieis and so were possibly particularly reliable at this time.

The Helot revolt among other things marked a turning-point in relations between Athens and Sparta. In 479 the Spartans had been secretly angered by Themistokles' circumvention of their wish that the walls of Athens should not be rebuilt. Probably in 478–477 a majority of them had been dissuaded only with difficulty from voting to declare war on Athens. In c.465, if Thucydides (1.101.2) is to be believed, they had actually voted to send help to Thasos in its revolt from Athens and had only been prevented from sending it by the earthquake and Helot revolt. This vote of assistance has been doubted, but Ste. Croix(1972, 178f.) has argued cogently that Thucydides is to be believed. The Athenians, however, unquestionably were not aware of the Spartan vote when they themselves agreed, perhaps after heated debate (Plut. *Kim.* 16.9), to send 4,000 hoplites under Kimon to Ithome in c.462.

Kimon, son of Miltiades, was the leading Athenian general of the day, vanquisher of the Persians at the famous Battle of the Eurymedon (c.469). Correspondingly, he was the foremost Athenian supporter of the 'dual hegemony' thesis, according to which Athens should lead the Greeks by sea, Sparta by land. Significantly in the 470s he had named one of his sons Lakedaimonios, just as the Spartan Perikleidas called a son of his Athenaios (Thuc. 4.119.2); Perikleidas was the ambassador who successfully sought Athenian aid in c.462 (Aristoph. *Lys.* 1138). This amicable policy was in shreds after the Spartans dismissed the Athenians, alone of their allies, from Ithome.

The probable reason for Spartan suspicion has been admirably expressed by Ste. Croix (1972, 179f.): 'the ordinary Athenian hoplite ... may well have been shocked when he arrived in Messenia and found that the revolting "slaves" of the Spartans were Greeks, the majority of them Messenians, who had never lost consciousness of the fact that their ancestors had been citizens of the *polis* of Messene, and were now fighting for their freedom and the right to be "the Messenians" once more.' Thereafter the Athenians and Spartans were openly hostile. The Athenians allied themselves first with Sparta's major Peloponnesian enemy, Argos, and then with one of the more

prominent groups of former medizers, the Thessalians. Moreover, they had been made forcibly aware of Sparta's Achilles heel, the Messenian Helots, and it was not long before they sought to exploit it ([Chapter 12](#)).

I have set out above the problem posed by Thucydides' text for dating the end of the revolt. My preference for an emendation giving a terminal date of c.460 will be further reinforced in the next chapter. However, as with the campaign of Theopompos in the 'First Messenian War' ([Chapter 8](#)), we can only guess at the manner in which the rebels were forced to capitulate. There is no archaeological evidence for a stone-built fortification on the mountain before the fourth century; but Ithome is (with Akrocorinth) one of the two best natural fortresses in the Peloponnese, so a palisaded camp will have been adequate to keep at bay an army self-confessedly incompetent at sieges. Besides, there is a well within twenty metres of the summit. Thus we must suppose that the Spartans and their allies gradually cut off sympathetic sources of supply and starved the Helots out.

Under the terms of the surrender the rebels (only the Messenians, not the Lakonians, according to Diod. 11.84.8 – divide and rule?) were permitted to withdraw from the Peloponnese (Sparta's preserve) on pain of instant enslavement should they set foot within it again. These terms have been seen as mild and an indication of Spartan weakness. But there may in fact have been relatively few Helots involved at the finish, and Sparta could hardly have anticipated either the brilliant move of the Athenians in settling them at Naupaktos or the havoc the Naupaktos Messenians would wreak in Messenia after the Athenian seizure of Pylos in 425 ([Chapter 12](#)). Indeed, 'dual hegemony' theorists in Sparta may have misguidedly hoped that a gesture of leniency towards the Helots might help to reconcile Sparta to Athens. Nor should we underestimate the power of religion or rather superstition. For the Helots had cleverly placed themselves as suppliants under the protection of Zeus Ithomatas, mindful perhaps of the Spartans' own explanation of the great earthquake as caused by the wrath of Zeus' brother Poseidon. However, even if the terms given to the rebels do not necessarily imply Spartan weakness, it still remains to consider the argument for weakness drawn from the alleged effects of the earthquake.

A full statement of this argument is Toynbee 1969, 346–52, but I find most of his views unconvincing. In the first place, he starts by saying (rightly) that 'the meagreness of our information makes it impossible to reach any sure conclusion about either the statistical facts themselves or their demographic, social, political and military consequences.' Yet a few pages later he concludes that 'these facts and figures' (i.e. his inferences from the meagre information) 'are

illuminating' and help to explain several major cruces of Spartan history between c.460 and 432. Second, the sources are in fact not only meagre but unreliable. The ancients, as David Hume so elegantly demonstrated ('Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations'), had a notorious weakness for large figures, and Diodorus' 'more than 20,000' fatalities need not be taken at its face value, even if we could be sure what he or his source meant by 'Lakedaimonians'. Toynbee tries to save his credit by arguing that the casualties were principally women and very young children – hence Archidamos' ability to rally the male warriors against the encroaching Helots. But if about half the total population of citizen status had really been wiped out (the total of 35,000–40,000 is extrapolated from our only usable figure, the 8,000 adult male warriors cited by 'Damaratos'), and if the proportion of the casualties among the women and very young children was relatively even higher, then the catastrophe would have been still more immense and its effects yet more long-lasting than even Toynbee depicts them.

I do not of course wish to deny that the earthquake brought death and destruction to Sparta. But elementary comparative demography shows that, other things being equal, a population which suffers even a major loss of life from a disaster quickly reconstitutes itself; we might perhaps compare the recovery of Argos by 460 after losing perhaps as many as 6,000 hoplites at Sepeia in 494. Transparently, then, at Sparta other things were not equal, and the constant and eventually catastrophic decline in the number of male Spartan citizens – from 8,000 in 480 to at most 1,500 in 371 – cannot be attributed to the earthquake alone. Neither can the army reform, which, as we shall see in the next chapter, was certainly carried out between 479 and 418 but not necessarily nearer 460 than 420.

Notes on further reading

Most of the essential secondary literature has been cited in the text. Here follow just a few supplements. For a fuller citation of the ancient sources for the Pentekontaëtia, reference should be made to the invaluable indices compiled by R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes in Hill 1951.

A new commentary on all Herodotus is a major desideratum. The Hellenic League is most usefully discussed by Brunt (1953/4); cf. Ste.Croix 1972, 301f. On all aspects of the Delian League and subsequent 'Athenian Empire' see Meiggs 1972. For the 'final problem' of Thermopylai see Hope Simpson 1972.

For the Thucydidean chronology of 465–431 see Deane 1972; but I cannot follow him in retaining 'tenth' in Thuc. 1.103.1 and dating the Helot revolt 464–455/4. See rather Bayer and Heideking 1975, 120f.,

130–4.

The history of Argos 494–461 is succinctly handled in Tomlinson 1972, 96–109.

Chapter twelve

The Athenian wars c. 460–404

The war between Sparta and Athens and their respective allies, which broke out in 431 and ended definitively in 404, is generally known today as 'The Peloponnesian War'. The very title is not the least remarkable achievement of its historian. For that it should be viewed as a single war temporarily interrupted by a 'phoney' peace, that this was 'the' war of the two fought in the fifth century between these antagonists, and that it should be seen primarily from the Athenian side – these are the legacies of 'Thucydides the Athenian' (1.1.1; 5.26.1 – where no other indication is given, the references in brackets in this chapter are to Thucydides), who undertook his history 'at the very beginning of the war in the belief that it was going to be a great war and more worth writing about than any of those which had occurred in the past'. As M.I. Finley has observed in his introduction to the 1972 reissue of the Penguin Classics translation of Thucydides, 'no other historian can match this achievement; no other war, for that matter no historical subject, is so much the product of its reporter.'

Thucydides had his rivals, above all Ephorus, who survives for us mainly in the garbled version of Diodorus. But it is a measure of Thucydides' impact in his own time that men like Xenophon, Kratippos and the unknown author of the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia' fragments (if indeed he was not Kratippos) preferred to complete rather than rewrite his unfinished manuscript. With scarcely a dissenting voice (Dionysios of Halikarnassos being a notable case in point) the judgment of posterity on Thucydides as an historian has echoed that of his continuators, whether explicitly (for instance Lucian, Hobbes and von Ranke) or implicitly. Until, that is, the twentieth century, when something of a reaction against Thucydides appears to have set in, some students preferring the broader vision of his main predecessor Herodotus, others stressing his subjectivity, yet

others querying his self-proclaimed accuracy, and all in some way touching upon 'the' Thucydides problem, that of the order of composition and degree of revision of the work as we have it.

My own view is that, for all its narrowness of outlook, subjectivity of interpretation, inaccuracy in detail and self-inconsistency due to lack of final revision, the history of Thucydides must be the bedrock of any account of Greek history from 433 to 411 (where it abruptly ends). Moreover, I agree with Ste. Croix (1972, 5–34) that Thucydides has a claim to both originality of thought and permanency of value in his unswerving insistence, for purposes of historical interpretation, on the amorality of interstate relations.

Reliance on Thucydides for 'the' Peloponnesian War, however, cannot automatically be extended to his account of the period before 433. The contemporary historian *par excellence*, Thucydides mainly confines his treatment of the preceding half-century to a prefatory excursus (1.89–118), which is both sketchy and chronologically fluid – oddly, because these are precisely the defects he berates in the work of his only forerunner in this field, Hellanikos (1.97.2). The difficulties posed by his excursus have been sampled in the previous chapter, but these pale when we turn to consider the role of Sparta in the origins, character and even duration of the so-called 'First' Peloponnesian War of c.460–445.

This does not mean that we should not base ourselves on Thucydides here too, but it is necessary to invert his perspective. For he viewed this war solely in the context of the growth of Athenian power, whereas we shall attempt to see both of the Peloponnesian wars and the fourteen years of genuine, if uneasy, peace which separated them from the Spartan side of the barricades – as Thucydides himself was more able to do during his enforced exile from Athens between 424 and 404 (5.26.1). Hence the deliberately unfamiliar title of this chapter, modified from Thucydides (5.28.2; 31.3, 5). No attempt, however, has been made here to give as complete as possible an account of the formulation and execution of Spartan domestic and foreign policy between c.460 and 404. Rather, the literary, epigraphical and (scanty) archaeological evidence pertaining to Lakonia and Messenia in this period has been set out in the belief that any account of Spartan policy should start from a consideration of developments within the *polis*-territory as a whole.

The dominant section of Spartan opinion in the late 460s was not necessarily anxious to effect a rift with Athens. But whatever its intentions, the rift was occasioned by the dismissal of Kimon from Ithome and the discrediting at Athens of his 'dual hegemony' thesis. Once this policy had been jettisoned, the newly radicalized Athenian democracy warmly embraced the interventionist ideas apparently

fathered by Themistokles. An alliance was concluded with Argos (Hill 1951, 1.4.5), which had recently recovered control of the Argolis and lovingly nursed longstanding grievances against Sparta, both specific (possession of Kynouria: 5.41.2) and general (hegemony of the Peloponnesians: cf. 5.28.2). Shortly after, Megara seceded from the Peloponnesian League – the first state to do so, unless Mantinea, Tegea and Elis really had concluded an offensive alliance with Argos in the late 470s – and made a full offensive and defensive alliance with Athens (Hill 1951, 1.4.8). Hence, according at least to Thucydides (1.103.4), Corinth's 'bitter hatred' for Athens, exacerbated by the Athenian masterstroke of settling Naupaktos at the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf with the Helot rebels from Ithome (Hill 1951, 1.4.7: perhaps in 460). An Athenian inscribed relief of c.450 depicting a seated goddess (*IG* I2.37) has been interpreted as evidence of an actual treaty of alliance between Athens and the Naupaktos Messenians (Meritt 1944, 224–9).

No doubt Corinth, which was now threatened at either end of the gulf named after it, was anxious to induce Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to declare war on the Athenian alliance. Sparta, however, was not lightly to be drawn into a war not of its own seeking; and although Thucydides (1.18.3) describes the *Pentekontaetia* as a period in which Sparta and Athens were for the most part 'either fighting each other or putting down revolts among their allies', the 'First' Peloponnesian (or Athenian) War should be understood mainly as a conflict between the Athenian alliance and Sparta's Peloponnesian League allies. The informal character of the struggle is implied in the scholarly controversy over the precise date at which the war may be said to have begun (Holladay 1977b). Whatever the solution to that, it seems clear that Sparta's direct involvement before the battle of Tanagra in 458 or 457 was negligible. Not even after the Athenians had reduced Aigina by siege in 457/6 and compelled it, though nominally still within the Peloponnesian League, to pay tribute (Hill 1951, 1.5.3) did Sparta engage more energetically.

On one level the reason for Spartan abstention is quite straightforward. The Athenians' alliance with Argos (followed perhaps by a minor victory over a Spartan force at Oinoe in the Argolis: Meiggs 1972, 459–62) and their occupation of the passes through Mount Geraneia in the Megarid (1.107.3) made it virtually impossible for the Spartans to venture north of the Isthmus and return to Lakonia without risking a full-scale battle. Also perhaps relevant in this context is Thucydides' reference (1.118. 2) to the 'internal/domestic wars' by which Sparta was hindered from resisting the increase of Athenian power. On another level, however, this geographical and also perhaps

political constraint only makes Sparta's two forays into central Greece during the 'First' Peloponnesian War the more problematic and potentially revealing.

The first of these was undertaken in the early 450s, ostensibly to aid Doris, the supposed motherland of the Dorians (1.107.2; 3.92.3), against Phokis. Phokis, it has been suggested, had seized Delphi, as it certainly did in 449. However, powerfully though the Spartans could be affected by ties of sentiment and religion, it is unlikely that they were not moved equally by considerations of prestige and profit (cf. 5.105.3f.). The defection of Megara, the siege of Aigina (then still in progress) and a defeat suffered by the Corinthians in the Megarid (Hill 1951, 1.5.4) constituted a powerful challenge both to the unity of the Peloponnesian League and to Sparta's leadership of it. So powerful indeed that, notwithstanding the recent earthquake and Messenian revolt, Sparta was prepared to send out of Lakonia 1,500 of 'its own' hoplites. Despite the arguments of Holladay 1977b, Thucydides' elliptical account must surely presuppose a decision taken by Sparta and then the Peloponnesian League as a whole, although I agree that this was not necessarily a decision for war specifically against Athens. However, more important for us perhaps are the two other facets of Sparta's action.

First, what is meant by 'its own' hoplites? In 3.92.5 Thucydides uses this expression to distinguish Spartiate from Perioikic colonists of Herakleia Trachinia; but such a distinction would be inappropriate here, where the contrast being drawn is between the troops contributed by Sparta and those by its allies. As in 5.57.1 and 5.64.2, therefore, where by 'themselves' Thucydides does not refer only to Spartiates, he is describing a mixed force of Spartiate and Perioikic hoplites. Still, even if not all and perhaps not even half of the 1,500 were Spartiates, the total is high as a proportion of the allied force as a whole, indeed 'about the highest... that was likely to occur' (Ste.Croix 1972, 209). This, I believe, not only underlines the importance of the expedition of 458–457 in Spartan eyes, but also supports the views tentatively advanced in the last chapter that the earthquake had not had catastrophic demographic effects and that the Helot revolt was over by c.460.

The second major point of interest concerns the routes whereby the allied force made its way into and out of the Peloponnese. The Isthmus being blocked, it has been inferred from Thuc. 1.107.3 that it went north by sea across the Corinthian Gulf, perhaps from Pellene or Sikyon, to modern Itsea and thence *via* Amphissa to the upper Kephissos valley. The knife-edge victory over the Athenian alliance at Tanagra in Boiotia (Hill 1951, 1.5.7) facilitated its return by land through the Isthmus, but it is significant of the prevailing strategic

situation that, even if Delphi had been temporarily liberated from Phokian control, the dedication offered by the Spartans and their allies for Tanagra was apparently made not at Delphi but at Olympia alone (M/L no. 36).

In a broader perspective the Athenian defeat at Tanagra was but a momentary set-back in a quinquennium or so of resounding success. From the Lakonian point of view the most portentous Athenian undertaking in this period was the Periplous or 'sailing-round' of the Peloponnese by a fleet under Tolmides (Hill 1951, 1.5.11). Thucydides (1.108.5) gives the barest of summaries, but he does at least record that Tolmides fired the Spartan dockyards. These can only have been at Gytheion, as Diodorus (11.84. 6) states in his much more circumstantial account under the year 456/5; a sonar search offers some confirmation of the ancient report (Strabo 8.5.2, C363) of built docks here (Edgerton and Scoufopoulos 1972). They may have been inaugurated under the influence of Athens' construction at Peiraieus (1.93) or at the urging of regent Pausanias, but they can hardly have been a hive of activity as far as the actual construction or refitting of Spartan warships was concerned, given the dearth of these before the final phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War.

The rest of Diodorus' narrative of Tolmides' expedition is of uneven value. An alleged motive of personal rivalry between Tolmides and Myronides (who by defeating the Boiotians at Oinophyta in 457 had won Boiotia for Athens) is given undue prominence. But to his credit Diodorus does stress that Lakonia and Messenia had never before been ravaged and that such an exploit would depress yet more the Spartans' prestige (11.84.3) – and so, though Diodorus does not draw the conclusion, further 'destabilize' the tottering Peloponnesian alliance.

Tolmides indeed may have had even more far-reaching intentions. For apart from Gytheion he attacked and briefly held Kythera and Boiai in Lakonia (Paus. 1.27.5) and Mothone in Messenia (Diod. 11.84.6) and then sailed round to Naupaktos. Diodorus is wrong to say (11.84.7) that it was Tolmides who planted the freed Messenian rebels here, at least at this date, but Tolmides may well have anticipated Demosthenes (below) in believing that the Naupaktos Messenians could contribute essentially to a strategy which would distract, though not necessarily by itself defeat, Sparta. We recall the alleged advice of Damaratos to Xerxes to seize Kythera in 480. Thus it seems to me that the modern debate about the tactic of *epiteichismos* (or *epiteichisis*), the occupation and fortification of a promontory or island in the enemy's own territory, may have sometimes been misconceived. The question is surely not whether this tactic was discussed as a possibility at Athens so early as 432 (1.142.2; cf. 122.1) but why, since it was an obvious possibility for a naval power (Ps.-

Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 2.13), it was not in fact employed until 427. The answer, implied by Thuc. 4.3.3, seems to be that permanent occupation of a piece of enemy territory was considered too expensive; but Tolmides, I suggest, was among the first to draw the correct lesson from the great Helot revolt and to advocate *epiteichismos* as a peculiarly effective way of exploiting the antagonism between the Spartans and the Helots.

Perhaps in 449 the Spartans made their second excursion north of the Isthmus in the 'First' War. By then, however, the international situation had radically changed. In 451 a Sparta which had never been able, even if it had wished, to prosecute the war vigorously made a truce for five years with an Athens then perhaps influenced by the returned Kimon (Hill 1951, 1.5.17; Piccirilli 1973, no. 20). Soon after, early in 450 rather than late in 451, Sparta granted to Argos the Thirty Years' Truce (cf. 5.14. 4; 28.2) that Argos itself had spurned in 481 (Hdt. 7. 148.4).

This stalemate between the great powers was symbolized by the 'Second Sacred War' (Hill 1951, 1.7.1): after Sparta had (again?) wrested Delphi from Phokian control, Athens promptly returned it to their Phokian allies. In 447, however, the equilibrium was shattered. Defeated at Koroneia, the one victory over Athens that the Boiotians could boast before 424 (3.63.3; 4.92.6), the Athenians were swiftly relieved of Boiotia. Worse followed in the shape of the revolt of Euboea, an island whose economic, strategic and psychological significance for Athens was laid bare in the closing phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War. At Sparta the tails of the 'hawks', those who since 478–477 had resented and feared the growth of Athenian power and wished to see it cut down to size, were up; and when Megara too, perhaps on cue, revolted from Athens (1.114.1), the way was open for a full-scale Peloponnesian League invasion of Attika (Hill 1951, 1.7.4–5), the fifth such incursion by Dorians (cf. Hdt. 5.77), the first by the League properly so called. But with Athens apparently at his mercy King Pleistoanax tamely withdrew from Attika and was later exiled on a charge of having been bribed by the Athenians (2.21.1).

The real bribe, however, may not have been monetary but 'the offer to surrender, or to discuss the surrender of, Megara, Troizen and Achaia' (Gomme 1956, 74; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 196–200). For in the winter of 446–445 Sparta and Athens concluded a Thirty Years' Peace whereby each side recognized the hegemony of the other, on land and by sea respectively (Hill 1951, 1.7.7). Athens, we note, retained Naupaktos and – a major gain from the war – Aigina. Argos was not a party to the treaty, but specific provision was made for the eventuality of its establishing friendly relations with Athens (Paus. 5.23.4).

Sparta entered into the peace from a bargaining position crucially

weakened by what some Spartans took to be the too ready compliance of Pleistoanax and his adviser. The peace, however, might have been expected to preserve the status quo about the Isthmus that had been so rudely disturbed by the defection of Megara. In the event, it lasted for only fourteen of its intended thirty years. For in 432 Sparta voted that the Athenians had broken their oaths and in 431 began 'the' Peloponnesian War by invading Attika once again. 'What made war inevitable', wrote Thucydides (1.23.6), 'was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta', a judgement he repeats in different words and with some amplifications. It was not, he says (1.88), the specific grievances which Sparta's allies Corinth, Megara and Aigina brought forward against Athens so much as Athens' growing power that influenced the Spartan vote for war. By 432, he adds (1.118.2), Athens' power had reached the point where it had begun to encroach upon and disrupt the Spartan alliance, particularly the Peloponnesian League, a situation Sparta found intolerable. Again, looking back from the vantage point of 413, Thucydides (7.18.2) says that the Spartans themselves then thought that in 432 the fault (*sc.* for breaking the peace) lay more on their side and that 'there was some justice in the misfortunes they had suffered' since 431, a remarkable admission on many counts, not least because it involved the retrospective recognition that Apollo's approval (1.118.3) had not turned the conflict into a 'just war' (contrast the view of Thucydides' Corinthians: 1.123).

The judgment of Thucydides on the origins of the war is still today, no less than in antiquity, monumentally controversial (e.g. Sealey 1975). But readers of Ste. Croix 1972 should at least be convinced that, whether or not Thucydides was right, his judgment is at least consistent with his portrayal of Sparta's behaviour in 432. That is to say, in contrast to 479, when it was 'chiefly because they were urged on by their allies' (1.90.1) that the Spartans had tried to prevent the rebuilding of Athens' walls, in 432 they took their decision for war chiefly through fear for their own position, specifically for fear that the Peloponnesian League might break up and so expose Lakonia to the kind of devastating invasion that did in fact occur in 370. In this judgment I believe Thucydides to have been essentially correct, although his own jejune narrative of the period 445–433 has made some historians wonder why he could have thought Athens' power was growing then.

The answer to this apparent puzzle is, I suggest, to be found in Thucydides' attitude to the challenge to Athenian domination in the Aegean thrown down by Samos between 440 and 439. He bestows his longest treatment of any episode in the *Pentekontaetia* on this challenge (1.115.2–117), which (in the words of Athenian democrats

in 411) had 'come very close to depriving the Athenians of their control of the sea' (8.76.4f.; cf. 73.4; 86.4; 98.4). In other words, if even the most powerful of Athens' subject-allies could not shake the grip of Athens on its Empire, there was small chance of any other ally's loosening it. Thus the suppression of Samos, together with the terms of surrender imposed (the Samians 'pulled down their walls, gave hostages, handed over their fleet, and agreed to pay reparations in instalments at regular intervals'), could be seen as a great advance in Athenian power. The effect at Sparta will have been to play once more into the hands of the 'hawks'. Indeed, it is probable that already in 441–140 the Spartans had voted to aid the Samians and so break the peace after only four years. To the arguments of Ste. Croix (1972, 117, 143, 200–3) we may perhaps add one drawn from the special relationship between Sparta and Samos – or rather between certain Spartan and Samian aristocrats – that had existed perhaps since the Second Messenian War.

In 432 the immediate occasion of Sparta's vote was Corinth's bringing into the open at Sparta its grievances against Athens over its colonies Kerkyra and Poteidaia. Corinth was not the only ally of Sparta with grievances, but Thucydides underlines Corinth's cardinal role within the Peloponnesian League by writing speeches for 'the Corinthians' alone of the allies both at the meeting of the Spartan Assembly which voted for war (1.68–71) and at the subsequent Peloponnesian League Congress which confirmed the Spartans' decision (1.120–4). How far Thucydidean speeches correspond to speeches actually delivered is another of those eternally vexed problems of Thucydidean scholarship, but fortunately in the case of the first Corinthian speech we need not trouble ourselves too much over this, given Thucydides' own personally expressed judgment of why Sparta voted for war. Instead, we may select what seem to me the two most revealing points made by 'the Corinthians' – that, if Sparta does not vote for war, they will look for 'another alliance' (1.71.4); and that Sparta's 'whole way of life is out of date when compared with theirs (sc. the Athenians)' (1.71.2; cf. 70).

The first of these points raises the whole question of diplomatic relations within the Peloponnesian League and between the League or its individual members and Athens or Argos. An ancient commentator on 1.71.4 inferred that Corinth was threatening to secede from the League and ally itself with Argos, and his view receives *prima facie* support from the diplomatic situation in 421 (below). However, as Ste. Croix (1972, 60) has pointed out, in 432 Argos' truce with Sparta still had more than a decade to run and in the event Argos showed no sign of willingness to break it. His alternative suggestion, that Corinth contemplated a separate alliance with Athens, may seem somewhat

implausible. But students of Middle Eastern affairs in late 1977 were presented with a no less extraordinary diplomatic volte-face; indeed, there was even talk of a 'separate peace' between Egypt and Israel, which could hardly be said to be less ideologically and politically opposed to each other than Corinth and Athens.

The second point, about the archaic character of the Spartan way of life, takes us back to the alleged 'death' of Spartan high culture. It was argued at the end of [Chapter 9](#) that this process had been either misdescribed or misconstrued but that by the time of Herodotus Spartan society had been reorganized along almost exclusively military lines, partly to palliate the disparities of private wealth among citizens and so abort civil strife, partly to compensate for shrinking citizen military manpower in face of the Helot threat. It is therefore entirely appropriate that Thucydides' Corinthians should draw an analogy between archaism in politics and archaism in the arts and crafts: for, according to Herodotus (2. 167.2), the Corinthians – upper-class Corinthians, that is – were of the Greeks the least unfavourably disposed towards the practitioners of manual crafts, the Spartans the most contemptuous of all. Herodotus himself adds a telling commentary on the anachronistic ossification of Spartan society. For Sparta is the only Greek state which he treats 'ethnographically' by describing some of the 'customs of the Spartans' (6.56–60) as if they were a 'barbarian' or non-Greek people. Indeed, he specifically remarks of one aspect of the elaborate funeral rites of Spartan kings that it was common to pretty well all non-Greek peoples.

It was also suggested in [Chapter 9](#) that the military reorganization of Spartan society was to be associated with the remarkable passion for horseracing attested by the outstanding record of rich Spartans in the four-horse chariot-race at Olympia between c.550 and 370. The palm or rather wreath must go to Euagoras, who in the late sixth century won at three successive Olympics with the same team of mares (Hdt. 6.103.4). But no less noteworthy in its own way, and for our purposes yet more informative, is the *curriculum vitae* of Damonon and his son preserved on a stele of the third quarter of the fifth century, precisely the period to which the remarks of 'the Corinthians' refer (Jeffery 1961, 196f., 201, no. 52; Schwartz 1976). The stele, originally set up in the sanctuary of Athena on the Spartan akropolis, records among other victories the well over thirty won by Damonon in horse-races at Lakonian festivals held in both Spartan and Perioikic territory: the Pohoidaia at Sparta, Helos and Thouria; the Athenaia and Ariontia (?) at Sparta (?); the Eleusinia at modern Kalyvia tis Sochas; the Lithesia near Cape Malea (?); and the Parparonia in the Thyreatis (on the site of the great victory over the Argives in c.545).

One can think of few better ways by which a Spartan might at once take advantage of the political unification of Lakonia and Messenia and emphasize his economic superiority over his Perioikic rivals and subjects. As if to ram the point home, Damonon stresses that his victorious teams were bred in his own stables.

Thucydides' Corinthians were of course concerned not with local Lakonian economics and politics but with the effect of the Spartans' outmoded way of life on their perception (or lack of it) of shifts in the contemporary diplomatic constellation. Thucydides himself, however, clearly believed that their general point had a yet wider, indeed almost a universal, application. For the contrast between stick-in-the-mud Sparta and go-ahead Athens drawn by 'the Corinthians' in 432 is one to which he recurs in different contexts and for various purposes throughout his history. One of the most revealing of these passages occurs near the end of the work as we have it (8.96.5): 'Athens, particularly as a naval power, was enormously helped by the very great difference in the national characters – her speed against their slowness, her enterprise as against their lack of initiative. This was shown by the Syracusans (sc. during the Sicilian expedition of 415–413, below), who were most like the Athenians in character and fought best against them.'

In fact, though, the Spartans were not absolutely slow, and in the type of situation exemplified in 432, when they felt 'compelled' to go to war in the sense that the alternatives to fighting were intolerable, they had never been slow at all (1.118.2, with Ste. Croix 1972, 94f.). And although Thucydides' retrospective judgment on the degree of Spartan success down to 411 does of course hold good, it is doubtful whether even he would have predicted this in 432 on the basis of the difference in national characters. At any rate, it is certain that the Corinthians had no such notions in 432. On the contrary they, like the majority of Greeks, confidently expected that, if the Spartan alliance invaded Attika annually shortly before the grain-harvest, Athens would be unable to hold out for more than three years at the outside (7.28.3; cf. 4.85.2; 5.14.3). It was not the least of the many paradoxes of 'the' Peloponnesian War that this confidence was largely misplaced. Let us therefore briefly review the strategy of the war.

On the Spartan side there is relatively little controversy. Since the Persian Wars of 480–479 it had been dogma, both inside and outside the alliance, that an invasion of Attika was the optimum method of bending Athens to its enemies' will. Moreover, in 432, Sparta as aggressor was bound to adopt such a primarily offensive strategy aimed at eliminating the threat posed by Athens to its hegemony of the Peloponnesian League; and as a land power heading an alliance mostly composed of primarily land-orientated states Sparta was bound

to play to its strength. The Athenians, it was calculated, would either refuse a pitched battle and so lose their crops and be starved into submission or be demoralized into risking a battle they would assuredly lose. The naval aspect of Spartan strategy was emphatically secondary for the simple reason that the Spartan alliance could not pack enough nautical punch and lacked sufficient expertise in naval warfare to threaten Athenian supremacy at sea. As late as 411 the inhabitants of Iasos on the south coast of Asia Minor could not believe that the fleet advancing on them was not Athenian (8.28.2). Instead, therefore, the Spartans relied on words rather than deeds to break the cohesion of the Athenian war-effort. To exacerbate existing discontent within the Athenian Empire, they proclaimed that their aim in the war was to liberate Athens' allies from the yoke of the 'tyrant' city (esp. 2.8.4).

The strategy of Athens, by contrast, remains controversial. Thucydides' representation of it cannot be fully discussed here because it forms part of the wider problem of the composition of the history. But the narrower question, that of the balance intended or struck by Athens between offence and defence, must be raised. To Thucydides the architect of Athenian strategy at the outbreak of war was Perikles, who spoke first at a meeting of the Assembly called when the Peloponnesians were on the point of invading Attika in 431 and gave the Athenians 'just the same advice as he had given before. This was that they were to prepare for war and bring into the city their property in the country. They were not to go out and offer battle, but were to come inside the city and guard it. Their navy, in which their strength lay, was to be brought to the highest state of efficiency, and their allies were to be handled firmly, since, he said, the strength of Athens came from the money paid in tribute by their allies, and victory in war depended on a combination of intelligent resolution and financial resources' (2.13. 2; cf. 65.7). The allied tribute was of course employed to finance the fleet, but what is left unclear in Thucydides is what role or roles Perikles envisaged for the fleet thus financed and mobilized. Was it to be used mainly defensively to keep the allies in hand and so preserve Athens' lifeline, the sea-lanes along which travelled the merchantmen carrying wheat from the Crimea to the Peiraieus? Or did Perikles also plan a major offensive role for fleets to be sent round the Peloponnese in order to ravage and even occupy the territory of Sparta's coastal allies and that of Sparta itself?

In the early books Thucydides lays the emphasis squarely on the first of these alternatives in line with the overwhelmingly defensive aura he imparts to Periklean strategy as a whole. The only passage with a different colouring is 3.17, but its authenticity is often – and reasonably – contested. In Book 6, however, after describing the

Athenian armada prepared against Sicily in 415 as 'by a long way the most costly and the finest-looking force of Greek troops that up to that time had ever come from a single city' (6.31.1), he points out that in numbers of ships it was no larger than the Athenian fleet of 430. From this and other indications scholars have inferred that Thucydides underestimated the role Perikles had allotted to sea-borne raids (cf. Westlake 1969, 84–100).

That may be true, but we should not, I think, allow this to outweigh Thucydides' view that Periklean strategy taken as a whole was preponderantly defensive in intention. For if we follow his judgment on the origins of the war (as interpreted above), it was enough for Athens as the aggrieved party to 'win' the war if it simply survived the annual Spartan onslaughts by land and, by keeping a firm hold on its alliance, maintained a supply of foreign grain sufficient to feed a population temporarily deprived of part of the produce of its own territory. Indeed, this is precisely what Perikles is made by Thucydides to say to the Athenian Assembly in 432, 431 and 430 (1.144.1; 2.13.9; 62.1; cf. 65.7), when he recommended his strategy as one that entailed suffering but would enable Athens, not to win an outright victory, but to 'win through' (cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 208).

And so it proved, at least in the first phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War from 431 to 421, which is sometimes known as the 'Archidamian War'. Thucydides of course could never have used this title (and in fact refers descriptively to 'the Ten Years' War': 5.25.1; 26.3). For not only did Archidamos die about halfway through the decade, but, if Thucydides represents him with substantial fidelity (see, however, Westlake 1968, 123–5), he actually opposed the majority Spartan view of Athens in 432 and advised that war should at least be postponed until Sparta was ready for it (1.80–5, esp. 83). It is of course possible that Thucydides the 'artful reporter' (Hunter 1973) used Archidamos to foreshadow dramatically the actual course of the initial phase of the war. On the other hand, as a guest-friend of Perikles and the most experienced Spartan general (though not in warfare against Athens), Archidamos was perhaps the best placed of the Spartans to evaluate the relative strengths of the two sides; and his experiences as general in the 460s may well have made him a 'dual hegemony' theorist and a supporter of the Thirty Years' Peace.

However that may be, Archidamos led the first three invasions of Attika, until in 427 he stood down in favour of the Agiad regent and in 426 was replaced by his son and Eurypontid successor, Agis II. The invasion of 430, though only lasting about forty days, was the longest of all (2.57.2), while the first, taking a maximum of thirty-five, is said to have continued 'a long time' (2.19.2). They were so short simply because they could last only as long as did the supplies the

Peloponnesians brought with them or found in Attika. It was part of the amateurism of hoplite warfare that an army was expected to live literally from hand to mouth (Pritchett 1974, 1, ch.2). In these circumstances it is not surprising that the invasions did no permanent and irretrievable damage, and that the damage they did cause was as much psychological as material.

Indirectly, however, they were responsible for the devastating effects of the greatest unforeseen accident of the Ten Years' War, the plague which first hit Athens in 430 (2.47.3–54; 3.87; cf. 6.12.1; 26.2; and generally 1.23.3). The concentration of population in the city of Athens in insanitary conditions aggravated the plague's virulence, and this further sapped the morale of a people already severely depressed by seeing their property destroyed under their noses. In fact, so powerful became the depression that envoys were sent to Sparta to treat for peace (2.59.1; 4.21.1), until a speech of Perikles (2.60–4; cf. 65.2), combined with 'hawkish' Spartan intransigence, convinced the Athenians that such diplomacy was pointless.

Not everything, however, went the way of Sparta in the first years of the war. For apart from mounting annual counter-raids on the Megarid and reducing Poteidaia eventually in 429 Athens had been notably active by sea round the Peloponnese. In 431, shortly after the first Peloponnesian invasion of Attika had begun, an Athenian fleet of 100 ships carrying 1,000 hoplites was despatched (2.23.2). Diodorus (12.43.1) mentions an attack on the Argolis, but Thucydides chooses to record only the raid on Perioikic Mothone in Messenia. The town was apparently fortified but not garrisoned, since the Spartans sent a mobile detachment (*phroura*) under the brilliant Brasidas to defend it (2.25.1f.). Gomme (1956, 84f.) did not believe that the Athenians intended Mothone to become their first *epiteichismos*, and he is probably right, since Mothone is rather far from the main object of such a tactic, the Helots working the central Pamisos valley. It is, however, highly significant, in the light of subsequent events, that among Athens' allies at Mothone were Messenians from Naupaktos. Moreover, after the Peloponnesians had withdrawn from Attika the Athenians 'established and garrisoned positions both by land and sea, with the intention of keeping these up for the duration of the war' (2.24.1). One of these positions was certainly Salamis (2.93.4); others may have been Aigina, from which the Athenians expelled the inhabitants in 431 and replaced them with their own colonists (2.27.1; cf. 8.69.1), and Naupaktos itself (2.69).

In 430 precisely the same response was made to the second Peloponnesian invasion of Attika (2.56), but this time Thucydides gives more details. First stop was Epidaurus, which lay *en route* to Argos and was friendly to Sparta; then Troizen, Halieis and Hermione;

and finally Lakonian Prasiai. Like Mothone, Prasiai was seemingly fortified but ungarrisoned; but the Spartans appear not to have sent a defence force and the Athenians captured and sacked the *polis* (2.56.6). Although Prasiai lay at the end of a difficult route of communication with the Eurotas valley, there was little profit in occupying it permanently. Naval raids were the best way of harming one of Sparta's more important Perioikic subjects, and to judge from some lines of Aristophanes' play *Peace* (242f.) invoking 'thrice-wretched Prasiai' they seem to have been effective.

In 429 the Spartans did not invade Attika, and the Athenians did not send a fleet round the Peloponnese until early in Thucydides' 'winter' (November to February). Instead, the Spartans laid siege to Plataia, whose eventual capitulation in 427, followed by a notorious instance of Spartan bad faith (3.68.4), helped to thwart Athenian designs on Boiotia in 424. The fleet that went round the Peloponnese late in 429 (thereby incidentally helping to diminish the terrors of Cape Malea outside the official sailing season) was commanded by Phormion, who used Naupaktos as a base to block fleets sailing from Corinth (2.83) and resoundingly demonstrated Athenian naval superiority by crushing a much larger Peloponnesian fleet.

Against the view of Brunt (1965, 271) that 'if Perikles set high hopes on the effectiveness of such attacks (sc. by sea on the Peloponnesian coast), this only shows that... he overestimated the potency of maritime superiority', I would point out first that the Spartans were persuaded to prepare a second fleet against Phormion in 429 precisely because they thought they might thereby 'make it more difficult for the Athenians to send their fleets round the Peloponnese' (2.80.1). In 428 their resolve can only have been confirmed by an Athenian expedition under Phormion's son which ravaged several places in 'Lakonike' (3.7.1-2) and a later one of 100 ships (as in 431 and 430) which landed at will in the Peloponnese and ravaged the Spartan Perioikis (specifically so called by Thucydides at 3.16.2). Second, the decision of the Spartans in 426 to found a colony in Trachis (Herakleia Trachinia: 3.92-3) should be taken as a firm indication that they were by then aware that land invasions of Attika would not alone win the war. For Herakleia was envisaged partly as a base for naval operations against Euboia, and partly as a way-station *en route* to Athens' allies in Thrace. As Gomme (1956, 395) remarks, 'clearly we can see the mind of Brasidas behind this.'

The Athenians' use of *epiteichismos* on the island of Minoa off Megara in 427 (3.51) marked a turning-point in the Ten Years' War. Thucydides, as we have noted, represents Athenian strategy in the first years as essentially that of Perikles. The great man, however, died of the plague in 429, and Thucydides in the course of a summary of

Perikles' influence written at least in part after 404 commented that his successors as democratic leaders entirely reversed the essentially defensive direction of his strategy (2.65.8). This judgment is hardly sustained even by Thucydides' own narrative, at least of the Ten Years' War (Gomme 1951, 70f., 76–80), and Perikles' followers, if not Perikles himself, may well have contemplated *epiteichismos*. Thucydides, though, tells us nothing about any debates over strategy there may have been in Athens after Perikles' death, so we can only guess that in 427 *epiteichismos* had been promoted from a longer-term to a short-term objective. Among the men elected general who actively favoured this tactic I would single out Nikias, who completed the first *epiteichismos*, and Demosthenes. Between them, by employing the tactic in Messenia and Lakonia, they very nearly won the war for Athens in the full sense, although the element of chance should not be overlooked. Historians have perhaps underestimated the extent to which such a tactic was the logical one to employ against Sparta in the light of its geographical situation and the course of its history since the Persian Wars.

Demosthenes makes his first appearance in Thucydides in the summer of 426 as one of the commanders of a fleet sent round the Peloponnese (3.91.1). His career as general in Aitolia in 426–425 was chequered, though ultimately successful, but its main significance for the future was that it brought him (like Tolmides and Phormion before him) into a close working relationship with the Naupaktos Messenians, for whose strategic and tactical skills he conceived a healthy respect. It was they who persuaded him to undertake the Aitolian campaign on the grounds that the Aitolians constituted a threat to Naupaktos (3.94.3; 95.1); one of their number acted as guide (3.98.1); their hoplites played a crucial role in the decisive battle with the Aitolians and Peloponnesians (3.108.1); finally, and not least, their Doric speech was for the first time used to confound Doric-speaking adversaries, in this instance the Ambrakiots (3.112.4). It was perhaps to mark these exploits that the Naupaktos Messenians erected a monument in the Athenian portico at Delphi (M/L, p.244). A similar offering at Olympia is perhaps to be dated about five years later (M/L no.74).

With 425 we reach the episode which more than any other before the abortive conspiracy of Kinadon in c.399 unmasks the realities of life in Lakonia and Messenia and so exposes Spartan priorities in decision-making to the glare, as unusual as it was unwelcome, of publicity: the Pylos affair – or 'disaster' as it seemed to the Spartans (4.15.1; 7.71.7). Reverting superficially to the pattern established in 431 and 430, the Spartans led an invasion of Attika in the spring, to which the Athenians responded with an expedition round the

Peloponnese (4.2.1f.). For once, however, Thucydides permits us some insight into the character of Athenian policy since Perikles' departure. This Athenian fleet had for its main objective an intervention in Sicily (where Athenian forces had been engaged since 427), but *en route* to Sicily it was to settle the vicious civil war in Kerkyra that had raged since 427, and *en route* to Kerkyra it was envisaged that Demosthenes might make some special use of the fleet on the Peloponnesian coast (4.2.4). 'No wonder', comments Gomme (1956, 438), 'that Athens had little success in Sicily.' What concerns us is the role of Demosthenes.

According to Thucydides (4.3.2), who seems to have had Demosthenes for a source, he had joined the expedition expressly to conduct an *epiteichismos* at Pylos on the west coast of Messenia. The discrepancy between this specific statement and the vague wording of 4.2.4 is ambiguous: Demosthenes may have wished to keep secret the location of his intended fortification or he may have felt that the majority of the Athenian Assembly would not share his views on Pylos. At any rate, neither his two fellow-commanders nor the junior officers nor the other ranks were convinced by the array of arguments he adduced *in situ* in support of his project (4.3.2f.): that Pylos possessed abundant timber and stone; that its situation was naturally strong; that it was unguarded; that it had a harbour close by; and finally that the Naupaktos Messenians, who knew the terrain and spoke the same language as the Spartans, would both provide a reliable garrison and do great damage to the surrounding country. The last of these arguments strongly suggests that Demosthenes was acting on the advice of the Naupaktos Messenians, whose motivation is implicit in Thucydides' description of Pylos as lying in 'the land that was once Messenia' (4.3.3; cf. 41.2). (Thucydides is wrong, however, to place Pylos at 400 stades from Sparta; by the easiest route *via* Oresthasion in south-west Arkadia it is some 600 stades or 90 kilometres.)

In the event, the only unanswerable argument in Demosthenes' favour was provided by an opportune storm, the second most portentous accident of the Ten Years' War. The Spartans at the time (May/June) were celebrating a festival and, confident that they would easily storm the Athenian fortification (it had been hastily erected and was manned by a few soldiers; there was not much grain in the place), merely informed the Peloponnesians, who were then encamped in Attika, of the occupation. Agis, however, perceptively and promptly withdrew from Attika, and a Spartan force was immediately despatched to Pylos, where it joined up with the nearest of the *Perioikoi* (presumably those of Mothone and Kyparissia). The other Lakedaimonians who had returned from Attika (presumably Lakonian *Perioikoi*) were slower to respond (4.8.1). Sparta's Peloponnesian

allies were also summoned and the Peloponnesian fleet of sixty ships was recalled from Kerkyra.

Against them the Athenians despatched a fleet of fifty ships from Zakynthos, including some from Naupaktos, to supplement the five left with Demosthenes when the rest had continued on to Kerkyra. The reinforcements anchored off the unguarded island of Prote which served as the harbour of Kyparissia. Before their arrival, however, and presumably by prior arrangement, Demosthenes was joined by forty hoplites of the Naupaktos Messenians. The Spartans meanwhile sent over hoplites in relays to garrison the island of Sphakteria, Thucydides' ignorance of whose topography argues against autopsy (4.8.6, with Gomme 1956, 484). When their fleet arrived, some ships were detached to fetch timber from Asine for siege – engines (4.13.1); there are the remains of extensive oak-forests on the hills west of modern Koroni.

This stalemate continued until the Athenians by a victory at sea as it were put the Spartans permanently in check by taking their queen. For cut off on Sphakteria was one of the relays of hoplites, 420 men (4.8.7, 9). The significance of the composition of this garrison for the organization of the Spartan army and the development of Spartan society will be considered at length below. In the immediate context what matters is the electrifying effect the potential loss of citizen hoplites had on the Spartan authorities. Treating the matter as a 'disaster', they concluded a local armistice and sent ambassadors to Athens to negotiate for the release of 'the men'. The terms of the armistice (4.16) were manifestly one-sided, only one clause – that forbidding the Athenians to land on Sphakteria – restricting the Athenians' freedom of movement. The Spartans on their side handed over all their remaining ships at Pylos and further agreed to place in Athenian custody all their warships from elsewhere in 'Lakonike' (meaning presumably those at Asine and perhaps also Gytheion); in all, sixty ships were surrendered. They contracted not to attack the Athenian fortification and to send over to the blockaded garrison on Sphakteria only moderate and perishable rations (two Attic *choinikes* of barley meal, two *kotylai* of wine and some meat for each soldier; half-rations for each servant).

The speech written by Thucydides for the ambassadors to Athens (4.17–20) is the most telling possible comment on the course of the war to 425, and best illustrates the foresight displayed in their different ways by Perikles and Demosthenes. Yet again one wishes one could be sure how closely Thucydides stuck to the original. The ambassadors begin with 'the men on the island' (4.17.1; cf. 19.1), their chief though not their only cause for anxiety. They continue with an unmistakable reminiscence of the fundamental provision of the

Thirty Years' Peace, over whose alleged breach Sparta had gone to war in 431: 'You (sc. Athenians) are now in a position where you can turn your present good fortune to good use, keeping what you hold.. ..' The idea had already been present to the Spartans' mind in 427 (3.52.2), and it is even possible that they had actually made a proposal for peace on these terms towards the end of 426 (Gomme 1956, 391). Anyway, a little later in the speech the idea is made explicit by an appeal to the 'dual hegemony' thesis: 'if we, Athens and Sparta, stand together, you can be sure that the rest of Hellas, in its inferior position, will show us every possible mark of honour' (4.20; cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 1082).

To bring out the full import of this speech the comment of Gomme (1956, 459f.) cannot be bettered: after 'a war begun with so many hopes, such high-sounding promises, such favour from the greater part of the Greek world, and continued with a series of miserable failures and but one success, the inglorious victory over Plataia', the Spartans, for the sake of a handful of men, were reduced to making 'an empty and, almost certainly, a vain offer' (sc. of peace, alliance and friendship: 4.19.1). So much for the avenging of the injuries done by Athens to Sparta's allies. So much for the 'liberation' of the Greeks from the Athenian yoke.

The rest of the story is more quickly told. The Athenian Assembly, then influenced mainly by Kleon (whose stature cannot be truly grasped because of Thucydides' transparent animosity towards him), refused to negotiate. The armistice at Pylos ended, and the Athenians robbed Sparta of its (mainly allied) fleet by refusing to hand back the ships in their custody. The Athenian blockade of Sphakteria was prolonged, however, both by the difficulties of the Athenians' own position (esp. 4.29.1) and by desperate Spartan counter-measures. The most notable, and drastic, of the latter was the unprecedented offer of freedom to any Helot who would take over supplies (4.26.5).

Eventually Kleon secured an extraordinary personal command, resigned to him by Nikias, and, thanks chiefly to the experience of Demosthenes (4.30.1) and the local knowledge of the Naupaktos Messenians (4.36.1), succeeded in storming the Sphakteria garrison remarkably quickly. To the astonishment of the Greek world (nicely captured by the anecdote in 4.40.2) the 292 survivors, of whom only about 120 were Spartan citizens (4.38.5), surrendered rather than fight to the death. They were taken back to Athens and used as hostages for Sparta's good behaviour; their physical presence is attested by the find of one of their shields in the Agora, where it had originally been hung in the Painted Stoa (Cartledge 1977, 13 n. 14). It was these prisoners, or rather the Spartiates among them, who did most to hamstring the Spartan effort in the remainder of the Ten

Years' War.

Sparta's troubles, though, had only begun. The fortification at Pylos was garrisoned with Naupaktos Messenians, who, as Demosthenes had predicted, channelled their nationalist' aspirations, knowledge of the terrain and Doric speech into successful guerrilla warfare, of which the Spartans had had no previous experience. So successful indeed was this warfare that the Messenian Helots began to desert in sufficient numbers to conjure up the spectre, always lurking in the Spartan subconscious, of a full-scale Helot revolt (4.41.3).

For some time, perhaps until the conclusion of an armistice in 423, the Spartans continued to send embassies to Athens to get back Pylos and 'the men' (cf. Aristoph. *Peace* 665ff.). But the Athenians not unnaturally were at first unwilling to do any deals. Rather they redoubled their efforts at *epiteichismos*. Later in 425 a large fleet under Nikias attacked the Corinthia and Epidauros; and Methana between Epidauros and Troizen was permanently fortified (4.45.1f.). It has been suggested that Nikias was merely anxious not to be outshone by Kleon and Demosthenes, but his exploits of 424, for which the ground had been carefully prepared, argue that he had perceived the wisdom of their strategy and felt it could profitably be extended to Lakonia.

For 424 was the first year of the war in which the major sea-borne campaign was directed specifically against Lakonia. Nikias' colleague in joint command of a fleet of sixty ships was Autokles son of Tolmaios. He may have been a relative of Tolmides (Davies 1971, no. 2717), and, if so, the kinship may not be irrelevant, since the primary objective of the expedition was the capture of Kythera, a feat Tolmides had accomplished in c.456–455. It appears from an inscription that Nikias received 100 talents for the expedition and that it departed in about the second week of May, a favourable time for the rounding of Malea with the Etesian wind blowing from the north-east.

Thucydides notes that the inhabitants of Kythera are Lakedaimonian Perioikoi, who are governed by an officer (called 'harmost' in a fourth-century inscription: *IG* V.1.937) sent out annually from Sparta with a garrison of hoplites from the mainland. He does not say when the Spartans had instituted this method of control, which was not normally applied to other Perioikic communities; but, if it did not go back to the mid-sixth century, Tolmides' Periplus provides an obvious occasion. Certainly it appears to have been a necessary precaution (if an ineffective one) during the Ten Years' War, since Nikias had been able to enter secretly into discussions with 'some Kytherians' (4.54.3).

It is tempting to infer from a general remark of Thucydides (3.82.1) about civil strife progressively convulsing practically the whole Greek world after 427 that these fifth-columnist Kytherians were in some

sense democratically inclined. But they may simply have wished to use the Athenians to secure independence from the Spartans, who, as is implied by the alleged advice of Damaratos to Xerxes, were well aware of the strategic implication of Kythera's geographical situation. For apart from being a port of call for merchantmen from Egypt and Libya, Kythera also offered a convenient base for raids on Lakonia by sea, the only method of harming the region, as Thucydides (4.53.3) emphatically notes – since, that is, the land-route through the Peloponnese was normally shut off. In 424 Kythera was besides the one link the Athenians needed to complete a chain of bases around the Peloponnese: Aigina, Minoa, Methana, Pylos, Zakynthos, Naupaktos and Kerkyra were already in their control; Nisaia off Megara was soon to be added (4.69).

Nikias divided his fleet in two and made separate landings, the main one at Skandeia, which he occupied and garrisoned, the other at 'the part of the island that faces Malea' (4.54.1), that is either at Ay. Pelayia on the northeast (Gomme 1956, 733) or near Diakophti much further south (G.L. Huxley in Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 38). The latter force advanced on (and presumably took) the upper town of Kythera itself, notwithstanding the Spartan garrison, which indeed is conspicuous by its absence from the narrative and had perhaps been withdrawn to forestall a repetition of the Sphakteria debacle.

Using Kythera as a base, the Athenians made wide-ranging raids on most of the coastal settlements in the Lakonian Gulf over a period of seven days. Asine (near Skoutari bay: this is the only certain reference to Lakonian Asine in ancient literature), Helos, Kotyrta and Aphroditia are mentioned by name (4.54; 56.1). To increase the Spartans' embarrassment, the Athenians also made raids round Malea on the eastern coast of Lakonia, first at Epidauros Limera and then at Thyrea. The latter had a double point, because Aiginetan refugees had been settled here in 431. Thyrea was captured, looted, burnt and not apparently rebuilt. All Aiginetan captives were put to death at Athens, but the commander of the Spartan garrison and some Kytherian hostages suffered the milder fate of the 'men from the island' (4.57.3f.). Finally, Kythera became a tribute-paying member of the Athenian Empire at the rate of four talents a year, although no record of actual payments survives on stone.

To counteract these raids, the Spartans could not follow the example of the Corinthians in 425 and muster a single force for a decisive battle (4.42–4), but, as in 431 for Mothone, despatched mobile garrisons to various key points (e.g. Thyrea, as we have seen). They also took the extraordinary step of raising a small force of cavalry and archers, a sign of the exceptional nature of the situation as it was apprehended at Sparta. For, as Thucydides is careful to

remark – and to underline by employing his favourite comparison between the Spartan and Athenian national characters – the Spartans were now more timid and hesitant than ever. They had suffered a great and unexpected disaster on Sphakteria; Pylos and Kythera were in enemy hands; and the Athenians were making lightning raids on their own territory (4.55.1f.). Indeed, the situation was so grave that the Spartans feared ‘there might be a revolution’. It is probable that, as in 425, what the Spartans mainly feared was a Helot revolt, but Thucydides’ wording does not exclude civil strife within the Spartan citizen body, the one thing the ‘Lykourgan’ system was at such pains to prevent.

In this desperate crisis even the cautious Spartans were bound to review critically the course of the war so far and to draw radical conclusions. Such was the fertile soil into which Brasidas could sow the seeds of a new and more profitable approach. The ground for his Thracian expedition had been laid by the foundation of Herakleia Trachinia and by the long since (1.56.2) wavering loyalty of Athens’ Thraceward allies, whose importance lay chiefly in their control of crucial raw materials like shipbuilding timber. Even so Brasidas failed to receive the wholehearted Spartan support that he required and – so Thucydides (4.81.2) fervently believed – richly deserved. The reason emerges later: the ‘leading men’ of Sparta were jealous of Brasidas, and besides it was not clear to them how Brasidas’ Thracian excursion would help to secure their main objective in the war since 425, the return of ‘the men from the island’ (4.108.7).

It is of course regrettable for the historian of ancient Sparta at this and many other junctures that ‘Sparta did not wash her linen in public’ (Gomme 1956, 358; cf. Brunt 1965, 278–80). But it seems certain that it was a mixture of this selfish jealousy with patriotic prudence, actual necessity and perhaps financial stringency which explains the composition of Brasidas’ army – 700 Helots and 1,000 Peloponnesian mercenaries. The Helots selected presumably had had some military experience as armour-bearers and were of proven loyalty, but this time they were equipped as hoplites by the state, the first known instance of this remarkable procedure; and they were despatched, if Thucydides is right, expressly because the Spartans were anxious to get some Helots out of the country (4.80.5). The reason for their anxiety is given earlier in the same chapter, when Thucydides repeats (there are clear signs of a lack of revision at this point) that the Spartans were afraid of a Helot revolt, and then goes on to retail what is possibly the single most illuminating episode bearing on Spartano-Helot relations (4.80.2–4).

With Pylos in Athenian hands, Thucydides says, the Spartans wanted a good pretext for sending some Helots out of Lakonia or

(Thucydides' Greek is ambiguous) they had good reason to send them. For they feared the unyielding character of the Helots (or, according to a variant reading, their youthful impetuosity). Then Thucydides inserts the famous parenthesis already considered in [Chapter 10](#) (again, however, the Greek is ambiguous): 'Spartan policy is always mainly governed by the necessity of taking precautions against the helots' (Ste. Croix) or 'most of the relations between the Lacedaimonians and the Helots were of an eminently precautionary character' (Gomme). Even if Gomme's interpretation of Thucydides' word-order is correct, I would still subscribe to the broader version of the generalization.

Next, Thucydides describes the Spartans' action. They made a proclamation that the Helots should select from among themselves those who thought they had best served Sparta in the wars. The implication of the proclamation was that these Helots were to be freed (like those who had volunteered to take over provisions to Sphakteria), but the real intention was to sort out the most obdurate dissidents, who, the Spartans anticipated, would be the first to put themselves forward. The Helots selected about 2,000 from their number, who crowned themselves with wreaths and made a progress of the local sanctuaries as if they were freed. The Spartans, however, 'liquidated' them (presumably at night), and no one knew how (a journalistic exaggeration designed to convey the secrecy and enormity of this mass execution; Plutarch, *Lyk.* 28.6, makes the educated guess that the Krypteia was responsible). No doubt this 'necessary' measure was to some degree exceptional, and a reflection of the critical post-Pylos situation in Lakonia; but, I repeat, Thucydides chose this episode as a vehicle for his generalization about relations between Spartans and Helots, so we should concentrate on its 'normal' features. These I take to be, first, the fact that these relations were based on fear and, second, the willingness of the Spartans to go to extreme lengths of cruelty to maintain their Helot base intact.

Brasidas' Thracian campaign was triumphantly successful, not least because he made great play with Sparta's 'liberation' propaganda (4.85.1–5; 86.1, 4f., 108.2; 114.3; 121.1) and because he was believed – somewhat naively (cf. 4.87.4–6) – to be sincere. Other significant features were his repeated use of marching by night (including one of the rare Greek attempts at surprise attack on a defended town) and the foreshadowing of the widespread Spartan use of governors known as 'harmosts' to control supposedly friendly or allied states (4.132.3). The home authorities, however, were insufficiently impressed, despite Brasidas' masterstroke of capturing Amphipolis (Thucydides' failure to save it led to his exile and no doubt helps to explain his admiration for Brasidas); and in spring 423 they concluded a one year's armistice

(4.117f.; Piccirilli 1973, no. 25) with an Athens chastened not only by its Thracian setbacks but by its defeat at Delion in Boiotia also in 424 (4.89–101.4).

The armistice is interesting primarily as an anticipation of the full peace that came two years later, many of whose clauses it shares. Again, as in 425, the Spartans were chiefly anxious to recover ‘the men’ (4.117.2), but the terms reflect the improvement in Sparta’s position since then. For example, although each side was to keep what it held, and thus the Athenians were to retain Pylos (or Koryphasion, as the Spartans called it; cf. 4.3.3; 5. 18.7), they were not to venture beyond Bouphras (Voïdhokoilia Bay?) and Tomeus (inland – but where?); and as for the Athenians on Kythera, they were not to enter into any communication with ‘the alliance’ (presumably the Peloponnesian League, but just possibly Sparta’s other Perioikic ‘allies’ as well). On the other hand, the sixth clause exposes Sparta’s Achilles heel: neither side was to receive deserters, whether free or slave (i.e. Helots above all).

Not all Sparta’s allies ‘signed’ the armistice, although those who did so included the all-important Isthmus block. Less surprisingly, Brasidas refused to countenance what he saw as an impediment to his projects and a poor return for his labours, and he proceeded at once to breach it in spirit if not also in the letter (4.123.1). This naturally fuelled the arguments of those Athenians like Kleon who had not favoured the armistice, and after its expiry Kleon led an army in August 422 specifically to recover Amphipolis. Overconfident and inexperienced, he was soundly defeated by Brasidas, but both generals died in the battle, and at a stroke two important obstacles to the conclusion of a full peace were removed. Negotiations to that end were begun in winter 422–421 and concluded, to the satisfaction at least of the principals, in mid-March 421.

Thucydides sums up the considerations that weighed most with the Athenians and Spartans, although the text of the relevant chapters (5.13–17) is certainly interpolated to some extent. With two exceptions Thucydides adds nothing to the reasons influencing the armistice of 423. The first exception is that ‘the men from the island’ are now said to have included ‘leading’ Spartan citizens (5.15.1), an expression which an ancient commentator glosses by saying that they were related to ‘leading’ Spartans, i.e. men formulating and executing policy. The second additional reason is the ‘Argos question’. The Thirty Years’ Truce of early 450 between Sparta and Argos was soon to expire, and the Spartans judged, wrongly in the event, that it would be impossible to fight Argos and Athens at once. They also suspected, rightly, that some Peloponnesian states planned to go over to Argos. In particular, though Thucydides does not explicitly say as much, Sparta

was threatened by the attitude of Mantinea. This important state had carved out for itself a small 'empire' in south-west Arkadia, had recently crossed swords with Tegea (4.134.1) and had built a fort in Parrhasia threatening the strategically crucial Skiritis (5.33.1, with A. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 31–4).

The Spartans, in short, whose territory was menaced from the south-west (Pylos), the south-east (Kythera) and the north (Skiritis), were more 'compelled' (in the Thucydidean sense) to make peace than the Athenians. There is also perhaps a hint in Aristophanes (*Peace* 622ff., with Ehrenberg 1962, 89) of Perioikic discontent with the war. So, to stiffen Athens' resolve, they threatened an invasion of Attika, but an invasion on a new, improved model: 'orders were sent round to the cities to prepare for building permanent fortifications in Attika' (5.17.2). The lesson of Pylos and Kythera had been learned, even if it was not to be acted upon for another eight years.

The basis for the negotiations in 422–421 was the same as that of Sparta's proposals for peace in 425: a return to the status quo of 431 and by implication of 445. The only difference was that in 421 the Spartans were not only prepared but able openly to ride roughshod over the wishes both of their allies and of their recent adherents in the Thraceward area (Ste. Croix 1972, 18, 157–9). This emerges starkly from the clause in the 'Peace of Nikias' (as it is usually called, after one of its chief sponsors) permitting Athens and Sparta to change any other clause by mutual agreement (5.18.11; cf. 23.6). This clause above all aroused consternation in the Peloponnese (5.29.2; cf. 30.1), and it was small wonder Athens insisted that Sparta's allies should swear separately to abide by the peace (5.18.9): this would prevent Sparta from concealing which of its allies declined. In practice these were the Boiotians, who refused to give up the fort of Panakton on the frontier with Attika (5.18.7; with 35.5; 36.2; 39.2f.; 40.1f.; 42.1f.); the Corinthians, who in fact objected to the losses they had incurred (5.30.2–4) but claimed publicly to be opposing Sparta's attempt to 'enslave' the Peloponnese (5.27.2); the Eleians, who considered the long-contested Lepreon in Triphylia on the border with Messenia to be theirs (5.31.1–5); and the Megarians, who wished to recover Nisaia (5.17.2).

Space forbids a listing of all the other clauses in the Peace of Nikias (Piccirilli 1973, no. 27). We may single out the one which both bears immediately on the main theme of this book and nicely illustrates the inefficacy of the peace. Athens contracted to return among other places Koryphasion (Pylos) and Kythera and to restore any Spartan prisoners of state held in Athens or Athenian territory (5.18.7). In fact, though, neither Pylos nor Kythera was returned, and it took yet another agreement, between Sparta and Athens alone, for Sparta to

retrieve 'the men'. This second agreement, concluded perhaps in late March 421, was a defensive alliance to last fifty years concurrently with the Peace of Nikias.

One of the main reasons for the alliance is implicit in a unilateral clause binding the Athenians to aid Sparta 'if the slave population (sc. the Helots) should revolt' (5.23.2). The other reasons are given by Thucydides in a passage which most unfortunately is corrupt (5.22.2). When emended in accordance with Gomme's plausible suggestion, it reads like this (with my exegetical notes in parenthesis): the Spartans thought that the Argives (who had refused to renew their Thirty Years' Truce with them) would be least dangerous to them without Athenian aid and that the rest of the Peloponnesians would be cowed (because, if they attacked Sparta or its loyal allies, they would be faced by both Athens by sea and Sparta by land); for, if it had been possible, the rest of the Peloponnesians would have gone over to the Athenians. The Spartans, in other words, anticipated that the opposition to their hegemony of the Peloponnesians would crystallize around a potentially resurgent Argos (5.28.2) and saw that, to safeguard their own narrow interests, it was imperative to forestall a renewal of the alliance between Athens and Argos. As it turned out, however, the alliance between Sparta and Athens was no less inefficacious than the Peace of Nikias.

The diplomatic manoeuvrings after March 421, which radically dislocated the pattern of alliances since 445, are too complicated to discuss here (see now Seager 1976); discussion is anyway frustrated by the state of the first eighty-three chapters of Thucydides' fifth book ('the odd man out in style and technique, apparently not revised even to the standard of Book VIII': Dover 1973, 20). Clearly, though, the second phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War opened like the first against a background of strong dissatisfaction with Sparta's leadership among its allies. Indeed, even stronger, since in 421 Mantinea actually seceded from the Peloponnesian League, the first state to take this drastic step since Megara in c.460. It naturally turned to Argos, chiefly because the latter, on the advice of Corinth, had passed a decree inviting 'any Greek state that chose, provided that such a state were independent and would deal with other states on a basis of legality and equality, to enter into a defensive alliance with Argos' (5.27.2; cf. 28). The lead of Mantinea was followed by Corinth and Elis, but Megara and Boiotia held aloof, expressly because they thought the Argive democracy would be less congenial to their own oligarchies than Sparta was (5.31.6; cf. generally 1.19). Tegea too held true to Sparta, vitally so, since the Corinthians and Argives believed that, if they could win over Tegea, they would have the whole Peloponnesians (5.32.3). It would be hard to cite a more spectacular dividend of

Sparta's policy of 'divide and rule' in Arkadia; a major factor in Tegea's loyalty was precisely Mantineian disloyalty.

Sparta was not backward in reasserting its supremacy. Probably soon after the middle of March the perhaps 500 or so survivors among Brasidas' 700 Helot hoplites returned from Amphipolis. The Spartans voted to liberate them (a vote was needed because they were 'in a manner public slaves') and allowed them to live where they wished (normally Helots were, as it were, tied to the soil) – so long, that is, as they undertook garrison duty at Lepreon (5.34.1). This was not the first time Helots had been liberated, but it is the first time that we get an indication of what liberation might mean in practice.

Despite much modern scholarship, there is no evidence and no reason to believe that they received grants of land in Triphylia, and the direction to garrison Lepreon implies that these men were not made citizens, even of inferior status. Other ex-Helots sent to Lepreon, however, had been made precisely that, as their title *Neodamodeis* (virtually 'new citizens') signifies. Thucydides infuriatingly provides no information on their origins or status, but it is a fair inference from the fact that Brasidas took unliberated Helots to Thrace that there were no *Neodamodeis* available in 424. The further facts that we hear of *Neodamodeis* only between 421 and 370–369 and that they appear exclusively in military contexts suggest that they were a systematically trained body first raised between 424 and 421 following the success of Brasidas' Helots and intended chiefly to compensate for that deficiency of manpower which, as the Pylos episode demonstrates, had by 425 become critical. Their special name will have been devised to differentiate them by origin and status from the hoplites who had entered the army via the *agoge* and participated in the common messes and Assembly. They will have differed from the 'Brasideiol' and the Helots sent to Sicily in 413 (below) in being manumitted prior to enrolment in the army.

The Spartans, then, held on to Lepreon, and in the summer of 421 they demolished the Mantineians' Parrhasian fort (5.33.1). But this was the limit of their success. In particular, they were aggrieved that Athens had not evacuated Pylos (5.35.6; cf. 39.3). After much negotiation the Athenians were in fact persuaded to withdraw at least the Naupaktos Messenians, the other (*sc.* Messenian) Helots and the deserters from Lakonike (?Lakonian Helots) who had taken refuge there (5.35.7). But in winter 419–418 some of these, perhaps only the Naupaktos Messenians, were returned (5.56.2f.), and they remained until Sparta recaptured Pylos in 409 or 408.

More grave even than this was the disunity within the Spartan citizen-body. There had from the start been a 'hawkish' faction opposed to the conclusion of the Peace of Nikias (and presumably yet

more so to the alliance with Athens). This faction had considerable success in the elections to the Ephorate for 421–420, and ironically its hand will have been much strengthened by the return of ‘the men from the island’, who would naturally have supported a strong anti-Athenian line. Hence, I believe, the remarkable punishment some of the latter incurred, probably in the summer of 421. Being ‘leading men’, they were already holding public offices, but they were behaving in such a way that the highest Spartan authorities feared internal revolution and deprived them of their full citizen rights (5.34.2). In particular, they were forbidden to buy and sell, a prohibition to whose significance we shall return in [Chapter 14](#).

Argive prospects of fulfilling their most cherished ambition, the hegemony of the Peloponnese (5.40.3), could hardly, one would have thought, have been rosier. They chose paradoxically to play safe. Having failed to renew their truce with Sparta before it expired, in 420 they sent ‘fresh’ proposals to Sparta (5.41.2): Kynouria was to be restored to them as the price of their standing aside from the conflict within the Peloponnesian League. When the Spartans refused even to discuss its restoration, let alone submit to independent arbitration, the Argives proposed a ‘romantic and preposterous combat’ (Tomlinson 1972, 120) – a re-run ‘Battle of the Champions’! The Spartans were not amused, although in their anxiety to secure Argive neutrality they did at least draft the terms of a new agreement (5.41.3). This, we infer, would have been concluded but for the timely intervention of Alkibiades, who used his family connections with Sparta and his ample diplomatic skills to effect a rift between Sparta and Athens and bring Athens into alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis. Corinth, however, withdrew from this axis (5.48.2; 50.5), consistently enough since its aim had probably been simply to bring pressure on Sparta to abandon the foreign policy of 421.

In the summer of 419 the Argive alliance tried to coerce pro-Spartan Epidaurus. The Spartans marched out in full force, apparently for the first time in their history, but they got no further than Leuktra (probably near modern Leondari in ancient Aigytis) on their frontier opposite Mount Lykaion; and ‘no one, not even the cities which had sent contingents, knew what was the aim of the expedition’ (5.54.1). This passage contains two major difficulties. First, who were ‘the cities’? Andrewes (in Gomme 1970, 74) argued that the reference is to the loyal members of the Peloponnesian League, but I share the view of Ste. Croix (1972, 345f.) that the *Perioikoi* are meant. For this expedition, like the one against the Parrhasian fort in 421, was a purely Lakonian affair, and the Spartans’ paramount consideration was secrecy. Thucydides was not alone in referring untechnically to the *Perioikic* communities as ‘cities’, and such an unquestioning duty

of obedience corresponds to what else we know of relations between Sparta and the Perioikoi but is not appropriate to the relationship of Sparta to its Peloponnesian League allies since c.504.

The second main difficulty is to decide what was the true aim of the expedition – and indeed of a subsequent expedition in the same summer, which this time only got as far as the Lakonian frontier at Karyai (5.55.3), the first recorded use of the more direct route from Sparta to Tegea (Figure 17). The answer, I suspect, is that they were designed not so much to relieve Epidauros as to secure Sparta's northern frontier against the kind of diplomacy illustrated in the 470s by Gnosstas' proxeny of the Argives at Oinous (Chapter 11). Alkibiades will not have been less astute in this than Themistokles. However that may be, in winter 419–418 the Spartans felt compelled to send in a small garrison to Epidauros. This, however, the Argives regarded as a breach of their alliance with Athens (5.47.9), while the Athenians in reply ostentatiously drew attention to Sparta's failure to implement all the provisions of the Peace of Nikias (5.56.3). In 418, with the renewal of fighting between the Argives and the Epidaurians, the Spartans decided to try conclusions with the Argive alliance.

In midsummer after the grain-harvest they again marched out in full force 'themselves and the Helots' (5.57.1). This expression, used by Thucydides only here and at 5.64.2 introduces one of the two main problems plaguing discussion of this crucial campaign, that of terminology. 'Helots', it has been suggested (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 79), includes Neodamodeis as well as Helots proper, unless (what is unlikely) Sparta maintained a reserve of trained but not liberated Helots. Alternatively these Helots were not combatants but assigned to the necessarily large baggage-train (Welwei 1974, 127). But what is meant by 'themselves'? Thucydides of course refers to the Spartan forces of 418 collectively as 'the Lakedaimonians', but this term as used by and of the Spartans was always potentially misleading, since it could refer either to the Spartans alone or to the Perioikoi alone or to a mixture of the two (Toynbee 1969, 159–61). In 418, it has been argued, the term achieved one of its most impressive and disturbing feats of deception, the hoodwinking of Thucydides himself.

This brings in the second main problem of interpretation, that of numbers. Thucydides was struck by the size of the forces put into the field by both sides in 418. He describes the first Spartan force led out by Agis, together with its Peloponnesian League allies, as 'the finest Greek army that had ever been brought together' (5.60.3), and he goes out of his way to give as detailed and accurate an account of the numerical composition of the second Spartan force (the one that fought the Battle of Mantinea) as 'the secrecy with which Sparta's

affairs are conducted' (5.68.2) made feasible. Yet most modern scholars have refused to accept Thucydides' figures as they stand and have accused the historian, albeit reluctantly, of committing a fundamental category error. Both of these major problems must be tackled here, for on their resolution or at least illumination depends our evaluation of the changing military role of the Perioikoi since 479.

The first phase of the campaign of 418 may be ignored, beyond noting that Agis' conclusion of a four-month truce with Argos on his personal initiative led to his being tried and heavily fined (5.63.2–4, with Ste. Croix 1972, 351). So we begin with Thucydides' repeated observation that Agis' army at Mantinea was perceptibly larger than the opposition (5.68.1; 71.2). This provides the surest indication that something is awry either in the transmission of Thucydides' text or in his calculations. For if the aggregate strength of the 'Lakedaimonians' comes out at only 4,484 (5.68.3), then they together with their Arkadian allies (only the Heraians, Mainalians and Tegeans) should have been far too inferior numerically either to have camouflaged their inferiority in such a way as to deceive Thucydides' informants (the historian was not himself an eyewitness apparently) or to have won the decisive victory they did. Wherein does the error lie?

To oversimplify grossly, two main solutions have been proposed. The first, and most popular, holds that the error springs partly from confusion over Spartan technical terminology (Toynbee 1969, 396–401; and more tentatively Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 111–17). Thucydides, it is contended, wrongly speaks of the highest multiple of the Spartan *enomotia* (platoon) as the *lochos* (battalion), when he ought to have called it *mora* (brigade). Thus, since there were two inter-linked *lochoi* in each *mora*, of which there were seven at Mantinea (one of Brasidas' veterans and Neodamodeis, six of the Spartiates and Perioikoi brigaded together), Thucydides has almost precisely halved the true total of 'Lakedaimonians' – almost, because the 600 Skiritai and the 300 Hippeis are not to be included in the organization by *morai*. The second solution (Forrest 1968, 132–5) rescues Thucydides' credit to some extent by postulating that in 418 Spartans and Perioikoi were not yet brigaded together in the *mora*, as they certainly were by 403 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31), and that Thucydides' figures should be taken as referring only to Spartiates.

The difficulties in the way of accepting either solution are wellnigh insuperable. Against the first, for example, and leaving aside Thucydides' putative confusion, it can be urged that there is no positive evidence for the *mora* before 403 and that Xenophon in his 'Constitution of the Spartans' (*Lak. Pol.* 11.4) implies that there were four, not two, *lochoi* to each *mora*. Thus, although both Thucydides' and Xenophon's analyses yield the same total number of the smallest

constituent units (*enomotiai*) in the 'Lakedaimonian' army, they arrive at this figure by different computations, each of which is in its way unsatisfactory. Against the second solution it may be argued that Thucydides' failure to remark on the numbers and organization of the Perioikoi in the situation of 418 practically constitutes criminal negligence and, more decisively, that there is some indirect evidence that the Spartiates and Perioikoi were indeed brigaded together by 418.

On balance I find the latter objections the weightier, and it may be added that a simple emendation of Xenophon's text, suggested well over a century ago (Welwei 1974, 129 n. 40), would remove the contradiction between him and Thucydides over the number of *lochoi* in a *mora*. Moreover, as we shall see, the adoption of the first solution facilitates a coherent reconstruction of Lakonian social and military history since 479.

The indirect evidence just mentioned is as follows. First, a barbed shaft loosed by Thucydides (1.20.3) against an unnamed predecessor: 'it is believed, too, that the Spartans have a company of troops (*lochos*) called "Pitanate". Such a company has never existed.' The unnamed predecessor is of course Herodotus (9.53.2), who mentions the 'Pitanate *lochos*' in his description of the Battle of Plataia. Herodotus, as we have remarked, is notoriously unreliable on technical matters, and Aristotle (fr. 541), when describing a Spartan army organized into five *lochoi*, does not mention one called 'Pitanate'. However, since one of Aristotle's five is variously transcribed as 'Mesoatas' or 'Messoages', and clearly derived its name from the 'obe' or village of Mesoa, Herodotus may plausibly be understood as 'giving a common-sense explanatory paraphrase of an esoteric technical term' (Toynbee 1969, 372), whereas Thucydides' criticism though formally justified would be pedantic. In 479, then, the Spartiates were organized in five 'obal' regiments, as they had been probably since the 'Lykourgos' reforms of the mid-seventh century. But by 418 there were six 'Lakedaimonian' regiments and by 403 the *mora* was in existence, a mode of organization that we know from Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.10f.) cut across local demarcations. Can we date the transition from 'obal' to 'moral' army more precisely than 'between 479 and 403'?

Here we invoke the other two pieces of indirect evidence. Xenophon in his *Lak. Pol.*, which was written in the second quarter of the fourth century, attributed the institution of the 'moral' army to Lykourgos; in itself obviously false, this attribution seems progressively more implausible the nearer the date of the change is brought to 403. Second, and more decisively, Thucydides in describing the Spartans' attempted defence of Sphakteria in 425 says that 'they sent the

hoplites across to the island, choosing the men by lot from each battalion (*lochos*) of their army ... the one that was caught there numbered 420 hoplites, with Helots to attend on them' (4.8.9); later he tells us that of the 292 survivors from the 420 about 120 were Spartiates, the rest Perioikoi (4.38.5). Toynbee's explanation of the 420 (1969, 373f., 376f., 382f., 391) as the sum of one *enomotia* of thirty-five men from each of twelve *lochoi* possesses what Einstein called the 'beauty' of the truly fruitful scientific hypothesis. For Toynbee's analysis of the *enomotia* as consisting of one man from each of the forty active-service Spartan age-classes (20–59 inclusive) 'is as secure as any hypothesis about the Spartan army can hope to be' (Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 115). In 425, therefore, Sparta would have called up thirty-five of the forty age-classes, and the presence of Perioikoi in the garrison was a consequence of the fact that they were now brigaded with Spartiates in the twelve *lochoi* of the 'moral' army (two *lochoi* to each of the six *morai*). Thus the *terminus ante quem* for the army reform would be 425.

I cannot, however, follow Toynbee in linking the reform exclusively with the great earthquake of c.465, since I believe he has exaggerated its demographic effects (Chapter 11). On the other hand, he is surely right in arguing that the purpose of the reform was to ease the share of the military burden borne by Spartan hoplites and shift it more on to the shoulders of the Perioikoi. In 480 there had been a rough total of 8,000 Spartiates of military age. In 425 the potential loss of about 120, albeit men of high social status, caused the Spartans to sue for peace. Moreover, even though these men had surrendered to save their skins, they, unlike the men who for one reason or another had failed to die at Thermopylai, were neither ostracized socially nor made to feel compelled to commit suicide. Similarly, the two Spartan commanders who refused to obey orders at Mantinea (5.72.1) were merely banished. Finally, since at Mantinea five sixths (5.64.3) of a full Spartan call-up amounted to only about 3,000 men, the total number of Spartiates of military age had dropped by a little over half in about two generations. A drastic step like the army reform was needed to compensate for this decline of Spartan military manpower, since other measures (Chapter 14) were proving manifestly inadequate.

Regrettably, we are wholly ignorant of the provision made for the training of those Perioikoi who now found themselves brigaded with Spartiates in the *mora*, and we can only guess at the proportion they comprised of the 'Lakedaimonian' complement (against Toynbee's suggested ratio of 6:4 see Welwei 1974, 130 n. 64). It is certain, however, that the Perioikoi as a whole were well equipped to handle a larger share of military responsibilities. Of the notional 100 Perioikic

communities some forty are attested archaeologically in the fifth and fourth centuries (Figure 18). This would give an average requirement of no more than 100 hoplites per community, if we assume that Thucydides has roughly halved the true figure for the 'Lakedaimonians' at Mantinea. We may single out in this connection the Skiritai of northern Lakonia, whose troops, presumably armed as hoplites, were stationed in a position of honour on the extreme left wing; and also Eualkes of Geronthrai, who lost his life in the battle and was proudly commemorated with the laconic epitaph 'Eualkes in war at Mantinea', exactly as if he had been a Spartiate (Jeffery 1961, 197f., 202, no. 60).

Victory for the Spartans at Mantinea was hardly won and dearly bought. But victory in 'the greatest battle that had taken place for a very long time among Greek states' (5.74.1) repaired the damage done to Sparta's reputation in 425 (5.75.3) and re-established its hegemony of the Peloponnese (5.77.6). Argos, rent by civil strife, withdrew from its alliance with Athens, Mantinea and Elis, and in winter 418–417 made a treaty with Sparta (5.77, 79). The two parties moreover made a joint resolution not to enter into diplomatic relations with Athens until it had abandoned its fortified posts in the Peloponnese (5.80.1), namely Pylos, Kythera and Epidaurus. Mantinea too was reconciled to Sparta and, on condition of relinquishing its Arkadian 'empire', made a special separate treaty (5.81.1; Xen. *Hell* 5.2.2). The position of Elis is uncertain, although it may have rejoined the Peloponnesian League by 413 (7.31.1; cf. 6.88.9).

Sparta's buoyancy is shown by the confident way in which in 417 it intervened, on the side of oligarchy, in Sikyon, Argos, Achaia and Tegea (5.81.2; 82.1; 82.3). The only failure was at Argos, where a democratic restoration brought the state back into alliance with Athens. Thucydides mentions almost in passing a winter campaign of the Spartans against the Argolis in 417–416, their capture of Hysiai and massacre of the free population (5.83.1f.). He is also careful to remind readers of the continued occupation of Pylos, noting that in 416 the Athenians there captured a great deal of plunder from Spartan territory (5.115.2).

In short, 'all of Alkibiades' fine plans for completing the humiliation of Sparta had gone astray' (Gomme 1970, 147; cf. K.J. Dover in Gomme 1970, 242, 248), and he required a fresh initiative to re-establish his charismatic authority with the Athenian people. Weariness with fighting Sparta, the rise of a new inexperienced generation, the fabled wealth of Sicily, the eagerness of Alkibiades himself – these and other factors opportunely conspired to recommend the 'Sicilian Expedition', to which Thucydides devotes most of his sixth and seventh books. His admiring comment on the quality of the

armada that left Peiraeus in 415 has already been quoted in a different connection; his final remark on the expedition was that 'this was the greatest Greek action that took place during this war, and, in my opinion, the greatest action that we know of in Greek history' (7.87.5).

For the Athenians, however, it began as it ended, disastrously. On the eve of sailing many of the Herms were inauspiciously mutilated. There were also allegations in circulation, directed chiefly against Alkibiades, concerning a plot to establish a tyranny and the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. (Intriguingly, one of those eventually convicted, an uncle of Alkibiades, owned a male Messenian slave: Pritchett 1953, 288, X.9; 1956, 278; it would be pleasant indeed to know how and why a Messenian had exchanged serfdom in his native land for chattel slavery at Athens.) Then, shortly after the expedition sailed, its prime mover was recalled to stand trial for his alleged profanity.

Here began Sparta's involvement, since Alkibiades jumped ship *en route* back to Athens, made his way to Sparta and (so Thucydides' account goes, but Alkibiades may have been his source) persuaded the Spartans to engage Athens on two fronts (6.89–92). At a crucial juncture in 414 they sent Gylippos to bring reinforcements to the beleaguered Syracusans (6.93.2); he sailed with two Corinthian and two Lakonian ships from Messenian Asine (6.93.3; 104.1) and slipped through the Athenian blockade to swing the balance in the Syracusans' favour (7.1.3f.). In 413 the Spartans sent a further force of 600 of the best Helots and Neodamodeis (7.19.3; 58.3). At the same time they implemented a decision at last taken in 414 (6.93.1f.), to effect an *epiteichismos* in Attika (7.19.1). The turning-point in 'the' Peloponnesian War had been reached.

Any lingering sympathy the Spartans may have had for the Peace of Nikias was killed in 414. After a lull of two years the Spartans had invaded the Argolis twice that summer (6.95.1; 105.1). To the first invasion the Argives replied with a profitable reprisal against the Thyreatis, but on the occurrence of the second the Athenians despatched a fleet not directly to the Argolis but against the east coast of Lakonia (6.105.2). It landed at Epidauros Limera, Prasiai and elsewhere (perhaps Kyphanta and Zarax) and laid waste the land in flagrant breach of the peace.

This violation, together with the continuing raids from Pylos and Athens' refusal to submit to arbitration, persuaded the Spartans that now, in contrast to 432, justice and religion were more on their side (7.18.2f.). A further incentive to action was provided by Demosthenes in 413. *En route* to Sicily he first ravaged Epidauros Limera (cf. 7.20.2) and then established a fortified post 'opposite Kythera' on 'a kind of

isthmus' (7.26.2: probably near what is now the island of Elaphonisos). The chief interest of this intended counterpart to Pylos is that Demosthenes thought it worthwhile trying to disaffect the Helots of Lakonia too. The fort at Trinasos (Paus. 3.22.3) northeast of Gytheion, whose remains perhaps go back to the fifth century, should probably be interpreted as a Spartan precaution against just this contingency. A final fillip to the Spartans was given by the result of the Sicilian expedition in 413 – 'to the victors the most brilliant of successes, to the vanquished the most disastrous of defeats' (7.87.5). No less brilliantly Thucydides twice (7.71.7; 86.3) illustrates the meaning and irony of the Athenian defeat by comparisons with Sparta's Pylos/Sphakteria disaster.

In a general reflection on the significance of the Spartan *epiteichismos* at Dekeleia (7.27f.) Thucydides comments that it was 'one of the chief reasons for the decline of Athenian power' (cf. Xen. *Por.* 4.25). Looking back on the invasions of Attika in the Ten Years' War, he points out that they had been short and had only temporarily interrupted the Athenians' access to some of their land, whereas between 413 and 404 they were permanently deprived of all of it. For Dekeleia was equidistant (at about eighteen kilometres) from the Boiotian frontier and Athens, and from here Agis could see not only Athens itself but the grain-ships arriving in Peiraeus (7.19.2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35). Agis, moreover, had the power to send troops where he wished, to raise fresh forces and to levy money; indeed, to begin with he had more contact and influence with Sparta's allies than did the home government (8.5.3).

Hence one ancient name for the final phase of 'the' Peloponnesian War is the 'Dekeleian War'. The rest of this account, however, will concentrate on an alternative title, the 'Ionian War' (8.11.3), for two reasons: by more of those ironies mentioned earlier in this chapter 'the' Peloponnesian War was decided not by land in mainland Greece but at sea, specifically at the Hellespont; and it was decided less by Peloponnesian prowess than by Persian gold.

The Sicilian disaster excited the optimistic belief among the Greeks (not including Thucydides) that the war would soon be over. In particular, both Athens (8.1.2) and 'the city of the Spartans' (8.2.3: an unusual expression) expected the arrival shortly in the Aegean of a Sicilian armada. Not for the first time, however, Sparta's hopes of Sicilian ships were disappointed (for 431 see 2.7.1 with Gomme). So in 413–412 a total of 100 was ordered from the Peloponnesian alliance, this being the greatest number it had actually managed to deploy in the Ten Years' War (2.66.1). Of these one quarter was to be built in Lakonia, presumably at Gytheion. Athens in its turn fortified Sounion to give protection for grain-ships from the Black Sea (cf. Xen.

Hell. 1.1.26) or Egypt (8.35.2), withdrew from its *epiteichismos* in the Malea peninsula (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 1.2.18) and concentrated on ensuring the loyalty of its wavering Aegean allies (8.4).

These energetic preparations recalled 431 (8.5.1), but the ensuing struggle was a far more patchy affair than the Ten Years' War. Thucydides' account breaks off in mid-flow in 411, although it ends appropriately with one of the chief reasons why Sparta did not make more rapid headway (8.109.2). We shall return to this after a few brief remarks on Thucydides' main surviving continuator, Xenophon, on whom we must principally rely for the rest of the period treated in this book.

Another Athenian writing as a political exile, Xenophon was, however, a historian of a very different stamp from his predecessor, and judgment of his value has usually been passed in the form of a comparison between them. Since Niebuhr ('his history is worth nothing; it is untrue, written without care, and with perfect nonchalance') and Grote ('to pass from Thucydides to the *Hellenica* of Xenophon is a descent truly mournful') comparison has usually been greatly to Xenophon's disadvantage. But just as there has been something of a reaction against Thucydides of late, so there has been one in favour of Xenophon (see Higgins 1977). I agree with the revisionists that Xenophon should be read according to his own lights and not as a Thucydides *manqué*, but as a historian I am not yet convinced that his allegedly allusive, ironic manner and anti-imperialist message are sufficient compensations for his undoubted brevity, omissions and partisanship (whatever its higher motivation may have been). In particular, the discovery of fragments of the 'Oxyrhynchus historian' has damaged, perhaps irretrievably, Xenophon's reputation for accuracy (Bruce 1967; Koenen 1976). On balance, therefore, I regard the transition from Thucydides to Xenophon as a descent, though not perhaps a mournful one.

To return to *Thuc.* 8.109.2, we find there Tissaphernes, governor of the southern of the two Persian provinces in Asia Minor, hurrying to the Hellespont in summer 411 to patch up his relationship with the Peloponnesians and in particular to prevent them coming to an arrangement with his northern counterpart and rival, Pharnabazus. Both Persians had reason to support Sparta against Athens, since the latter by developing an Empire had dried up a source of Persian tribute and diminished the Great King's prestige (8.5.4f.; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 313). Specifically, Athens had aroused Persian ire by reneging on its treaty of perpetual friendship with Darius II and backing the rebel Amorges, perhaps early in 414. On the other hand, it was not in the Persians' interest that a defeated Athens should simply be replaced by another Greek superpower with imperial and 'Panhellenic'

ambitions. Sparta, in other words, should be supported, but rather in the way that a rope supports a hanging man. This was particularly the policy adopted by Tissaphernes (8.29; 46; 87.4; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.9), allegedly at the instigation of the resilient Alkibiades.

Sparta for its part was no stranger to dealings with Persia. To look no further back than 432, Archidamos, who laid such stress on Sparta's lack of cash, had envisaged receiving aid from this source (1.82.1), and in 431 and 430 Spartan embassies had been despatched to the Great King (2.7.1, with Diod. 12.41.1; 2.67.1, with Hdt. 7.137). In 428, however, the Spartan navarch Alkidas had shown himself remarkably timid and dilatory, even for a Spartan, and failed to capitalize on Mytilene's revolt from Athens by co-operation with Tissaphernes' predecessor (3.31.1); a Spartan inscription of perhaps 427 (M/L no. 67), which records contributions to its war-fund in Persian darics and other media, suggests that more could have been achieved. Moreover, Spartan diplomacy perhaps fell short of its usual professional standards in dealing with Persia, as the Athenians discovered in 425 when they captured a Persian messenger on his way to Sparta. For his despatches (in Aramaic) revealed that the Great King was at a loss to know what the Spartans wanted of him: each embassy, he claimed, told a different story (4.50). That, however, is the last we hear of Spartano-Persian relations until 412, an instance of a general deficiency in Thucydides which presumably he would have remedied had he lived to complete his work (Andrewes 1961).

In 412 there began 'the most noteworthy example of foreign assistance' to a Greek state at war (Pritchett 1974, I, 47), the Persian subsidy of the Peloponnesian fleet from 412 to 404. Pritchett most helpfully tabulates this aid, with references to the ancient sources (apart from Andok. 3.29 and Isokr. 3.97, who overestimated the total at 5,000 talents or more). However, as Pritchett notes, it was not until Pharnabazus in 410 took over the role of chief provider from Tissaphernes that the aid made any real difference militarily. For Tissaphernes had been so far successful in his double dealing that in 412 the Spartans formally sold the Asia Minor Greeks to Persia for gold (8.58; cf. 84.5) and yet, although in 412–411 they mustered large fleets including a sizable number of Lakonian ships (8.42.4; 91.2), in 411 were defeated at Kynossema (8.104–6) and in 410 at Kyzikos (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.17–23). Indeed, after this second defeat the Spartans were apparently so demoralized that they offered to call off the war: each side was to keep what it held, except that the Peloponnesians would withdraw from Dekeleia if the Athenians would abandon Pylos (Diod. 13.52f.; Philochoros 328F139).

The Athenians, despite just having experienced unprecedented political upheaval at home (8.47–98), looked this gift horse in the

mouth and were never again presented with so favourable an opportunity to make peace with honour. For although the democracy of strategically pivotal Samos remained magnificently loyal to the bitter end (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6), Athens' other major Aegean allies one by one fell prey to oligarchic counter-revolutions and defected to Sparta (esp. Chios: 8.15.1;40; and Euboea: 8.95.2; 96.1). In 409 or 408 the Spartans at last recovered Pylos (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18; Diod. 13.64.6), and perhaps Kythera simultaneously; and in 407 the Persian prince Cyrus, then aged sixteen, was sent down from Susa with a general command of the Asia Minor provinces (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.3; cf. *Anab.* 1.9.7). It was his friendship with the extraordinary Spartan Lysander that sealed Athens' fate (cf. Thuc. 2.65.12) and incidentally marked the final abandonment, despite the protests of the Spartan navarch Kallikratidas in 406, of Sparta's pretensions to 'liberating' the Greeks.

In 407 and above all 405 Lysander received from Cyrus the wherewithal to equip, train and maintain a fleet adequate to defeat Athens. Notwithstanding Athens' base at Sestos, occupied since 411 (8.62.2f.), Lysander gained the final victory at Aigospotamoi in the Hellespont in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.20–30; contrast Diod. 13.106). This was a triumphant confirmation of the Mytilenaians' prediction of 428 that 'it is not in Attika, as some people think, that the war will be won or lost, but in the countries from which Attika draws its strength' (3.13.5). For Lysander was master of the narrows, and Athens, its Black Sea wheat-supply cut off, was starved into submission by spring 404. After fruitless negotiations Athens lost its walls, most of its fleet and its Empire and became a subject-ally of Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19–22; Plut. 'Lys.' 14).

One of the Peloponnesian admirals at Aigospotamoi may have been a Perioikos from Zarax or Tyros (M/L, p. 289). If so, he was a worthy successor to those Perioikoi who since 412 had been entrusted with important naval missions (8.6.4; 22.1) and an appropriate personage to end a [chapter one](#) of whose main themes has been the increasingly crucial military role of Sparta's Perioikic subjects.

Notes on further reading

The period covered by this chapter is perhaps the one to which most modern research in Greek history has been and is still directed, so these bibliographical notes may seem even more inadequate than the rest. A useful textbook on the fifth century is Will 1972, esp. 149–70 ('First' Peloponnesian War), 313–39 (Ten Years' War), 340–92 (421–404). Unfortunately, this was written before the publication of Ste. Croix 1972 and Meiggs 1972, which in their very different ways have between them created a new groundwork on which future scholarship must build. The former, unlike Kagan 1969, ranges far beyond its

ostensible subject.

The commentary on Thucydides begun by A.W. Gomme and continued by A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover is presupposed throughout; commentary on Book 8 (by Andrewes) appeared in 1981. To the enormous secondary literature on Thucydides cited in Ste. Croix 1972, 295f., add now esp. Dover 1973 (an unorthodox and challenging pamphlet), Hunter 1973 (which perhaps overstates the reasonable case that Thucydides' literary artistry tends to turn not only the reader but the historian himself into the obedient servant of his own point of view), and Edmunds 1975 (esp. ch. 2 for Sparta). Thucydides' handling of prominent individuals is treated in Westlake 1968; the most relevant Spartans are Archidamos, Brasidas (whose name, incidentally, may be connected with Prasiai) and Gylippos. Ramou-Chapsiadi 1978 appeared too late to be considered in the present work.

For the 'First' Peloponnesian War in general see Kagan 1969, 75–130; on Sparta's role therein Holladay 1977b. The terms of the peace of 445, the essential background to 'international' diplomacy down to 421, if not 404, are set out in Ste. Croix 1972, 293f., and, with extensive bibliography, in Piccirilli 1973, no. 21.

The Samian rebellion is discussed in detail by Kagan (1969, 170–8) and Meiggs (1972, 188–94).

On the Ten Years' War generally see Kagan 1974, which though detailed is perhaps insufficiently critical. Spartan strategy is admirably analysed in Brunt 1965; see also Cawkwell 1975.

Kagan (1974, 218–59) describes rather than analyses the Pylos/Sphakteria episode; more critical is Westlake 1974, but he underemphasizes the sharpness of the change in Spartan attitudes to the war after 425. A historical and topographical study of Thucydides' account of the Pylos campaign is J. Wilson (1979).

An interesting sidelight on the situation of Kythera in the late fifth century is thrown by Anglo-American excavations at Kastri; the Kytherians were using Attic and Corinthian as well as mainland Lakonian pottery (Coldstream and Huxley 1972, 159–65; 306f.). However, the Attic imports are not necessarily to be explained solely in terms of the Athenian occupation: Attic black-painted amphorai of the fifth century have been excavated at Gytheion too (AD 21B, 1966, 157).

For comments on Sparta's relations with central and north Greece in the fifth and early fourth centuries see Andrewes 1971, 217–26; I would only add that the father of Chalkideus ('the Chalkidian', frequently mentioned in Thuc. 8) was perhaps one of those who favoured expansion by land to the north.

Bibliography on the Peace of Nikias and other treaties projected or

concluded may be found in Bengtson 1975; on those including provision for arbitration in Piccirilli 1973. On the authenticity and function of the documents inserted verbatim by Thucydides see Meyer 1970 (a photographic reproduction of the first edition of 1955). Particularly problematic are the alliance between Athens and Sparta in 421 and the Spartano-Persian treaties of 412–411 (below).

A wide range of modern theories on the origins and status of the Neodamodeis is well discussed in Oliva 1971, 166–70. But he fails to explain their title satisfactorily, as does Welwei 1974, 142–58, which in other respects supersedes previous treatments. The suggestion that regent Pausanias envisaged the creation of Neodamodeis in the 470s has been advanced by Cawkwell (1970, 52) and followed apparently by Lazenby (1975, 249f.). But Pausanias is said to have offered the Helots full citizenship, and an offer to transform them merely into Neodamodeis seems insufficient to have aroused such violent opposition and served as a pretext for his murder. Sparta was not of course alone in freeing slaves for war: a particularly interesting parallel is Chios, which is specifically compared to Sparta for the size of its slave population in relation to the free (Thuc. 8.40.2) and which apparently freed slaves for service in the fleet in the late fifth century (Welwei 1974, 4 n. 12; 93 n. 104; 179 n. 8).

The battle of Mantinea is discussed in relation to the army reform in Toynbee 1969, 396–401. Other discussions of the reform, in addition to those cited in the text, are Anderson 1970, 225–51; and Welwei 1974, 128–31, 138–40 (with most of whose conclusions I agree).

The most recent biography of Xenophon in English is Anderson 1974. Though dismissed by Higgins (1977, xiv) as unoriginal, Anderson does at least share Higgins' respect for Xenophon. The only full commentary in English on the *Hellenika* is Underhill 1900, which though thorough and sensible is naturally out of date, especially in the eyes of those who wish to argue that the *Hellenika* is a unity (Baden 1966) and that Xenophon's historiographical intentions have been misprised (Higgins 1977, 99–127). My own view coincides with that expressed in summary by G.L. Cawkwell (introduction to the 1972 reissue of the Penguin Classics *Anabasis*): the *Hellenika* is essentially the memoirs of an old man.

On the role of Lysander between 407 and 404 see Lotze 1964; this also discusses clearly the chronological problem of 410–406, on which see further Lotze 1974.

Lewis 1977 is an important contribution to Spartan history of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. We agree substantially on basics: a large subject population of Helots was 'the major determining fact about Sparta' (27); and 'the Athenians would have had no difficulty in

winning the Peloponnesian War decisively, had they done a little more to promote helot revolt' (28). But we differ considerably in emphasis and detail. I cannot, for example, regard the first two Spartano-Persian accords of 412–411 (Thuc. 8.18, 37) as genuine treaties. Nor am I persuaded of the existence of a 'Treaty of Boiotios' of 408–407 between Sparta and Persia, as reconstructed by Lewis (123–34). For if Sparta made its peace overtures to Athens in 410 and 408–407 partly to recover Spartiate prisoners (126), this seems an unlikely time for Sparta to be concerning itself about the liberty and autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks. And as Lewis himself rightly remarks of Spartan 'panhellenism' (144), 'I would not argue that it took precedence in Spartan policy over her need to retain supremacy in the Peloponnese and internal stability in Laconia and Messenia.'

Chapter thirteen

The reduction of Lakonia 404–362

The essential backdrop to this chapter is provided by Thucydides' comment on the *stasis* or civil strife at Kerkyra in the 420s (3.82.1): 'thereafter practically the whole Greek world was similarly convulsed, the democratic leaders calling in the Athenians, their oligarchic opponents the Spartans.' So far as 'the' Peloponnesian War is concerned, the comment applies particularly to its final phase, in which *stasis* was a major contributory cause of Athens' defeat. *Stasis*, however, did not subside with the conclusion of the war. Rather, it burst out anew, the rule of the 'Thirty Tyrants' at Athens being but the best-known instance. Indeed, the history of the whole period spanned by the long adult life of the Athenian publicist Isokrates (436–338) can be written largely in terms of what might be called the Greek disease (Fuks 1972).

Even Sparta, as we shall see, was three times on the verge of catching the infection. What makes this so remarkable and revealing is that it was precisely for its vaunted freedom from *stasis* within the citizen body that the Spartan political and social system had come to exercise such fascination over oligarchs in other states – men like Kritias, bloodstained leader of the 'Thirty Tyrants' who wrote both a verse and a prose 'Constitution of the Spartans' (we drew on the latter in [Chapter 10](#)). Another such 'Lakonizer', if a politically more moderate one, was Xenophon, whose unsatisfactory *Hellenika* is our main literary narrative source for the period under review here.* Occasionally our other literary sources – especially Diodorus, using Ephorus, and Plutarch, who drew on several fourth-century sources including Xenophon and Ephorus – provide correctives and supplements. But these, like the relevant epigraphical and archaeological evidence, rarely bear on our main theme, which is the way that Sparta's progressive failure to maintain its grip on Lakonia

and Messenia and on the Peloponnesian League led to its demotion from a position of supremacy in the Greek world east of the Adriatic to the status of an irretrievably second-rank power.

Spartan might since the end of the seventh century had been based on the exploitation of Helot labour-power in Lakonia and Messenia, aided and abetted by a complex organization of Perioikic intermediaries ([Chapter 10](#)). From the mid-sixth century Sparta had extended its suzerainty to the greater part of the Peloponnese and, with the establishment of the Peloponnesian League in essentials by 500, had since then held sway through a combination of military muscle and diplomatic support for allied oligarchies (Thuc. 1.19, 76.1.144.1).

Victory over Athens in 404 stimulated a temporary attempt to extend the system in a modified form to the members of the old Athenian Empire. Narrow oligarchies, frequently only of ten men ('dekarchies'), were established and propped up by garrisons under Spartan governors known as harmosts ('fixers'); tribute in military service, cash and kind was now payable to Sparta. The best documented and historically most decisive example of such counter-revolution is of course the reign of the 'Thirty' at Athens, but it is convenient first to consider the experience of Samos, since it reintroduces the victor of Aigospotamoi.

Lysander had done more than any other Spartan to win 'the' Peloponnesian War through his understanding with Cyrus. He also it was who most favoured the policy of imperialist expansion by means of puppet dekarchies, for the installation of which he had prepared the ground since 407. Following Athens' capitulation in 404, Lysander naturally turned his attention to Athens' staunchest democratic ally, Samos, whose control was besides of major strategic importance. After a siege lasting the whole summer Samos was taken, the democratic regime terminated, the oligarchs recalled. The Skionaians in 423 had honoured their 'liberator', Brasidas, with a golden crown, and private individuals had garlanded him as if he were a victorious athlete (Thuc. 4.121.1). The restored Samian oligarchs honoured Lysander as if he were a god (Plut. *Lys.* 18), the first attested instance of divine worship of a living mortal in Greece. Undoubtedly Lysander's reputation has suffered from posthumous defamation (Prentice 1934); but such adulation in his lifetime tells us more about Samian politics than about Lysander's qualities.

For whatever we think of his Samian settlement, his treatment of Athens was hardly prudent. The terms of surrender imposed in April 404 had included no explicit constitutional provision beyond the requirement to recall exiles. Among the latter was Aristoteles, a creature of Lysander and later one of the 'Thirty' (2.2.18), spiritual kin

to those among the 'Four Hundred' extreme oligarchs who in 411 had been prepared to sell Athens and its allies to Sparta in return for Spartan support for their rule (Thuc. 8.90.2). It was on behalf of such men that Lysander sailed from Samos to Athens and, using the threat of force and the pretext that the Long Walls had not been pulled down as prescribed, had a decree passed establishing a board of thirty legislative commissioners (Lysias 12.44, 72, 77; 13.28; Plut. *Lys.* 15).

The pro-Spartan character of what soon degenerated into the tyranny of the 'Thirty' had been apparent from the start. It was not long before the new regime stole another leaf from the Lysandrian book and through his influence received from Sparta a 'Lakonian' garrison of 700 men (probably Neodamodeis: Anderson 1974, 50) under a Spartiate harmost (2.3.13f., 42; 4.4, 6, 10). In the event, however, at least in Xenophon's account (and he seems to have been present), the garrison was indirectly a major cause of a split within the ranks of the 'Thirty'. For Kritias used it to kill and rob the rich, whatever their political persuasion or social standing (2.3.14, 17, 21), and this alienated Theramenes (2.3. 38–40, 47–9), the very man responsible for negotiating with Lysander in 405–404 (2.2.16) and securing the subjection of Athens to Sparta (2.3.38).

Theramenes' impious execution particularly excited the sympathy of Xenophon (2.3.55f.), but more disturbing to thinking Spartans was the fact that not only their traditional enemy Argos (Diod. 14.6.2) but also their allies Corinth, Megara and Thebes were openly flouting a Spartan decree forbidding any state to harbour Athenian refugees (2.4.1, with Aesch. 2.148; Isokr. 7.67; Diod. 14.6, 32.1; Plut. *Lys.* 27.5–7). The disobedience of Corinth and Thebes was particularly alarming since they had opposed Sparta's treatment of Athens on its surrender and had advocated that Athens be totally destroyed (2.2.19f.; cf. 3.5.8). Sparta, on the other hand, had proposed its demilitarization and incorporation in the Peloponnesian League, partly perhaps in recognition of its past services to Greece, but surely also in order to undercut Thebes' growing influence north of the Isthmus. The relations between Sparta, Athens and Thebes shaped Greek interstate politics down to the 360s.

Immediately, it was very largely due to Theban aid that a mere seventy or so democratic exiles under Thrasybulos were able to seize the Athenian frontier fort of Phyle in winter 404–403 (2.4.2–7) and then to collect a sufficient force, composed chiefly of 'the men in the Peiraeus', to defeat the 'Thirty' in an urban encounter (2.4.10–19). The survivors of the 'Thirty' fled to Eleusis, where they set up a separate polity, and were replaced by the 'Ten'. Both sets of oligarchs scurried to Sparta for further help (2.4.28; *Ath. Pol.* 38.1). The Spartans replied by loaning 100 talents to the oligarchs 'from the city'

for the hire of mercenaries and by despatching Lysander by land as harmost and his brother Libys by sea as navarch to Attika. Lysander went straight to his friends at Eleusis and began to raise a large force of Peloponnesian mercenaries; Libys blockaded the Peiraieus according to plan. But then there occurred one of those startling reversals of Spartan foreign policy whose causes, despite recent attempts to analyse Spartan decisionmaking in terms of 'factions' (Hamilton 1970; *contra* Thompson 1973), can only be surmised.

Agis had by now (403) returned to Sparta from Dekeleia and was presumably in broad agreement with the line Sparta had taken towards Athens since April 404. His Agiad co-king Pausanias, however, having first convinced a majority of the five Ephors, led out two *morai* of 'Lakedaimonians' at the head of a Peloponnesian League force. There was some fighting between the Peloponnesians and the Peiraieus democrats, in which the two Spartiate polemarchs and other Spartiates were killed; but Pausanias entered none the less into secret negotiations with his opponents, and the deputation they sent to Sparta had the blessing of the two Ephors on the campaign, both of whom supported Pausanias' conciliatory policy.

Faced with a rival deputation from the 'city' oligarchs, the Spartan Assembly instructed a fifteen-man commission to come to an agreement with Pausanias over the settlement of Athens. The upshot was the restoration of full democracy and the proclamation of a general amnesty (2.4.43), the first known in history, followed two years later by the political reunification of Attika. One small way in which the democrats thanked their Spartan liberators was by erecting in the Kerameikos a fine tomb for those Spartans they had killed in the Peiraieus (Willemssen 1977).

The tomb, Xenophon notes (2.4.33), lay outside the city gates – in fact on the road to the Academy in what has been called the Westminster Abbey of Athens. There were fourteen burials in all, the corpses being laid out with their heads resting on stone 'pillows' and pointing towards the street. In the approved 'Lykourgan' manner the burials lacked grave-goods, apart from one which contained merely a strigil. The tomb was originally marked by an inscribed marble block over twelve metres long and by three stelai. The stelai and most of the block are now lost, but the names of the two polemarchs cited by Xenophon are wholly preserved.

Reaction to Pausanias' settlement extended along a spectrum from democratic jubilation at Athens (Lysias 13.80) through mixed feelings at Thebes and Corinth (neither of which had sent forces for Pausanias' army, probably because they feared a Spartan take-over of Attika) to outright hostility from Pausanias' enemies at Sparta. The latter succeeded in having him put on trial for retreating from Athens after

an indecisive battle (Paus. 3.5.2), but despite the fact that even Agis voted for condemnation he was acquitted. More important, the Lysandrean form of imperialism through narrow oligarchies was definitively abandoned (Andrewes 1971, 206–16).

The following year (402) Sparta took two decisions with vital long-run consequences. The first was to ‘bring the Eleians to their senses’, as Xenophon (3.2.23) paraphrases the resolution of the Ephors and Assembly. The immediate issue was the one that had divided the two states since the Persian Wars, namely how far Elis should be allowed to extend its direct political control over what it took to be its own ‘perioikic cities’ in Eleia and Triphylia. But the Spartans and particularly Agis were also anxious to punish Elis for its defection from the Peloponnesian League in 420 and subsequent failure to meet its League obligations in the war, and for two insults delivered in virtue of its custodianship of the panhellenic sanctuary of Zeus at Olympia.

The ‘liberation propaganda’ which the Spartans now officially resuscitated was therefore so much window-dressing, and the undeceived Boiotians and Corinthians significantly refused again to contribute contingents to the League force (3.2.25). A weak and cautious Athens, however, did follow the Spartans’ lead, and the campaign, which extended over two years, was brutally successful. In economic terms it provided a veritable ‘harvest for the Peloponnese’ (3.2.26; cf. Pritchett 1974, 1, 78). Politically, Elis was stripped of all its dependencies apart from Olympia and compelled to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance on those terms (3.2.30f.).

After this, according to Diodorus (14.34.2f.), the Spartans took the opportunity of tidying up some loose ends from the great Helot revolt of the 460s. The Messenians settled by the Athenians at Naupaktos and on Kephallenia were now expelled and sailed away, some to Sicily (ironically to become mercenaries in the service of Sparta’s ally Dionysios I, tyrant of Syracuse since 405), some to Cyrenaica.

The second major decision taken by the Spartans in 402 was to send official support to Cyrus in his bid to oust his elder brother Artaxerxes II, who had succeeded to the Persian throne some two years earlier (3.1.1; cf. Diod. 14.19.2). The Spartans were of course deeply indebted to Cyrus (1.5.2–9; 6.18; 2.1.11–14; 3.1.2), but we may suspect that they also hoped to repair the damage done to their credibility as liberators by the treaty of 412–411 and Lysander’s dekharchies. For the Greek cities of Asia had revolted from Tissaphernes to Cyrus (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6). Be that as it may, the aid they sent was slight, thirty-five Peloponnesian ships under the navarch Samios or Pythagoras (Sealey 1976, 349f.) and 700 hoplites under the Spartiate Cheirisophos (Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.2f.). These hoplites were not

Spartan citizens, Perioikoi or even Neodamodeis but probably Peloponnesian mercenaries (Roy 1967, 300), and they formed a small proportion of the 12,000–13,000 or so hired altogether, more than half from overpopulated Arkadia and Achaia.

This was not the first time Greek mercenaries had been extensively used in a Persian dynastic struggle, but the ‘Ten Thousand’ were the largest body of Greek mercenaries yet recruited for a single mission. As such their significance can tend to be overrated, especially since our information on their vicissitudes comes chiefly from Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, a first-hand account but written up several decades later. None the less this work does reveal that Sparta had sent out as Cheirisophos’ understudy a Perioikos, Neon, an ‘Ulsterman’ from Messenian Asine (*Anab.* 5.3.4; 6.36 etc.); it provides a wealth of detail on conditions in the western extremities of the Persian Empire; and, above all, it supplies the essential linking material omitted from the *Hellenika* in the abrupt transition from the restoration of democracy at Athens in 403 (2.4.43) to Sparta’s declaration of war on Tissaphernes in the autumn of 400 (3.1.4).

Cyrus had been unnecessarily killed and so defeated at Cunaxa in Mesopotamia in 401. Six out of the eight Greek generals of the ‘Ten Thousand’, including their supreme commander Klearchos (a Spartan exile), had been treacherously murdered by Tissaphernes, who had wisely chosen the path of loyalty to Artaxerxes. Only with great hardship did the 8,0 or so survivors struggle back to the Black Sea and Greek civilization in 400.

Their reception here, however, was not all they might have hoped. In particular, the navarch Anaxibios and Aristarchos, harmost of Byzantion, did not shrink even from selling 400 of them into slavery (*Anab.* 7.1.36; 2.6). One would therefore be forgiven for thinking that the official attitude of Sparta towards the sizeable remnant of the ‘Ten Thousand’ in the summer of 400 was at best negative, at worst actively hostile; and that Sparta wished thereby to make some amends to Artaxerxes for supporting Cyrus. However, three chapters and a few months later another extraordinary *volte-face* in Spartan foreign policy is reported (*Anab.* 7.6.1): two Spartiates arrive from Thibron to announce that the Spartans have decided to fight Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Thibron himself arrives in the spring of 399 with 1,000 Neodamodeis and 4,000 other Peloponnesian troops (3.1.4) and promptly absorbs the remainder of Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries into his own force (3.1.6; *Anab.* 7.8.24).

Xenophon’s account of the background to this change of heart is plausible enough so far as it goes, but his order of narration has obscured a vital connection. Tissaphernes, in high favour with Artaxerxes, was given command of Asia west of the Halys river (3.1.3;

2.13). His demand that the Ionian cities should be subject exclusively to him and his attack on Kyme provoked two Ionian embassies to Sparta (3.1.3; 2.12), whose aid was sought in its capacity as 'leader of all Greece' (cf. *Anab.* 6.6.9, 12, 13; 7.1.28). The Spartans replied first with a diplomatic note (Diod. 14.35.6) reminiscent of their response to Cyrus the Great on behalf of Croesus in c.550 (Hdt. 1.152) and then by despatching Thibron (above). What Xenophon fails to do, however, is link this aggressive anti-Persian policy with the death of Agis and the role played by Lysander in the unexpected accession of Agis' brother Agesilaos (3.3.1–4). Perhaps Xenophon was unwilling to admit any evidence that might detract from his picture of Agesilaos the 'panhellenist' fervently seeking the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks, an image which the king himself was anxious to foster. At any rate, the most economical explanation of this turn of events is that Lysander hoped to use Agesilaos and the new policy to regain the ground he had lost to Pausanias since 403.

Instead of spelling this out, Xenophon follows his description of Agis' funeral ('more awful than befits the mortal estate') and Agesilaos' elevation with what is perhaps the most remarkable episode in all Lakonian history, the conspiracy of Kinadon (3.3.4–11; cf. *Arist. Pol.* 1306b34–6). I am still unclear why Xenophon mentions this incident, which at least in his account had no serious or obvious consequences, while he omits others that are blatantly material to his chief interests. But, whatever his intention, he has certainly succeeded in exhibiting in a brief compass the variegated social structure of Lakonian society at the turn of the fourth century. For this reason discussion of the conspiracy's social implications has been postponed to the next chapter. Here follows just an annotated summary.

The conspiracy was uncovered within a year of Agesilaos' accession. This timing is not likely to be fortuitous. For apart from the succession crisis provoked by Agis' death, his funeral would have provided a marvellous opportunity for a prospective revolutionary to test the political temperature, since the elaborate ritual prescribed by Spartan custom involved the congregation at Sparta of not only the Spartiates but Perioikoi and Helots too, presumably heads of households, and their wives (Tyrtaios fr. 7; Hdt. 6.58.2f.). It was then, I suggest, that Kinadon began to plot.

Exactly what Kinadon hoped to achieve by his revolution and how extensive and advanced the plot was when it was betrayed to the Ephors – these are unclear. What is certain is that his prime target was the Spartiates, citizens of full status. The conspiracy was to begin in Sparta, presumably with the murder of suitably prominent Spartiates, perhaps even of Agesilaos (from whom Xenophon may have heard the story, which begins with Agesilaos' ill-omened sacrifices). The Ephors

were allegedly terrified by what they considered a potent plan, but their smooth and instant response suggests the existence of a well-oiled counter-insurgency machine. In fact, it was precisely because Kinadon had himself been employed on similar missions in the past that the Ephors could now send him, without arousing his suspicions, to Perioikic Aulon in north-west Messenia to arrest some named Aulonites and Helots.

The significance of this tactic, however, is unfortunately ambiguous (see [Chapter 14](#)), and the status of these Helots at Aulon is problematical. Some like Welwei (1974, 109 n. 5) think that, exceptionally, the Aulonite Perioikoi could have Helots working for them. This I find intrinsically improbable and suggest that it was precisely because these named Helots were at Aulon and not working their masters' *kleroi* in, say, the adjacent Soulima valley that they were detailed for arrest. The site of Aulon too is uncertain; indeed, it may have been a region rather than a town, as its name meaning 'Hollow' suggests. But Xenophon provides a strong hint that there was a Spartan garrison here, perhaps under a harmost. For Kinadon is ordered to bring back also a lady, presumably a prostitute, whose physical charms were corrupting older and younger 'Lakedaimonians' alike. By this I think we should understand Spartiates or at least Neodamodeis as well as Perioikoi. The presence of a garrison on the Triphylian border is easily explicable in terms of the recent troubles with Elis, and there is besides archaeological evidence, which may go back to the fourth century, for a fort in just about the right place – at modern Vounaki (*MME* no. 601).

Ostensibly to accompany, but in fact to arrest, Kinadon the Ephors sent six or seven 'younger' or 'young' men (Xenophon uses both words). Since the selection of this squad was by pre-arrangement entrusted to the eldest of the (three) Hippagretai (cf. *Xen. Lak. Pol.* 4.3), we may assume that these men were Hippeis. We should not, however, simply infer from this that Hippeis were regularly used to arrest Helots and Perioikoi, let alone that they were the mainstay of the Krypteia. Rather, the choice of members of the royal bodyguard is an index of the Ephors' apprehension and may even imply that Agesilaos himself was actively involved in the counter-measures, although Xenophon only says vaguely that the Ephors had consulted some Gerontes. In case of trouble, however, the Ephors also detailed a *mora* of cavalry as a back-up force. This is our first evidence that the cavalry, which had first been regularly raised in 424, was also organized in *morai*.

All went according to the Ephors' plan. Kinadon was arrested outside Sparta and confessed the names of his closest confederates. The latter were then arrested too. Intriguingly, they included a seer,

Teisamenos, whom it is tempting to see as a descendant of the Teisamenos who gained Spartan citizenship before the Battle of Plataia ([Chapter 11](#)); perhaps this citizenship was somehow of an inferior kind. All those detained had their hands bound and their necks put in dog-collars and were thus dragged around Sparta under the whip and the goad. ‘So they met their punishment’ is Xenophon’s laconic coda. We may suspect, however, that they were executed, though perhaps only after due process.

Xenophon’s account continues with Sparta’s response in 396 to the news of a Persian naval build-up in the Aegean (3.4.1). By this time Sparta had been fighting in Asia Minor for three years. Thibron had been replaced in the autumn of 399 by Derkylidas (3.1.8), a skilful diplomatist and general, typically Spartan in his religiosity (3.1.17; 2.16) but ostentatiously unSpartan in his Sisyphean-like cunning (cf. Ephorus 70F71) and bachelor status (to which we shall return in [Chapter 14](#)). He raised the number of his troops to about 12,000, some 4,000 of whom were allocated to garrison-duty in the cities which he and Thibron had liberated from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. In winter 399–398 he concluded a truce with Pharnabazus to avoid billeting his troops on the liberated cities (3.2.1; Diod. 14.38.3), and this was renewed in spring 398 after ratification by a three-man commission sent out by the Ephors (3.2.6, 9).

By 397, however, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes had overcome their mutual suspicion (3.1.9) and were actively cooperating (3.2.13). In particular, Pharnabazus had secured money from Artaxerxes to put in commission a fleet of 300 Phoenician ships under the Athenian Konon (Diod. 14.39; cf. Isokr. 9.55; Plut. *Ages.* 6.1; Nepos, *Con.* 2; Paus. 1.3.1). This important development is omitted by Xenophon, although he does give us the name of the Spartan navarch for 398–397, Pharax (3.2.12, 14). In summer 397 a further truce was concluded by Derkylidas, this time with Tissaphernes as well as Pharnabazus (3.2.20); but Xenophon does not make it clear whether the Spartans formally accepted the Persian terms for peace (abandonment of Asia, withdrawal of harmosts and garrisons from the Greek cities), and Diodorus (14.39.6) merely says that after the truce both sides disbanded their armies.

Thus Xenophon contrives to omit the naval, and obscure the diplomatic, background to the Spartan decision to send out Agesilaos to Asia in 396 (3.4.2; cf. Xen. ‘*Ages.*’ 1.7). He does, however, stress the vigorous support for the expedition expressed by Lysander (cf. Plut. *Lys.* 23.1), who is said to have wished to re-establish *dekarchies*. According to Xenophon, indeed, it was actually Lysander who suggested the composition of Agesilaos’ force: thirty Spartiate advisers, including himself, 2,000 of the *Neodamodeis* and 6,0 allied

troops (3.4.8).

We note the omission of Spartiate or Perioikic hoplites and, second, the large number of Neodamodeis (3,000 in all were employed in Asia). Xenophon's partitive genitive 'of the Neodamodeis' and Plutarch's description of the 2,000 as 'picked men' ('Ages.' 6.4) confirm that Sparta had enormously increased its reserve of Neodamodeis since 413, doubtless because the huge influx of wealth in the form of Persian subsidy (Lysander was said to have brought back 470 talents in 405–404) and imperial tribute made such an increase financially feasible (Welwei 1974, 149 n. 44, 151, 157, 159). They were perhaps recruited from Helots who had seen active service as batmen and armour-bearers. As far as the allies are concerned, Xenophon crucially fails to mention here that Corinth, Athens and Thebes on various pretexts refused to contribute troops (cf. Paus. 3.9.1–3). He does, on the other hand, record that the leaders of the Boiotian League prevented Agesilaos from sacrificing at Aulis, like a second Agamemnon, prior to sailing (3.4.4).

Agesilaos' programme was nothing less than to make the Greek cities of Asia autonomous like those in mainland Greece (3.4.5). Such a provision for the autonomy of mainland cities, great and small, had been written into the treaty of 418–417 between Sparta and Argos after Mantinea (Thuc. 5.77, 79), but the Eleians would not have been alone in suspecting that in practice 'autonomy' would be interpreted to coincide with the Spartans' conception of their own best interests. It was at the least a flexible notion, as many mainland Greeks were to learn to their cost. In 396, however, Agesilaos gave no hint that less than ten years later he would preside over the resale of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia. Rather, he seems to have aimed to surpass the 'Ten Thousand' in taking the war deep into the Great King's territory.

At least this is the picture presented by Xenophon; less committed sources like the 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (12.1) gave a more restricted interpretation. Once the personal rivalry between Agesilaos and Lysander had been resolved by the despatch of the latter to the Hellespont (3.4.7–10; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 24.1), Agesilaos made Ephesos his base for a highly successful campaign first against Pharnabazus' Phrygia in 396 and then against Tissaphernes' Lydia in 395 (3.4.12–15, 21–4). Tissaphernes was beheaded on Artaxerxes' orders; his successor, Tithraustes, offered Agesilaos a financial inducement to quit Asia, backed by a guarantee of autonomy for the cities if they would pay the 'old tribute' to Persia.

The 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (12.1) and Diodorus (14.80.8) speak of a truce between Agesilaos and Tithraustes, but in Xenophon Agesilaos stalls by saying that he must wait for instructions from Sparta and moves north again into Pharnabazus' territory (3.4.26). Here his

instructions from Sparta arrived, perhaps no more unexpected than they were welcome. For he was put in charge of both land and sea operations, the first time a king had been given such a joint command (Plut. Ages. 10.9f.). Xenophon does not explain why Agesilaos put such energy into raising a fleet of 120 triremes, which he placed under his brother-in-law Peisandros (3.4.28f.). The answer is provided by the 'Oxyrhynchos historian' (15): Konon had caused the key base of Rhodes to revolt from Sparta.

It can hardly have been coincidental that Tithraustes in 395 should have decided to emulate Artaxerxes' grandfather and namesake (Thuc. 1.109.2) by distributing cash to potentially friendly Greeks on the mainland. Only this time the boot was on the other foot, and it was against rather than to the Spartans that the money was disbursed. For it was distributed to politicians in Thebes, Corinth and Argos on condition that they persuaded their cities to make war on Sparta. Xenophon (3.5.1) naively or disingenuously implies that it was this money that indirectly brought about the grand coalition of these three with Athens. But the wiser or less biased 'Oxyrhynchos historian', who also provides the essential background for Athens' decision, expressly rebuts this view by pointing out that anti-Spartan Athenians had long been awaiting a suitable opportunity to brine about such a conjuncture (7; cf. 18; Lehmann 1978).

The immediate occasion of the alliance and the ensuing 'Corinthian War' was Sparta's intervention on the side of Phokis in its struggle with East or perhaps West Lokris, which had allegedly been instigated by Thebes (3.5.2; cf. *Hell. Ox.* 16–18). According to Xenophon's one-sided account, the Spartans actually welcomed the occasion or pretext (*prophasis*) to campaign against Thebes: the timing was convenient, and they (and Agesilaos above all) wished to punish Thebes for its disloyalty and constant opposition since 405–404 (3.5.5). The Ephors therefore proclaimed a levy, and, as in 403, Lysander was sent ahead, with king Pausanias commanding the Lakedaimonian and Peloponnesian League force to follow and liaise with him (3.5.6f.). Lysander was immediately successful in detaching Orchomenos from the Boiotian League, and the Thebans responded by seeking an alliance with Athens.

At this point in his narrative Xenophon rises above his usual level to write for the Theban ambassadors collectively a thoroughly Thucydidean speech nicely conveying the diplomatic and military realities (3.5.8–15). Not every detail, however, can be trusted, and the Thebans' misrepresentations should perhaps be put down to Xenophon's hostility towards Thebes. They begin by explaining away their state's desire for the destruction of Athens in 405–404. They stress the hatred of Sparta felt by the Argives, Eleians, Corinthians,

Arkadians and Achaians and by the cities tyrannized by harmosts (including Helot harmosts), garrisons and dekachies. (In fact, the dekachies had been abolished nearly a decade earlier and, despite Lysander, not reimposed; and if there is any truth in the allegation that Helots became harmosts, these would have been strictly *nothoi*, sons of Helot mothers, rather than Helots in the full sense: Welwei 1974, 132. Demosthenes, 18.96, however, does list a string of places under harmosts and garrisons.) The Thebans then try to excite those Athenians, probably a majority (cf. Seager 1967, 115), who dreamed of restoring their empire (cf. 3.5.2); and they conclude optimistically by noting a contrast between Spartan and Athenian imperialism: whereas Athens had had a navy to control its shipless subjects, the Spartans are themselves few and rule men who are not only many times more numerous but also no worse armed than they. The significance of this closing reference to the small number of the Spartiates (they alone are meant) is that it ties in with one of the main points in Xenophon's account of Kinadon's conspiracy.

The Athenians found the Thebans' arguments cogent and in or about August 395 concluded defensive alliances for ever with Boiotia and Lokris (Tod 1948, nos 101–2). The alliances soon bore fruit. Lysander, who had not waited for Pausanias, was killed at Haliartos (3.5.17–21; cf. Plut. *Lys.* 29; Paus. 3.5.4f.), and Pausanias rather than continue the battle asked for a truce to pick up the dead (3.5.21–4). For arriving too late, for arranging a truce instead of fighting (contrast 6.4.15; 7.4.25!) and for allowing the Athenian democrats to escape (in 403!) Pausanias was arraigned on a capital charge (Ste. Croix 1972, 351). Anticipating condemnation, he fled, like Latychidas before him, to Tegea, where he lived for at least another fifteen years as a suppliant within the sanctuary of Athena Alea and devoted part of his leisure to the composition of an anti-Lykourgan tract. After the death of Lysander it was 'discovered' that he too had wished to modify the 'Lykourgan' constitution. Perhaps it was not so surprising that Agesilaos, faced with political revolution from above as well as below within five years of his accession, should have been such a stickler for unquestioning obedience to 'the laws' – at least so far as they were conformable to his own inclinations.

Meanwhile back in Phrygia Agesilaos in autumn 395 resumed his onslaught on Pharnabazus' domain (4.1.1ff., but see *Hell Ox.* 18.33–20.38). Much booty was taken and sold (4.1.1, 26), more cities were won over, until in 394 Pharnabazus consented to a conference with Agesilaos (4.1.31–9). Xenophon artistically points up the contrast between the simplicity of the Spartan king and the pomp of the oriental potentate, but cannot disguise the pointlessness of the exercise, whose only positive result was that Agesilaos became the

guest-friend of Pharnabazus' son. But Xenophon does at least permit the judicious reader to pass a critical judgment on Agesilaos' conduct by juxtaposing the king's visionary design of detaching a large chunk from the Persian Empire (4.1.41) with the fear of the Spartans at home for the safety of their own city, threatened as it was by the coalition of Boiotia, Athens, Corinth and Argos (4.2.1).

By this fear I think we should understand Xenophon to mean that the Spartans dreaded an invasion of Lakonia. For this is precisely what he makes a Corinthian speaker advocate a few sections later (4.2.1 If.), using a vivid entomological simile. The Spartans, says Timolaos (one of those in receipt of Persian money in 395), should be fought in their own territory or as near to it as possible, just like wasps, who cause no trouble when they are smoked out of their nest but sting if allowed to swarm. Moreover, like the Theban ambassadors at Athens, Timolaos emphasizes the small number of the Spartans, whom he compares to rivers – small at their source but swollen by tributaries as they proceed away from it. His implication, incidentally, that it will be possible to pass through Arkadia unhindered also ties in with what the Thebans had said and is a valuable corroboration of Arkadian dissatisfaction with Spartan hegemony.

The Spartans, however, had other ideas. 'Slow to war unless compelled to it', they had sent a message to Agesilaos ordering his instant return from Asia (4.2.2; cf. Plut. Ages. 15.2) and now proclaimed a levy under Aristodamos, guardian of Pausanias' under-age son Agesipolis (4.2.9). Aristodamos speedily marched out to north-east Peloponnese, picking up some Tegean and Mantineian troops *en route* but failing to receive any from Phleious (4.2.16), which pleaded exemption legitimately enough on religious grounds but had other reasons for neutrality (Legon 1967, 329f.). The ensuing battle at the Nemea River, the largest inter-Greek battle yet, resulted in a convincing victory for the Spartan side. We need not linger over the tactics, revealing though they are of the changed military conditions of the fourth century (Anderson 1970, 144–7, 181–4). However, scarcely less of a battleground is the interpretation of the 'about 6,000 Lakedaimonian hoplites' (4.2.16) who were engaged, and this problem is relevant to our main concerns. For what we want to know is how many of these were Spartiates.

It is as well to make clear at once that certainty is impossible. To begin with, Xenophon's description of the 'Lakedaimonian' contingent draws no other distinction than that between the 6,000 or so hoplites and the 600 or so cavalry. Welwei (1974, 152), mainly following Busolt, allows for the 300 Hippeis (cf. Thuc. 5.72), some 600 Skiritai (cf. Thuc. 5.68.3), about 1,500 Neodamodeis and five *morai* of about 3,300–3,500 men in all. (The sixth *mora* was in garrison at Boiotian

Orchomenos: 4.3.15; cf. 2.17.) I agree with him (140 n. 75) against Toynbee (1969, 380) and Andrewes (in Gomme 1970, 113) that there could have been a sizeable number of Neodamodeis present, since not all of them had been sent to Asia in 399 and 396. But I would prefer to increase his estimate for the number of Spartiates and Perioikoi in the five *morai* by about 1,000, to give a *mora* of about 900 men. Such a figure is attested in Polybius (fr. 60 B-W) and other sources and is appropriate to an emergency for which Sparta probably mobilized thirty-five of the forty active-service age-classes (Toynbee 1969, 379); in any case we should expect the *morai* at the Nemea River to have been significantly larger than the one of about 600 which was performing only garrison duty at Lechaion in 390 (4.5.12: below). Of these putative 4,500 or so hoplites in the *morai* perhaps 2,500 were Perioikoi, 2,000 Spartiates. This may represent a drop of about one third on the number of Spartiates at Mantinea (in a possibly greater levy).

It was perhaps fortunate that of 'their own men' (not necessarily just Spartiates) the Spartans lost a mere eight in the battle (4.3.1; cf. Xen. *Ages.* 7.5). This cheerful information was conveyed by Derkyllidas (perhaps Xenophon's source) to Agesilaos, who had promptly obeyed the summons from Asia, crossed the Hellespont from Abydos to Sestos and followed Xerxes' route through Thrace to Amphipolis (4.2.3–8). His other news was less heartening: most of Thessaly had revolted from Sparta to Thebes after the battle of Haliartos (Diod. 14.82.5f.). Agesilaos succeeded none the less in forcing a passage by defeating the Thessalians in an engagement in which his cavalry did particularly well (4.3.9: this was not of course Spartan cavalry, but horsemen hired in Asia – 3.4.2, 16, 20; 4.2. 5).

Agesilaos' pride, however, was soon humbled. On 14 August 394 he learned of Peisandros' disastrous defeat at sea off Knidos by Konon and Pharnabazus (4.3.10–14). For background and descriptive details we must turn to other sources than Xenophon (*Hell. Ox.* 19ff.; Diod. 14.79, 81, 83; cf. Underhill 1900, 129f.). From these we learn that, apart from the admiral's inexperience, the Spartan defeat was due to the vast superiority in numbers of the Phoenician fleet which Konon had raised by at last securing adequate finance from Artaxerxes.

Xenophon's silence on the Knidos sea-battle is to this extent understandable, that he had left Asia with Agesilaos and was personally involved in the third major battle of 394, at Koroneia in Boiotia (4.3.15–22; Polyain. 2.1.23). The 'Lakedaimonians' under Agesilaos' command comprised a *mora* which had crossed over from the Corinthia after the Nemea River battle by sea (the passage through the Isthmus, as in the 'First' Peloponnesian War, being blocked), half of the *mora* stationed at Orchomenos, and those of the 3,000

Neodamodeis sent to Asia who had not either been killed or left behind there on garrison duty. Xenophon twice describes the battle as 'unlike any other in my time' (4.3.16; Ages. 2.9). He probably had in mind the nature of its progress, and especially Agesilaos' heroic response to the manoeuvres, rather than its magnitude or importance. For although it was another victory for the Spartan side, it no more decided the Corinthian War than the Nemea River battle. Phokis and Orchomenos were secured, but no strategic position for effective action in central Greece. The rest of the land actions in the war centred about Corinth.

In the late 390s *stasis* produced one of the most interesting political experiments in the history of the independent Greek city-states, the 'union of Corinth and Argos' – or rather perhaps the conclusion of an isopolity (mutual citizenship) agreement between them (4.4.6; 8.34; Diod. 14.92.1). Xenophon sees this entirely from the side of the Corinthian oligarchs, and one suspects that Pasimelos (4.4.4; 7.3.2) was one of the 'Lakonizers' from whom he gathered much of his information when he was living at Corinth after 371. But bloody though the circumstances of the 'union' perhaps were (4.4.3–5), the mass of the Corinthians are unlikely to have shared the view of their oligarchic opponents that for the next seven years their status was no better than that of resident aliens. From the Spartan standpoint the 'union' was a disaster. It meant the breakdown of a policy dating at least from 494, whereby an isolated and hostile Argos should serve to keep Corinth loyal and the Isthmus passage secure.

Xenophon's chronology for the next few years of the war is confused and confusing, since he treats land-operations from 393 to 388 in one piece without clear divisions between years before returning to the war at sea from 394 to 387. Diodorus is, as usual in this respect, of little or no help. Not even Xenophon and Diodorus, however, can completely obscure a vital connection. In 393 the war was for the first time brought to Sparta's own territory. In 392 Sparta through Antalkidas reversed its policy of the past seven years and once more sought to ingratiate itself with Persia at the expense of the Asiatic Greeks.

Following the Knidos sea-battle Konon and Pharnabazus 'sailed around' the Aegean, driving out Spartan harmosts and giving the cities the twofold assurance that their citadels would no longer be garrisoned and that their autonomy would be respected (4.8.1f., 5). Sparta in fact lost much of its Aegean empire, as we learn also from Diodorus (14.84.3f.) and Pausanias (6.3.16). A decree of Erythrai honouring Konon (Tod 1948, no. 106) will not have been unique; and Athens was quick to begin the process of restoring its power in the Aegean (Tod 1948, no. 110: a decree of perhaps 393 honouring

Karpathos) and to attempt to win over Dionysios of Syracuse from the Spartans (Tod 1948, no. 108). The coinage bearing the superscription SYN and linking cities from Byzantion to Rhodes is perhaps the token of an anti-Spartan league based on Thebes (Cawkwell 1963).

In spring 393 Pharnabazus and Konon sailed through the Aegean to Melos, which they planned to use as a base for ravaging Lakonia (4.8.7). In Xenophon's account the idea was conceived by Pharnabazus as a means of retaliation against the Spartans for the losses Derkylidas (3.1.9ff.) and Agesilaos (3.4.12ff.; 4.1.1ff.) had inflicted on his province. It is, however, worth considering the possibility that the plan was suggested to Konon by the Messenian exiles in his entourage (cf. *Hell. Ox.* 20.3); Konon would then be in a direct line of descent from Demosthenes ([Chapter 12](#)).

However this may be, Pharnabazus and Konon attacked Pharai (modern Kalamata) at the head of the Messenian Gulf and ravaged its land, the first attack on Sparta's home territory since the Athenians' unsuccessful attempt to recapture Pylos in 409–408. They then made landings at various points on the coast (presumably of Lakonia as well as Messenia) and did as much damage as possible. This was not, however, as much or as serious as they would have liked, for they were hampered by the lack of suitable harbours to use as bases (cf. [Chapter 10](#)), by the defence forces sent by the Spartans (presumably mobile detachments like that commanded by Brasidas at Mothone in 431), and by the shortage of cereals (it was the time of year when, as Alkman fr. 20.3–5 had noted, hunger was never far away). So, following the example of Nikias in 424, they sensibly decided to conduct an *epiteichismos* on Kythera.

A landing was made at Phoinikous (probably modern Avlemonas Bay). The citadel of Kythera town was captured, allegedly at the first assault, and the Kytherians or some of them were sent away under a truce to the Lakonian mainland (4.8.8; Diod. 14.84.5). The absence of the Spartan harmost and a Lakedaimonian garrison is, as in 424, remarkable and probably to be explained on the same lines. Konon then repaired the fortifications, left behind a garrison of his mercenaries under an Athenian harmost (so described by Xenophon) and sailed for the Isthmus, which the anti-Spartan coalition had made its GHQ.

What Xenophon and Diodorus may have omitted as relatively insignificant is an attack by Konon on Antikythera (known by various names in antiquity). This small island ([Chapter 2](#)) lies equidistant from Kythera and Crete and could be reached from the former before the first meal of the day was taken, according to the fourth-century Teriplos' of Pseudo-Skylax. Its main town, Aigilia, was fortified in the fifth century, either by the Spartans or possibly by Nikias. The reasons

for thinking that Konon took an interest in the site are twofold. First, sling-bullets inscribed 'of the king' have been found here (Foss 1975, 42), together with spearheads and many black-painted sherds. Second, at some time between 400 and 350 the akropolis walls were reconstructed and an enceinte-wall added, enclosing an area of some 300,000m². The presence of walling of such quality demands an explanation in the absence of evidence for ancient occupation from the rest of the island, and Konon, as we have seen, had the men and equipment to repair the walls of Kythera.

Konon's arrival first at Corinth and then, after an absence of twelve years, at his native Athens raised the war on to a new plane. For the Persian money he brought enabled the anti-Spartan coalition temporarily to gain the mastery of the Corinthian Gulf (4.8.10) and for the next four years to maintain a permanent force of mercenaries in the Corinthia, while at home the Athenians could now fully rebuild the walls they had been compelled to dismantle in 404 (4.8.10; cf. Tod 1948, no. 107; Pritchett 1974, II, 121 n. 22). The Spartans were nevertheless far from incapable of responding. In 392 they won the Battle of the Long Walls of Corinth (4.4.6–13) and in 391 they actually captured Lechaion, Corinth's Peiraieus on the Corinthian Gulf, and garrisoned it (4.4.17, with Underhill 1900, 139f. on the chronology).

In the interval between these military successes, however, they had undertaken a drastically new diplomatic initiative, compelled to do so, as suggested earlier, by the *epiteichismos* on Kythera (which had followed so soon after Kinadon's abortive rising and the machinations of Pausanias and Lysander). In Xenophon (4.8.12–17) the Spartans apparently intended to enter into purely bilateral negotiations with Tiribazus, who seems to have succeeded Tithraustes (cf. 5.1.28). In the event they found themselves attending at Sardis an international conference that included representatives of their Greek enemies, the Athenians, Boiotians, Corinthians and Argives. Antalkidas proposed peace with Persia on condition that all Greek cities and islands should be autonomous, but on the understanding that the Spartans would not dispute ownership of the cities of Asia with the Great King – a return, in other words, to their position of exactly twenty years previously. Not surprisingly, the other Greek representatives demurred, partly because these terms involved the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, but mainly because the 'autonomy' clause threatened their own vital interests – Athens' control of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, crucial for its wheaten lifeline; Thebes' control of Boiotia; and the 'union' of Corinth and Argos. Tiribazus, on the other hand, was impressed, secretly gave Antalkidas some money and publicly arrested Konon. Artaxerxes, however, was not yet ready to settle.

A few months later, early in 391, the Spartans tried again to make peace and convened a conference at Sparta, this time not only without involving Persia but also seeking to meet the other Greeks' objections halfway. Andokides (3), our only source, is the earliest surviving writer to use the expression 'Common Peace' to describe 'a general treaty based on the principle of autonomy' (Ryder 1965, 33). But it was precisely the 'autonomy' clause which once again proved to be the stumbling-block.

The attitude of Agesilaos to the initiative spearheaded by Antalkidas is unclear. Plutarch (Ages. 23.2) says that the two were personal and political enemies, but the difference between them may only have been one of emphasis. For Agesilaos the application of the 'autonomy principle' in Sparta's favour throughout mainland Greece seems to have been the paramount consideration. Ideally perhaps he would have preferred not to renege on the Asiatic Greeks; but, as the events of 387–386 and following were to demonstrate, if they had to be sacrificed on the altar of mainland Greek 'autonomy', then Agesilaos would not shrink from applying the knife – indirectly, through Antalkidas, for whom peace was a commodity to be bought at this price. It is tempting to link the latter's fervour with a curious piece of information in Plutarch (Ages. 32.1), that in 370 he sent away his children for safety to Kythera. Perhaps he had friends there whose property and lives were menaced by the *epiteichismos*.

The fluctuating fortunes of the remainder of the Corinthian War by land and sea from 391 to 387 (4.4.15–7.7; 4. 8.17–5.1.24) need not long delay us, since, despite the occupation of Kythera, Lakonia as such played little or no role, at least in our preserved accounts. Indeed, Xenophon refers to Lakonia just once (4.7.6), in the context of an Argive counter-raid presumably against Kynouria during an expedition against the Argolis led by Agesipolis in 388. For the rest, apart from a Peloponnesian League campaign against the Akarnanians led by Agesilaos on behalf of the Achaians in 389 (4.6.1–12), regular fighting on the mainland was confined to the Corinthia. Here one famous episode requires our attention.

In May/June 390 Agesilaos commanded the first major Spartan offensive of the war, an attack on Corinth itself (4.5.1). The Corinthians feared that the city would be betrayed to Agesilaos, who was accompanied by Corinthian oligarchic exiles, and so summoned to their aid Iphikrates and his mercenaries, who were in garrison at nearby Peiraion protecting Corinth's communications with Boiotia and Athens (4.5.3; Xen. Ages. 2.19). Iphikrates had been despatched to the Corinthia by the Athenians in 393 and placed in command of a 'Foreign Legion' of mercenaries (Androtion 324F48; Philochoros 328F150). Thanks to Persian money he was able to keep a more or

less stable force in commission for four years, but it was his brains rather than Persian gold that welded this force into a powerful tactical unit. Not only did he introduce significant modifications of equipment, blending the hoplite with the light-armed infantryman to produce a new, improved peltast, but he also proved an excellent disciplinarian and field commander. His finest hour came in 390.

Agésilaos' expedition against Corinth coincided with the Hyakinthia festival, and it was customary for Amyklaian Spartans to return to celebrate it wherever or for whatever purpose they happened to be away from home (4.5.11). They were therefore granted the usual dispensation and were escorted by the *mora* of about 600 hoplites on guard at Lechaion and by a small contingent of cavalry to within four or five kilometres of Sikyon. Here the commander of the *mora* entrusted the Amyklaians to the cavalry commander and set out back to Lechaion; but *en route* he was ambushed by Iphikrates, and the *mora* was cut to pieces (4.5.12–17). Xenophon's account of the number killed is not self-explanatory: although a few, he says, escaped to Lechaion, yet only about 250 were killed. Perhaps he means to refer only to the Spartiate casualties. At any rate, the Spartans could no longer afford to be scornful of peltasts, as they had been the previous year (4.4.17). For this destruction was a 'disaster of a kind unusual for the Spartans' (4.5.10), and Xenophon highlights its magnitude by remarking that the sons, brothers and fathers of the dead men rejoiced at the news. This response presages the reaction to the far greater disaster at Leuktra in 371.

Agésilaos, one minute receiving a Boiotian embassy treating for peace, next minute is leading back the remains of the destroyed *mora* to Sparta, shamefacedly taking care not to pass by Mantinea in daylight and so present the Mantineians with a chance to mock (4.5.18). Thereafter there was a stalemate on land, and Iphikrates next turns up in the Hellespont in 389–388, commanding eight ships and about 1,200 peltasts, with which he defeats the Spartan harmost Anaxibios (4.8.34–9). He had been sent there because the Athenians were afraid of losing the control of the northern side of the Hellespont won for them in 389 by Thrasyboulos, the resistance leader of 403. In fact, Thrasyboulos had gone some considerable way towards laying the basis for a renewal of the fifth-century Athenian Empire (4.8.25). However, the Athenians' naval resurgence since 393 had led them to overplay their hand. In 390 they entered into a treaty with a revolted vassal of Persia, King Evagoras of Cyprus (Bengtson 1975, no. 234); in 389 they intervened on the side of democracy at Klazomenai (Tod 1948, no. 114). The Great King therefore was more sympathetic to the Spartans when in 387 Antalkidas (navarch since 388) once again brought proposals for a Common Peace.

Antalkidas first obtained an alliance with Persia, a necessary precaution in case the Athenians should refuse to accept the peace (5.1.25). To make doubly sure of Athenian compliance, Antalkidas with Syracusan and Persian help gathered the largest fleet in service since 394 (eighty or more ships) and regained control of the Hellespont; the Athenians were thereby threatened with a repetition of the aftermath of Aigospotamoi (5.1.28f.). The complaisant attitude of Argos was secured by the threat of a full-scale Spartan invasion (5.1.29). The Thebans, concerned as ever for their hegemony of the Boiotian League, attempted to resist the 'autonomy principle', but Agesilaos had war declared on them too, and they tamely submitted to the dismemberment of the League (5.1.32f.). The Corinthians at first refused to withdraw the garrison sent by Argos (cf. 4.4.6; 5.1), but like the Argives and Thebans yielded to Agesilaos' threat of force; the 'union' of Corinth and Argos was terminated, the Corinthian exiles restored (5.1.34).

The peace to which all Greeks from 386 were formally party contained three clauses: the Greek cities of Asia were to be the King's, as were Klazomenai and Cyprus; all other Greek cities, great or small, were to be free and autonomous and to keep their own territory, except Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros; any state refusing to accept these terms would be liable to attack by the King. Officially, these terms had been 'sent down' by Artaxerxes to be rubberstamped by the Greeks meeting at Sardis, and so one name for the peace was the 'King's Peace'. Informally, and more informatively, it was known as the 'Peace of Antalkidas' (5.1.35). For as Agesilaos reportedly remarked in its defence (Plut. *Ages.* 23.4; *Artax.* 22.4; *Mor.* 213B), the Spartans were not 'medizing' so much as the Persians were 'lakonizing'.

In other words, this was an arrangement sponsored by the Spartans mainly in their own selfish interests. The past three years of fighting had brought them no advantage over the Greeks, and the anti-Persian policy of the 390s had merely contributed to the resurgence of Athens. Hence the abandonment of the Asiatic Greeks in favour of concentrating first on re-establishing Spartan suzerainty in the Peloponnese and then on extending it north of the Isthmus. As Ryder (1965, 39) well puts it, 'the King's Peace had been devised by the Spartans as an acceptable basis for Persian intervention. ... It was, then, naturally suited primarily to the interests of the Spartans and Persians.'

The new Spartan policy was at first triumphantly successful, although its success should not be put down to the peace as such, whose direct influence, as Seager (1974) has demonstrated, was intermittent and superficial. Rather it was because Sparta was still the single greatest military power in mainland Greece that by 379 the

Spartans could seem to have 'at length established their empire in all respects well and securely' (5.3.27). Isokrates in his *Panegyrikos* of c.380 (4.126) summarized the main events leading to this happy position. Mantinea had been destroyed (385), the Kadmeia (akropolis) of Thebes had been occupied and garrisoned (382), Olynthos and Phleious were being besieged (from 382; both submitted in 379), Amyntas (III) of Macedon, Dionysios of Syracuse and the Great King were being aided. Diodorus (15.23.3f.), amplifying Xenophon and Isokrates, adds a curious explanation: 'the Spartans had constantly applied themselves to securing an abundance of population and practice in the use of arms, and so were become an object of terror to all because of the strength of their following.' If Diodorus (or his source) meant an abundance of population in Lakonia and Messenia, this can only refer to Helots and Perioikoi. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, a far greater thinker than he rightly attributed Sparta's eventual eclipse precisely to its lack of manpower, meaning of course citizen manpower.

We need not, however, confine ourselves to the matter of Spartiate manpower to detect signs of Spartan weakness. For the above summaries of Sparta's position in 380–379 present a one-sided picture of the period 386–379. For example, in 384 Athens concluded a perpetual alliance with the important island of Chios (Tod 1948, no. 118); six years later this alliance could serve as a model for the series of alliances comprising the Second Athenian Confederacy, a new improved version of the fifth-century Empire. In 383 Athens allied itself with the Chalkidian League headed by Olynthos (Tod 1948, no. 119). The possibility of such a compact was one of the chief arguments used by the Akanthian delegate at a Spartan assembly of that year to win Peloponnesian support against Olynthian encroachment (5.2.15f.). By 382 the first certain innovation in the 'constitution' of the Peloponnesian League had been made (5.2.21f.; cf. 5.3.10, 17; 6.2.16): in lieu of men an ally might now contribute a fixed amount of cash. The measure would of course have benefited Sparta by providing the money to hire the now obligatory mercenaries; but the very fact that mercenaries were necessary is an indication of the war-weariness of the allies. Nor was it only they, it seems, who found the repeated demands on their manpower excessive. In 381, according to Diodorus (15.21.2), more than 1,200 'Lakedaimonians' were killed at Olynthos. This figure is probably exaggerated, but it cannot be coincidental that in 380 Sparta, for the first and only time on record, was forced to rely on volunteers to make up the 'Lakedaimonian' force (5.3.9). Apart from men of inferior Spartan status ([Chapter 14](#)), the volunteers also included 'men of quality' from the Perioikoi, men, in other words, whom one would

have expected to be called up rather than able to volunteer.

Over and above these difficulties, there is evidence that Agesilaos' policy – for such it surely was – was far from unanimously popular in Sparta. Diodorus (15.19.4) speaks of principled disagreement between Agesilaos and Agesipolis, but since Agesipolis cheerfully executed Agesilaos' policy towards both Mantinea and Olynthos (cf. generally 5.3.20) it is better to think of Agesipolis as the figurehead around whom opposition to so strong a king as Agesilaos naturally tended to crystallize (cf. Carlier 1977 on the position of Damaratos *vis-à-vis* Kleomenes). This opposition surfaced most noticeably in 382 after Phoibidas' seizure of the Theban akropolis (5.2.32) and in 381 over the forcible restoration of a handful of oligarchic exiles to democratic Phleious (5.3.16). In both cases – as indeed in all cases down to the end of Agesilaos' reign – the opposition was either won over or silenced. But Sparta's internal and external enemies can only have been heartened by such discord.

Already before 379, then, there were hints that the feet of the Spartan colossus might be of ceramic composition. Within a decade the feet had crumbled, and the giant had been toppled from its pedestal. At the beginning of the process of disintegration stands the liberation of the Kadmeia, which provoked from Xenophon the nearest he could muster to a direct criticism of Agesilaos. Its seizure in 382 by Phoibidas, he now says (5.4.1), was an act of impiety. The Spartans had broken their oath of 386 to leave the cities autonomous, and it was for this that they were punished by the Thebans, who inflicted on them (in 371) their first-ever defeat. Xenophon does not actually say that Agesilaos ordered or suggested the seizure; rather he casts a slur on Phoibidas' character (5.2.28). But he does make it clear that Agesilaos virulently hated Thebes (5.1.33) and that he condoned the action on narrowly utilitarian grounds (5.2.32); and he records that in 378 Agesilaos installed Phoibidas as harmost of Boiotian Thespiiai (5.4.41). It may not therefore be accidental or irrelevant that Xenophon reports the following message sent by Agesilaos in 396 (3.4.11): 'he (Tissaphernes) by his perjury has made the gods enemies to himself but allies to the Greeks.'

We, however, may beg to differ from Xenophon's pious interpretation of Spartan history after 382. A more obvious secular reason for the 'retribution' Sparta suffered through the Thebans is Agesilaos' unreasoning hostility towards them. According to a *post eventum* rationalization of a familiar type, one of the *rhetai* of Lykourgos forbade the Spartans to make war continuously on the same enemy (Plut. *Lyk.* 13.10; *Pelop.* 15.3; *Mor.* 189E, 213E, 217D, 227D). Had the law-abiding constitutionalist Agesilaos known of the *rhetra*, no doubt he would have avoided this particular error; but as it

was from 379 until 366 apart from short breaks in 375–374 and 371–370 Sparta waged war constantly against Thebes.

Since Agesipolis had died at Olynthos in 380 (5.3.19; cf. Tod 1948, no. 120), only the second Spartan king known to have died on campaign, and since Agesilaos speciously pleaded to be excused from the command on the grounds that he was beyond military age (5.4.13), the war-effort was at first led by Agesipolis' younger brother and successor Kleombrotos. His campaign of 379–378 effectively strengthened Sparta's hold on Boiotia and so served to keep the Athenians neutral, as they were as yet unwilling to take the Thebans' side in a war that might spill over into Attika (5.4.14–19).

All this good work, however, was undone by Sphodrias, harmost of Thespiiai (5.4.15), who in 378 made an abortive attempt to capture the Peiraeus (5.4.20). Precisely what Sphodrias' thinking was and who conceived the scheme will always be uncertain, but the consequences were clear cut and instructive. Sphodrias was put on trial at Sparta but, remarkably, was acquitted, thanks to Agesilaos (esp. 5.4.26), on the highly revealing ground that Sparta needed soldiers like him (5.4.32). The Athenians, no longer so impressed by their latter-day 'dual hegemony' theorists like Kallistratos (cf. 6.3.10–17), voted that the Spartans had broken the King's Peace (Diod. 15.29.7) and initiated moves resulting in alliance with Thebes and other states prior to the foundation in mid-378 of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod 1948, no. 123; cf. 121–2).

The geriatric Agesilaos was once more galvanized into activity. Both in 378 (5.4.35–41; Diod. 15.32) and in 377 (5.4.47–55; Diod. 15.34) he led Peloponnesian League forces into Boiotia. Presumably he too was responsible for a major reorganization of the League designed perhaps to emphasize the burden carried by the Spartans and so to restore their prestige as leader when their harshness was pushing the allies in the direction of Athens (Diod. 15.31. If.). Neither invasion, however, was a startling success. Indeed, the retreat in 377 may have been hastened by allied discontent (Plut. Ages. 26.6; Polyain. 2.1.7, 18, 20, 21); and Diodorus (15.34.2) portentously comments that the Thebans for the first time found themselves not inferior to the Spartans. In 376 Kleombrotos fared even worse, ostensibly because he felt unable to force the passes of Kithairon (5.4.59; cf. Ste. Croix 1972, 194). Thwarted by land, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian League allies decided to try their luck at sea and, as in 404 and 387, starve Athens into submission (5.4.60). Yet again, their luck was out, and the Athenians won their first solo naval victory since 'the' Peloponnesian War, off Naxos in 376 (5.4.61).

The reminiscence of 'the' Peloponnesian War does not end there. For the Athenians in 375 complied with a Theban request to 'sail

round' the Peloponnese in order to forestall another invasion of Boiotia by the Spartans, who would be unable both to guard their own country and that of their neighbouring allies and to attack Thebes in sufficient force (5.4.62f.). The ploy succeeded, and the Thebans used the breathing space first to win the Battle of Tegyra against 1,000 'Lakedaimonians' from the Orchomenos garrison (Diod. 15.37.1; 81.2; Plut. *Pelop.* 16f.; with Anderson 1970, 162–4) and then to reconstitute the Boiotian League, on harsher lines (6.1.1; cf. Isokr. 14.8).

Plutarch's comment on the Tegyra battle, which is chiefly remarkable for Pelopidas' use of the Theban 'Sacred Band', deserves quotation: 'this battle was the first to reveal to the other Greeks the secret that it was not only the Eurotas or the country between Babyka and Knakion (sc. the place where the Spartan Assembly met) which produced martial and bellicose men.' Soon after, Sparta rebuffed the request of their Thessalian proxenos to amputate the rising power of Jason of Pherai in Thessaly, on the grounds that they lacked a sufficient reserve of forces (6.1.2–17). They also participated in the second Common Peace, of 375–374 (Bengtson 1975, no. 265). This time it was the Athenians, alarmed by the growth of Theban power and finding the cost of war excessive, who were gratified to have their hegemony of the sea recognized by Sparta (Nepos, *Timoth.* 2.3). As for the Thebans, they had their control of Boiotia acknowledged, if only *de facto* (Diod. 15.38.1–4).

However, the peace soon broke down, with Athens and Sparta fighting over Kerkyra (6.2.3–26), and Diodorus' 'common anarchy' (15.45.1) seems a more appropriate label for the situation than Common Peace. The chief significance of the Kerkyra struggle from our standpoint is that in 373 the democrats lured their Athenian allies to aid them with the bait of their island's geographical situation, pointing out that it was strategically placed for operations not only against the Corinthian Gulf but also against the 'Lakonian land', i.e. Messenia (6.2.9). In 372 Iphikrates, having swallowed the bait, made preparations to use his large fleet precisely for the latter purpose (6.2.38). Xenophon maddeningly gives no details of his successful operations, but it may plausibly be suggested that there was a connection between his raids on Lakonia (or at least the imminent threat of them) and the next Common Peace, sworn at Sparta early in 371 (Bengtson 1975, no. 269).

The initiative for this peace came either from Athens (6.3.2) or from Persia (Diod. 15.50.4), or perhaps from Persia prompted by Sparta, if Antalkidas really was again 'with the King' in 371 (6.3.12). Xenophon underlines the importance of the occasion by writing speeches for three of the Athenian ambassadors. Kallias, the Spartans' proxenos, orotundly but unconvincingly argues that the common heritage of

Athens and Sparta demands common action (6.3. 4–6). Autokles seeks to split from Sparta its Peloponnesian League allies (whose representatives were present) by delivering a concerted attack on Sparta's one-sided and self-seeking interpretation of the 'autonomy principle' (63.1–9). Finally, Kallistratos bluntly advocates the 'dual hegemony' thesis as a way of reconciling the pro-Athenian and pro-Spartan factions at loggerheads in each Greek city (6.3.10–17).

The Spartans voted to accept a peace whose main difference from that of 386 was that Sparta was no longer to be its unofficial guarantor. In fact, there was to be no guarantor at all. Thus although Sparta as heretofore swore to the peace on behalf of its allies, its hold on them was appreciably enfeebled. None the less, when the Thebans as in 386 and 375–374 claimed the same prerogative of swearing in relation to Boiotia, Agesilaos as in 386 refused to permit it (6.3.19). This time, however, there were no second Theban thoughts, and the Thebans remained isolated outside the diplomatic framework.

This was a considerable coup, welcomed by the anxious Athenians (6.3.20). But Xenophon has omitted what is for us perhaps the most interesting detail of all, the heated exchange between Agesilaos and one of the Theban representatives, Epameinondas, which is recorded by Plutarch (*Ages.* 27.5–28.3; cf. *Nepos*, 'Epam.' 6.4; *Paus.* 9.13.2). The context is no doubt Agesilaos' refusal to allow the Thebans to swear on behalf of Boiotia. Epameinondas counters with the demand that all cities must be of equal status. Agesilaos, ignoring Epameinondas' appeal to universally applicable standards, repeats his demand that Boiotia be autonomous. Epameinondas replies with a telling question: is it not just for Lakonike to be autonomous too? Agesilaos doggedly reiterates his previous demand, to which Epameinondas answers that the Thebans will allow Boiotia to be autonomous – if Agesilaos will do the same for Lakonike. The reference unmistakably is to the status within Lakonia of the *Perioikic poleis*. Agesilaos was incensed, but yet at the same time delighted to have a pretext for declaring war on Thebes.

This anecdote, in so far as it redounds to the credit of Epameinondas, is perhaps *ben trovato*, but a more humdrum variant of it appears in Diodorus (15.51.3f.). Here the same question about Boiotian autonomy is put to the Thebans rather later, just before the invasion leading to the Battle of Leuktra, and the Thebans reply that they never meddle in Lakonike. The essential point is the same in both accounts and one which suggests to me that some *Perioikoi* had seen how to turn Sparta's cherished 'autonomy principle' against its principal champions uncomfortably close to home. Perhaps they were the same *Perioikoi* who, as we shall see, played a crucial role in bringing a Theban army into Lakonia in 370.

The 'Spartano-Boiotian War' (Diod. 15.76.3) which followed the exclusion of Thebes from the (first) peace of 371 was largely Agesilaos' idea. This we learn from Plutarch (Ages. 28.6), not Xenophon, who merely says that 'the Assembly' of the Spartans dismissed as rubbish a call for Kleombrotos' army in Phokis to be disbanded (6.4.2f.). If Xenophon (6.1.1) is right, Kleombrotos had been in Phokis with four *morai* since 375, but it is perhaps more likely that he was only sent out to aid Phokis against Thebes early in 371. Anyway, in the summer of that year, acting on the Spartan Assembly's decision, he invaded Boiotia and led his army on a circuitous route (designed to secure his communications with the Peloponnese) to Leuktra in the territory of Thespiiai (6.4.3f.). According to Diodorus (15.1.2; 50.2), everyone expected the Spartans to defeat the Thebans. This statement, however, is no less suspect than that of Thucydides on attitudes to Sparta and Athens in 431. For Diodorus' account of the preliminaries to the decisive battle is wholly incompatible with that of Xenophon and is based on pro-Theban sources concerned to magnify the Theban victory.

As for the battle itself, the best account from the Theban side is given in Plutarch (*Pelop.* 23); Xenophon's is patchy and written from the Spartan side only (6.4.13–15), while that of Diodorus (15.50–5) is largely a rhetorical set-piece. To be brief, the outcome was decided on the Spartan right, where the only real fighting occurred, between the 6,000 or so Theban hoplites under Epameinondas (Diod. 15.52.2), massed at least fifty deep (6.4.12), and the 2,250 or so 'Lakedaimonians', who were drawn up twelve deep. The figure for the 'Lakedaimonians' is computed as follows: thirty-five year classes were called out (6.4.17), giving an *enomotia* of thirty-five, each of which was drawn up in three files abreast to give a depth of twelve (6.4.12). Since there were sixteen *enomotiai* to a *mora* (according to the scheme accepted in [Chapter 12](#)), the four *morai* at Leuktra comprised 2,240 men.

Now we know that there were about 700 Spartiates present (6.4.15), few or none of whom except the commander of cavalry were cavalrymen (6.4.10f.). So, if 300 of them were the Hippeis (restored in the text of 6.4.14), and if (as I believe) the Hippeis were drawn up separately from the 'morai', then only 400 of the c.2,250 in the *morai* were Spartiates, the rest being Perioikoi and perhaps men of inferior Spartan status. In other words, the proportion of Spartiates in the *morai* had fallen catastrophically since the Battle of the Nemea River in 394, and before the Battle of Leuktra the total number of Spartiates cannot have exceeded 1,500 compared to the 8,000 of a century earlier. No doubt poor generalship and inferior tactics contributed largely to the Spartan defeat. But the adverse effect on morale of this

tiny and shrinking handful of Spartiates dominating a League force of perhaps 10,0 hoplites (Plut. *Pelop.* 20.1) should not be overlooked. Even Xenophon does not hide the fact that some of the allied troops were actually pleased with the result (6.4.15).

Diodorus in line with his pro-Theban stance put the 'Lakedaimonian' casualties impossibly at 4,000. Xenophon (6.4.15) more plausibly estimates the 'total Lakedaimonian' deaths to be 1,000. Of these about 400 were Spartiates, including Kleombrotos (Plut. *Ages.* 28.8; Diod. 15.55.5) and a polemarch (6.4.14). Rather than fight to recover the corpses, as some Spartans wished, the surviving polemarchs wisely decided to ask for a truce.

The news of the disaster was brought to Sparta on the last day of the Gymnopaidiai festival, which the Ephors ordered to be completed as usual (6.4.16). The relatives of the dead, at least the male relatives, were reportedly cheerful, those of the survivors miserable – in some cases with more than usually good reason, since, as Plutarch (*Ages.* 30.2–6) tells us in his considerably more detailed account, there had been many 'tremblers' (cowards) at Leuktra, including some 'top people'. With legalistic nicety Agesilaos ordained that the rigorous law affecting 'tremblers' should be suspended for a day (*Ages.* 30.6; *Mor.* 191C, 214B), giving the same reason as he had for urging the acquittal of Sphodrias. Presumably therefore these men were included in the second Spartan force which was hastily despatched under Agesilaos' son Archidamos to unite with the remnant of the Leuktra army (6.4.18).

We do not know how many died on the Theban side, although at least one of their leaders was killed (Tod 1948, no. 130). We do, however, know that the Thebans were not quick to capitalize on their stunning victory. 'If the battle of Leuktra marks a revolution in the art of generalship, it is because of the way it was won, not the way that it was followed up' (Anderson 1970, 205). One reason was that Sparta's control of Lakonia and the Peloponnesian League did not at first appear to have been shaken (6.4.18; 5.1); another was the continuing Athenian suspicion of Thebes (6.4.19f.); a third was the ambiguous attitude of Thebes' northern ally Jason (6.4.20–32). The immediate upshot was that the Spartans and their allies were permitted to withdraw from Boiotia and a conference was convened at Athens, where the representatives swore a fourth Common Peace (6.5.1–3).

There are considerable problems over what this peace was and whether Sparta was involved. Xenophon, our only source, is inadequate. If it was a renewal of the King's Peace of 386, Theban adherence would be surprising. On the other hand, if Athens was aiming to use the conference to entice the Peloponnesian League allies away from Sparta, then Spartan adherence would be somewhat odd.

Whatever the truth (cf. Ryder 1965, 71–3), Elis at least refused to swear the oath, since this would have implied support for the autonomy of the Triphylian towns of whose control they had been deprived by Sparta in 400 (6.5.2; cf. 3.2.30f.). This is the first spark of what in 370 became a forest-fire of disaffection with Spartan rule, fuelled as usual by *stasis*.

‘The cities’, says Diodorus (15.40.1), ‘fell into great disturbance and civil strife, especially in the Peloponnese.’ He gives five concrete examples: Phigaleia, Sikyon, Megara, Phleious and Corinth. To these we may add Mantinea (6.5.3–5), Tegea (6.5.6–10; Diod. 15.59) and Argos (Diod. 15.58; with Tomlinson 1972, 139f.). Isokrates in his *Archidamos* of c.366 (a speech put in the mouth of Agesilaos’ son) refers to this farflung revolutionary upheaval at length and with horror (6.64–9). From the Spartan viewpoint by far the most important defections were those of Mantinea and Tegea. For as a result of their joint action Arkadia, which had been not much more than a geographical expression’ (Jones 1967, 131), now became (with a couple of exceptions) a political unit, the Arkadian League (cf. Tod 1948, no. 132). What the ‘Quadruple Alliance’ of 420 had hoped for had become a reality. Sparta was now faced by enemies all along its northern frontier.

Clearly a show of such strength as Sparta could muster was obligatory, and Agesilaos once more emerges to command an almost entirely Lakonian force in Arkadia well after the end of the normal campaigning season (6.5.10). He captured Eutaia, a small town on the Arkadian side of the Lakonian border (6.5.12; cf. Paus. 8.27.3) and then advanced through Tegeate territory to Mantinea, only to be forced to retire in the face of overwhelmingly large numbers of Tegeans, Mantineians, Argives and Eleians. Diodorus (15.62.3–5) adds the vital information that the Argives and Eleians, rebuffed by the Athenians, had secured an alliance with Thebes (cf. Xen. Ages. 2.24).

Following Agesilaos’ withdrawal, the states bordering on Lakonia and Messenia urged on the Thebans an immediate invasion by land of Lakonia, the first time such a tactic had been proposed since 394 (4.2.12) and the first time ever that it had really been feasible. All stressed the size of the forces at the Thebans’ disposal, but the Arkadians added that Lakonia was short on military manpower (6.5.23). The Thebans, however, remained reluctant. Lakonia, it seemed to them, was extremely hard to penetrate (cf. Eur. fr. 1083; Diod. 15.63.4), and its frontiers were garrisoned at Oion in the Skiritis and Leuktron (or Leuktra) above Maleatis (for its probable location see Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 31–4). They also thought that their allies were exaggerating the Spartans’ weakness and that nowhere would they fight better than in their own territory (6.5.24). At this

critical juncture some people arrived from Karyai, supporting the Arkadians' argument from the Spartans' lack of manpower and offering to act as guides (6.5.25). Since Xenophon says 'there were also present some of the Perioikoi', I infer that Karyai had already defected from Sparta. We recall its alleged 'medism' in 480 ([Chapter 11](#)). Their urging, together with their allegation that their fellows were already refusing to obey the Spartiates' summons to aid, finally convinced the Thebans to invade Lakonia.

The main sources for this – the first, as it turned out – invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas are Xenophon (6.5.25–32), Diodorus (15.63.3–65.5) and Plutarch (*Ages.* 31f.; *Pelop.* 24). As usual, their accounts diverge considerably in detail, and I present a conflated version with some critical or exegetical supplements. The invasion was mounted on four fronts. The Argives entered through the Thyreatis (already perhaps in the Arkadian League: cf. Tod 1948, p. 99), presumably along the Astros-Karyai road ([Chapter 10](#); [Figure 17](#)). Somewhere *en route* they stormed a garrison under the Spartiate Alexandros. The Boiotians took a road that led to Sellasia, no doubt along the River Sarandapotamos to Karyai and thence through the waterless Kleissoura pass (hence the need for guides). The Arkadians crossed the frontier further west and confronted the garrison of Neodamodeis (their last mention) and Tegean exiles stationed at Oion under the Spartiate Ischolaos. He and most of his troops were killed, and the Arkadians advanced to join up with the Thebans (and presumably the Argives) at Karyai. Thence they proceeded to Sellasia, which they burned, looted and probably (cf. 7.4.12) captured from Spartans. Finally, the Eleians crossed into Lakonia through the Belminatis (cf. Plut. *Kleom.* 4.1) and followed the easiest route to Sellasia along the Eurotas valley. Perhaps therefore Belmina, like Karyai, had already been liberated from Spartan control; at any rate, a few months later, as we shall see, Pellana, not Belmina, was garrisoned to hold the line at this point of entry into Lakonia.

The reunited invaders made camp in the plain north of Sparta in the sanctuary of Apollo at Thornax on the left bank of the Eurotas. Some hoplites had been posted to oppose them on the right bank, so the invaders proceeded south through the Menelaion area to a point on the other side of the river from Amyklai, on the way burning and plundering houses full of valuables (a hint of the relaxation or evasion of the 'Lykourgan' discipline). They then with difficulty forded a Eurotas swollen with melted snow (the invasion had begun at the winter solstice of 370) and reached Amyklai, which had presumably been evacuated. Here the Arkadians occupied themselves with looting the houses, whereas the Thebans cut down many trees (cf. Polyb. 5.19.2) , presumably olives, to build a palisade. It was while the

invaders were thus engaged that allies from Phleious slipped past them and made their way to Sparta. Prevented by the Arkadians and Argives from entering Lakonia by land, the Phleiasians – like the allies from Pellene, Sikyon, Corinth, Epidauros, Troizen, Hermione and Halieis before them – had been forced to take ship to Prasiai and then make the difficult crossing over Parnon to the Eurotas valley (7.2.2f.).

Sparta itself was in turmoil. Agesilaos had at his disposal only a few hundred Spartiates, whom he stationed at various points to guard the unwallled city. (The wall of which good traces survive to this day was not completed until 184.) The Spartan women, already unbalanced by the deaths of their men at Leuktra, were now running amuck at the sight of the smoke caused by the invaders. The Perioikoi had not contributed to the full extent of their manpower, and some of those who had been enlisted were deserting. An extraordinary proclamation was therefore made inviting Helots to join the ranks on the understanding that they would be liberated. More than 6,0 of them – presumably only Lakonian Helots (below) – accepted the offer with alacrity, indeed with alarming alacrity, since they swamped the Spartiates and probably the Perioikoi too. Worst of all, there was disaffection within the Spartan ranks, and two conspiracies had to be suppressed. Certainly some of those involved were Spartiates, since we hear that for the first time ever Spartiates were put to death without trial (Plut. Ages. 32.11). But perhaps the majority were men of inferior Spartan status, following the trail blazed by Kinadon.

Despite its dire situation, however, Sparta was not taken, and Epameinondas turned his attention to the southern part of the Eurotas valley. It seems that by no means all the Perioikoi had deserted Sparta, for any of their towns that were unwallled were looted and put to the torch. Gytheion, however, which presumably was fortified, was besieged for three days and perhaps taken. If so, Sparta was temporarily without a convenient outlet to the sea. But this was a trifling inconvenience compared with the immediate sequel, a sequel which Xenophon could not nerve himself to record, although he could not completely conceal its occurrence. I refer of course to the liberation of the Messenian Helots.

They had naturally revolted *en masse* some time after Leuktra (7.2.2; Xen. Ages. 2.24), in company, I assume, with the Perioikoi of Thouria and Aithaia as in c.465. In 369, however, Epameinondas took the step essential for transforming the former Helots and the expatriates who flooded back to their homeland into 'the Messenians'. He supervised the (re)founding of the city of Messene (perhaps at first called Ithome) on the west side of Mount Ithome, drew up the citizen-register and divided up the land (Diod. 15.66.1, 6; Plut. Ages. 34.1; *Pelop.* 24.9; Paus. 4.26.5–27). The remains of the magnificent enceinte walling are

to this day a massive testimonial to his achievement.

The loss of the Messenian Helots was the greatest blow the Spartans had ever suffered. It meant the definitive end of their status as a first-rate power. Not unnaturally therefore they were angry, chiefly with Agesilaos, at losing a territory which was as populous as Lakonia and which they had exploited for some three and a half centuries (Plut. *Ages.* 34.1). Perhaps no less difficult to stomach was the blow to their pride. For as Isokrates' Archidamos (6.28) nicely put it, what was most painful was not being unjustly robbed of Messenia but seeing their own slaves becoming masters of it.

In fact, by no means all Messenia was removed at a stroke from Spartan control; nor did the citizens of Ithome/Messene immediately control all that was so removed. For the 'plantation' towns of Mothone and Asine (Paus. 4.27.8), together with Koryphasion (Pylos) and Kyparissia (Diod. 15.77.4), remained Perioikic, while the other Perioikic towns became independent cities in their own right. None the less, the Spartans had lost the most fertile and directly controlled portion; and the crucial strategic link between Messenia and Arkadia, hemming in Lakonia, had been forged. The men of New Messene also took out diplomatic insurance by allying themselves to the Arkadian League and probably to the Thebans too.

In this nadir of their fortunes the Spartans went crawling to the Athenians for help. This they received – but too little, too late (6.5.33–51). Soon after, in the spring of 369, they revived the precedent of 421 and sought an alliance with the Athenians (7.1.1–14: it is here that we get our only certain reference to Helot sailors; cf. Welwei 1974, 158f.). Again, however, although the alliance was concluded, its practical effect was minimal. The Thebans once more penetrated the Peloponnese, despite an attempt to block them at the Isthmus, in which 1,000 of the 6,000 or more Helots enlisted for the defence of Sparta took part (Diod. 15.65.6).

Moreover, the Arkadians were able to make two raids against Spartan territory, probably in the spring and autumn of 369. First, Lykomedes of Mantinea, the guiding spirit of the Arkadian League, led 5,000 elite troops against Pellana, which was garrisoned by 300 or more 'Lakedaimonians' (Diod. 15.67.2). The town was taken by storm, the garrison killed, the land ravaged; perhaps the fourth-century tombstone of Olbiadas *IG* V.1.1591) is to be associated with this raid. Second, the Arkadians made an expedition against Asine 'in the Lakonian land' (7.1.25). Some have thought Xenophon was referring here to Lakonian Asine, but whether or not we consider it possible or likely that the Arkadians could have marched past Sparta, Lakonian Asine was too petty a prize. Messenian Asine, on the other hand, had remained loyal to Sparta and was the nearest enemy town to New

Messene. That Xenophon meant this Asine is corroborated by the presence there of a garrison commanded by a Spartiate – or rather a man who had somehow ‘become a Spartiate’. (Perhaps he was by origin a *nothos* or *trophimos* foreigner: cf. [Chapter 14](#).) The garrison was defeated, its commander slain and the suburbs of Asine ravaged. But the town itself seems to have remained intact and loyal, and perhaps it was in response to this failure that the buffer-towns of Kolonides (near Longa) and Korone (modern Petalidhi) were built ([Figure 18](#)).

In 368 the fortunes of the Spartans revived somewhat. Despite their refusal to countenance the ‘autonomy’ of New Messene, Persian money was deployed on their behalf to raise a large force of mercenaries (7.1.27). They also received a supporting band of mercenaries from Dionysios of Syracuse, which Archidamos used to recapture Karyai (7.1.28). Emboldened by this success, he then made inroads into south-west Arkadia, laying waste the land of the Parrhasioi and Eutresioi (7.1.29). When the Arkadians finally gave battle, they were defeated (7.1.30–2), and the Spartan losses were so slight that the encounter became known as the ‘Tearless Battle’ (Diod. 15.72; Plut. Ages. 33.5–8). The sequel, however, was considerably lachrymose. For the Arkadians, no doubt at the urging of their Messenian allies (cf. 7.1.29), decided to block Sparta’s access to south-west Arkadia for good by founding Megalopolis (Diod. 15.72.4; Paus. 8.27.1–8; Moggi 1976, no. 45). In the process, according to a plausible emendation of Paus. 8.27.4 (cf. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 34), the Arkadians deprived Sparta of part if not the whole of Aigyitis and Skiritis: Oion, Malaia, Kromoi (Kromnos), Belmina and Leuktron were among the forty communities incorporated in Megalopolis.

The period 369–362 somewhat recalls 421–418, in that it was one of kaleidoscopically shifting alliances, intermittent warfare and periodic revolutions rounded off by a major but indecisive pitched battle. The difference was that Thebes, not Sparta, was calling the tune. Of Sparta’s allies in 369 only the Phleiasians remained consistently loyal. Elis, however, rejoined the fold to oppose the common enemy, the Arkadians (7.4.19). On the other hand, in 366 Corinth took the initiative in opposing Sparta, as in c.504, 440, 432, 404 and 395 – but this time with decisively deleterious effect. For in leading the movement to make a separate peace with Thebes, it brought about the effective end of the Peloponnesian League (7.4. 7–9). If Thebes had been diplomatically isolated in 371, how much more true was this of Sparta from 366. The irony was that Sparta found itself in this position because it had abandoned the ‘autonomy principle’ and refused to recognize either New Messene or Megalopolis.

The year 365 was one of mixed luck for Sparta: Sellasia (7.4.12) and perhaps Pellana too (cf. 7.5.9) were recovered, but Koryphasion and Kyparissia were liberated by the Arkadians (Diod. 15.77.4). In reprisal Archidamos in 364 apparently sought to re-establish Sparta's position in Aigytis and maybe also Skiritis. At the request of the now allied Eleians he took the field with 'the citizen troops' (7.4.20) – in fact with a force that included Perioikoi as well as Spartiates (7.4.27).

Having captured Kromnos, he left three of the twelve *lochoi* there as a garrison and returned to Sparta. Scholars like Anderson (1970, 226) believe that this way of describing a quarter of the Lakedaimonian hoplite army (cf. 7.5.10), taken with the fact that in the *Hellenika* Xenophon does not speak of *morai* after Leuktra, indicates a further reorganization of the army in the 360s. However, Polybius (fr. 60 B-W) mentioned the *mora* in a passage probably describing the army of Kleomenes III (236–22) or Nabis (206–192); and Xenophon's *Lak. Pol.*, which portrays the organization by *morai*, was probably written in the 350s. Whatever the truth, the Kromnos garrison was besieged by the Arkadians, and in an attempt to relieve it Archidamos was wounded and at least thirty 'Lakedaimonians' were killed. The latter included 'almost their most distinguished men', presumably Spartiates. A truce was made, but the siege was raised only by a third expedition, this time by night. Even so more than 100 Spartiates and Perioikoi were captured – and then either ransomed or killed, Xenophon does not say.

In 364–363 the simmering tension between democrats and oligarchs and between Mantinea and Tegea boiled over into open conflict within the Arkadian League. The attitude of the Thebans was crucial, and Epameinondas prepared the ground for Theban intervention by condemning a truce made between the Arkadians and Eleians and supporting the action of the Theban governor at Tegea in violating it (7.4.33–40). Rival deputations were sent – by the Tegeans to Thebes, by the Mantineians, Eleians and Achaians to Athens and Sparta – and in 362 Epameinondas for the fourth time brought an army across the Isthmus.

Both Athens and Sparta responded positively too; indeed, the Athenians planned to go by sea to Lakonia and join forces with the Spartans there before marching north to Arkadia (7.5.7). But Epameinondas learned of the plan and pre-empted it by a rapid advance to Tegea. His opponents meanwhile decided to take their stand at Mantinea. Remarkably, Agesilaos (now over eighty) was given command of the Spartan force, but when he reached Pellana he heard that Epameinondas had for a second time invaded Lakonia (7.5.9), no doubt by the route he had taken in 370–369. So he sent on to Mantinea his cavalry and three of the twelve *lochoi* (7.5.10) and

managed to regain Sparta before Epameinondas arrived. Thwarted here, Epameinondas too proceeded to Mantinea, where he decided to risk all on a big battle. The Theban side won, but Epameinondas himself was killed (7.5.22–5), and the outcome, in Xenophon's famous concluding words, was even greater disturbance in Greece than before (7.5.27).

Our story, however, does not end there. The two sides concluded a Common Peace on the battlefield, for the first time without Persian intervention (Bengtson 1975, no. 292). But it was an entente from which Sparta deliberately excluded itself, since participation would have entailed the formal recognition of an independent Messene (Diod. 15.89.1f.; Polyb. 4.33.8f.; Plut. *Ages.* 35.4). This futile gesture of defiance, for which Agesilaos deserves a large measure of the blame, is an appropriate symbol of Spartan weakness in 362.

Notes on further reading

Bibliography on Xenophon is given in the notes to [Chapter 12](#). The *Lak. Pol.* has been discussed by Higgins (1977, 65–75). I agree that the essay was composed in one piece in the 350s, but I cannot accept Higgins' view that it is a consistent and subtle critique of the Spartan polity. For modern work on the notoriously problematic fourteenth chapter, which I believe was provoked by Sparta's downfall after 371, see Tigerstedt 1965, 462–4 n. 530.

The development of the 'Second Spartan Empire' from 404 is discussed in Parke 1930. Bockisch 1965 is a full treatment of Sparta's use of harmosts down to 386 but contains several inaccuracies of interpretation and detail. The same is true of her more recent and again fully documented study of the Spartan crisis (1974) whose principal merit is to bring out the universally decisive importance of *stasis*. On Lysander see the literature in Tigerstedt 1965, 407 n. 17; add Habicht 1970, 6–9, on his apotheosis at Samos.

The downfall of the Thirty Tyrants' at Athens is exhaustively discussed in Cloché 1915.

On the composition and terms of service of the Ten Thousand' see Roy 1967. The increasing use of mercenaries in Greek inter-state warfare from the late fifth century is documented and analysed in Parke 1933.

Sparta's relations with Persia from the support given to Cyrus down to the King's Peace have been acutely discussed by Lewis (1977). I cannot, however, agree with his view, even in its relatively weak form (144), that Sparta's 'Panhellenism' was substantially genuine and altruistic.

The reign of Agesilaos has been challengingly reviewed by Cawkwell (1976), but I find myself unable to follow him in

exonerating Agesilaos from responsibility for Sparta's downfall (see further [Chapter 14](#)). Most of the factors which I feel he has not sufficiently accounted for are conveniently listed in Coleman-Norton 1941, 72 n. 10; but add the internal opposition to Agesilaos' foreign policy discussed by Smith (1953/4).

The outbreak of the Corinthian War is discussed in Perlman 1964. For all set-piece battles in this and subsequent wars down to 362 see Anderson 1970, although I cannot follow his account of the reorganization(s) of the Spartan army (229–51). On the career of Iphikrates see Pritchett 1974, II, 62–72.

On 'Common Peace' in general see Ryder 1965; bibliography on the individual peaces may be conveniently found in Bengtson 1975. The connection between the occupation of Kythera and Antalkidas' abortive negotiations in 392 was noticed independently by Lewis (1977, 144).

Spartan politics from 386 to 379 are analysed, not wholly convincingly, in terms of three factions by Rice (1974, 1975). See rather Ste. Croix 1972, 133–6, an admirable treatment of the trials of Phoibidas and Sphodrias.

Concerning the revolutionary upheavals after Leuktra, I am not convinced by the attempt of Roy (1973) to retain Diodorus' date of 374 for those listed at 15.40. See rather Fuks 1972, 35–7 n. 66. However, for the confused chronology of 370–362 I follow Roy 1971 rather than Wiseman 1969.

For the status of Messenia following the liberation of the Helots see Roebuck 1941; and briefly Lazenby in *MME* 89ff. The extent of the territory controlled by New Messene and the related economic questions are considered in Roebuck 1945 (relevant also to the period before 370).

* Where no other indication is given, all references in brackets in this chapter are to the *Hellenika*. It should be pointed out here that many of the dates given in this chapter are more or less controversial.

IV

Results and prospects

The decline of Spartiate manpower

In the second book of his great work entitled ‘Matters relating to the polls’ (our *Politics*) Aristotle first examines and rejects the ideal states of Plato, Phaleas and Hippodamos and then turns to consider the three polities which had commonly been accounted the best of those actually existing: Sparta, Crete and Carthage. He prefaces his detailed discussion of Sparta with the general observation that any law shall be adjudged good or bad according as it is or is not consonant first with the laws of the truly ideal state (as conceived by Aristotle) and second with the idea and character of the polity proposed to the citizens by their lawgiver.

In relation to his ideal state Aristotle finds Sparta defective on the grounds that the lawgiver (meaning Lykourgos) concerned himself with only a part of virtue, the military part, and neglected the arts of peace. But no less harsh are his criticisms of the failure of Spartan laws to bring about even the defective kind of polity the lawgiver had proposed. These criticisms are directed especially to seven aspects of Spartan social and political organization: the Helots, the women, the Ephorate, the Gerousia, the common meals, the system of naval command and public finance. We have glanced earlier at those concerning the Helots. Relevant here are those directed against the organization of the common meals and more especially the position of women. For under the general heading of the women he produces his most damning criticism of all (*Pol.* 1270a29–32). In a country capable of supporting 1,500 cavalrymen and 30,000 hoplites the militarily active citizen-body shrank to fewer than 1,000; and, as events showed, the state was not capable of withstanding a single blow but was destroyed through lack of manpower (*oliganthropia*).

Clearly, Aristotle’s estimate of Sparta’s citizen military potential is appropriate only to the period before the loss of the Pamisos valley,

and the 'single blow' is the defeat at Leuktra in 371. Probably too the figure of less than 1,000 militarily active citizens was borrowed from Xenophon's evidence for the Spartiate effective at Leuktra. Aristotle therefore expressly linked Sparta's defeat at Leuktra and consequent 'destruction' with its deficiency in citizens. He is in fact the only surviving source to make this theoretical connection and, if that was all there was to it, his explanation would be vulnerable to the objection that it was not a shortage of Spartiate warriors but inadequate generalship, military conservatism and poor morale that brought about the Leuktra debacle. However, the strength of Aristotle's analysis is that, in shining contrast to all our other ancient sources, he does not merely note or explain away Spartiate oliganthropy but interprets it squarely as a function of the Spartan system of land-tenure and inheritance. As we shall see, this sociological rather than moralizing approach saved him from the error of Xenophon and others who ascribed Sparta's downfall to a random 'exogenous variable'. For Aristotle the failure lay within the system itself, which necessarily produced the historically decisive oliganthropy. In this penultimate chapter I shall try to demonstrate that Aristotle was right both in fact and in interpretation and to explain why official measures to combat oliganthropy proved in the end a failure.

It must be stressed at once that the oliganthropy for which we have evidence concerns only the adult male citizens of full status. We have no figures for the categories of men, below the status of 'Homoiol', who, like the Roman *capite censi* or *proletarii*, did not originally form part of the regular army. Even for the Spartiates, however, we have at most four texts which give, or can be made to yield, concrete, if hardly cast-iron, totals. The 8,000 of 480 (Hdt. 7.234.2), which is corroborated by the 5,000 of 479 (9.10.1, 11.3, 28.2, 29.1), had become about 3,500 by 418 (Thuc. 5.68, as interpreted in [Chapter 12](#)). The 2,500 or so of 394 (extrapolated from Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16) had fallen by nearly a half to a maximum of about 1,500 in 371 (*Hell.* 6.1.1; 4.15, 17). This then is the scale and pace of Spartiate oliganthropy in the last 100 years of Spartan greatness. Can we say when and why it became first critical and then apparently irreversible?

The tying of citizenship and so membership of the hoplite army to land ownership and minimum contributions to a common mess (Arist. *Pol.* 1271a27–38) will possibly have encouraged a general 'malthusianism' from the seventh century, especially if I am right in thinking that the *kleroi* then distributed became to all intents and purposes private property and so subject to the normal Greek practice of partible inheritance. In particular, though, rich Spartiates, like rich

men elsewhere in Greece, will probably have tried harder than most to limit their male offspring, so as to bequeath their considerable property intact. A further inducement to this end will have been the fact that in Sparta daughters as well as sons were entitled to a share of the paternal inheritance.

However, we lack relevant evidence to substantiate these hypotheses before the mid-sixth century, when the Ephors intervened to force the Agiad king Anaxandridas to divorce a loved but barren wife – or rather to take a second, bigamously (Hdt. 5.39f.). This could of course be explained by reason of state, but it was also around 550 that Sparta abandoned its aggressively imperialistic policy of expansion by land in the Peloponnese, and there may have been a demographic factor in this change of course (Toynbee 1969, 314). Even if we do not believe Cicero's report (*De Div.* 1.112; cf. Pliny *NH* 2.191) of a serious earthquake at Sparta about this time, the Spartans may already have been alarmed by the disparity in numbers between themselves and the Helots.

In the late sixth and early fifth centuries the Agiads Kleomenes I, Dorieus and Pleistarchos all failed to leave a son – or at least, in Dorieus' case, a legitimate one (White 1964, 149–51). By the same general period, we happen to hear, the line of one Glaukos had become extinct (Hdt. 6.86). An inscription of about 500 (/G V. 1.713) suggests that women who died in childbirth were by then exempt *de facto* from the prohibition on named tombstones (Plut. *Lyk.* 27.2). In 480 the 300 Spartans selected to fight with Leonidas at Thermopylai had already produced male issue (Hdt. 7.205.2). A decade later the authorities moved most circumspectly against the regent Pausanias, because 'it was the custom of the Spartans not to act hastily in the case of a male Spartiate' (Thuc. 1.132.5). This formulation, though softened at the edges, recalls Agesilaos' reason for supporting the acquittal of Sphodrias in 378 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.32) and for exonerating the 'tremblers' at Leuktra (Plut. *Ages.* 30.6; *Mor.* 191C, 214B).

Taken together, these scraps of evidence fully support the brilliant suggestion of Daube (1977, 11) that around 500 Sparta, in common with other Greek states, took legal steps to stimulate the procreation of embryonic warriors. Daube explains this development in terms of the military threat to Greece from the Persian empire, and this is no doubt partly right. But since the measures taken at Sparta were more extreme than elsewhere, it seems necessary to postulate that the Helots rather than, or in addition to, the Persians prompted their passage. If we were to assign them to a specific date, 490 comes to mind.

The measures in question involved above all the legal obligation on men to get married (Plut. *Lys.* 30.7; cf. *Lyk.* 15.1; Stob. *Flor.* 67.16;

Pollux 3.48; 8.40). Under the law bachelors suffered a diminution of full civic rights and a fine, together with public disgrace and ridicule. They were excluded from the Gymnopaediai festival (Plut. *Lyk.* 15.2) and so, I assume, from the holding of offices connected with its celebration. On public occasions not only would younger men not rise to offer them their seats, but the bachelors were obliged to surrender theirs to their juniors, a terrible humiliation in gerontolatrous Sparta (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 9.5; Plut. *Lyk.* 15.3; *Mor.* 227EF; cf. Hdt. 2.80.1). Each winter they had to walk naked around the Agora, compounding the agonies of the cold (-6.3°C has been recorded in Sparta) by singing a song to the effect that they were being justly punished for breaking the law. But perhaps the most powerful evidence for the strength of the opprobrium heaped on bachelors is the assimilation of their social status to that of the 'tremblers' (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 9.4f.). Laws in Sparta were of course unwritten, but, other things being equal, we should expect the force of example and the pressure of peer-group conformism in such a disciplinarian and public culture to have been at least as efficacious as any written law. Thus the fact that we do hear of confirmed bachelors – including, as we shall see, a man occupying high public office – suggests that other things were not always equal.

The whole point of this elaborate legal, ritual and customary apparatus was of course to force adult male citizens to procreate within the accepted framework of marriage. But monogamy within what we call the nuclear family is only one among many possible variants of pairing relationship contrived for the procreation of legitimate offspring and so for the transmission of hereditary private property; and Sparta was notorious in antiquity for its seemingly lax attitude to monogamy (Oliva 1971, 9).

It might happen, says Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 1.7–9; cf. Plut. *Lyk.* 15.11–18), that an old man had a young wife. Such a husband was permitted to introduce into his house a younger man to beget children for him by his wife (a kind of anticipation of our AID system). Conversely, a man who did not wish to marry (perhaps a bachelor, but presumably a widower) might have children by a married woman, if he could secure her husband's consent. Xenophon claimed to know of many similar pairing arrangements. One of these may have been what Polybius (12.6b.8) calls the honourable custom whereby a man who had produced enough children might pass his fertile wife on to a friend.

It is unclear whether such marital practices had legal as well as customary sanction. However, since Plutarch (*Lyk.* 15.16; *Mor.* 228BC) denies the possibility of adultery (between citizens, that is: contrast Hdt. 6.68.3; 69.5) in Sparta, and since Xenophon does not mention adultery at all, it is tempting to connect this in Greek terms

extraordinary state of affairs with the legal crackdown on bachelors. It may also have been in the early fifth century that fathers of three sons were exempted from military service, fathers of four or more from all state burdens (Arist. *Pol.* 1270a40-b7; cf. Aelian *VH* 6.6).

Be that as it may, the measures certainly failed to produce the desired effect. In 425 the eagerness of Sparta to sue for peace to recover the mere 120 or so Spartiates captured on Sphakteria (Thuc. 4.38.5) unambiguously signifies extreme concern over manpower-shortage. For even if some or all of these captives were leading men or related to leading men, as a scholiast believed, and even if there had been a peace movement in Sparta well before the Sphakteria disaster, the change of official attitude compared to that of implacable hostility towards the survivors of Thermopylai is starkly apparent. Some scholars, notably Ziehen (1933, esp. 231–5), would attribute the change largely to the great earthquake of c.465. But, as I have suggested in [Chapter 11](#), the demographic effects of such a natural disaster should have worked themselves out by 425. Far more important, as should emerge, was one of the penalties imposed on the returned Sphakteria hostages in 421, deprivation of their right to buy and sell real property (Thuc. 5.34.2, with Gomme 1970, 36).

By 425, then, Spartan oliganthropy had become critical. It cannot be merely coincidental that immediately thereafter ‘Brasideioi’ and Neodamodeis appear in the ancient sources, that in 418 these ex-Helots fight as hoplites at Mantinea and that by the same date (at the very latest) Perioikoi are brigaded with Spartiates in the regular hoplite phalanx. Between 418 and 394, however, if our estimates are approximately correct, there apparently supervened a generation or so in which the pace of oliganthropy slackened somewhat. Appearances, though, may be misleading, since the number of Spartiates at the Nemea River may have been artificially bolstered by a determined resort to ‘Homoioi by adoption’ (the *mothakes*) and/or by enlisting Hypomeiones (‘Inferiors’). For what is meant by these terms we must now return to Xenophon’s remarkable account of Kinadon’s conspiracy in c.399 (*Hell.* 3.3.4–11) and consider its social implications.

The informer, so he told the Ephors, was taken by Kinadon to the edge of the Agora in Sparta and asked to count the Spartiates, who numbered only about forty all told (one king, the five Ephors, the twenty-eight Gerontes and five or six others). Those, Kinadon pointed out, were the enemies, whereas the other 4,000 or more persons in the Agora were to be considered allies. Kinadon then took the informer on a guided tour of the streets of Sparta, where again the Spartiates in their ones and twos were contrasted with the many ‘allies’, and then of the country estates, where it was noted that on each there was but one enemy, the Spartan master, and many ‘allies’ (i.e. the Helots and

any private slaves there may have been).

The Ephors then asked how many people Kinadon had said were implicated with him. The answer was, a few but trustworthy individuals, who themselves added, however, that the ensemble of Helots, Neodamodeis, Hypomeiones and Perioikoi were potential accomplices. For whenever among these groups any mention was made of Spartiates, no one could hide the fact that he would gladly devour them – even raw.

This obviously tendentious account – neither the informer nor Xenophon's source (if they were different persons) nor Xenophon himself supported Kinadon's cause – poses three main difficulties. First, were Kinadon and his intimates right to imply that all the subordinate classes of population within the Spartan state were bitterly hostile to the ruling Spartiates? Second, did Kinadon's plan embrace Messenia as well as Lakonia or did his plot have 'an essentially Laconian character', as suggested by Vidal-Naquet (in Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 258)? Third, who are these Hypomeiones – a group explicitly attested only in this one passage of Xenophon and in no other author?

In the first place, it was clearly in the interests of Kinadon and his confidants to exaggerate the extent of the hatred for the Spartiates. Thus we surely need not accept that even a majority, let alone all, of the Neodamodeis and Perioikoi were so cannibalistically inclined. This does not of course mean that there were not some Neodamodeis who were disenchanted with their semi-liberated status and some Perioikoi who desired full citizen rights at, or (more likely) independence from, Sparta. But most of the Neodamodeis and at least the hoplites among the Perioikoi (like Eualkes of Geronthrai: [Chapter 12](#)) presumably regarded it as a privilege to be counted as 'Lakedaimonian' warriors. To the Hypomeiones we shall return presently. The attitude of the Helots is linked to the second of the problems under discussion.

A priori, perhaps, we would expect most Helots to be at least ill-disposed towards the Spartiates, although we must draw a distinction between the domestic and the agricultural Helots. Again *a priori* we might imagine that the Messenian Helots would be more hostile than the Lakonians. However, in favour of Vidal-Naquet's interesting suggestion (above) is the geographical consideration that the country estates nearest to Sparta were of course in Lakonia, and that it was in Lakonia too that the vast majority of the Perioikoi lived. Moreover, Kinadon was sent by the Ephors, after they had learned of the plot, to arrest some named Helots at a Perioikic town in Messenia, a dangerous tactic, one would have thought, if there had been a serious risk of a rising of the Messenian Helots and Perioikoi. On the other hand, however, it might also be argued, as Vidal-Naquet himself

notes, that the Ephors were seeking to divide the potential enemy's front by setting Lakonian and Messenian Helots and Perioikoi at each other's throats; and we might add that, if Kinadon did have purely Lakonian aims, he was apparently depriving himself of one of his most potent levers against the Spartiates, Messenian nationalism'. It is best therefore to leave open the question of the intended geographical application of Kinadon's plans.

This leaves for consideration the identity and status of the 'Inferiors' and a possible motive for Kinadon's behaviour. We may begin with Kinadon himself. Xenophon does not expressly say that he was an 'Inferior', but he implies this in two ways. First, he notes that he was not one of the Homoioi or 'Peers', the citizens of full status. Second, he reports Kinadon's alleged reason for plotting as his wish to be inferior to no one in Lakedaimon. In fact, unless Kinadon wished to make himself tyrant or institute an egalitarian democracy, what he probably said was that he did not want to be one of the 'Inferiors' or perhaps that he wished to abolish the status of 'Inferiors' altogether.

Now we know that Kinadon was not consigned to 'Inferior' status for want of physical robustness or moral fibre, since Xenophon emphasizes that he was suitably endowed in both these respects and yet was not one of the Homoioi. On the other hand, it appears from another passage of the *Hellenika* (6.4.10f.) that physical and moral debility were grounds for degradation. For the men enrolled specially for cavalry, not hoplite, service in the emergency of 371 were 'the most physically incapable and the least ambitious'. In other words, men who had failed to pass through the *agoge* or had not subsequently been elected to a common mess and so were automatically ineligible for regular hoplite service became 'Inferiors'.

Some of the plotters, however, as Kinadon revealed to the informer, were enlisted men (I prefer this translation of *syntetagmenoi* to Underhill's 'definitely organized conspirators') and had hoplite weapons. Kinadon could of course have been referring to Neodamodeis and Perioikoi, but as leader he must surely have had arms of his own. Thus, if he was in fact an 'Inferior', as I believe, then some 'Inferiors' at least could be enlisted for hoplite service. This will have been less hard to arrange if the state anyway provided weapons and armour to Spartiates ([Chapter 10](#)). The enlisted men, however, would have comprised relatively few of the revolutionaries: the 'masses', Kinadon said, would seize their weapons from the 'iron store'. This, I think, must be a reference to the central military arsenal in Sparta. For the great quantities it contained of daggers, swords, spits (for cooking), axes, adzes and sickles (for cutting down the enemy's crops) are explicitly contrasted by Kinadon with the civilian tools used in agriculture, carpentry and stonemasonry.

To return to the enlisted men among the 'Inferiors', these would have acquired their degraded status solely by reason of their poverty, being men of Spartan birth on both sides who had perhaps completed the *agoge* and even been elected to a common mess but then found themselves unable to maintain the stipulated mess contribution. Also to be assigned to the 'Inferiors' are those who had been temporarily or permanently deprived at law of their full citizen rights, whether for cowardice in battle (the 'tremblers'), alleged revolutionary designs (the returned 'men from the island' in 421) or other misdemeanours.

More problematic, however, are the two or possibly three other categories whose names are attested but whose status as 'Inferiors' is uncertain. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.3.9) refers once to foreigners of the category *trophimoi* and to the *nothoi* of the Spartiates, some of whom volunteered, apparently as hoplites, for the Chalkidian campaign of 380. The latter are described as 'exceedingly fine-looking men not without experience of the good things of the city', which perhaps means that, like such *trophimoi* foreigners as Xenophon's own sons, they had gone through the *agoge*. Phylarchos (81F43), Plutarch (*Kleom.* 8.1) and Aelian (*VH* 12.43) mention also the category *mothakes*, possibly to be identified with the *mothones* cited by lexicographers and scholiasts.

If these disparate sources can be reconciled, it may be that the *nothoi* were bastards of Spartiate fathers and Helot or Perioikic mothers and that they, like the *trophimoi* foreigners, formed part of the wider category of *mothakes* / *mothones*. The shared characteristic of the latter was perhaps that, regardless of their status at birth, they had been raised with and put through the *agoge* with the sons of men of full status. Since such distinguished figures as Lysander and Gylippos were believed to have been *mothakes*, clearly *mothax* origin was not necessarily incompatible either with Spartiate birth on both sides (Lysander indeed was a Heraklid) or with adult Spartiate status. The *nothoi* and *trophimoi* foreigners, however, were presumably disqualified from Spartiate status by their illegitimate or foreign birth and so remained 'Inferiors' for life.

However this may be, we have no positive indication whatsoever of the size of the 'Inferior' group in 399 (or any other time of course). Still, if 'Inferiors' could on occasion be enlisted as hoplites, the continuing drastic fall in the size of the 'Lakedaimonian' army in the fourth century must mean either that they did not then form an abundant reservoir of military manpower or that the Spartiates were unwilling to draw upon it extensively. Whatever the true number of 'Inferiors' may have been, by 371 there were not many more than 1,000 Spartiates all told. Since this was presumably a matter of no small concern to the Spartan authorities, or at least Aristotle clearly

thought it ought to have been so, we must ask what were the countervailing factors over which they had insufficient control.

First, those of demography. The incidence of exclusive homosexuality and bachelorhood, and their effect on the birthrate, are not quantifiable, but the ability of a confirmed bachelor like Derkyllidas to shrug off the potent sanctions of civic disgrace and reach the political heights suggests that this factor may not have been negligible. Habitual intermarriage among a small group of families, without replenishment from outside or below (Herodotus, 9.35, was struck by the small number of outsiders to acquire Spartan citizenship), should also have tended to diminish the citizen population. So too would contraception, abortion, infant mortality and the exposure of neonates; but only for the latter do we have any solid, though again not quantifiable, evidence (Roussel 1943). On the other hand, it seems certain that Spartan girls married relatively late by Greek standards (Plut. *Lyk.* 15.4), and this would perhaps have reduced total female fertility. Such also would have been the effect, and was perhaps the object, of the polyandry, especially adelphic polyandry, attested by Polybius (12.6b.8): for the multiple husbands were restricting the number of their legitimate offspring to the childbearing potential of a single shared wife.

However, no matter how great we suppose the effects of these demographic factors to have been, they should have been partly if not wholly offset by the measures to encourage procreation discussed earlier. We must therefore look for an explanation of the drastic oliganthropy to broader and deeper socio-economic conditions. This after all is the general direction in which the ancient sources pointed the finger.

We should not, however, follow Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 14.3) and Plutarch (*Lyk.* 30.1 etc.) in inflating the significance of the wealth, especially coined wealth, that flowed into Sparta following Lysander's successful imperialism (Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8f.; Diod. 13.106.8; 14.10.2; Polyb. 6.49.10). For it was a commonplace from at least Herodotus (9.122) onwards that military might was gained through personal abstinence; and anyway wealth, even if in less liquid forms, had been passing between the same kind of few Spartan hands long before the end of the fifth century. Nor, I think, should we follow Phylarchos and Plutarch in attributing a decisive causal importance to the probably inauthentic *rhētra* of Epitadeus ([Chapter 10](#)), even if the injection of foreign cash may have stimulated the market in Lakonian land in the fourth century, as it certainly affected Spartan lifestyles.

On the other hand, we are, I believe, bound to respect the sources' unanimous association of Sparta's downfall with materialistic greed. By this I suggest we should understand not so much greed for cash

and movables as greed for land and the resultant anxiety of the ever fewer rich Spartiates to keep their ever increasing property intact. Aristotle tells us that most of the land in Lakonia in his day, the third quarter of the fourth century, had fallen into a few hands (*Pol.* 1307a36) and that almost two fifths of it were in the hands of women (*Pol.* 1270a23f.). This was but the culmination of a process extending over at least a century and a half, in which the rich had grown richer through bequests, adoptions and marriage-alliances, while the impoverished majority found themselves increasingly unable to maintain the stipulated contribution to a common mess and so were degraded to the status of 'Inferiors' (above).

There was of course nothing peculiarly Spartan about this anxiety over the transmission of property, any more than there was in the widening gulf between rich and poor Spartans, in the fifth and fourth centuries. What seemed to demand some exceptional explanation and so prompted the misplaced recourse to the 'exogenous variable' was the suddenness and distance of Sparta's fall, from the leadership of the Greek world to the status of a second-rate power in less than a decade. In reality, though, the fall exemplifies the rule enunciated by Montesquieu in 1734 in his *Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the Romans and of their Decline*: 'if the chance of a battle, that is to say, a particular cause, has ruined a state, there was a general cause ensuring that this state had to perish by a single battle.' The battle was Leuktra, and the 'general cause' was the acquisitiveness of the famous *vaticinatio post eventum* (cited in *Arist. fr.* 544 and *Diod.* 7.12.5) that 'acquisitiveness alone will destroy Sparta'. For acquisitiveness in the matter of landed property entailed the oliganthropy through which, as Aristotle laconically put it, Sparta was destroyed and for which, as Aristotle also saw, the remedy would have been to keep landownership more evenly distributed, as was done for example in the state in which he was himself resident, Athens.

The destruction was not, however, a simple quantitative process. The Spartiates had always been a minority in the total Lakonian population and greatly outnumbered by their allies in all major battles since the second half of the sixth century. It was rather the effects of Sparta's progressively shrinking citizen numbers first in Lakonia and Messenia on the 'Inferiors', Perioikoi and Helots, then in the Peloponnese on its Peloponnesian League allies, and finally on its enemies, especially the Thebans, that brought the destruction about.

In short, if I were to single out any one group of Spartans as chiefly responsible for Sparta's downfall, that group would consist of the few rich Spartiates, personified precisely by those like Agesilaos for whom Xenophon and Plutarch evinced such warm admiration. It was perhaps fitting that Agesilaos should meet his end in Libya at the age of about

eighty-four, returning home from fighting as a mercenary in Egypt.

Notes on further reading

The evidence for Spartiate oliganthropy is conveniently brought together in Ste. Croix 1972, 331f.; it is well discussed in Toynbee 1969, 297ff., less convincingly in Christien 1974 (in particular, I disagree with her interpretation of Epitadeus' *rhētra* as a response to a debt-crisis).

On social differentiation at Sparta in the fifth to fourth centuries see Oliva 1971, 163–79. There is as yet no wholly satisfactory account of the status of Spartan citizen wives in any period. I hope to publish shortly a discussion dealing with among other things their property-rights during the sixth to fourth centuries.

For Aristotle as an interpreter of Sparta see Oilier 1933, 164–88; Tigerstedt 1965, 155f.; Laix 1974.

Chapter fifteen

Epilogue

The history of Lakonia in the late Classical, Hellenistic and Roman periods deserves a book to itself. Here I shall give only a chronological sketch of the years from 362 BC to AD 78, in order to indicate how Sparta lost its remaining Helots and Perioikoi, how what we have for convenience labelled 'Lakonia' shrank in size correspondingly, and how the Spartans by the first century AD had become exhibits in a museum of their past.

After the losses of manpower and territory in the wake of Leuktra, Sparta next suffered such losses in 338 at the hands of Philip II of Macedon. The Spartans had not fought with the Greeks he defeated at Chaironeia, but neither would they join his League of Corinth. In return, perhaps after a fruitless attempt at negotiation, Philip laid Lakonia waste as far south as Gytheion and formally deprived Sparta of Dentheliatis (and apparently the territory on the Messenian Gulf as far as the Little Pamisos river), Belminatis, the territory of Karyai and the east Parnon foreland (Roebuck 1948, 86–9, 91f.). The principal beneficiaries were respectively Messene, Megalopolis, Tegea and Argos; but the latter at least seems to have been unable to reap the full benefit of Philip's largesse, since in the early third century Tyros and Zarax were still in Spartan control (Charneux 1958, 9–12).

By the time Agis IV ascended the Eurypontid throne in c.244, the number of Spartiates had further declined from Aristotle's not even 1,000' (in the 360s?) to not more than 700' (Plut. Agis 5.6). Of the latter, Plutarch says, perhaps only 100 possessed a *kleros* as well as real property. How Plutarch understood the distinction between these two kinds of land is unclear, although I suspect that he wrongly believed the *kleros* to have been inalienable and somehow publicly owned before the *rhētra* of Epitadeus (cf. [Chapter 10](#)). What is clear, however, is that by the mid-third century the 'Lykourgan' system of social organization, with its strict nexus between *agoge*, *kleros*, common mess, army and citizenship, had completely broken down. Most of the non-Perioikic land in Lakonia was in the hands of women (Agis' mother and grandmother were the two richest women in Sparta), while the majority of those who were not either Perioikoi or

Helots were Hypomeiones or what Plutarch describes as ‘an indigent and disenfranchised mob’.

To remedy this drastic situation, Agis proposed to realize the twin revolutionary slogan of all oppressed Greek peasantries, cancellation of debts and redistribution of the land. He, however, was executed in 241, and it was left for the Agiad king Kleomenes III to carry out Agis’ plans in a modified form in 227. The propaganda of Agis and Kleomenes, preserved in Plutarch, and the counter-propaganda of the recently established and hostile Achaian League, preserved in Polybius, have made a sorry mess of the evidence for the original ‘Lykourgan’ regime, as we saw in [Chapter 10](#). We are no more in a position to say whether the programme of Agis and Kleomenes ‘was devised by them for the greater good of the world at large, of Spartans, of Sparta, or of themselves’ (Forrest 1968, 144). Clearly, however, the essence of the programme was an attempt to increase the numbers of the Spartiates, resubmit this enlarged body to the ‘Lykourgan’ regime and so restore Sparta’s military and political status to what it had been before 371. The new Spartiates, making a total of about 4,000, were drawn from the Hypomeiones, Perioikoi and foreigners. The Helots, on the other hand, were to remain the economic basis of Spartan power.

This revolution was certainly a step in the right direction, but it is, I think, an exaggeration to say that ‘now for the first time the Spartan State utilised to the full the resources of the country and its population’ (Toynbee 1913, 274). For a few years, though, Kleomenes did achieve remarkable success both at home and abroad, until his unremitting hostility to the Achaian League served as the occasion for a second Macedonian intervention in Lakonia in 223 or 222. Kleomenes’ new army was hastily reinforced by some 6,000 emancipated Helots, who unlike the 6,000 or more enlisted in 370 were required to purchase their freedom with cash (Plut. *Kleom.* 23.1). Even so the fewer than 20,000 men on Kleomenes’ side were no match for the 30,000 troops under king Antigonos Doson, who won a crushing victory at Sellasia and then proceeded to take Sparta itself, the first time the site had been occupied by outsiders since the Dorian ‘invasion’ of the tenth century ([Chapter 7](#)). Sparta was forcibly enrolled in the Hellenic League and subjected to a Macedonian governor. Moreover, as in 338, Macedonian intervention had unfavourable implications for the size of Lakonia. For Doson either confirmed or renewed the dispensations of Philip II, as far as Dentheliatis and the east Parnon foreland were concerned, and he seems also to have deprived Sparta of (presumably Perioikic) Leukai, which is perhaps to be associated with the Hyperteleton sanctuary.

The immediate aftermath of Sellasia was fifteen years of political

and social chaos in Lakonia, complicated internationally by the intervention of Rome in Greece against Macedon and the Achaian League. By 206 Sparta naturally enough found itself on the Roman side, but in that year the central direction of Spartan affairs was assumed by a third revolutionary leader, Nabis, allegedly a direct descendant of the deposed Damaratos. His overriding aim (savagely misrepresented of course by our uniformly hostile sources) was no doubt the same as that of Agis and Kleomenes; but his methods were significantly different in two crucial respects. First, whereas Kleomenes had freed Helots purely for military reasons, Nabis emancipated them in order to prop up his rule. Logically, therefore, he made them beneficiaries of his land redistribution and incorporated them in the Spartan citizen body. (It is possible too that under Nabis the state, as in Crete, was made responsible for financing the common messes.) Second, whereas Kleomenes had put all his military eggs into one land-orientated basket, Nabis also built up Sparta's first-ever navy of any value and used the Perioikoi of the coastal towns of Lakonia as his elite troops (though apparently without giving them citizenship).

For about a decade Nabis (and Sparta) prospered remarkably, but in 197 he made the twofold mistake, in Roman eyes, of accepting Argos from Philip V of Macedon (by then deserted by the Achaian League) and extending his social programme to that city. In 196 Philip was defeated by the Romans, whose representative, T. Quinctius Flaminius, then invaded Lakonia. Nabis was not in fact eradicated, since, as Briscoe (1967, 9) has rightly pointed out, the aim of Flaminius was 'a balance of power, not upper-class constitutional government, and he preferred to tolerate the continued existence of a revolutionary government in Sparta rather than allow the Achaean League excessive power in the Peloponnese'. The importance of Nabis and Sparta, however, was irretrievably reduced by the liberation of the remaining Perioikic dependencies and their transfer either to the direct control of Argos (in the case of Prasiai to Zarax inclusive) or to the general protection of the Achaian League. Perhaps it was between 195 and the death of Nabis in 192 that the liberated Perioikic towns went over to the Roman side and were formally recognized as the 'Koinon (League) of the Lakedaimonians'. Sparta, however, retained its 'Lykourgan' socio-economic institutions, including the by now severely reduced Helot base, until 188, when all were violently abrogated by the Achaian League (of which Sparta had been a member perforce since 192).

In 146, however, the Achaian League was itself disbanded, greatly to the benefit of Sparta, which had opposed the League's attempt to shake off the Roman yoke. Under the aegis of Rome Sparta seems to have recovered Belminatis and Aigyti from Megalopolis, but

Dentheliatis remained Messenian. It was perhaps now that the few remaining Helots exchanged their anomalous status for another. Thereafter the Spartan propertied class derived its surplus from the exploitation of chattel slaves or tenants.

The struggle for control of the Roman world between Antony and Octavian/Augustus also redounded to the advantage of the Spartans, since they had taken the winning side. According to the Augustan settlement, presumably of 27, Lakonia was divided into two separate political entities, Sparta (with enlarged territory: below) and the 'Koinon of the Free Lakonians' (the Eleutherolakonian League). The League originally comprised twenty-four members, but of these only eighteen remained by c. AD 150, the time of Pausanias (3.21.7): Gytheion, Teuthrone, Las, Pyrrhichos, Kainepolis (the successor to Tainaron, established at modern Kyparissi on the opposite, western, flank of south Mani), Oitylos, Leuktra (in north-west Mani), Thalamai, Alagonia, Gerenia, Asopos, Akriai, Boiai, Zarax, Epidauros Limera, Prasiai, Geronthrai and Marios. The six communities which had left the League or disappeared between 27 BC and c.AD 150 may have been Kotyrta, Hippola, Pharai, Kyphanta, Leukai and Pephnos. The original total of twenty-four corresponds roughly to the thirty or so 'polichnal' referred to by the contemporary Strabo (8.4.11, C362), and the decrease from the conventionally 100 (actually perhaps eighty) of the fourth century has been plausibly explained as the result of political amalgamations by the smaller communities after 195. The process of amalgamation may have been furthered by an absolute decline in the former Perioikic population from the mid-second century.

The new, separate Sparta appears to have controlled the Eurotas furrow as far south as Aigiai, together with Skiritis and the territory of Karyai. In addition, Augustus ceded to the Spartans Kardamyle, Thouria and Kythera, the two former giving them respectively an outlet to the sea and a foothold in the south-east Pamisos valley, the latter becoming more or less the personal property of the Spartan C. Julius Eurycles (Bowersock 1961). The chief losers by the Augustan dispensation were of course the Messenians, who had improvidently sided with Antony at Actium. Their southern boundary with the Free Lakonians was fixed at the Choireios Nape (modern Sandava gorge) towards Alagonia and Gerenia, but to the north they lost among other territory the psychologically important Dentheliatis (in dispute since the eighth century).

Under Tiberius, however, in AD 25 the Dentheliatis was returned to the Messenians by the Senate (Tac. *Ann.* 4.42), and in AD 78 a boundary commission under the auspices of Vespasian confirmed the award. The official record of the AD 78 boundary between Messenian

and Spartan territory has been found at ancient Messene (IG V.1.1431), and the discovery of boundary-marks helps us to trace the frontier from the sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis in the south (where the whole trouble may have begun: [Chapter 8](#)) to a point not far east of ancient Asea (Chrimes 1949, 60–70; Kahrstedt 1950, 232–42; Giannokopoulos 1953).

It is also with the Flavian period that there commences in earnest the mass of epigraphical material bearing on the Spartan social system. This material was first comprehensively studied by Chrimes (1949, 84–168) and, whatever errors of fact and interpretation she may have committed, her overall conclusion – that in their social organization the Spartans were monumentally conservative – is cogent and indeed unsurprising. It was, however, an empty and fetishistic conservatism. The keeping up of ancient appearances was no more than a colourful stage setting for the benefit of visitors, particularly wealthy Romans, who would come to Sparta as to one of the most famous cities of Greek history’ (Oliva 1971, 318) – partly, we might add, to witness the floggings in the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia ([Appendix 5](#)). Perhaps as good an indication as any of Lakonian decadence is conveyed by the suggestion of Rawson (1969, 107f.) that ‘the ordinary Roman ... would seem to have thought, when he heard the word Laconia, primarily of the hunting dogs, fine marble, and purple dye that she exported, and perhaps also of the hot-air chamber in the baths called the “laconicum”.’ *Sic transit gloria*.

Notes on further reading

For the main outlines of the changes in Sparta’s former dominions I have mostly followed Toynbee 1969, 405–13; other modern work has been cited in the text.

Will 1966 covers thoroughly, and with helpful bibliographical notes, the political history of the Greek world in the last three centuries BC; for Hellenistic Sparta as a whole add now Oliva 1971, 201–318; and for the century prior to the Roman conquest Shimron 1972.

The revolutions of Agis, Kleomenes and Nabis are considered from the standpoint of the treatment of the Helots by Welwei (1974, 161–74). Tarn 1925 remains a stimulating essay on the wider socio-economic situation in Greece in the third century.

Appendix 1

Gazetteer of sites in Lakonia and Messenia

For the purposes of this gazetteer Lakonia is taken to embrace the entire Mani, up to and including Kalamata. Listed under Lakonia are all sites for which there is archaeological evidence for any period from the Neolithic (N) to the Classical (C), taking in on the way Early, Middle and Late Helladic (EH, MH, LH), Protogeometric (PG), Geometric (G) and Archaic (A). Under Messenia are listed only those sites for which there is archaeological evidence for the G, A or C periods. Ancient names, where certain or possible, are given in brackets.

A. Lakonia (numbers in brackets indicate the site-numbers in Hope Simpson 1965, of which a second edition is forthcoming)

ALEPOTRYPA: N EH

AAA 1971, 12ff., 149ff., 289ff.; AAA 1972, 199ff.; *BCH* 1972, 845ff.; AD 1972B, 251–5.

ALMYROS: C *MME*, no. 543.

AMYKLAI

Amyklaion (97): EH MH LH II LH IIIA-C PG G A C

AE 1892, 1ff.; *JdI* 1918, 107ff.; AA 1922, 6ff.; AM 1927, 1ff.; *BSA* 1960, 74ff.

Ay. Paraskevi (sanctuary of Alexandra/Kassandra): G A C

BCH 1957, 548ff.; AD 1960B, 102f.; *PAAH* 1961, 177f.

Sklavochori (Amyklai?): C

BSA 1960, 82, no. 3.

ANALIPSIS (Iasos/Iasaia?) (135): EH LH I-III B G A C

PAAH 1950, 234f.; 1954, 270ff.; 1955, 241f.; 1956, 185f.; 1957, 110f.; 1958, 165f.; 1961, 167f.; *BSA* 1961, 131; *BSA* 1970, 95f., no. 36.

ANEMOMYLO (149): EH LH III

BSA 1961, 138.

ANGELONA (148): EH LH III? A C
 BSA 1905, 81ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 216 n. 1; BSA 1961, 138.

ANOYIA (Dereion?): A C
 AM 1904, 13; BSA 1910, 65f., 70f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 199f.; BSA 1960, 82, no. 5.

ANTHOCHORION (100): LH IIIB-C PG G A C
 PAAH 1962, 113ff.

ANTIKYTHERA (Aigilia): C
 Kahrstedt 1954, 214; BSA 1961, 160ff.; AR 1975, 42, no. 10.

APIDIA (Palaia/Pleiai?) (106): N EH MH LH II-IIIC PG C
 BSA 1908, 162; BSA 1921, 146; Kahrstedt 1954, 215; BSA 1960, 86f.

ARACHOVA (Karyai): not certainly located
 JHS 1895, 54ff., 61; RE s.v. Karyai; IG V.1, p.172; *Peloponnisiaka* 1958-9, 376ff.

ARCHASADES: see XIROKAMBI (Spartan plain)

ARKINES (101): LH III C?
 AE 1889, 132ff.; BSA 1910, 67; Philippson 1959, 434; BSA 1961, 128ff.

ARNA: C?
 AE 1889, 132f.; BSA 1910, 67.

ARVANITO-KERASIA (Oion): C
 JHS 1895, 61f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 202; A. Andrewes in Gomme 1970, 33.

ASTROS (137): MH LH PG? A C
 Frazer 1898, 307; AA 1927, 365; *RhM* 1950, 227ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 171; BSA 1961, 131; *BCH* 1974, 604.

AY. ANDREAS: C?
 Frazer 1898, 307f.; AA 1927, 365; *RhM* 1950, 229; *BCH* 1963, 759.

AY. EFSTRATIOS (110): N EH MH LH II-IIIB C
 BSA 1960, 87ff. ('Ay. Strategos' is a slip.)

AY. GEORGIOS (155): LH A C
BCH 1958, 714; BSA 1961, 145; AD 1971B, 122.

AY. GEORGIOS (Spartan plain): C
 AM 1904, 6f.

AY. IOANNIS (147): EH LH III
 BSA 1908, 179; BSA 1961, 137.

AY. IOANNIS (Bryseiai?): C
 PAAH 1909, 295f.; Bölte 1929, 1330f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 199f.

AY. IOANNIS (lower Eurotas valley): LH III C
 BSA 1960, 95.

AY. IOANNIS (west Parnon foreland): C
BCH 1961, 691.

AY. NIKOLAOS (116): MH LH IIIB
 BSA 1960, 94f.

AY. PETROS: C

Frazer 1898, 310; *AM* 1905, 415f.; *AM* 1908, 177ff.

AY. STEPHANOS (120): EH MH LH I-III C *BSA* 1960, 97ff.;

BSA 1972, 205ff.; *AR* 1975, 15ff.

AY. TRIADA (Thyrea?): C?

Frazer 1898, 307. See also ASTROS.

AY. TRIADA (Malea peninsula): LH

BSA 1961, 145.

AY. VASILIOS (99): EH MH LH IIIB C

AE 1936B, If.; *BSA* 1960, 79ff.

BRINDA: C

MME, no. 548.

CHAROUDA: not certainly occupied.

AM 1876, 162f.; *AM* 1904, 44ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209; Fermor 1958, 71ff.; Giannokopoulos 1966, 45f.

CHASANAGA (Hyperteleton sanctuary): PG? G? A C

PAAH 1885, 31ff.; *BSA* 1908, 165f.; *IG* V.1, pp, 187ff.; *BSA* 1921, 147f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 211; *AD* 1969B, 138f.; *BCH* 1971, 888.

CHELMOS (Belmina): G A? C

JHS 1895, 36ff? 71ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 201f.; *BSA* 1961, 125; *BCH* 1961, 686; *BSA* 1970, 101, no. 53; *AD* 1973B, 175.

CHERSONISI (138): EH MH LH III

AA 1927, 365; *BCH* 1963, 759.

CHOSIARO (Las) (127): LH? A C

BSA 1906, 274f.; *BSA* 1907, 232ff.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209f.; *BSA* 1961, 118; Giannokopoulos 1966, 52ff.

CHRYSAFHA (102): EH LH? A C

BSA 1910, 65; *BSA* 1921, 144f.; *BSA* 1960, 82ff.

DAIMONIA (Kotyrta) (152): EH? MH LH I-IIIB PG A C *BSA* 1908, 166;

BSA 1921, 148f.; *BSA* 1961, 141.

DICHOVA: A

BSA 1907, 233f.; *AD* 1968B, 153.

DRAGATSOULA (111): EH MH LH III

BSA 1960, 89.

ELAPHONISOS (Onougnathos) (157–8): EH LH III

RE s.v. Onou gnathos (1); Kahrstedt 1954, 213; *BSA* 1961, 145ff.; Arvanitis 1971, 55–9.

ELEA (Biandina?) (150): EH MH? LH III C

BSA 1908, 162; *BSA* 1921, 149; *BSA* 1961, 139.

EPIDAUROS LIMERA (Epidauros Limera) (146): N? LH I-III C A C

RE s.v. Epidauros (2); *BSA* 1908, 176ff.; *BSA* 1961, 136f.; *AD* 1968A, 145ff.

GANGANIA (107): EH MH LH IIIB

BSA 1961, 139.

GERAKI (Geronthrai) (105): N EH MH LH III (IIIC?) A C

BSA 1905, 91 ff.; *BSA* 1910, 72ff.; *BSA* 1960, 85f.; Le Roy 1974, 220–2.

GIANNITSA (Kalamai?): C

MME, no. 537; Meyer 1978, 178, 180f.

GORITSA (103): N EH MH LH I II LH IIIB

BSA 1960, 83.

GOULES: see PLYTRA

GOUVES: A? C

BSA 1909, 163; *BSA* 1921, 146; *BSA* 1960, 87 n. 101.

GYTHEION (Gytheion): AC

RE s.v. Gytheion; *BSA* 1907, 220ff.; Giannokopoulos 1966; AAA 1972, 202ff.; *IJNA* 1975, 103ff.

HELLENIKO (Eua): G

Frazer 1898, 306; AA 1927, 365; *RhM* 1950, 230.

IERAKA (Zarax): C?

BSA 1909, 167ff.; *RE* s.v. Zarax; *BSA* 1961, 136 n. 147.

KALAMATA (Pharai) (166): EH? LH IIIA-B G A C

BSA 1957, 242f.; *BCH* 1961, 697; *MME*, nos 141–2, 540.

KALYVIA GEORGITSI (Pellana) (133): EH? LH IIIA-C C

AD 1926, Parart., 41ff.; *RE* s.v. Pellana (1); *BSA* 1961, 125ff.

KALYVIA TIS SOCHAS (Eleusinion sanctuary): A? C

BSA 1910, 12ff.; *BSA* 1950, 261ff.; *BSA* 1960, 82, no. 4.

KAMBOS (169): N? LH II-III A-B C

MME, no. 146.

KARAOUSI (112): N EH MH LH I-IIIC PG? G? C

BSA 1960, 89ff.; *AR* 1960, 9; *BSA* 1972, 262f.

KARDAMYLI (Kardamyle) (170): N? EH? MH? LH A C

BSA 1904, 163; *MME*, no. 147; *AD* 1972B, 265; Meyer 1978, 176f.

KARYAI: see ARACHOVA

KAstri (164): see KYTHERA

KIPOULA (Hippola) (130): LH? A C

BSA 1907, 244f.; *IG* V.1, p.237; *BSA* 1961, 123; Rogan 1973, 68f.

KOKKINIA (Akriai) (108): LH? C *BSA* 1908, 162;

BSA 1961, 138f.

KOKKINIOCHOMATA: see PIGADIA

KOSMAS (Glympeis/Glyppia?) (144): LH? A C

BSA 1909, 165; *PAAH* 1911, 277f.; *RE* s.v. Glympeis, Glyppia; *BSA* 1961, 135; *BCH* 1963, 759.

KOTRONAS (Teuthrone) (128): EH MH? LH? C
BSA 1907, 256f.; *BSA* 1961, 119; *BCH* 1961, 215ff.; *BCH* 1965, 358ff.

KOTRONI (141): LH IIIA-B
BSA 1961, 132f.

KOUPHOVOUNO (96): N EH LH IIIB
BSA 1960, 74.

KOUTIPHARI (Thalamai) (173): LH G? A C
BSA 1904, 161f.; *MME*, no. 150.

KRANAI (Kranai) (124): EH? LH IIIA-C
BSA 1907, 223; *BSA* 1961, 114; Giannokopoulos 1966, 25, 185.

KROKEAI (Krokeai) (121): MH? LH II-IIIC C
BSA 1910, 68f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 200f.; *BSA* 1960, 103ff.; *BCH* 1961, 206ff.

KYPARISSI (Kyphanta): C
BSA 1909, 173f.; *RE* s.v. Kyphanta.

KYPRIANON (129): LH? C
BSA 1961, 119ff.; *BSA* 1968, 333ff.

KYTHERA (Kythera) (159–65): N EH EM MM I-LM IB LH II LH M IIIA-B G A C
RE s.v. Kythera; Kahrstedt 1954, 213f.; *BSA* 1961, 148ff.; Coldstream/Huxley 1972.

LAGIO (122): EH LH III
BSA 1960, 105; Giannokopoulos 1966, 26.

LEKAS (119): EH MH LH IIIB C
BSA 1960, 97.

LEONIDHION (Prasiai) (140): LH III A C
BSA 1908, 167, 174f.; *PAAH* 1911, 278f.; *RE* s.v. Prasiai; *BSA* 1961, 131.

LEVTRIO (Leuktra) (171): MH? LH III C
BSA 1904, 162; *MME*, no. 548; Meyer 1978, 176.

LIONI (161): see KYTHERA

LYMBIADA (Glyppia?) (143): EH LH III C?
BSA 1909, 165; *BSA* 1961, 135.

MARI (Marios) (145): LH? A C
BSA 1909, 166f.; *RE* s.v. Marios; *BSA* 1961, 136.

MAVROVOUNI (125): EH LH IIIB-C PG C
BSA 1961, 114ff.

MELATHRIA: LH IIIA-B C
BCH 1960, 693; *AD* 1967B, 197ff.; *AAA* 1968, 32ff.

MELIGOU (Anthana?): A
Frazer 1898, 308; *RhM* 1950, 230; *AM* 1968, 182f.

MENELAION (sanctuary of Menelaos and Helen) (95): MH III
 LH II-III B G A C
PAAH 1900, 74ff.; *BSA* 1909, 108ff.; *BSA* 1910, 4ff.; *BSA* 1960, 72,
 82; *AR* 1977, 24ff.
 MEZAPPOS (Messe?) (131): LH III?
BSA 1907, 243f.; *BSA* 1961, 122f.
 MIKRA MANDINIA: LH? C
MME, no. 144.
 MONEMVASIA: see EPIDAUROS LIMERA

 NEAPOLIS (Boiai) (154): EH LH IIIA-B A C
RE s.v. Boiai; *BSA* 1908, 168ff.; *BSA* 1961, 142ff.; Arvanitis 1971.
 NEROTRIVI (Selinous?): C?
BSA 1909, 164f.; *BSA* 1921, 145.

 OITYLON (Oitylos) (132): LH? C *BSA* 1904, 160f.;
BSA 1961, 121.

 PAIZOULIA (123): EH MH LH II-III B C
BSA 1960, 105; Giannokopoulos 1966, 26.
 PALAIOCHORA (Abia): C?
BSA 1904, 164f.; *MME*, no. 545; Meyer 1978, 178.
 PALAIOCHORA (Aigiai) (126): LH? A C *BSA* 1907, 231f.;
BSA 1961, 114, 173ff.
 PALAIOCHORI (142): EH MH LH I-III B
BSA 1961, 132ff.
 PALAIOGULAS (Sellasia): A C
RE s.v. Sellasia; *PAAH* 1910, 277f.; Pritchett 1965, ch. 4.
 PALAIOPOLIS (164): see KYTHERA
 PALAIOPYRGI: see VAPHEIO
 PANAYIOTIS (118): EH MH LH IIIA-B C
BSA 1960, 95ff.
 PAPPAGENIES DAPHNI: C
BSA 1961, 141 n. 181.
 PAVLOPETRI: EH MH? LH III B
BSA 1969, 113ff.; *Archaeology* 1970, 242ff.
 PEPHNOS (Pephnos) (172): LH III
BSA 1904, 162; *RE* s.v. Pephnos; *MME*, no. 149.
 PERIVOLAKIA (Kalamai?): LH III
MME, no. 140; Meyer 1978, 178, 180f.
 PHARAI: A? C
MME, no. 542.
 PHLOMOCHORI: A (but not certainly occupied)
BCH 1965, 366, 371ff.
 PHONEMENOI (Hermai?): A C

BSA 1905, 137f.; *Athena* 1908, 383ff.; PAAH 1950, 235f.

PIGADIA (168): N? EH? MH? LH I-II-III A-C PG?

MME, no. 145.

PLYTRA (Asopos) (151): N EH MH LH III C

Frazer 1898, 382f.; BSA 1908, 163ff.; BSA 1961, 139ff.; *Archeologia: trésors des ages*, Nov.-Dec. 1968, 42f.

PORTO TON ASOMATON (Tainaron): C

BSA 1907, 249ff.; AM 1915, 100ff.; RE s.v. Tainaron; BSA 1961, 123f.; AAA 1975, 160ff.

POULITHRA (Polichna): C?

BSA 1909, 176; PAAH 1911, 276f.; RE s.v. Polichna.

PYRRHICHOS (Pyrrhichos): C?

BSA 1904, 160; BCH 1965, 378ff.

SKOUTARI (Asine): C?

BSA 1907, 235; CR 1909, 221f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 209.

SPARTA

Akropolis: LH III PG G A C

BSA 1907, 137ff.; BSA 1908, 142ff.; BSA 1925, 240ff.; BSA 1927, 37ff.

Limnai (Artemis Orthia sanctuary): PG G A C

AO; Boardman 1963.

Pitana (tile-stamps, Hellenistic): BSA 1907, 42.

Pitana (A settlement): BSA 1960, 82.

Mesoa (A graves): AD 1964A, 123ff.

Kynosoura? (A sanctuary at modern Kalogonia): PAAH 1962, 115ff.; BCH 1963, 759f.

City-wall (Hellenistic): BSA 1907, 5ff.

Thornax?: BSA 1960, 82, no. 1.

STENA (153): EH LH II-III B

BSA 1961, 141f.

STENA (near Gytheion): see MAVROVOUNI STROTSA: A?

BSA 1907, 226f.; BSA 1910, 67f.

TRINASA (Trinasos): C?

Frazer 1898, 380; BSA 1907, 230f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 206.

TSASI (115): EH LH III A-B A? C

BSA 1960, 92ff.

TSERAMEIO (Alesiai?): C

BSA 1960, 82, no. 2.

TYROS (Tyros) (139): EH LH? A C

PAAH 1911, 253ff.; PAAH 1953, 251ff.; BSA 1961, 131.

VAPHEIO (98): EH MH LH II-III B

AE 1889, 132ff.; BSA 1960, 76ff.

VERGA: LH

BSA 1966, 116; *MME*, no. 143.
VEZANI (Helos) (109): MH LH? C
BSA 1909, 161f.; Kahrstedt 1954, 212; BSA 1960, 87ff.
VLACHIOTI (114): EH LH III C
BSA 1909, 162; BSA 1921, 150; BSA 1960, 92.
VRONDAMA (104): LH III C
BSA 1960, 83ff.

XERONISI (117): EH MH LH IIIA-C C
BSA 1960, 95.
XIROKAMBI (136): LH?
AA 1927, 365; BSA 1961, 131.
XIROKAMBI (Spartan plain): A? C?
BSA 1960, 81.

B. **Messenia** (spelling and site-numbers are those of *MME*, where references to earlier work may be found; see also Meyer 1978, 169–212)

AETOS: AY. DHIMITRIOS (226): C
AITHAIA: ELLINIKA (Thouria) (137): G? A? C
AKOVITIKA (151): GAC
ANOKOPANAKI: AKOURTHI (234): C
ANOKOPANAKI: STILARI (Polichne) (233): C
ARTEMISIA: VOLIMNOS (sanctuary of Artemis Limnatis) (138): G A C
AY. FLOROS (temple of Pamisos) (530): A C
AY. ANDHREAS (temple of Apollo Korynthos) (504): A C

BALIRA (525): C?

CHANDRINO: PLATANIA (33): AC
CHAROKOPIO: DEMOTIC SCHOOL (109): C
CHAROKOPIO: GARGAROU (509): C
CHATZI: BARBERI (26): C
CHORA: ANO ENGLIANOS (Mycenaean Pylos) (1): G
CHORA: VOLIMIDHIA (20): G
CHRISOKELLARIA: AY. ATHANASIOS (111): C?
CHRISTIANI (410): C?

DHIODHIA: AY. IOANNIS (518): C

EVA: NEKROTAFION (125): C

FINIKOUS: AYIANALIPSI (79): GC

GARGALIANI: KANALOS (15): C

HELLENIKA: see AITHAIA

ITHOME: see MAVROMATI

KAFIRIO: see LONGA

KAKALETRI: AY. ATHANASIOS (Hira?) (611): AC

KALOYERAKI: SAMARINA (522): C?

KASTELIA-VOUNARIA (Kolonides?) (507): C

KASTRO TOU MILA: CHAMOUSA (604): C

KATO KREMMIDHIA: FOURTZOVRISI (34): C

KATO MELPIA: KREBENI (216): A? C

KONSTANDINI: AY. ATHANASIOS (Andania?) (607): C

KORIFASION: PORTES (3): C

KORONI: BOURGO (Asine) (512): AC

KORONI: KAMINAKIA (514): C

KORONI: ZANGA (513): C

KOUKOUNARA (35): C

KYPARISSIA (Kyparissia) (70): A C

LAMB AIN A: TOURKOKIVOURO (122): C

LAMBAINA (523): C?

LONGA: KAFIRIO (107): G? A? C

LOUTRO: KOKKALA (Ampheia?) (211): G?

MALTHI: GOUVES (Dorion?) (223): G A (*AE* 1972B, 12–20)

MAVROMATI (Messene, Ithome) (529): G A (*BSA* 1926, 138, no. 9) C
RE Supp. XV, 136–55.

METHONI (Mothone) (412): A C

MILITSI: G A C

AD 1970B, 181f.

MIROU: PERISTERIA (200): C

MONI VOULKANOU (526): C?

NEDON VALLEY: A

Valmin 1930, 46, 48ff., 207ff.; *RE* s.v. Nedon; Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 5.

NEROMILOS: PANAYITSA (517): A

NICHORIA: see RIZOMILO

PALIO NERO: VOUNAKI (Aulon?) (601): C?

PAPOULIA (53): A

PERISTERIA: see MIROU

PETALIDHI (Korone) (502): C

PETROCHORI: CAVE OF NESTOR (10): C

PETROCHORI: PALIOKASTRO (Koryphasion/Pylos) (9): C

PIDHIMA: AY. IOANNIS (136): A? C

PILA (402): A

PL ATI (524): C?

POLIANI: PALIOCHORA (535): C

POLICHNI: AY. TAXIARCHOS (Andania?) (212): C

PROTI (Prote, Prokonnesos) (407): A (Jeffery 1961, 206, no. 2) C?

RIZOMILO: NICHORIA (Aipeia?) (100): GAC

Hesperia 1972, 218–73; 1975, 69–141.

ROMANOU: VIGLITSA (400): AC

SPERCHOYIA (533): C?

SPILIA: PRINDZIPA (69): C?

TRIKORFO: KAKO KATARACHI (121): C

VALTA: AY. PANDELEIMONAS (58): C?

VASILIKO: FILAKION (605): AC?

VELIKA: SKORDHAKIS (112): C?

VOLIMIDHIA: see CHORA VOLIMNOS: see ARTEMISIA

VOURNAZI: BAROUTOSPILIA (127): C

YIALOVA: DHIVARI (401): AC

Appendix 2

The Homeric poems as history

Concerning Homer everything, not excluding the name, has been the subject of immemorial debate. For my limited purposes, however, I shall accept without discussion that the Homeric poems, our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, are traditional oral formulaic poems, which reached approximately the form in which we have them, perhaps with the aid of writing, somewhere in the eighth or early seventh centuries. Their formulaic diction is characterized by the mixture of scope and economy diagnostic of the epic genre, and their language is an artificial amalgam of dialectal forms of diverse origin and date, never spoken outside the context of an epic recital.

The crucial period for the formation of the tradition was probably the early Dark Age (second half of the eleventh and tenth centuries) rather than the tail-end of the Mycenaean era, and the process took place among the Ionian and Aiolian Greeks of the Asiatic diaspora, although the precise nature of ‘colonial’ society and in particular the social milieu in which the Homeric poems were created and developed are still obscure. The great advance in our knowledge of the epic genre and the relevant archaeological data makes it necessary to pose the overall problem of historicity as follows: ‘is the Homeric world Mycenaean with a few anachronisms, or eighth century with a few garbled survivals, or something intermediary, or a synthesis of them all, or a fictional world of the imagination?’ (D.H.F. Gray in Myres 1958, 293). I shall concentrate on two facets of the problem, the historicity of the Trojan War as it is envisaged in the *Iliad* and the historical status of the ‘Catalogue of Ships’ (*II.* 2.484–760), with special reference to the ‘Kingdom of Menelaos’.

In the absence of contemporary and directly relevant written documents, on either the Greek or Trojan side, the suggested solutions

must depend on evaluation of Homer as traditional oral poetry and interpretation of the archaeological evidence. It is generally agreed today that there is a profound discontinuity between the world in which the events described in the *Iliad* could have occurred, the thirteenth century, and the world in which ‘Homer’ lived and thought. ‘The world of the (sc. Linear B) tablets is one of which the Homeric poems retain only the faintest conception’ (Page 1959, 202). Thereafter, however, scholars are divided between those who believe that there is a historical basis to the poem, overlaid and distorted no doubt in the course of transmission but none the less still recoverable; those who believe that there is a historical basis but one that is no longer recoverable, at least not with any certainty or precision; and those who believe that there is no or only a very slight historical basis. In relation to the two problems isolated for discussion in this Appendix I belong with the intermediary group. Space forbids much more than a skeletal justification of this stance, and I would stress that I am concerned only with the historical basis of the essential plot, not with all the elaborations and incidentals, apart from those of the ‘Kingdom of Menelaos’.

Comparative studies of heroic poetry, of which the *Iliad* is no doubt in several respects an exceptional representative, indicate that such poetry takes its origin in a historical event but that in the final version historical matter may be very scanty or even entirely absent. To take an extreme case, a defeat may be transformed into a victory, although this is of course by no means a prerogative of heroic poetry. The likeliest occasion for the creation of oral epic poetry is an impoverished era which stands self-consciously in the shadow of a more expansive predecessor. To simplify, ‘saga presupposes ruins’ (Lesky 1971, 27). Too much reliance should not perhaps be placed on comparative evidence, which cannot replace the direct evidence we lack. But it is not unreasonable to postulate that a Trojan War may have taken place during LH IIIB and that the epic commemorating it originated perhaps in the eleventh century.

The evidence from the excavations at Hissarlik, if – as it surely is – this is Homer’s Troy, suggests that there were two destructions around the LH IIIB period, the first (c.1300) due to natural agency, probably an earthquake, the second later in the thirteenth century due to man. However, the dispute about the relative chronology of LH IIIB pottery (Chapter 6) and a controversy over the stylistic identification of the sherds associated with the second, man-made, destruction have led to confusion over both its relative and its absolute dating. What is undisputed, or should be, is that excavation has not disclosed the identity of the destroyers. If we suppose them to have been Greeks, and Homer is the sole unambiguous support for this hypothesis, it is

still open to question whether they fought and were organized in the manner described in the *Iliad*. For many scholars the 'Catalogue of Ships' has seemed to offer certain answers.

Any satisfactory explanation of the 'Catalogue', however, must account for at least the following four facts: it contains elements which descend ultimately from the Mycenaean period; it contains elements which could only have been incorporated after the Mycenaean era; it was not sung originally for the place in which we now – and *ex hypothesi* the Greeks from the eighth century on – read it; and finally there are discrepancies between it and the rest of the *Iliad*. In the light of these facts it is perhaps understandable that the 'Catalogue' is still among the most controversial passages of the entire *Iliad*. My own view in summary is that it is basically a composition of either the latest (LH IIIC) phase of Mycenaean civilization or the immediate post-Mycenaean period, which has subsequently undergone a process of amplification, omission and conflation; and, second, that it is in no sense a documentary record of an actual warfleet muster.

Specifically, the kingdom ascribed to Menelaos (*II*. 2.581–7, below) has resisted more successfully than most of the others all attempts to prove on archaeological grounds the hypothesis that it corresponds to the political geography of a particular historical epoch:

those who held hollow Lakedaimon full of ravines,
Pharis and Sparte and many-doved Messe,
and dwelt in Bryseiai and lovely Augeiai,
and held Amyklai and Helos a city on the sea,
and who held Laas and dwelt around Oitylos,
these his brother led, Menelaos of the loud warcry,
sixty ships in all.

Of the ten place-names listed, the first, Lakedaimon, to judge from its epithets probably applies to the kingdom as a whole, just as it certainly applied to the whole Spartan state in historical times, rather than to an individual site (but see below). Of the remainder only four (Amyklai, Laas, Oitylos and Messe) can be identified at all confidently with actual sites, and this only if two further hypotheses are well grounded, namely that the names remained unchanged from the time at which they were first incorporated in the 'Catalogue' to the time of their first use by a post-Homeric literary source; and, second, that the sites identified on the ground have been correctly so identified from the indications of the written sources. Neither hypothesis is unassailable.

Of the four plausibly identified on this basis only Amyklai has so far yielded material remains earlier than the Archaic period. Of the rest Sparte (also mentioned in the *Odyssey*: below) may refer either to

classical Sparta or to an earlier counterpart of that name, for which the site on the Menelaion ridge is the only real candidate. If it is the former, then in view of the dearth of Mycenaean remains here Sparte at least would be a post-Mycenaean insertion. If on the other hand there was a Mycenaean Sparte on the Menelaion ridge, then what is to be done with the 'well-towered Therapne' of Alkman (fr. 14b), which was clearly a settlement rather than an area whatever Pausanias (3.19.9) may have thought when he described the Menelaion sanctuary ambiguously as 'in Therapne'? This difficulty might be resolved if Homer's Lakedaimon could be equated with Alkman's Therapne, but I do not think it would be justifiable to adopt the less likely interpretation of Lakedaimon as an individual site in order to effect this equation. So *non liquet*. Pharis, however, may well be the Palaipyrgi site, and Helos may be Ay. Stephanos. But Bryseiai, whose historical homonym is itself not surely located, is not identifiable with any Mycenaean site, despite attempts to preserve the pristine Mycenaean purity of the 'Catalogue' by identifying it alternatively with Anthochorion or Ay. Vasilios in the Spartan basin. Finally, Augeiai, if it is not simply a doublet of the Lokrian Augeiai (11.2.532), could be a forerunner of Perioikic Aigiai, but the latter, if correctly identified, has nothing to show for itself archaeologically before the sixth century. In short, it is impossible to decide on archaeological grounds either when this section of the 'Catalogue' was composed or to what period if any it ostensibly refers. We may add in conclusion that the two post-Mycenaean linguistic forms used here are not of course unambiguous proof that the whole section was originally a post-Mycenaean composition.

This leaves the problems of the role and status of Menelaos. In the first place, there seems to be nothing in the *Iliad* which could be due to a poet's desire to flatter a Spartan audience. Second, the number of ships attributed to him in the 'Catalogue' seems appropriate to his status as brother of the overall commander, Agamemnon, and in proportion to his relative importance in the rest of the *Iliad* by comparison to, say, Nestor, who brought ninety ships. Whether these absolute figures bear any relation to Mycenaean reality of any period is impossible to say, but, if we interpret them along the lines of Thucydides (1.10), then perhaps they do roughly correspond to our current archaeological pictures of thirteenth-century Lakonia and Messenia.

On the other hand, I am not persuaded that Agamemnon's overall command at Troy necessarily tells us anything about the political organization of Mycenaean Greece under less exceptional conditions, and I tend to see it as mainly due to the exigencies of the plot. Moreover, no palace fit for a Menelaos has yet been located in Lakonia

to match the 'Palace of Nestor' at Pylos and the other known palatial establishments of the thirteenth century. There is therefore nothing to disprove the suggestion that the description of Menelaos' palace in the fourth book of the *Odyssey* is as fictional as the alleged chariot-route over Taygetos taken there by Odysseus' son Telemachos when he came to visit Menelaos at Sparte. Indeed, it is even possible on present evidence to argue that Lakedaimon (or whatever the name of Menelaos' supposed realm was) did not in fact exist as an independent kingdom in the thirteenth century but was controlled from the Argolis or even Messenia; the latter situation after all would only be the converse of the historical relationship between the two areas from c.700 to 362.

However that may be, I hope I have brought forward sufficient arguments to show why I do not believe it to be sound method to use the *Iliad* as part of an explanation of the last centuries of the Mycenaean era. Thus I cannot, for example, accept that an enterprise of this Homeric magnitude weakened Mycenaean Greece and acted as a prelude to the destructions and desertions evident in the material record for the latter part of the thirteenth and for the twelfth centuries. Nor can I agree that it was the prolonged absence of Mycenaean rulers which encouraged factional strife and internecine war on their return from Troy. In the present state of our evidence the only respectable intellectual position is honest agnosticism.

Notes on further reading

The bibliography on Homer, following the 'Homeric question' have let loose by F.A. Wolf at the end of the eighteenth century, is vast. The best brief guides are perhaps Hainsworth 1969 and Lesky 1968. Of the longer treatments Kirk 1962 is still useful.

The demonstration of the traditional formulaic nature of the Homeric poems is due to Milman Parry, whose *oeuvre* has been collected by his son as Parry 1971. That the poems were also oral was a hypothesis Parry set out to test in Yugoslavia; it is now generally accepted as proved, with important doubts about the role of writing in the closing stages of the living tradition. On the 'Parry-Lord thesis' see the bibliography Haymes 1973. According to Hainsworth (1969, 9), 'the real question, as yet unattempted, is whether the dramatic quality could have been orally conceived'; but this is not wholly fair to Thomson 1961, 433–582, where an attempt is made and the possibility strongly indicated.

For the language of the epics see Meister 1921; Hiersche 1970, 80–106; Shipp 1972. The dispute over the existence and character of Mycenaean poetry is usefully reviewed in Kirk 1960, esp. sections 18–25.

The archaeological background to Homer is considered in Lorimer 1950 (now very outdated); in various contributions to *Archaeologia Homerica* (uneven in quality); and in Bouzek 1969.

Kirk 1975 is a helpful short discussion of the historical value of the poems. Of the longer treatments Page 1959 is still stimulating, but Adam Parry (in Parry 1971, xliv) perhaps understates the case when he says that Page 'takes the argument for the historicity of the Homeric epics as far as it can reasonably go'. On the question whether there was a unified 'Homeric world' identifiable in space and time I agree with the negative conclusion of Snodgrass 1974.

For the 'Catalogue' see e.g. Burr 1944; Jachmann 1958; and Hope Simpson and Lazenby 1970. All these have powerful axes to grind.

The archaeological aspect of the Trojan War controversy is well summarized by Wiseman (1965). On the hegemony allegedly exercised by Mycenae I agree with Thomas 1970 against the cautiously positive view of Desborough (1972, 18).

Appendix 3

The Spartan king-lists

The purposes of this Appendix are twofold: to discuss the source and significance of the lists of Agiads and Eurypontids preserved in Herodotus ([Table 1](#)) and to illustrate briefly the cardinal role that the upper reaches of these and comparable lists appear to have played in the elaboration of a chronology for early Greek history.

TABLE 1	
<u>Agiads (7.204)</u>	Eurypontids(8.131.2)
	Herakles
	Hyllos
	Kleodaios
	Aristomachos
	Aristodamos
Eurysthenes	Prokles
Agis (I)	Euryp(h)on
Echestratos	Prytanis
Labotas	Polydektes
Doryssos	Eunomos
Agesilaos (I)	Charillos
Archelaos	Nikandros
Teleklos	Theopompos
Alkamenes	Anaxandridas (I)
Polydoros	Archidamos (I)
Eurykrates	Anaxilaos
Anaxandros	Latychidas (I)
Eurykratidas	Hippokratidas
Leon	Agesilaos
Anaxandridas (II)	Menares*
<u>Leonidas (I)</u>	Latychidas (II)

* Did not reign

We must first decide what these lists represent. Are they, as the ancients believed (although, as we shall see, they differed in detail), king-lists? Or are they, as Henige (1974, 207–13) has now argued in a fundamental study of oral tradition, merely the pedigrees of Leonidas I (reigned c.490–480) and Latychidas II (c.491–469)? The way in which Herodotus introduces the lists suggests the latter, and this view is apparently supported both by the omission of otherwise recognized kings (from the Agiads Kleomenes I; from the Eurypontids Agasikles, Ariston and Damaratos) and by his cross-reference at 9.64.2, where he points out that regent Pausanias had the same ascendants (*progonoi*) as Leonidas. On the other hand, Herodotus states explicitly (8.131.3) that ‘all except the two named immediately after Latychidas (viz his father and grandfather) became kings of Sparta’, and this may indeed imply that he believed all Leonidas’ ascendants had done so too. At any rate, this was how he was understood by all later writers.

Neither interpretation is entirely cogent, but on balance I think Herodotus did indeed mean the lists for king-lists. The major obstacle in the way of this interpretation is the omission of recognized kings from both lists, but this has been adroitly circumvented by Prakken (1940) with the suggestion that Herodotus was adapting lists compiled, perhaps by Hekataios (below), in the joint reign of Kleomenes I and Damaratos, neither of whom was succeeded by a son. Whether or not Hekataios (or whoever) was the first to produce and publish written king-lists we cannot of course say.

A minor objection, that not even the Spartans believed Leonidas’ and Latychidas’ ascendants before Aristodamos to have been kings of Sparta, has been proven groundless by Huxley (1975b), who rightly distinguishes between kings ‘of’ Sparta and kings ‘in’ Sparta; we may add that in 371 the Dioskouroi, ‘the model and divine guarantee of the Spartan dyarchy’ (Carlier 1977, 76 n. 42), could be referred to as ‘fellow citizens’ of the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.6). Moreover Herodotus’ confusion over the name of Latychidas II’s grandfather – Agesilaos in Table 1, but Agis at 6.65.1 – seems most easily explicable if, as Herodotus himself states, Agesilaos/Agis did not in fact reign. Thus, since Latychidas II and Damaratos were coevals (they fell out over the girl they both wanted to marry: 6.65.2), Latychidas’ grandfather could have been a younger brother of Damaratos’ grandfather, Agasikles, the co-king of Leon. This would make Latychidas and Damaratos second cousins, closely enough related for Kleomenes I to use the former as an acceptable replacement for the latter.

To these negative arguments in favour of the interpretation of the

lists as king-lists we may add the evidence of two papyri from Oxyrhynchos published after Prakken's important paper. One of these (2390, with Harvey 1967) proves that Latychidas I did indeed reign – probably c.600, since Alkman sang of him. The other (2623.1, a choral lyric fragment attributable to Simonides or Bacchylides) mentions a Zeuxidamos (see [Table 2](#), below) and perhaps a Hippokratidas (cf. [Table 1](#)), apparently in a royal context. We know that Stesichoros sang before a Spartan prince in Sparta c.550 and that he lent his voice to Heraklid propaganda (West 1969, 148). Perhaps the poet of this fragment was doing the same for a Eurypontid prince in the early fifth century.

Granted then that we have access to Spartan king-lists in Herodotus, two further and related questions arise. How far may we accept them as true records of the dyarchy? Second, what role or roles might the lists have played in forming the Spartans' view of their past and in determining the way that past was presented to or used against outsiders?

We may start with the connection of the eponyms Agis (I) and Euryp(h)on through the twin sons of Aristodamos to Herakles. The Heraklid connection is first explicitly attested in Tyrtaios (fr. 2.12–15W), but it should go back to the dissemination of the Homeric or similar poems in Sparta and the foundation of the Menelaion sanctuary in the late eighth century, if not to the incorporation of 'Achaean' Amyklai c.750. Indeed, it is likely enough to have been forged at the same time as the dyarchy itself, which perhaps began with Archelaos and Charillos ([Chapter 8](#)). From Tyrtaios the assertion of the connection can be traced in an almost unbroken chain of poetical references through the Lakonians Kinaithon and Alkman in the seventh century, Stesichoros and the Delphic Oracle in the sixth to Pindar, the contemporary of Leonidas I and Latychidas II.

As far as the outside world was concerned, the function of the Heraklid connection was to legitimate Spartan supremacy in Lakonia and indirectly, the Peloponnese. Within Sparta itself, however, it had other functions. All 'Heraklids' were Spartans, but not all Spartans were 'Heraklids' (Hdt. 8.114.2). Moreover, within the Spartan aristocracy there were other 'Heraklid' families besides the Agiads and Eurypontids, and families like the Aigeidai (Hdt. 4.149.1) who were not Heraklid at all. The king-lists therefore were a very special kind of genealogical charter (Malinowski's expression) or 'mnemonic of social relationships' (Goody and Watt 1963, 309), serving to affirm the superior blue-bloodedness of the Agiads and Eurypontids against the claims of other aristocratic families and to distinguish the aristocracy from the commons.

So much for the roles of the lists. Now for their accuracy. We must

at once admit the depth of our ignorance. We do not know when, if ever, after the introduction of writing the lists were committed to script at Sparta; nor, if and when the transmission was purely oral, how that transmission was effected; nor how much circumstantial detail was passed on in association with any particular name. However, we do know that by the time of Pausanias (3.2.1–7; 3.1–8; 7.1–10) Herodotus' lists were regarded as king-lists and were taken to imply both that each Agiad king had had his one Eurypontid counterpart and that succession had been hereditary from father to son over fifteen generations within each house. Why then do the Eurypontid lists of the two authors differ ([Table 2](#))?

TABLE 2 Eurypontids

<u>Herodotus</u>	<u>Pausanias</u>
Prokles	Prokles
Euryp(h)on	Soos
Prytanis	Eurypon
Polydektes	Prytanis
Eunomos	Eunomos
Charillos	Polydektes
Nikandros	Charillos
Theopompos	Nikandros
Anaxandridas (1)	Theopompos
Archidamos (1)	Zeuxidamos
Anaxilaos	Anaxidamos
Latychidas (1)	Archidamos (1)
Hippokratidas	Agasikles
Agesilaos*	Ariston
Menares*	Damaratos
<u>Latychidas (II)</u>	<u>Latychidas (II)</u>

* Did not reign

The introduction of Soos is easy to explain: the Eurypontid list in Herodotus was one shorter than the Agiad, and he was probably inserted in the fourth century (Kiechle 1959, 90–101). The discrepancies after Theopompos are more difficult. In effect Pausanias has Zeuxidamos and Anaxidamos for Herodotus' Anaxandridas (I) and Anaxilaos, and he has omitted Herodotus' Latychidas (I) and Hippokratidas. Of these Latychidas I was certainly a king and Hippokratidas may have been referred to as such in the choral lyric fragment of the early fifth century (above). On the other hand, Pausanias' Zeuxidamos may be the man who appears in the same fragment and so may also have some claim to have ruled; alternatively, he could be the son of Latychidas II (Hdt. 6.71). Either way, it is possible that Pausanias had independent access to genuine

Eurypontid tradition, perhaps ultimately through Charon of Lampsakos (262T1 Jacoby). If therefore we accept that both Herodotus and Pausanias may preserve the truth about the ruling members of the Eurypontid house, the most economical hypothesis to explain the discrepancies between their lists is that both lists are selective king-lists, the one confined to Latychidas II's direct ascendants, the other recording those of Damaratos.

This hypothesis has many merits, of which two may be singled out here. First, as we shall see in the second part of this Appendix, it helps to solve a puzzle in early Greek chronography. Second, it does away with the glaring contradiction between the allegedly unbroken father/son succession down to Kleomenes I and Damaratos and the situation thereafter. For between c.491 and 219 lineal succession broke down in no fewer than twelve out of the twenty-six instances; of the remaining fourteen successions the largest number, five, were consobrinial – brother succeeding brother. We must make some allowance for changed political conditions after c.491, which saw the first attested deposition of a Spartan king (Ste. Croix 1972, 350–3). But as Henige (1974, 210) rightly says, it ‘beggars the imagination’ to postulate two series of unbroken father/son succession in a single state over the same sixteen generations from Eurysthenes and Prokles. In other words, even if Herodotus’ lists are adaptations of king-lists drawn up in the joint reign of Kleomenes I and Damaratos, we should make allowance for an unknowable number of collateral successions.

By a still more opaque process than those of their creation and trans-mission the Spartan king-lists transcended their local political significance to occupy a unique niche in the chronography of early Greek history. The first exponent of ‘scientific’ chronography, a byproduct of the shift in emphasis of Ionian *historia* from nature to man (Chapter 5), was probably Hekataios. It could then have been he who drew up the king-lists which Herodotus adapted (Jacoby 1949, 306 n. 25, 323 n. 28, 357 n. 26). He too it may have been who interpreted the fifteen kings in each line from Agis and Eurypon to Kleomenes I and Damaratos as fifteen generations and, making allowance for the Heraklid connection, gave to each generation the notional value of forty years (Meyer 1892, 153–88, esp. 169ff., 179–82). However, since ‘it is impossible to accept a generation average as high as forty years over a period of fifteen generations, no matter what contingencies are postulated’ (Henige 1974, 208), the hypothesis about collateral, and especially perhaps consobrinial, succession may again be invoked to account for it, if indeed it is felt that the forty-year generation has any basis in fact.

However that may be, exact lengths were subsequently attached to the reigns at least down to those of Alkamenes and Theopompos.

Various candidates for the role of first calculator have been proposed, of whom the third-century Lakonian Sosibios (595 Jacoby) has possibly the strongest claim. Eratosthenes of Cyrene, also in the third century, brought the lists into an acceptable relationship with the First Olympiad, which was for him the dividing line between 'mythical' and 'historical' Greece (Fraser 1970, esp. 190, 196f.). From Eratosthenes descends the 'vulgate' chronology of early Greek history through Apollodoros (c.100) and Diodorus to Eusebius (AD 263–339).

It goes without saying that the absolute dates arrived at by these erudite men have no truly scientific foundation, and that differences between their dating and ours are to be expected. On the other hand, to tamper with their relative chronology is hazardous. In general, their absolute dates are too high, a natural consequence of the Heraklid distortion. If we substitute the more plausible allowance of thirty years per generation for the 'Hekataian' forty, we achieve a satisfying congruence between potsherds and pedigrees, at least for the Agiads: Agis I could have been on the throne around the last third of the tenth century (Forrest 1968, 21). At the same time, however, we cannot pretend that in the present state of our knowledge this is much more than a happy coincidence.

Note

I was greatly helped in the preparation of the original version of this Appendix by my late friend Richard Ball, although the responsibility for any remaining errors is of course entirely mine.

Appendix 4

The Helots: some ancient sources in translation

A. General

1 Thucydides (5c.)

- (a) 4.80.2: Most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security against the Helots. (**OR** As far as the Helots are concerned, most Spartan institutions have always been designed with a view to security.) (b) 8.40.2: The Chians possessed many slaves (*oiketai*), the most in fact of any one state apart from Sparta.

2 Plato (4c.)

- (a) *Laws* 776C (quoted, with minor verbal differences, ap. Athen. 6.264DE): The Helot-system (**OR** The Helots) of Sparta is (are) practically the most discussed and controversial subject in Greece, some approving the institution, others criticizing it. (**OR** The condition of the Helots among the Spartans is of all Greek forms of servitude the most controversial and disputed about, some approving it and some condemning it.)
- (b) *Laws* 777BC: (Man) is a troublesome piece of goods, as has often been shown by the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which happen in states having many slaves (*oiketai*) who speak the same language... . Two remedies alone remain to us, – not to have the slaves of the same country, nor, if possible, speaking the same language (Jowett).
- (c) *Alk.* I.122D: No one could doubt that their land in Lakonia and Messenia is superior to our [Athenian] land, both in extent and quality, not to mention the number of their slaves (*andrapoda*) and

especially the Helots.

3 Aristotle (4c.)

Pol. 1330a25–8: The very best thing of all would be that the farmers should be slaves, not all of the same people and not spirited; for if they have no spirit, they will be better suited for their work and there will be no danger of their making a revolution.

4 Strabo (1c. BC/1c. AD)

8.5.4: Helotage lasted right up to the Roman conquest.

B. Origins

1 Hellanikos (5c.)

FGrHist 4F188: The Helots are those who were not by birth the slaves (*douloi*) of the Spartans but those occupying the city of Helos who were the first to be defeated.

2 Antiochos (5c.)

FGrHist 555F13: After the [First] Messenian War the Spartans who did not participate in the expedition were adjudged slaves (*douloi*) and called Helots, while all those who had been born during the campaign were called Partheniai and deprived of full citizen rights. (OR.... while all those to whom children had been born during the campaign (had to accept that their sons) were called Partheniai, etc.)

3 Thucydides

1.101.2: The majority of the Helots were descended from the Messenians who were enslaved (*doulothenton*) of old. Hence all were called Messenians.

4 Ephorus (4c.)

FGrHist 70F117: Agis [I] son of Eurysthenes robbed (the Perioikoi) of their equal political status and compelled them to pay contributions to Sparta. They obeyed, but the Heleioi, those who held Helos, revolted and were conquered by force of arms and adjudged slaves (*douloi*) on fixed conditions.

5 Theopompos (4c.) *FGrHist* 115

- (a) F13: They are those who have been enslaved (*katadedoulomenoi*) for a very long time by the Spartiates, some of them being from

Messenia, while the Heleatai formerly inhabited Helos in Lakonike.

- (b) F122: The Chians were the first Greeks after the Thessalians and Spartans to make use of slaves (*douloi*), but they did not acquire them in the same way as these. For the Spartans and Thessalians ... recruited their slave populations from the Greeks who previously inhabited the country they now control, the Spartans from the Achaeans, the Thessalians from the Perrhaiboi and Magnesites; and they called those whom they had enslaved respectively Helots and Penestai.

6 Plutarch (1–2c. AD)

Lyk. 2.1: Of these ancestors (of Lykourgos) the most distinguished was Soos, in whose reign the Spartans made the Helots their slaves (*douloi*).

7 Pausanias (2c. AD)

- (a) 3.2.7: (In the reign of Alkamenos) the Achaeans of Helos by the sea revolted too, and (the Spartans) defeated the Argives who came to the aid of the Helots.
- (b) 3.20.6: (The inhabitants of Helos) were the first to become slaves of the community (*douloi tou koinou*) and the first to be called Helots.

8 Anecdota Graeca

(ed. Bekker) 1.246, s.v. 'Heilotes': The slaves (*douloi*) of the Spartans ... so called because they were first defeated in Helos and enslaved.

9 Stephanos of Byzantion (6c. AD)

s.v. 'Chiol': (The Chians) were the first to use servants (*therapontes*), just as the Spartans used Helots, the Argives Gymnesioi, the Sikyonians Korynephoroi, the Italians Pelasgoi, and the Cretans Dmoitai (*sic*).

C. Status (see also A.1 b, 2b⁻c, D)

1 Kritias (5c.)

88B37 D-K: In Lakedaimon are to be found those who are the most enslaved (*douloi*) and those who are the most free.

2 Thucydides

- (a) 4.118.7 (armistice of 423): Neither side is to receive deserters

during this period, whether free or slave (*doulos*).

- (b) 5.23.3 (alliance between Sparta and Athens, 421): If the slave class (*douleia*) revolts, the Athenians are to come to the aid of the Spartans in full strength in accordance with their ability.

3 Xenophon (4c.)

- (a) *Hell.* 7.1.13: You [Athenians] become leaders merely of their slaves (*douloi*, i.e. Helot rowers) and men of least account.
- (b) *Lak. Pol.* 6.3: They are able to use even the slaves (*oiketai*) of another (Spartiate), if they so request.
- (c) *Lak. Pol.* 7.5: (Lykourgos made Spartan money valueless so that) a man should not be able to conceal it from his slaves (*oiketai*) if he dragged it home.
- (d) *Lak. Pol.* 12.4: They keep the slaves (*douloi*) away from the arms-dumps (in camp).

4 Isokrates (4c.)

12 (*Panath.*) 178: The souls (of the Perioikoi) are reduced to slavery no less than those of (the Spartans') slaves (*oiketai*).

5 Ephorus

(continuation of B.4): Their master was permitted neither to manumit them nor to sell them beyond the frontier.

6 Theopompos

F40: The Ardiaioi (of Illyria) possess 30,000 dependent labourers (*prospelatai*) on the same conditions as (the Spartans) possess Helots.

7 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol.* 1264a32–6: Again (Sokrates) makes the Farmers the masters of the estates, for which they pay a rent (*apophora*). But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and rebellious than the Helots, Penestai or slaves in general.
- (b) fr. 586: (The Kallikyrioi at Syracuse) are like the Spartans' Helots, the Thessalians' Penestai and the Cretans' Klarotai.

8 Myron (3c.)

FGrHist 106F1: The Spartans often freed their slaves (*douloi*) calling some Aphetai (released?), some Adespotoi (masterless?), some Erykteres (curbers?), others again Desposionautai (master-

seamen?); the last they assigned to naval expeditions.

9 Kallistratos (3c.)

FGrHist 348F4: They called the Mariandynoi (of Herakleia Pontika) Dorophoroi (gift-bearers) to take away the sting in the word 'slaves' (*oiketai*), just as the Spartans did for the Helots, the Thessalians for the Penestai, and the Cretans for the Klarotai.

10 Phylarchos (3c.)

FGrHist 81F8: The Byzantines rule over the Bithynoi in the same way as the Spartans rule over the Helots.

11 Strabo

8.5.4: The Spartans held (the Helots) as slaves (*douloi*) as it were of the community (*tropon tina demosious*).

12 Livy (1c. BC/1c. AD)

- (a) 34.27.9: Next some of the Helots – these had been 'castellani' (farm- or fort-dwellers) from remotest times, a rural people – were accused of wishing to desert and were lashed to death in all the villages (*vici*).
- (b) 34.31.11: But the name of 'tyrant' and my actions are held against me (Nabis), because I liberate slaves (*servi*).

13 Pollux (2c. AD)

3.83: Between free men and slaves (*douloi*) (are) the Lakonian Helots, the Thessalian Penestai, the Mariandynian Dorophoroi, the Argive Gymnetes and the Sikyonian Korynephoroi.

D. Treatment (see also C.1, 3b, 4, 8; F.i.2b)

1 Tyrtaios (7c.)

- (a) fr. 6: Like asses exhausted under great loads: under painful necessity to bring their masters full half the fruit their ploughed land produced.
- (b) fr. 7: They and their wives too must put on mourning and bewail their lords whenever death should carry them away.

2 Kritias

(following C.1): Through distrust of these Helots a Spartiate at home removes the arm-band from his shield. Since the frequent need for speed prevents him taking this precaution on campaign,

he always carries his spear with him, in the belief that he will be stronger than the Helot who tries to revolt with a shield alone. They have also devised keys which they think are strong enough to resist any Helot attempt on their lives.

3 Thucydides

- (a) 1.128.1: The Spartans had once dragged some Helot suppliants from the sanctuary of Poseidon and led them away to be killed, as a result of which, so they believed, the great earthquake had hit Sparta.
- (b) 4.80.3 (following A.1a): (The Spartans) made a proclamation that the Helots should choose from their number as many as claimed to have done the best service in the war. They implied that these Helots would be freed, but in fact it was a test conducted in the belief that those who thought themselves best qualified for freedom would also be the most likely to revolt. About 2,000 were selected, who put garlands on their heads and did the rounds of the sanctuaries as if they had been freed. But not much later the Spartans did away with them, and no one knew how each of them was killed.

4 Isokrates

12.181: The Ephors have the right to choose as many (*Perioikoi*) as they wish and put them to death, and this when for all Greeks the murder of even the most nefarious slaves (*oiketai*) is considered impious.

5 Theopompos

F13: The Helot population is in an altogether cruel and bitter condition.

6 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol* 1269b7–12: Apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing (the Helots) is a troublesome matter – the problem of how contact with them is to be managed. If allowed freedom, they grow insolent and think themselves as good as their masters; if made to live a hard life, they plot against and hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose Helot-system works out like this have not discovered the best way of managing it.
- (b) fr. 538 (ap. Plut. *Lyk.* 28): The so-called ‘*Krypteia*’ of the Spartans, if this really is one of Lykourgos’ institutions, as Aristotle says, may have given Plato (*Laws* 630D) too this idea of (Lykourgos)

and his polity. The Krypteia was like this. The magistrates from time to time sent out into the country those who appeared the most resourceful of the youth, equipped only with daggers and minimum provisions. In the daytime they dispersed into obscure places, where they hid and lay low. By night they came down into the highways and despatched any Helot they caught. Often too they went into the fields and did away with the sturdiest and most powerful Helots. (Here Plutarch retails D.3b.) And Aristotle specifically says also that the Ephors upon entering office declared war on the Helots, so that their murder might not bring with it ritual pollution.

- (c) *Lak. Pol.* (excerpted by Herakleides Lembos 373.10 Dilts): It is said that (Lykourgos) also introduced the Krypteia. In accordance with this institution even now they go out by day and conceal themselves, but by night they use weapons to kill as many of the Helots as is expedient.

7 Myron

F2: They assign to the Helots every shameful task leading to disgrace. For they ordained that each one of them must wear a dogskin cap and wrap himself in skins and receive a stipulated number of beatings every year regardless of any wrongdoing, so that they would never forget they were slaves (*douleuein*). Moreover, if any exceeded the vigour proper to a slave's condition, they made death the penalty; and they allotted a punishment to those controlling them if they failed to rebuke those who were growing fat. And in giving the land over to them they set them a portion (of produce) which they were constantly to hand over.

8 Plutarch

- (a) (following D.6b): And in other ways too they treated the Helots harshly and cruelly. For example, they would compel them to drink a lot of unmixed wine and then bring them into the common messes to show the young men what drunkenness was like. They would also order them to sing songs and perform dances that were ignoble and ridiculous but to refrain from those appropriate to free men. However, such cruelties were, I believe, inflicted by the Spartans only relatively late, especially after the great earthquake....
- (b) *Comp. Lyk. et Num.* 1.5: (Helotage was) the cruellest and most lawless system.

E. Attitude of Helots (see also D.2, 6a)

1 Xenophon

Hell. 3.3.6: The secret (of the Helots, Neodamodeis, Hypomeiones and Perioikoi) (was that), whenever among these mention was made of Spartiates, none was able to conceal that he would gladly eat them – even raw.

2 Aristotle

- (a) *Pol.* 1269a37-b5: The Penestai of the Thessalians repeatedly revolted, as did the Helots – who are like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartans. Nothing of this kind has yet happened in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighbouring cities, even when at war with one another, never ally themselves with the (servile) rebels. For since they themselves possess a subject population (perioikoi), this would not be in their interest. The Spartans, on the other hand, were surrounded by hostile neighbours, Argives, Messenians and Arkadians.
- (b) *Pol.* 1272b17–20: (Crete) is saved by its geographical situation; for distance has had the same effect as the expulsion of aliens (from Sparta). A result of this is that, whereas the Cretan perioikoi stay loyal, the Helots frequently revolt.

F. Functions

i Agriculture (see also D.7)

1 Aristotle

Pol. 1271b40–72a2: The Cretan institutions resemble the Spartan. The Helots are the farmers of the latter, the perioikoi of the former.

2 Plutarch

- (a) *Lyk.* 8.7: The kleros was large enough to yield seventy medimnoi of barley for a man and twelve for a woman, and the corresponding amount of fresh fruits.
- (b) *Mor.* 239DE: A curse was decreed to fall upon (the Spartan) who exacted more than the long-established rent (*apophora*), so that (the Helots) might serve gladly because gainfully, and (the Spartans) might not exceed the fixed amount.
- (c) *Mor.* 223A: Kleomenes [I] son of Anaxandridas said that Homer was the poet of the Spartans, Hesiod of the Helots; for Homer had given the necessary directions for warfare, Hesiod for agriculture.

ii Warfare

Hdt. 6.80f. (batmen, etc.); 9.28f., 80.1, 85 (auxiliary personnel); Thuc. 4.80 (hoplites); Xen. *Hell* 3A.27 (batmen), 6.5.28f. (hoplites), 7.1.12f. (rowers).

iii Miscellaneous

Hdt. 6.52.5–7, 63.1; Xen. *Hell* 5.4.28; *Lak. Pol* 7.5; Plut. *Agis* 3.2 (all household servants); Hdt. 6.68.2 (groom); 6.75.2 (armed guard); Kritias 88B33 D-K (cup-bearer at mess).

Appendix 5


The sanctuary of (Artemis) Orthia

By the beginning of the twentieth century the British School of Archaeology at Athens could look back on striking successes in the excavation of prehistoric sites but lacked for a classical counterpart to Delphi and Olympia, secured respectively by the French and German Schools. Somewhat boldly, in view of the weight of ancient literary evidence suggesting artefactual sterility, the School selected Sparta for its operations. Sensibly, however, they spread the risks by simultaneously conducting smaller excavations in other parts of Lakonia, on both prehistoric and classical sites, and by undertaking invaluable and unrepeatable topographical surveys of the southern portion of the region. The groundwork was laid by M.N. Tod and A.J.B. Wace in their still serviceable *Catalogue of the Sparta Museum*, which was published in the same year, 1906, as the School began excavations in Sparta itself.

The most significant ancient landmark at that time, in a landscape undistinguished for its ancient remains, was a Roman theatre on the right (west) bank of the Eurotas. Even this, though, had been extensively looted and largely denuded since the foundation of the modern town in 1834 and was being slowly encroached upon by the river. It was, however, precisely the Greek remains dislocated by the ingress of the Eurotas which gave hope of important early finds – a hope that was to be fulfilled far beyond the expectations even of those responsible for the decision to concentrate the digging here. As the main director of excavations, R.M. Dawkins, later wrote (AO 50): ‘The Roman theatre had done its work thoroughly in preserving untouched ... the great wealth of archaic objects which by their fresh light on early Sparta have given this excavation its chief importance.’

The stone theatre, it emerged, had been constructed in the third

century AD. Its function was to enable blood-thirsty spectators to watch Spartan youths being flogged, preferably to death, in a painful simulacrum of what had once been an initiation-rite integral to the Spartan social system. The deity in whose honour this gory performance was staged was then known as Artemis Orthia, but her original title, attested by inscriptions from the late seventh century onwards, had been simply Orthia. (I retain this conventional spelling for convenience; in fact, several variants are recorded epigraphically.) The literary evidence for her cult was such that it was 'one of the most puzzling and vehemently discussed in the Greek world' (Rose in AO 399), but it appeared to have been more intimately linked to the routine of Spartan life than that of the state's patron deity Athena Poliachos (later known also as Chalkioikos). The excavation of Orthia's sanctuary was therefore thought the more likely to illuminate the nature and development of Spartan taste and religio-political observance.



So indeed it proved, and such were the richness and complexity of the deposits that the School initially devoted five seasons to unearthing and reconstructing them. Dawkins, reporting in 1910 that no further excavation was contemplated, stitched together the results into a 'History of the Sanctuary', which was reprinted almost unchanged in the supposedly definitive publication of the site nineteen years later (AO ch. 1). Yet in the interim the School had spent another five seasons on Sparta (1924–8), including a cleaning operation at Orthia in 1928 which yielded important new results. Since these results made no impression on the 'final' 1929 publication, they have been largely neglected hitherto. But this neglect has been more than made up for by the attention lavished since 1919 on the reports of the main series of excavations.

To some extent the participants in this dig were pioneers in their attempt to apply consistently the stratigraphical method to a classical Greek site, and like all pioneers they quickly excited over-warm approval – or acrimonious disparagement. Now that the dust has settled, there is still the need for a full discussion both of the excavators' view of their objectives, methods and achievements and of the course of subsequent revaluations (the most important to date being Boardman 1963). Here, however, there is space only to attempt answers to the two major questions arising from a study of the Orthia stratigraphy. First, what is the most likely reconstruction of the history of the sanctuary before the laying of the sand? Second, in what way and to what extent may we use the stratigraphical evidence to establish the sequence and absolute dates of Lakonian artefacts of the Geometric and Archaic periods (c.750–500)? (After c.500 the archaeological evidence from Lakonia as a whole declines markedly in quantity and quality, and the stratigraphy of Orthia becomes correspondingly less significant.)

Taking the history of the sanctuary first, we find that the construction of a cobble pavement c.700 provides the stratigraphical *terminus ante quem* for the beginnings of cult in this natural hollow by the Eurotas. Since this was a new Dorian cult on an uninhabited and not previously used site, topography offers a major clue to the nature of the deity – vegetational and chthonic. The earliest portion of the deposit contained PG pottery, which cannot be more closely dated than between c.950–900 and 750. As the depth of the deposit is no guide to the length of time required for its formation, the origin of the cult may be placed on grounds of general probability alone in the ninth century, perhaps in its first half.

Worship, consisting of animal-sacrifice and presumably also the pouring of libations, took place on and around an earthen altar in

what later became the eastern rectangle of the delimited sacred area. For c.700 the sanctuary was enclosed by a wall and paved with river-cobbles, upon which were set a part-stone altar and temple, the former close to the circuit wall, the latter at an angle of about 90° on the west and also hard by the wall. The sanctuary retained this format until the second quarter of the sixth century, when the whole area was raised and levelled with a layer of river sand, perhaps in response to a devastating Eurotas flood. Upon the sand were erected an all-limestone altar and temple, with the same general orientations as their predecessors, and a new enlarged enclosure wall. This second temple was rebuilt in the second century BC, but the altar remained substantially unchanged until the third century AD, when its Roman successor was built to accompany the new stone theatre.

The second question posed above is considerably more problematic, the answer more tentative. In the first place, the excavators' chronology, both relative and absolute, must be scrapped, since it was based on an untestable assumption of regular deposition (involving an unreasonably mechanical translation of depth of deposit into period of years) and a now superseded dating of PC pottery. Second, although four pre-sand Lakonian pottery styles were distinguished, only two pre-sand strata were eventually recognized. Third, the earlier ('Geometric') stratum was not sealed by a floor or pit: the cobble pavement was built actually in it, towards its close. Since, therefore, there is no clearcut stratigraphical evidence to help date the pottery styles, and since the pottery cannot be used to date the cobble pavement precisely, there must be an element of subjectivity in interpreting the pottery associations and/or findspots of particular artefacts. Fourth, as Dawkins rightly stressed, the strata were thin and partly disturbed by subsequent building or natural agencies, so objects could easily have been displaced from their original place in the earth. Finally, in a votive deposit the original position of an artefact can anyway never indicate more than the relative date at which it was discarded.

Extreme caution is therefore obligatory when using the Orthia stratigraphy. However, as long as it is treated just as a general guide, there seems to be no compelling reason not to place some faith in it. As for the pottery, not only is its sub-division into styles somewhat arbitrary but its dating by reference to its association with PC and to the development of other Greek fabrics is also uncertain. None the less, a workable chronological framework can be and has been devised, subjective though it inevitably is. The extent to which the results obtained for the Orthia sanctuary hold good for other sites in Sparta and Lakonia is problematic, not least because of the absolute dearth of excavated and stratified settlement deposits. However, in

Sparta and Amyklai at least, where the evidence is fullest, there seems to be scarcely any aspect of the material record which does not have its correlate on one or other of the sites. For most purposes, therefore, Orthia may be taken as a typical, if generally more informative, sample.

Notes on further reading

Preliminary reports of the Orthia excavations: *BSA* 1906–10 (with the *Annual Reports*); *JHS* 1907–10 ('Archaeology in Greece', by Dawkins). Cleaning dig of May 1928: *BSA* 1928, 1, 306 (with the *Annual Report*); *JHS* 1928, 185. Process of digging: *BSA* 1907, 71; 1908, 14.

The most important discussions of the excavators' methods and conclusions are: Rodenwalt 1919, 182; V. Wade-Gery 1930; Droop 1932; Hartley 1932; Kunze 1933; Yavis 1949, 108–10; Benton 1950, 17f.; Kirsten 1958; Boardman 1963; Bergquist 1967, esp. 47–9.

For the cult of Orthia see Rose in *AO* ch. 12; a new study is promised by G. Kipp. The temple of c.700 is discussed by Drerup (1969, 19–21); the Archaic temple of c.570–560 was not distinguished and has attracted little art-historical attention.

Abbreviations

~~AA~~ *Archaeologischer Anzeiger* (until 1961 with Jdl, thereafter published separately)

~~AA~~ *Annals of Archaeology*

~~AC~~ *Antiquité Classique*

~~AD~~ *Archaiologikon Deltion*

~~AE~~ *Archaiologiki Ephemeris* (earlier *Ephemeris Archaiologiki*)

~~AHR~~ *American Historical Review*

~~AJA~~ *American Journal of Archaeology*

~~AJP~~ *American Journal of Philology*

~~AK~~ *Antike Kunst*

~~AM~~ *Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)*

~~AN~~ *Annales (ES)* *Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations*

~~AO~~ *Oriens Orthia*, JHS Supp. 5, ed. R.M. Dawkins, London, 1929

~~AR~~ *Archaeological Reports* (supplement to JHS)

~~AS~~ *Ancient Society*

~~ASAA~~ *Ateneo della Scuola Archeologica di Atene*

~~BAMA~~ *Age Migrations in the Aegean. Archaeological and Linguistic Problems in Greek Prehistory*, ed. R.A. Crossland and A. Birchall, London, 1973

~~BC~~ *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*

~~BI~~ *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*

~~Bö~~ *Bönnener Jahrbücher des Rheinischen Landesmuseums in Bonn und des Vereins von Altertumsfreunden im Rheinlande*

~~BR~~ *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*

~~BSA~~ *Bulletin of the British School at Athens*

~~CH~~ *Cambridge Ancient History*

~~CP~~ *Classical Philology*

~~CQ~~ *Classical Quarterly*

~~CR~~ *Classical Review*

~~CS~~Comparative Studies in Society and History
~~EH~~Economic History Review
~~ES~~Economic and Social Atlas of Greece, ed. B. Kayser et al., Athens, 1964
~~GR~~Greece and Rome
~~HT~~History and Theory
~~IG~~Inscriptiones Graecae
~~IJNA~~International Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater
 Exploration
~~Jd~~Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts
~~JHS~~Journal of Hellenic Studies
~~JRS~~Journal of Roman Studies
~~JWG~~Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte
~~LCM~~Liverpool Classical Monthly
~~MH~~Museum Helveticum
~~MS~~Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century
 B.C., ed. R. Meiggs and D.M. Lewis, Oxford, 1969
~~MM~~Minnesota Messenia Expedition: Reconstructing a Bronze Age
 Regional Environment, ed. W. A. McDonald and G.R. Rapp, Jr,
 Minneapolis, 1972
~~Op~~Auscula Atheniensia
~~PA~~Archaiologia tis en Athenais Archaiologikis Hetaireias
~~PA~~Proceedings of the British Academy
~~PCPS~~Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society
~~PP~~Parola del Passato
~~RD~~Revue Historique de Droit français et étranger
~~RE~~Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft
~~REA~~Revue des Etudes Anciennes
~~REG~~Revue des Etudes Grecques
~~RhM~~Rheinisches Museum
~~RS~~Rivista Storica dell'Antichità
~~SE~~Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum
~~SMEA~~Studi Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici
~~TA~~Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
~~ThS~~The Times Literary Supplement
~~W~~World Archaeology
~~YCS~~Yale Classical Studies
~~ZPE~~Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik

Bibliographical appendix to the second edition

The original edition of *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 BC* appeared over twenty years ago, that is, for me, more than half a scholarly lifetime in the past. It was widely reviewed and generally well received – full if not quite complete details are available in the relevant volumes of the classicists' bible, *L'Année Philologique*. One particularly acute reviewer (Michael Jameson) observed, perhaps a touch ambiguously, that 'Cartledge gives a good deal more than his title promises or the reader may have bargained for' (*The Bookshelf*, May/June 1981, 75). On the other hand, one exception to the generally favourable reception may be noted: Franz Kiechle in *Classical Review*. But he unfortunately laboured under the misapprehension that I was a pupil of Moses Finley and used my book to try to settle a few scores with his (properly, in my view) severe critic. Actually, as I was careful to state in the very first sentence of my Preface, the book was largely based on a doctoral dissertation completed under John (now 'Professor Sir John', but then just plain 'Mr') Boardman: 'Early Sparta c. 950–650 BC: an Archaeological and Historical Study' (University of Oxford, 1975); cf. Cartledge 2000.

The following bibliographical addenda are necessarily selective. A fuller bibliography, on pretty well all matters Spartan, may be found in Cartledge 2001 (collected essays, written over the same period, concentrating on the Archaic and Classical periods).

1.Sparta, General

A book on Sparta or some aspect of Sparta, Russell Meiggs once observed, is to be expected (if not necessarily welcomed) every two years. In the past three years (1998–2000) there have been no fewer

than six: Baltrusch 1998, Birgalias 1999 (cf. Cartledge 1992a, Kennell 1995), Hodkinson 2000, Hodkinson & Powell eds 1999, Meier 1998, and Richer 1998. Other books wholly or importantly on Sparta published since 1979 include Cartledge & Spawforth 1989 (to be reprinted in 2001), Christ ed. 1986 (a collection of reprinted papers, with an important introductory survey of Spartan scholarship by the distinguished editor), Clauss 1983 (bibliographical), Hooker 1980, Kennell 1995, Lazenby 1985, Link 1994, MacDowell 1986, Malkin 1994, Nafissi 1991, Poralla & Bradford 1985 (prosopographical), Pomeroy 1997, Powell ed. 1989, Powell & Hodkinson eds 1994, Shipley, D. R. 1997, Stibbe 1996 (archaeological) and Thommen 1996. Further bibliography in Cartledge 2001 (see above).

Three scholars have made disproportionately important contributions to Spartan studies, in various aspects, since 1979; it is a pleasure to mention in dispatches Ephraim David (1979, 1981, 1982/3, 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1992, 1993, 1999), Jean Ducat (1983 [bibliographical], 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c), and Stephen Hodkinson (1986, 1989, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000).

2.Landscape and Geography

General: Alcock & Osborne eds 1994 (with my review Cartledge 1996b), Cavanagh 1991 (intensive field-survey), Daviero-Rocchi 1988, Hordern & Purcell 2000, Jameson et al. 1994/1995, Kirsten 1984, Osborne 1987, 1996, de Polignac 1994, 1995, Pritchett 1989–91, Rackham & Moody 1996, Rich & Wallace-Hadrill eds 1991, Sallares 1991, Shipley 1996, Shipley & Salmon eds 1996 (with my review, *AJA* 101, 1997, 789–90), and Snodgrass 1986, 1987.

Sparta and Lakonia (including Messenia): Cartledge 1998, Cavanagh & Crouwel 1988, Cavanagh et al. 1996, forthcoming (the BSA/University of Amsterdam Lakonia survey), Davis et al. 1997 (the Pylos Regional Archeological Project); Barmijo et al. 1991 (464 BC earthquake at Sparta).

Comparative: Hirsch & O'Hanlon eds 1995, Hordern & Purcell 2000.

3.Archaeology and History

General: Finley 1986: ch. 5, Morris 1998, Salmon 1984 (successfully doing for Corinth to 338 BC something like what I have here attempted for Sparta to 362).

Spartan archaeology: Cartledge 2000, Cartledge 2001: ch. 12, Fitzhardinge 1980, Förtsch 1994, Hodkinson 1998, 1999a, 2000, Sanders ed. 1992, and Stibbe 1996.

4.Sparta, Early Historic

Dark Age: Cartledge 1992b, Coulson 1985, Eder ed. 1990, 1998, Margreiter 1988; cf. for Greece generally, Morris & Powell eds 1997, and Hölkeskamp 2000.

Archaic: Hodkinson 1997b.

5.Sparta, Classical

Politics: Berent 1994 (Greek *polis* seen as ‘a stateless political community’, Spartan *polis* as the most ‘state-like’), Bringmann 1980, and Cartledge 1980, 1998.

Public finance: Loomis 1992.

Religion: Catling 1990a, 1990b, and Pettersson 1992.

Society and culture: Bryant 1996, Calame 1977/1997, Cartledge 1981a, 1981b, 1996a, Ducat 1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, Figueira 1984, Hodkinson 1999a, and Millender 1999.

Analysis and narrative, c.445–360 BC: Cartledge 1987, *passim*.

6.Helots

Ducat 1990 is now the basic work, if controversial in important parts; cf. Hodkinson 1997a. In *Sparta and Lakonia* (esp. ch. 10) and Cartledge 1987 (esp. ch. 10) I have urged that the Helots should be regarded as the absolutely fundamental causal factor in Spartan history and social structure. This is not a universally shared view: see Talbert 1989 (with my rejoinder 1991) and Whitby 1994. In Cartledge 2001: ch. 11 (an updated reprint, with new introduction, of Cartledge 1985) I have tried to restate my case.

7.Perioikoi

One review of *Sparta and Lakonia* (by Simon Hornblower in the *TLS*) was published under the title ‘Promoting the Perioikoi’. If the book (esp. ch. 10) did its bit towards making their indispensable contribution to Spartan and Lakonian history a little less obscure, I would be content. Since 1979 we have learned much more about some of them through the work of the Lakonia survey (see § 2, above), and also from Hall 2000, Lotze 1994, Mertens 1999, Pritchett 1989, 1991, and (especially) Shipley, G. 1992, 1997. For Messenia, as opposed to Lakonia, see Bauslaugh 1990, Davis et al. 1997, and Figueira 1999.

8.The Spartan Crisis

I have myself devoted a whole book to this important subject, by the indirect means of a quasi-biography of King Agesilaos II (r. c. 400–360): Cartledge 1987 (repr. 2000). For fullscale, head-on approaches, the assiduous and sophisticated work of Hodkinson (esp. 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000) stands out. See also Christien 1998, and Cartledge & Spawforth 1989: ch. 1 (repr. with addenda 2001).

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